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NORTH KOREAN FORCES INVADE SOUTH KOREA:

Security Council Action Requested — ^U.S. Air and

Sea Forces Ordered Into Action • Statements by the

President, Secretary Acheson, Ambassador Austin, and

Ambassador Gross. Texts of Security Council Resolutions .

ACHIEVING A COMMUNITY SENSE AMONG FREE
NATIONS— A STEP TOWARD WORLD ORDER •

Address by Secretary Acheson

KEEPING PEACE IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA •

By EduMrd A. Jamison

For complete contents see back cover

Vol. XXIII, No. 574
July 3, 1950

U. i. SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS

JUL 251950

'>-r„<^'

x^owy*. bulletin

Vol. XXIII, No. 574 • Publication 3902
July 3, 1950

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U. S. QovernmSCt Printing Office

Washington 25, D. C.

Price:

62 Issues, domestic $6, foreign $8.50
Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has
been approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (February 18, 1949).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
Of State Bdlletin as the source will be
appreciated.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication compiled and
edited in the Division of Publications,
Office of Public Affairs, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the De-
partment of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes
press releases on foreign policy issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of inter-
national affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and inter-
national agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department, as
well as legislatii^e material in thefield
of international relations, are listed
currently.

NORTH KOREAN FORCES INVADE SOUTH KOREA

U.S. PRESENTS CEASE-FIRE
RESOLUTION TO SECURITY COUNCIL

Statement by Ernest A. Gross

Deputy U.S. Representative on Security Council ^

At 4 o'clock in the morning, Sunday, June 25th,
Korean time, armed forces from North Korea com-
menced an unprovoked assault against the terri-
tory of the Eepublic of Korea. This assault was
launched by ground forces along the 38th Parallel,
in the Ongjin, Kaesong, and Chunshon sectors,
and by amphibious landings on the east coast in
the vicinity of Jnagmung. In addition, North
Korean aircraft have attacked and strafed the
Kimpo airport in the outskirts of the capital city
of Seoul.

Under the circumstances I have described, this
wholly illegal and unprovoked attack by the North
Korean forces, in the view of my Government, con-
stitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggres-
sion.

This is clearly a threat to international peace and
security. As such, it is of grave concern to my
Govermnenh It is a threat which must inevitably
be of grave concern to the governments of all
peace- and freedom-loving nations.

A full-scale attack is now going forward in
Korea. It is an invasion upon a state which the
United Nations itself, by action of its General As-
sembly, has brought into being. It is armed
aggi'ession against a government elected under
United Nations supervision.

Such an altack strikes at the fundamental pur-
poses of the United Nations Charter. Such an
attack openly defies the interest and authority of
the United Nations. Such an attack, therefore,
concerns the vital interest which all the members

' Made before the Security Council on June 25 and re-
leased to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the
same date.

of the United Nations have in the organization.

The history of the Korean problem in the United
Nations is well known to you. At this critical
hour I will not review it in detail. But let me
recall only a few milestones in the development of
the Korean situation.

A joint Commission of the United States and
the Soviet Union for 2 years sought unsuccessfully
to agree on ways and means of bringing to Korea
the independence which we assumed would auto-
matically come when Japan was defeated. This
2-year deadlock prevented 38 million people in
Korea from getting the independence which it was
agreed was their right.

My Government, thereupon, sought to hold a
four-power conference at which China and the
United Kingdom would join the United States and
the Soviet Union to seek agreement on the inde-
pendence of Korea. The Soviet Union rejected
that proposal.

The United States then asked the General As-
sembly to consider the problem. The Soviet Union
opposed that suggestion. The General Assembly
by resolution of November 14, 1947, created the
United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea.
By that resolution the General Assembly recom-
mended the holding of elections not later than the
31st of March 1948, to choose representatives with
whom the Commission might consult regarding the
prompt attainment of freedom and independence
of the Korean people. These elected representa-
tives would constitute a national assembly and
establish a national government of Korea.

The General Assembly further recommended
that upon the establishment of a national govern-
ment, that government should in consultation with
the Commission constitute its own national secu-
rity forces and to dissolve all military or semi-
military formations not included therein. The
General Assembly recommended that the national

July 3, 1950

government should take over the functions of
government from the military command and from
the civilian authorities of North and South Korea,
and arrange with the occupying powers for the
complete withdrawal from Korea of the armed
forces as early as practicable and if possible within
90 days.

Elections were held in South Korea, and the
Coromission did observe them. A Government in
South Korea was set up as a result of the elections
observed by the Commission. The Commission
was unable to enter North Korea because of the
attitude of the Soviet Union.

The Temporary Commission in its report to the
third session of the General Assembly stated that
not all the objectives set forth for it had been fully
accomplished and that, in particular, unification
of Korea had not yet been achieved.

Notwithstanding the frustrations and difficulties
which the Temporary Commission had experienced
in Korea, the General Assembly at its third session
continued the Commission's existence and re-
quested it to go on with its efforts to bring North
and South Korea together.

One aspect of the resolution adopted by the third
session of the General Assembly should, I feel, be
particularly emphasized. The General Assembly
declared that a lawful government had been estab-
lished in Korea as a result of the elections observed
by the Commission and declared further that this
was the only lawful government in Korea. Tliis
is a most significant fact.

The General Assembly declared further than the
Government of Korea was based on elections which
were a valid expression of the free will of the elec-
torate of that part of Korea and which were ob-
served by the United Nations Commission.

In the light of this declaration, my Government
on January 1, 1949, extended recognition to the
Government of the Republic of Korea, and more
than 30 states have since that time also accorded
recognition to that Government.

The United Nations Commission worked toward
the United Nations objective of the withdrawal of
occupation forces from Korea, the removal of the
barriers between the regions of the North and
South, and the unification of that country under a
representative government freely determined by
its people.

In 1949, as in 1948, the Commission's efforts to
obtain access to North Korea which included both
direct intercourse with the northern authorities

and endeavors to negotiate through the Govern-
ment of the U.S.S.R. were fruitless. The Com-
mission was unable to make progress either toward
the unification of Korea or toward the reduction
of barriers between the Republic of Korea and the
northern authorities. The Commission reported
to the General Assembly that the border of the
38th Parallel was becoming a sea of increasingly
frequent exchanges of fire and armed raids, and
that this constituted a serious barrier to friendly
intercourse among the people of Korea.

The Commission observed the withdrawal of
United States forces, which was completed on June
19, 1949. Although it signified its readiness to
verify the fact of the withdrawal of Soviet occu-
pation forces from North Korea, the Commission
received no response to its message to the U.S.S.R.
and therefore could take no action.

At the fourth session, the General Assembly
again directed the Commission to seek to facilitate
the removal of barriers to economic, social, and
other friendly intercourse caused by the division
of Korea. The General Assembly also authorized
the Commission on October 21, 1949, in its discre-
tion, to api^oint observers and utilize the services
and good offices of persons whether or not repre-
sentatives of the Commission. The United Nations
Commission on Korea is presently in Seoul and
we have now received its latest report.

Mr. President, I have tabled a draft resolution ^
which notes the Security Council's grave concern
at the invasion of the Republic of Korea by the
armed forces of North Korea. This draft resolu-
tion calls upon the authorities in the North to
cease hostilities and to withdraw armed forces to
the border along the 38th Parallel.

The draft resolution requests that the United
Nations Commission on Korea observe the with-
drawal of the North Korean forces to the 38th
Parallel and keep the Security Council informed
on the implementation and execution of the resolu-
tion. The draft resolution also calls upon all
members of the United Nations to render every
assistance to the United Nations in the carrying
out of this resolution and to refrain from giving
assistance to the North Korean authorities.

The Security Council

RECAr.MNo the finding of the General Assembly in its
resolution of 21 October 1949 that the Government of the

' Adoirted by the Security Council on June 25, 1950, by a
vote of 9 to 0, with 1 abstention (Yugoslavia) ; U.S.S.R.
was absent.

Department of State Bulletin

Republic of Korea is a lawfully established government
"having effective control and jurisdiction over that part
of Korea where the United Nations Temporary Commis-
sion on Korea was able to observe and consult and in which
the great majority of the people of Korea reside ; and Uiat
this Government is based on elections which were a valid
expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of
Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Com-
mission; and that this is the only such Government in
Korea" ;

MiNDBTJL of the concern expressed by the General As-
sembly in its resolutions of 12 December 1948 and 21 Octo-
ber 1949 of the consequences which might follow unless
Member states refrained from acts derogatory to the re-
sults sought to be achieved by the United Nations in bring-
ing about the complete independence and unity of Korea ;
and the concern expressed that the situation described by
the United Nations Commission on Korea in its report
menaces the safety and well-being of the Republic of Korea
and of the people of Korea and might lead to open military
conflict tliere;

Noting with grave concern the armed attack upon the
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea,

Determines tiiat this action constitutes a breach of the
•pence,

I. Calls upon the authoriites of North Korea (a) to
cease hostilities forthwith; and (b) to withdraw their
armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel.

II. Requests the United Nations Commission on Korea
(a) to observe the withdrawal of the North Korean forces
to the thirty-eighth parallel ; and (b) to keep the Security
Council informed on the execution of this resolution.

III. Calls upon all Members to render every assistance
to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution
and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean
authorities.

U. S. AIR AND SEA FORCES
ORDERED INTO SUPPORTING ACTION

Statement hy President Trwnan

[Released to the press June 27]

In Korea, the Government forces, which were
armed to prevent border raids and to preserve in-
ternal security, were attacked by invading forces
from North Korea. The Security Council of the
United Nations called upon the invading troops to
cease hostilities and to withdraw to the 38th Par-
allel. This they have not done but, on the con-
trary, have pressed the attack. The Security
Council called upon all members of the United
Nations to render every assistance to the United
Nations in the execution of this resolution. In
these circumstances, I have ordered United States
air and sea forces to give the Korean Government
troops cover and support.

The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond
all doubt that communism has passed beyond the
use of subversion to conquer independent nations
and will now use armed invasion and war. It has
defied the orders of the Security Council of the
United Nations issued to preserve international
peace and security. In these circumstances, the
occupation of Formosa by Communist forces
would be a direct threat to the security of the
Pacific area and to United States forces perform-
ing their lawful and necessary functions in that
area.

Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet
to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary
of this action, I am calling upon the Chinese
Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea
operations against the mainland. The Seventh
Fleet will see that this is done. The determination
of the future status of Formosa must await the
restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace set-
tlement with Japan, or consideration by the
United Nations.

I have also directed that United States forces in
the Philippines be strengthened and that military
assistance to the Philippine Government be accel-
erated.

I have similarly directed acceleration in the
furnishing of military assistance to the forces of
France and the Associated States in Indochina and
the dispatch of a military mission to provide close
working relations with those forces.

I know that all members of the United Nations
will consider carefully the consequences of this
latest aggression in Korea in defiance of the Char-
ter of the United Nations. A return to the rule of
force in international affairs would have far-
reaching effects. The United States will continue
to uphold the rule of law.

I have instructed Ambassador Austin, as the
representative of the United States to the Security
Council, to report these steps to the Council.

Soviet Help'Asked To Restore Korean Peace

In reply to inquiries from the press the State
Department on June 27 confirmed that the American
Embassy at Moscow communicated, on that date,
with the Soviet Foreign Office in regard to the inva-
sion of the Republic of Korea by North Korean
armed forces. The Embassy asked that the Soviet
Government use its influence with the North Korean
authorities for the withdrawal of the invading forces
and the cessation of hostilities.

July 3, 1950

Remarks hy Secretary Acheson

At his news conference on June 28 Secretary Acheson
made the following extemporaneous remarks concerning
the announcement hy President Truman of United States
support for the Republic of Korea in accordance with the
resolution of the Security Council of June 25.

There are a few points which I should like to
make before we go into the questions about the
matter which I am sure is uppermost in all of your
minds. That is the announcement by the Presi-
dent yesterday of decisions which he had taken. I
will not go into those decisions in detail but make
some points about them.

The first point I want to make is our feeling of
deep gratitude here in the Department, and re-
sponsibility also, for the almost unanimous world
reaction which has come from the action taken by
the United Nations and from the announcement
made yesterday by the President of his actions in
support of the United Nations.

In all parts of the world where free opinion ex-
ists, there has been an immediate response — a
response to the realization that this was, if there
ever was in the world, a test of whether the United
Nations is going to survive.

This attack was the most cynical, brutal, naked
attack by armed forces upon an undefended coun-
try that could occur. The world has understood
that, and it has understood that the actions taken
by the United States have been taken in support
of the United Nations.

The second point I want to make is that as soon
as we knew that this attack had taken place, and
had immediately conveyed that information to the
President and gotten his instructions, it was the
view of the President, and of the entire Govern-
ment of the United States, that our first responsi-
bility was to report this to the United Nations.
This was done in the middle of the night on Sat-
urday, June 24, and a meeting of the Security
Council was called on Sunday, June 25. From
then on, all action in Korea has been under the
aegis of the United Nations. That is a very
important point.

The next point that I want to make is one that I
am sure you understand. It is that the entire ac-
tion of the Government of the United States, since
a late hour on Saturday when this information
came to us, has been taken under Presidential lead-
ership and direction. Here, as in many other situ-
ations in the years in which I have been Under
Secretary and Secretary, the President has been

faced with the most difficult decisions which had
to be made quickly, and after taking full advice
he has assumed the responsibility and he has made
the decision.

The fourth point I would like to make is that
there has been complete unity among the Presi-
dent's advisers, civil and military. The Depart-
ments of State and Defense have worked practi-
cally as one department ever since this matter
arose, and in anticipation of possible difficulties
of this sort, so that we were able on the shortest
possible notice to present completed staff work to
the President. He had the view of his advisers
without having differences among his advisers.

The fifth point I should like to stress is the unity
which existed at the President's meeting yester-
day, at which the Secretary of Defense and I, and
our advisers, were present with the Congressional
leaders. Here, again, the understanding of the
problem, the understanding of the actions taken
showed complete unity.

The sixth point I should like to make is that
with very few exceptions the press and radio of
the United States has been unified in its comments
upon what was done and the necessity for doing it.
I assume, and I think I assume justly, that that
attitude on the part of the press and the radio
indicates that there is similar unity among the
people of the United States.

Finally, I should like to leave with you the
thought that the complexities and difficulties of
the international situation are great. This is a
time for very steady and sober talk and action.
It is not a time for general speculation, for trying
to stir up difficulties which do not exist, for imag-
ining possibilities which are remote. It is a time
for the very greatest steadiness, and it is a time,
as I have often said in the past, where, more than
ever, you gentlemen share with the officials of the
Government a very deep responsibility, which I
feel sure you are quite aware of.

U.S. ASKS SECURITY COUNCIL
TO ASSIST IN REPELLING ATTACK

Statement hy Ambassador Warren R. Austin
U.S. Representative to the Security Council ^

The United Nations finds itself confronted to-
day with the gravest crisis in its existence.

' Made before the Security Council on June 27 and re-
leased to the press by the U.S. Mission to the United
Nations on the same date.

Department of State Bulletin

Forty-eight hours ago the Security Council, in
an emergency session, determined tliat tlie armed
invasion of the Republic of Korea, by armed forces
from Northern Korea, constituted a breach of the
peace. Accordingly, the Security Council called
for a cessation of hostilities forthwith and the
■withdrawal by the Northern Korean authorities
of their armed forces to the 38th Parallel. The
Security Council also requested the United Na-
tions Commission on Korea to observe the with-
drawal and to I'eport. Finally, the Security Coun-
cil called upon all members to render every
assistance to the United Nations in the execution
of the resolution and to refrain from giving assist-
ance to the North Korean authorities.

The decision of the Security Council has been
broadcast to the Korean authorities and is known
to them. We now have before us the report of the
United Nations Commission for Korea which con-
firms our worst fears. It is clear that the authori-
ties in North Korea have completely disregarded
and flouted the decision of the Security Council.
The armed invasion of the Republic of Korea con-
tinues. The North Korean authorities have even
called upon the established Government of the
Republic to surrender.

It is hard to imagine a more glaring example of
disregard for the United Nations and for all the
principles which it represents. The most impor-
tant provisions of the Charter are those outlawing
aggressive war. It is precisely these provisions
which the North Korean authorities have violated.

It is the plain duty of the Security Council to
invoke stringent sanctions to restore international
peace.

The Republic of Korea has appealed to the
United Nations for jsrotection. I am happy and
proud to report that the United States is prepared
as a loyal member of the United Nations to furnish
assistance to the Republic of Korea.

I have tabled a resolution * which I ask the
Council to consider favorably as the next step to
restore world peace.

That resolution is as follows:
The Security Council,

Having Determined that the armed attack upon the
Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea constitutes
a breach of the peace,

Having Called for an immediate cessation of hostilities,
and

Having Called upon the authorities of North Korea to
withdraw forthwith their armed forces to the 38th Par-
allel, and

Having Noted from the report of the United Nations
Commission for Korea that the authorities in North Korea
have neither ceased hostilities nor withdrawn their armed
forces to the 3Sth Parallel, and that urgent military
measures are required to restore international peace and
security, and

Having Noted the appeal from the Republic of Korea to
the United Nations for immediate and effective steps to
secure peace and security,

Recommends that the Members of the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may
be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore
international peace and security in the area.

This is the logical consequence of the resolution
concerning the complaint of aggression upon the
Republic of Korea adopted at the 473d meeting of
the Security Council on June 25, 1950, and the
subsequent events recited in the preamble of this
resolution. That resolution of June 25 called upon
all members to render every assistance to the
United Nations in the execution of this resolution

* Adopted by the Security Council on June 27 by a vote
of 7 (U.S., U.K., France, China, Cuba, Ecuador, and
Norway)—! (Yugoslavia), with 2 abstentions (Egypt and
India) ; the U.S.S.R. was absent.

Article 27 of the U. N. Charter

1. Each member of the Security Council shall
have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural
matters shall be made by an aJfirmative vote of
seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of
seven members including the concurring votes of the
permanent members ; provided that, in decisions un-
der Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article
52, a party to a dispute shall abstain from voting.

Article 28 of U. N. Charter

1. The Security Council shall be so organized as
to be able to function continuously. Each member
of the Security Council shall for this purpose be
represented at all times at the seat of the Organi-
zation.

2. The Security Council shall hold periodic meet-
ings at which each of its members may, if it so
desires, be represented by a member of the govern-
ment or by some other specially designated
representative.

3. The Security Council may hold meetings at
such places other than the seat of the Organization
as in its judgment wUl best facilitate its work.

Editor's Note: A Security Council practice has
developed under which, if a permanent member of
the Security Council abstains from voting on a non-
procedural decision of the Council, such abstention
is not considered to be a veto.

July 3, 1950

and to refrain from giving assistance to the North
Korean authorities. This new resolution is the
logical next step. Its significance is affected by the
violation of the former resolution, the continua-
tion of aggression, and the urgent military
measures required.

I wish now to read the statement which the
President of the United States made today on this

critical situation.

[Here follows the President's statement as printed in
this issue on page 5.]

The keynote of the resolution and my statement
and the significant characteristic of the action
taken by the President is support of the United
Nations purposes and principles — in a word
"peace."

SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS

The instability of peace the world over is due,
in large measure, to deliberate Soviet policy and
actions and to the wholesale Soviet violation of
basic agreemerds. Because of the U.S.S.R.''s rec-
ord in ignoring its international pledges, the faith
of the world in Soviet signatures had been badly
shattered. Whether it be the Yalta agreement or
a treaty of friendship, the U.S.S.R. has chosen to
ignore its sworn conwriitments whenever it has
found such action advantageous for its own
purposes.

As it ruthlessly pursues its expansionist objec-
tives in the postwar world, the Soviet Union is
building up a reputation as an irresponsible inter-
national marauder. Before the court of world
opinion, it stands indicted for disregarding its
international treaties and agreements, openly
flouting protocols and promises, and encouraging
violations of basic human rights by other treaty
signatories. Because of its policy of refusal to
work in concert with other nations, its preference
for abrupt and unauthorized unilateral action, and
its apparent determination to impose its will upon
the world, the value of agreements with the Soviet
Union has been nullified. From Yalta to the
present, the broken pledges of the U.S.S.E. have
marked international relations. A review of this
record is worthwhile.^

Europe

The uncertain peace of postwar Europe is pri-
marily due to the fact that the Russians have de-
liberately undermined the foundations upon which

' This study brings up to date the material published in
the BuiiETiN of June 6, 1948, p. 738.

peace was to be built. The Soviet Union has vio-
lated the Yalta agreement of February 1945, the
Potsdam Declaration of July 1945, and the peace
treaties so far concluded with the ex-German satel-
lites. Soviet violation of Allied armistice agree-
ments, refusal to act in concert with the other
Allies on control commissions, and even the ignor-
ing of the decisions of the Council of Foreign
Ministers can be added to those. The fact that
the framework of peace has never been completed,
that Austria still pleads for a treaty, and that the
settlement of the German question still plagues
Europe is also due to Soviet intransigence and the
unreliability of its word.

THE YALTA AGREEMENT

Wlien the Big Three met at Yalta in February
1945, the three Governments, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R., agreed
to assist liberated people to form "interim gov-
ernment authorities broadly representative of all
democratic elements in the population and pledged
to the earliest possible establishment through free
elections of governments responsive to the will of
the people." According to James F. Byrnes, for-
mer Secretary of State, Stalin accepted the Yalta
agreement without serious discussion and in an
atmosphere of genial camaraderie. Yet, Soviet
action has consistently undermined and made
meaningless this fundamental declaration.

The Potsdam Decisions and the Control Council

The Potsdam Declaration of July 1945 aimed at
the ultimate creation of a unified, democratic Ger-
many. To achieve this aim, the powers repre-
sented at the conference committed themselves to

Deparfment of State Bulletin

the destruction of German militarism, the wiping
out of nazisiu, the punishment of war criminals,
the decentralization of the political structure of
Germany, and the dissolution of concentrations of
economic power. A new democratic German gov-
ermnent was to be developed under the supervision
of an Allied Control Council (Ace), and the
four Allied zone commanders were to enjoy abso-
lute sovereignty in their respective zones unless
their powers were pre-empted by Ace legislation.
Besides dealing with Germany, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union agreed
at Potsdam, among other things, to consult with
each other with a view to revising the procedures
of Allied Control Commissions for Rumania, Bul-
garia, and Hungary.

The lack of success of the program formulated
at Potsdam can be laid at the door of the Soviet
Union. From the inception of the Potsdam pro-
tocols, the U.S.S.R. has a record of wholesale vio-
lation of the agreement, refusal to abide by
decisions of the Control Councils, and a flagi'ant
usurijation of power on the Control Councils in
the satellite area.

GERMANY

Moreover, in dealing with Germany, the Soviet
Union has readily disregarded promises made at
meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers
(Cfm). By a Cfm decision reached at Moscow,
March 19-April 24, IQIT, all German prisoners of
war were to be repatriated by December 1, 1948.
The U.S.S.R. not only did not return all German
prisoners by tliat date, but she unilaterally an-
nounced a new deadline of January 1, 1950.

Under the Paris Cfm communique of June 20,

1949, each occupying power in Germany agreed to
insure the "normal functioning" of transport be-
tween Berlin and the zones as well as between the
Soviet and Western zones. Since January 13,

1950, the Soviet authorities have intermittently
interfered with traffic between Berlin and Western
Germany.

Violations of the Peace Treaties

Upon ratification of the treaties of peace with
Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania, on September
15, 1947, the armistice period and the authority of
the Allied Control Commissions came to an end.
On this date, the treaties entered into force, and
the three Governments regained a type of nominal
sovereignty. In fact, however, the U.S.S.R. con-

tinued to exercise tutelary powers over them. In
consequence, the implementation of the treaties is
characterized by subservient fulfillment with re-
gard to obligations toward the U.S.S.R. but by
evasion, delay, and violations with reference to the
Western Allies. The Soviet Union condones and
in many cases, abets these infringements and, as the
tutelary power, must bear responsibility for them.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Under the peace treaties, the Hungarian, Bul-
garian, and Rumanian Governments undertook to
guarantee the enjoyment of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including freedom of ex-
pression, of press and publication, of religious
worship, of political opinion, and of public meet-
ing. The U.S.S.R. directly aided and abetted
these Governments in failing to fulfill these human
rights clauses. Freedom of expression and of press
and publication no longer exist in any of these
countries. Freedom of worship is interfered with
time and again, either through subtle methods or
through drastic procedures such as the trials and
imprisonments of church leaders. Freedom of
political opinion is also violated by the forceful
elimination of all political groups opposing the
Communist-controlled governments of these coim-
tries.

On April 2, 1949, the United States and Great
Britain charged the three Governments with hav-
ing violated the human-rights obligations of the
peace treaties. All three Governments issued de-
nials and indicated their unwillingness to adopt
the requested remedial measures. The United
States and the United Kingdom thereupon in-
formed them that in the British and American
view a dispute had arisen concerning the interpre-
tation and execution of the peace treaties. Under
the treaties,^ any dispute concerning the execution
of the treaties, which is not settled by diplomatic
negotiations, should be referred to the heads of the
United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.
missions in the three countries. On May 31, 1949,
the United States called upon the United Kingdom
and U.S.S.R. to hold a meeting of the three heads
of mission in each country to settle the disputes
which had arisen over noncompliance with the
human-rights clauses. The Soviet Union, in a note
of June 11, 1949, refused to participate in the
meetings, contending that no such disputes had

' Art. 40, Hungarian treaty ; art. 36, Bulgarian treaty ;
and arts. 37 and 38, Rumanian treaty.

July 3, 1950

arisen and that there was, therefore, no reason for
such a meeting. A second United States note, de-
livered June 30, 1949, expressed regret for the
Soviet Union's disregard of the provisions of the
treaties and again asserted that disputes did exist
between the United States and the three satellite
Governments. In a memorandum dated July 19,
1949, the Soviet Union reaffirmed its previous con-
tention and, since that time, has consistently re-
fused to participate in a meeting on the matter.

By its stand, the Soviet Union violates the dis-
putes clause of the peace treaties and the offending
countries are encouraged to continue systematically
and willfully to violate their treaties.

Besides the flagrant violations of the human-
rights clauses, there have been other treaty viola-
tions. In each instance, the attitude of the Soviet
Government is to condone the violation.

HUNGARY

Under article 10 of her treaty, Hungary under-
took to honor her prewar bilateral treaties with
the Allied and Associated Powers, provided that
the other contracting party notified the Hungarian
Government, within a period of 6 months of the
coming into force of the peace treaty, that she
desired to keep in force or revive the bilateral
treaty in question. Among the prewar treaties
coming under the provisions of this article was
the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Naviga-
tion of 1925 between the United States and Hun-
gary. Although the United States Government
duly notified Hungary, within the prescribed
6-month period, that she desired to keep this bilat-
eral treaty in force, the Hungarian Government
has evaded and refused to fulfill its obligations
under article 10 in at least two notable instances :
first, in the seizure of United States property ; and
second, in the arrest and trial of two American
citizens, Robert Vogeler and Israel Jacobson, who
were held incommunicado without access to United
States consular officers.

Under article 23 of the peace treaty, Hungary
undertook to pay the sum of 100 million dollars
as reparations to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.
On February 27, 1949 (after the Moscow-inspired
Cominform declaration of June 28, 1948, against
Yugoslavia), the Yugoslav Minister to Hungary
delivered a note to the United States Legation at
Budapest stating that the Hungarian Govern-
ment had failed to abide by article 23 of the treaty
and that, as a result of the ill will of the Hungar-

ian Government, the enforcement of article 23
could not be carried out by direct negotiations
between the two Governments. The Hungarian
Govei-nment has, to this day, refused to comply
with article 23 of the treaty, and the Soviet Gov-
ernment has refused to participate in a meeting
of the three heads of mission at Budapest, pro-
vided for in article 40 of the treaty for the settle-
ment of disputes which cannot be solved by direct
negotiation.

Under article 28 of the treaty, Hungary under-
took to restore all legal rights and interests of the
United Nations and their nationals, as they existed
on September 1, 1939, as well as to compensate
such persons for property loss and war damage.
The Hungarian Government has given no indica-
tion that she intends to compensate American cit-
izens. On November 8, 1949, the United States
Legation at Budapest transmitted to the Hungar-
ian Minister for Foreign Affairs four new claims
and additional evidence with regard to 116 previ-
ous claims. Although Hungary has acknowledged
receipt of the note, she has taken no action to fulfill
these claims.

BULGARIA

The U.S.S.R. has openly aided and abetted the
Bulgarian Government in failing to fulfill com-
pletely or in totally ignoring treaty provisions lim-
iting the armed forces.^ The Soviet Union ac-
complished this fact by supplying Bulgaria with
arms, ammunition, and equipment in excess of
those needed for the armed foi'ce stipulated by the
peace treaty. In addition, the U.S.S.R., by nega-
tive and extremely dilatory acts, is tolerating Bul-
garian failure to reduce these forces to the limits
prescribed in article 10. The U.S.S.R., by nega-
tive and obstructionist tactics, aided and abetted
the Bulgarian Government in the formation, main-
tenance, and training of paramilitary organiza-
tions, i. e., the militia and the use of this organ-
ization by the Bulgarians to violate both the spirit
and letter of article 2, the human-rights clause of
the treaty. The U.S.S.R., encourages the Bul-
garian Government to deny the Governments of
the United States and United Kingdom their
rights, under the terms of the treaty, to informa-
tion pertaining to the Bulgarian armed forces or
the right to gather such information by investiga-
tion. The Soviet Government declined the United
States-United Kingdom invitation to name a So-

' Arts. 9, 10, 11, and 12.

DepartmenI of State Bulletin

viet rein-esentative to participate in a proposed
survey of the Greco-Bulgarian border.* It, there-
by, encouraged the Bulgarian Government's reply
that, under the terms of the peace treaty, the mat-
ter should be referred to the United States, United
Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. diplomatic missions. ( The
Soviet Government had already refused to partici-
pate in any such conventions under article 3G of the
peace treaty to settle disputes concerning the in-
terpretation or execution of the Bulgarian peace
treaty.)

RUMANIA

As in Bulgaria, the Soviet Government has con-
sistently refused to cooperate with American and
British chiefs of mission to consider the princi-
ples involved in the implementation of the mili-
tary clauses of the peace treaty with Rumania.
Both the Soviet and British chiefs of mission
agreed to a meeting on this matter, scheduling it
for May 18, 1948. However, the Soviet Ambas-
sador cancelled the scheduled meeting, saying that
he was "indisposed,"' and, on May 26, 1948, he
addressed a note to the American Minister stating
that there was no necessity for the proposed meet-
ing and no reason for putting the proposal into
effect. Thus, the Rumanian Government has felt
free to violate the military provisions of the peace
treaty.

Violations of Agreement With Iran

Soviet-Iranian relations are based formally on
the treaty of friendship of February 26, 1921,
which was reaffirmed in 1928. Article IV of this
treaty states :

In consideration of the fact that each nation has the
right to determine freely its political destiny, each of the
two contracting parties formally expresses its desire to
abstain from any intervention in the internal affairs of
the other.

In 1942, the U.S.S.R., United Kingdom, and Iran
signed a treaty of alliance in which the two large
powers agreed to respect the territorial integrity,
sovereignty, and independence of Iran. In the
1943 Tehran declaration, the U.S.S.R., United
Kingdom, and the United States expressed their
desire for the maintenance of the independence,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Iran. As
a signer of the United Nations Charter, the
U.S.S.R. subscribed to article II (par. 4), which
states :

* Note No. 056 of Feb. 16. 1948.

All members shall refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat of use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any State, or in any
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations.

The U.S.S.R., in her relations with Iran, has vio-
lated all of these solemn commitments.

The Soviet Government, in a note to the United
States on November 29, 1945, admitted that Soviet
forces in Iran had prevented Iranian troops from
taking action after the outbreak against the Iran-
ian Government in northern Iran. This Soviet
action at least indirectly aided the Azerbaijan sep-
aratists and, thus, constituted interference in the
internal affairs of Iran, in violation of its 1921
pledge of friendship. Furthermore, violations of
the tripartite treaty occurred both during and
after World War II. By supporting the Azer-
baijan separatists while occupying Iran and by its
refusal to evacuate its troops except under United
Nations pressures, the U.S.S.R. violated the
Tehi-an declaration. The Iranian appeal to the
Security Council in January 1946 and its notifica-
tion to the Council on December 5, 1946, that the
U.S.S.R. had warned Iran to refrain from moving
troops into Azerbaijan were both based upon
charges of Soviet interference in the internal af-
fairs of Iran in violation of the United Nations
Charter. Moreover, the Soviet radio has repeat-
edly attacked the Iranian Government on false
grounds, has incited the Iranian people to violent
action against the government, and has given sup-
port to the illegal Tudeh Party.

Violation of Agreements Involving the Far East

KOREA

The Soviet Government openly violated the
joint United States-U.S.S.R. Moscow agreement
for the reestablishment of Korean independence
and the economic recovery of the country. The
two powers were to consult in the preparation of
proposals for the formation of a provisional Ko-
rean government. The U.S.S.R. representative on
the Joint Control Commission consistently refused
to allow such consultation except under unilateral
interpretations of the phrase "democratic parties
and social organizations" which, in each case,
would have excluded all but pro-Soviet political
groups. Moreover, the Soviet delegation refused
to consult with Korean groups whose representa-
tives had at any time expressed opposition to the

July 3, 7950

provision for placing Korea under trusteeship, as
envisaged in the Moscovf agreement.

The Joint Commission agreed to reestablish the
movement of persons, motor, rail transport, and
coastwise shipping between the zones of north and
south Korea. The Soviet Command in north
Korea refused to discuss or implement this agree-
ment and resisted efforts toward reestablishing
the natural economic unity of the country. Con-
cessions to economic coordination were made only
on a barter basis. No regularized movement of
persons or transport was established beyond that
allowed the United States to supply her outposts
that were accessible only by roads through Soviet-
occupied territory.

JAPAN

In the terms of the Potsdam Declaration, defin-
ing the conditions for the Japanese surrender.

Japanese military forces, after being completely
disarmed, were to be permitted to return to their
homes, "with opportunity to lead peaceful, pro-
ductive lives." On December 8, 1949, the U.S.S.R.
signed the Geneva Prisoners of War Convention,
setting forth the rights and obligations of coun-
tries holding prisoners of war.

TASS, the official Soviet news agency, on May
20, 1949, declared that there were 95,000 Japanese
prisoners of war in Soviet-held territory still
awaiting repatriation. According to Japanese
figures, an additional 376,929 Japanese were then
still under Soviet control. The discrepancy is ex-
plicable either by continued detention of Japanese
prisoners or an abnormally high death rate. The
U.S.S.R. refuses to give any information on the
matter and has walked out of Control Council
meetings in which the problem was broached.

The Korean Experiment in Representative Government

Statement hy John Foster Dulles
Consultant to the Secretary ^

The American people salute the Korean nation.
We honor the valiant struggle you are making for
liberty — human liberty and national liberty.

The American people enlisted in that struggle
175 years ago. We were, then, few, poor, divided,
and menaced. There were only about 3 million of
us. We were living precariously off the soil and
the seas. We had been divided by loyalties to 13
rival sovereign states. We were closely pressed
by the great military powers of that time — Spain
to the south, England and France to the north, and
Russia, which had moved into our continent, in
the west. Nevertheless, our founders saw that
Providence had given our people a unique oppor-
tunity' to show that a free society could develop a
spiritual, intellectual, and material richness which
could not be matched by a society of dictatorship
and that, if we took advantage of that opportunity,
our example would stimulate men elsewhere to cast
off the shackles of despotism. From its beginning,
our effort was consciously related to the general
welfare of mankind.

We went through many dark days and long
nights. But our exj^eriment succeeded. Our con-

' Made before the National Assembly of the Republic of
Korea at Seoul, Korea, on June 19 and released to the press
on the same date.

duct and example, despite many faults, did help
to show the infinite possibilities of free men, and it
encouraged men everywhere to pry loose the grip
of despotism and to take command of their own
destiny. The nineteenth century was, in most of
the world, an era of human liberation.

But the battle between liberty and despotism is
never-ending. It has no limits either in space or
in time. It is part of the constant struggle between
good and evil, a struggle that seems to have been
ordained for the testing of man.

DesiJotism, thrown onto the defensive in the
nineteenth century, has resumed the offensive in
the twentieth century. Already, the United States
has twice intervened with armed might in defense
of freedom when it was hard-pressed bj' unpro-
voked military aggression. We were not bound by
any treaty to do this. We did so because the
American people are faithful to the cause of
human freedom and loyal to those everywhere
who honorably support it.

Today, the Korean people are in the front line
of freedom, under conditions that are both dan-
gerous and exciting. You emerged from over 40
years spent under Japanese militarism. But you
have not emei'ged into conditions of placid ease.
Instead, you encounter a new menace, that of So-

Depaiiment of Sfafe Bulletin

viet communism. It denies the spiritual worth and
dignity of the individual human being. It insists
that ail men should be regimented into a pattern
of conduct made for them in Moscow. It seeks
to impose that degrading concept upon all men
everywhere.

Taking advantage of Japanese surrender terms,
Soviet communism has seized in its cruel embrace
the Korean people to the north of the 38th Paral-
lel ; and, from that nearby base, it seeks, by terror-
ism, fraudulent propaganda, infiltration, and in-
citement to civil unrest, to enfeeble and discredit
your new Republic, hoping, no doubt, that the
people might, m despair, accept the iron discipline
of the Soviet Communist Party.

That is a hard test for those who are only newly
training in the practice of representative govern-
ment.

Some observers felt that your task was a hope-
less one. You have proved them to be wrong.
Your faith and your works have confounded the
skeptics. You have already held two general elec-
tions in an atmosphere free of terrorism, and a
very high percentage of all eligible voters have
participated. Out of your electoral processes, has
come a stable and representative government.
You have developed a strong, disciplined, and
loyal defense establishment. Through hard work,
you are steadily improving your country's eco-
nomic condition.

There is solid ground for encouragement. No
doubt, there are difficult days ahead and many
problems yet unsolved, some internal, some exter-
nal. But what has already happened shows that
it lies within your power to achieve the goal of a
Korea that is strong and free. Nothing can pre-
vent that if you persist in your resolute will to be
free, and if each of you individually exercises the
self-controls that are required for the general
good. A free society is always a society of di-
versity. That is the secret of its richness. But
also it is a society in which men must voluntarily
curb their individualism to the extent needed to
enable the nation as a whole to avoid frustration
and to achieve creation.

As you establish here in South Korea a whole-
some society of steadily expanding well-being, you
will set up peaceful influences which will disinte-
grate the hold of Soviet communism on your fel-
lows to the north and irresistibly draw them into
unity with you. Never, for a minute, do we con-
cede that Soviet Communists will hold perma-
nently their unwilling captives. No iron curtain
can indefinitely block off the attracting force of
what you do if you persist in the way you have
been going.

You are conducting what may go down in his-
tory as the Great Korean Experiment, an experi-
ment which, in its way, can exert a moral influ-
ence in the twentieth century as prof oimd as that

which, in the nineteenth century, was exerted by
what was then called the Great American Experi-
ment. That is why the eyes of the free world are
fixed upon you. You carry the hopes and aspira-
tions of multitudes.

The American people give you their support,
both moral and material, consistent with your own
self-respect and your primary dependence on your
own efforts.

W& look on you as, spiritually, a part of the
United Nations which has acted with near una-
nimity to advance your political freedom, which
seeks your unity with the north and which, even
though you are technically deprived of formal
membership, nevertheless requires all nations to
refrain from any threat or use of force against
your territorial integrity or political independence.

The American people welcome you as an equal
partner in the great company of those who com-
prise the free world, a world which commands
vast moral and material power and resolution that
is unswerving. Those conditions assure that any
depotism which wages aggressive war dooms itself
to unutterable disaster.

The free world has no written charter, but it is
no less real for that. Membership depends on the
conduct of a nation itself; there is no veto. Its
compulsions to common action ai'e powerful, be-
cause they flow from a profound sense of common
destiny.

You are not alone. You will never be alone so
long as you continue to play worthily your part
in the great design of human freedom.

Tax Treaty Negotiations
To Open With Israel

[Released to the press June 16]

United States and Israeli tax officials are ex-
pected to meet at Washington on July 10, 1950,
for technical discussions of possibilities for im-
proving tax relations between the two countries
and to consider whether a basis exists for conven-
tions for the avoidance of double taxation with
respect to taxes on income and to taxes on the
estates of deceased persons.

If a basis for conventions is found, drafts of
the proposed terms will be prepared by the partici-
pants and submitted to their respective govern-
ments for consideration with a view to signing.

In preparation for the discussions, interested
persons are invited to submit information and sug-
gestions to Mr. Eldon P. King, Special Deputy
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue, Washington 25, D. C.

July 3, 1950

ACHIEVING A COMMUNITY SENSE AMONG FREE NATIONS-
A STEP TOWARD WORLD ORDER

Address hy Secretary Acheson ^

For years to come, no Secretary of State will
speak at Harvard without tliinking of General
Marshall's address here 3 years ago. That speech
was an act of far-reaching importance. It may be
useful for his successor to put that act in a setting
in history and to show where it has led and where
it is now leading us.

Not 2 years had then passed from the end of the
war, but our hopes for the postwar world were
already dimmed.

In the anguish of war, the world had resolved
to build a new order in which peace, freedom, and
justice would be secure. These aspirations were
expressed in the Charter of the United Nations.
If ever a document spoke the feeling in the hearts
of all mankind, that document was the Charter.

It pledged that the nations would live together
as good neighbors; that they would unite their
strength to maintain the peace; that armed force
would not again be used, save in the common in-
terest ; that they would work together to advance
the well-being of all men everywhere.

That document was signed 5 years ago next
Monday.

It was essential to the success of this organiza-
tion, as Mr. Cordell Hull had said on April 9, 1944,
that the major powers recognize and harmonize
their basic interests.

The foreign policy of the United States was
firmly founded on the belief that this could be
done. We hoped that the union of our efforts with
those of our Allies in time of war could be con-

' Delivered before the Harvard Alumni Association,
Cambridge, Mass., on June 22 and released to the press
on the same date.

tinned. To this end, we were determined to ac-
commodate our basic interests with those of other
powers.

That determination found expression in our
actions.

Differences there were, but that was to be ex-
pected. We were prepared to look upon them as
the natural residue of years of mutual mistrust.
We were prepared to honor our wartime commit-
ments and the security requirements of other na-
tions. The overwhelming sentiment of our people
favored settlement of our points of friction, as
we regarded them, the immediate demobilization
of our armed forces and the inauguration of the
new era of peace.

But, as the ominous portents grew, doubt also
grew as to whether one of our late allies was, in
fact, intent on cooperation.

Review of Soviet Actions Since 1945

The year of the San Francisco conference was
also the year in which the Soviet Union renewed
intimidating pressures upon its neighbors, Iran
and Turkey. It was the year in which the Soviet
Union, in violation of agreements on which the ink
was scarcely dry, imposed governments of its own
choosing on Bulgaria and Rumania and supported
the imposition of a minority regime in Poland.

In the following year, 1946, the sequence of
Soviet actions filled out an unmistakable pattern.
This was the year in which the head of the Soviet
state made it clear in a speech to his people that the
wartime alliance with the non-Communist world
was at an end. This speech was followed by a
propaganda campaign of unrestrained hostility

Dspattmen\ of State Bulletin

against our country, which has continued to this
day.

This was the year also in which Soviet leaders
began a program of assistance to Communist-dom-
inated guerrillas in Greece and increased their
l^ressure on Turkey for control of the Straits.
This was the year when Soviet action in Germany
foreshadowed its intention to break up the four-
]iower control arrangement and to Sovietize the
Eastern zone, which it controlled. This was the
year in which the Soviet Union walked out of the
Security Council when called upon to honor its
agreement to withdraw its troops from Iran.

In this year, also, the Soviet control of Hungary
was consummated. In this year, the international
Communist movement began its efforts to block
the political and economic recovery of France and
Italy by strikes and other disruptive activities of
its parties in these countries.

The pattern was plain. Wherever the force of
Soviet arms prevailed, the Soviet Union would
take over virtual control. Where Soviet armed
forces could not reach, the international Commu-
nist movement was used to gain control by subver-
sion.

American Response to Soviet Actions

Three events which took place in 1947 helped to
crystallize the American response to Soviet con-
duct.

The first of these was President Truman's mes-
sage to Congress of March 12, requesting fimds for
the Greek- Turkish Aid Program. In his message,
the President declared it to be the policy of the
United States —

... to support free peoples who are resisting attempted
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures.

. . . We must assist free peoples to work out their own
destinies in their own way.

The second event of 1947 was the speech of Gen-
eral Marshall from this platform on June 5th.

Its purpose was the revival of the working econ-
omy of the world so that free institutions could
exist.

Less than 1 month later, the Soviet Foreign Min-
ister, Mr. Molotov, walked out of the conference
at Paris at which the European Recovery Program
was launched.

That the Soviet Union would not only refuse
to participate in the European Recovery Program
but would also sabotage the effort was made ex-

plicit 2 months later at the founding of the Com-
munist Information Bureau.

There, the Soviet delegate announced that the
Soviet Union would bend every effort in order
that the European Recovery Program be doomed
to failure.

The Soviet effort to defeat the program did not
succeed. But its decision to obstruct rather than
participate did much to sharpen the cleavages of
a divided world.

The third event in 1947 which helped to mark
and to crystallize a development in American
thinking was the London meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers, and General Marshall's report
to the American people upon his return, on De-
cember the 19th.

In analyzing the reason for the frustration we
had encountered in our efforts to reach an agree-
ment with the Soviet Union on Germany, General
Marshall concluded — and this was a significant
step in the development of our thinking — that until
the political vacuum created by the war had been
filled by the restoration of a healthy European
community, we would not be able to achieve any
genuine agreements with the Soviet Union.

Agreements between sovereign states, General
Marshall reminded us, are usually the reflection
and not the cause of genuine settlements.

This was the issue, he said : we would not have
a settlement until the coming months had dem-
onstrated whether or not the civilization of West-
ern Europe would prove vigorous enough to rise
above the destructive effects of the war and restore
a healthy society.

As the issue became understood in these terms
by the American people and the other people of
the Western world, they responded with a succes-
sion of measures looking toward the strengthening
of the free world.

The pace of this response was quickened by the
Communist seizure of Czechoslovakia, 2 months
later.

The formation of the Western Union and the
signing of a defense treaty at Brussels in the early
months of 1948 gave expression to the European
resolve to unite both political and military strength
in the common defense.

This country, in statements by the President and
a resolution of the Senate, announced its support
of these efforts and its desire to help them.

In his inaugural address of January 20, 1949,
the President announced the intention of the

July 3, 7950

United States to enter into a treaty for the defense
of North Atlantic Area and to supply military
assistance to free nations.

Success of U.S. Efforts
To Strengthen Free World

In the 17 months which have since passed, we
have witnessed the rapid emergence of the North
Atlantic community as a political reality.

An unj^recedented rate of economic recovery
has now brought the productivity of Western
Europe, for the most part, above prewar levels.
Long-range economic problems are being met with
vigor and initiative. The nations of the North
Atlantic community are building a common de-
fense system for the primary purpose of prevent-
ing any further acts of aggression against this
area.

These measures of coalescence and of strength
evidence the determination of the free world that
the Soviet Union shall not, by coercion or subver-
sion, destroy the independence of free states.

Wherever free men and their governments have
been determined to preserve their freedom and
their independence and where assistance from the
United States could help them to do so, we have
given our help. Our aid is a supplement and not
a substitute. We have seen, in China, that even
help on a great scale cannot replace the will of the
people and their goveinment to preserve their
independence.

Elsewhere in the world, the assistance and en-
couragement we have given to men who were
stoutly helping themselves have been of decisive
importance. In accordance with our American
traditions and the responsibilities which our times
have thrust upon us, we have exercised a position
of leadership in strengthening the free world.

In the period we have been discussing, there
have been a number of Secretaries of State in this
country. There has been, however, but one Presi-
dent. The successive decisions — and they were
hard decisions — by which this policy has been
developed and applied were made by the President.

The consistency of purpose reflected in these
decisions, which I have enumerated, is evident to
all in retrospect. They are successive signposts,
with a constancy of destination.

Our goal has not changed. We continue to strive
for the fulfillment of the aspirations to which we
dedicated ourselves in the war. We seek to realize
the principles of the Charter of the United Na-

tions— a just and lasting peace, modei'ation and
mutual respect among nations, the advancement of
the well-being of mankind.

Our efforts to move toward this goal by agree-
ment among nations have been confronted witli a
great obstacle. That obstacle is the inordinate
ambition of the Soviet leaders, which is based on
their delusions about the non-Communist world.

We are taking measures which will enable us to
surmount this obstacle and move on toward our
objective. This is the meaning of our efforts to
strengthen the free world.

Strengthening Measures To Prevent War

I have said before — and it cannot be said too
often — that war is not inevitable. It is the deter-
mined purpose of this country, and of the like-
minded nations working with us, to prevent war.
We are building our strength in order that we may
eliminate the conditions which could give rise to
war, and we are on the threshold of a new period
in the successful forward-movement of this effort.
We face this new period with confidence, but we
must be very clear in our minds about our purposes
in the times that lie ahead.

We do not arm for purposes of conquest. Our
strength is a shield, whose purpose is twofold.

First, our strength is essential to a progressive
and successful resolution of the difficulties which
today beset the international community.

The obverse of General Marshall's conclusion
after the London meeting of the Council of For-
eign Ministers is that when the political vacuum
has been filled by the restoration of a healthy
European conmiunity, greater progi'ess will be
possible in settling differences in the world.
Strength is not a substitute for discussion and
accommodation.

As the leaders of the Soviet Union come to
appreciate that their analysis of the world situa-
tion and their policies flowing from that analysis
have been incori'ect, the possibility for reasonable
settlements of matters affecting the stability and
progress of the international community will
increase.

Until the Soviet leaders do genuinely accept a
"live and let live" philosophy, then, no approach
from the free world, however imaginative, and no
Trojan dove from the Communist movement, will
help to resolve our mutual problems.

This does not mean that discussion should not
take place or that every effort should not be made

Dapartment of Slate Bulletin

to settle any questions which are possible of
settlement.

It is our policy to be, as General Marshall put
it, the first to attend at international conference
tables and the last to retire.

We shall continue, through diplomatic channels
and through the United Nations, to keep open
every possibility for the adjustment of differences,
and we look forward confidently to the day when
the gradual process of accommodation will begin
to make itself felt.

To this end, we shall continue to give unfaltering
support to the United Nations. In addition to the
constructive work it is now doing, the United
Nations is a symbol of our hopes for harmony
among nations.

The second purpose of our strength is to enable
us to carry ahead a creative relationship with the
other nations of the free world. Our traditions
and our self-interest direct us toward the great
constructive tasks before us among the peoples of
the free world.

Democracy is a dynamic idea in the world.
Many millions of people look to this country for
leadership in applying both the moral and the
practical idea of democracy to the problems which
we and they face. It is our responsibility to dem-
onstrate the unlimited creative possibilities of the
democratic process for "better standards of life
in larger freedom," in the language of the United
Nations Charter.

Community Sense Among Free Nations

It is a fact of considerable importance, although
hardly recognized, that much of what the free
world has been doing to build its strength has
been in itself a great creative effort. The means
by which free men have sought to strengthen their
defenses have led, perhaps to some degree uncon-
sciously, to a community sense among free nations.
Both the North Atlantic community and the com-
munity of the American states are institutions
founded on pi'inciples which must eventually pre-
vail in a wider world.

Unlike the alliances of a former day, these
associations among states produce a community of
peoples where no dominance exists, a community
which is based on generous and willing coopera-
tion and on the primacy of individual liberty.
These are communities in which rules of mutual
aid and self-help are cardinal and in which the
duty and responsibility of aiding other free peo-

Ju/y 3, 1950

892500—50 3

pies to achieve their own development in their own
way are fully recognized.

Thus, the weaving of a community sense among
the nations who have joined their strength in these
common efforts is a substantial step toward the
realization of a world order based on consent and
dedicated to peace and progress. It has accom-
plished, in a great area of the world, a fuller reali-
zation of the principles of the Charter of the
United Nations since it has advanced international
cooperation to maintain the peace, to advance
human rights, to raise standards of living, and to
promote respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of i^eoples.

The great effort in which we are engaged to
build a North Atlantic community is not merely
a means. It is in itself a creative act of historic
significance.

It is often true in history that men acting under
immediate compulsion are only partly aware of
the great consequences of what they have set in
motion. Measures taken to suit a narrow purpose,
if conceived in harmony with man's moral nature,
may leave a great creative legacy.

The barons at Runnymcde were seeking relief
from the oppressive and arbitraiy actions of a
despotic king, but the principles they enunciated,
embodied in the Magna Carta, laid the basis for
the restraints upon the state which are funda-
mental to individual liberty.

The complaints of the American colonists about
taxation, which might conceivably have been
settled through diplomatic negotiation, instead,
gave rise to that enduring statement of the in-
alienable rights of man, the Declaration of
Independence.

It is in the nature of democracy to recognize
that the means we choose shape the ends we
achieve. In a democracy, there are no final ends,
in the sense of a Utopia.

The followers of Karl Marx endure the dictator-
ship of a police state in the delusion that they are
ascending to a classless society. But a democratic
society camiot employ means which belie and
indeed destroy the possibility of achieving its
goals. Democratic society, by its conduct from
day to day, from week to week, and from year to
year, is creating its own future.

If we would continue to move toward our goal
of a world order in which peace, freedom, and
justice may be secure, the means we choose to
{Continued on page 38)

KEEPING PEACE IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA

ty Edward A. Jamison

On April 8, 1950, in the Council Chamber of the
Organization of American States (Oas), in the
Pan American Union building at Washington, the
representatives of 21 nations of the Western Hem-
isphere took part in an event of profound impor-
tance to peace and security among their own
governments and of significance to the peace of
the world. Meeting as representatives of govern-
ments of sovereign equality, these members of the
Council of the Oas, who were acting provisionally
as Organ of Consultation under the Rio treaty,
brought to a successful conclusion (without a dis-
senting vote in 6 hours of continuous voting and
debate) the second and third successful applica-
tions of that inter- American pact to controversies
between American states.

Here was a convincing demonstration of inter-
American solidarity in action. For over 3 months,
the consultative body of the Oas dealt with charges,
by one or another government of the Caribbean
area, that other American governments or their
officials had tolerated or even openly supported
activities directed from abroad against their own
existence. During that period, an Investigating
Committee of five members of the Organ of Con-
sultation carried out an intensive and thorough
examination within all the countries directly con-
cerned of the factual bases of these charges and
produced an objective and frank report.

The report, Which has been made public, was
the basis upon which the Organ of Consultation
on April 8 took firm and constructive action. It
approved resolutions which (1) made clear the
culpability of certain of the accused governments;
(2) called upon these governments to take st«ps

to remove the causes of the difficulties and to restore
their relations to a normal, friendly basis; (3) in-
dicated that repetition of the disturbing events
might well require more extreme action under the
Eio treaty ; and (4) laid the groundwork for other
general action to eliminate the causes of underly-
ing difficulties.^

Controlling International Strife Among Countries

The problems that revolutionary irregularities
create are not new in the general area of the Car-
ibbean, elsewhere in the Americas, or, for that
matter, in the world. For generations, and fre-
quently even in recent years, armed groups and
individual adventurers have sought by various
means to overthrow by force one or another of the
established governments of the area. Nor is such
action necessarily a strange phenomenon among
countries that had originally achieved indepen-
dence by revolutions, at times with the active
assistance of other governments and peoples.
However, the growth of concepts of international
order and the development of procedures for
making them efi'ective have produced an increas-
ing recognition of the fundamental fact that gov-
eriunents have a responsibility, if only as an
aspect of maintaining their own independence, of
preventing irregular activities which they can
control and which have the purpose of starting or
promoting civil strife in neighboring countries.

' For full texts of the resolutions approved on Apr. 8,
1950, see Bulletin of May 15, 1950, p. 771. Copies of the
resolutions, which have been issued in English, Spanish,
French, and Portuguese, may also be obtained from the
Pan American Union, Washington, D.C.

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

This purpose was the meaning of the action that
the American Republics took in 1928 at Habana
when manj' of them signed a treaty proscribing
sucli activities. Such, also, has been one of the pur-
poses, since that time, of numerous other inter-
American actions.

In 1947, the American states drew up the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, "the
Rio Treaty," which provides inter-American ma-
chinery for dealing not only with armed attack
or serious thieats from outside the hemisphere and
with open conflicts between American states but
also with any other fact or situation that ''might
endanger the peace of America" and "that affects
the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or
the sovereignty or the political independence of
any American State." The quoted language is
from article 6 of that treaty.

Applying the Rio Treaty

The Rio treaty became effective in December
1948 when the necessary ratifications by 14 gov-
ernments were completed. Shortly thereafter,
Costa Rica invoked the treaty, and its procedures
were applied to a dispute between that country
and Nicaragua, a dispute which was settled to the
satisfaction of both parties by their concluding,
on February 21, 1949, and subsequently ratifying,
a treaty of friendship. This settlement marked
the successful culmination of the first application
of the Rio treaty.^

On January 3, 1950, an American state again
invoked that treaty. The Government of Haiti,
through its representative on the Council of the
Oas, Ambassador Joseph L. Dejean, on that date,
requested the Chairman of the Council, Ambas-
sador Luis Quintanilla of Mexico, to p)lace before
that body charges by Haiti that the Government
of the Dominican Republic had committed acts of
intervention which affected the territorial inviola-
bility, the sovereignty, and the political independ-
ence of Haiti. The charges also included the
accusation that officials of the Dominican Govern-
ment had aided in the preparation of a conspiracy
in which an armed band was to overthrow the
established Government of Haiti. This armed
band, according to the charge, was proceeding
from the Dominican Republic under the leadership
of a former Haitian army officer. Colonel Roland,

* For an account of the situation by W. Tapley Bennett,
Jr., see Bxjlletin of June 5, 1949, p. 707.

who had been in exile in that country for some time
and whose activities had been the basis of earlier
action by Haiti under inter-American procedures
for settling disputes. Although Haitian officials
had thwarted the conspiracy, Haiti held that the
situation Mas sufficiently serious to warrant action
under article G of the Rio treaty.

Chairman Quintanilla lost no time in calling a
meeting to consider the Haitian invocation of the
treaty. Wlien the representatives gathered on
January 6, the Haitian Ambassador, who had only
recently been welcomed as the new representative
of his Govermnent on the Council, expounded fur-
ther the bases of the Haitian complaint.

Ambassador Joaquin Salazar of the Dominican
Republic replied by reading a formal note in
which, in the name of his Government, he not only
denied categorically the Haitian charges but also
called upon the Council to apply the terms of the
Rio treaty to the situation which the Dominican
Republic claimed had developed as a result of
failure of several other govenunents of the Carib-
bean over a period of years to carry out their
international obligations. This situation, he in-
dicated, had endangered and continued to endan-
ger the sovereignty of his government.

Debate on the Haitian Charges

The debate which ensued demonstrated that
most of the Council members clearly felt that valid
grounds existed for putting the treaty procedures
into effect. Whether this action should be taken
with respect to the specific charges presented by
Haiti alone, or whether the more general situation
presented by the Dominican Government (in
which other countries figured) should be dealt,
with as well was not, at first, clear. Actually, the
Council produced no definitive decision on the
issue at the January 6 meeting, but the importance
of the charges that Ambassador Salazar brought
out was recognized by reference to them in the
preamble of the resolution finally approved.

The resolution set for the precise decisions, how-
ever, on applying the treaty and declared the
need for a full investigation of the facts. The
Council followed the procedure for which an im-
portant precedent had been set in the Costa Rica-
Nicaragua case of the previous year. In the first
place, the Council convoked the Organ of Consul-
tation and called a meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, with time and place of the meeting not
specified.

July 3, 1950

In conformity witli article 12 of the treaty, the
Council itself may act provisionally as Organ of
Consultation until the meeting of Foreign Minis-
ters takes place. The significant precedent of the
Costa Rica-Xicaragua case showed, however, that
acting provisionally as consultative organ without
the actual holding of the Foreign Ministers meet-
ing, the Council may reach a satisfactory resolu-
tion of the problem.

Appointment of Investigating Committee

The second important decision embodied in
the resolution of January 6 was that the Council
should appoint an Investigating Committee to de-
termine the facts upon which subsequent decisions
of the consultative organ would be based. The
view that an impartial baring of the facts of the
situation would in itself have a salutary effect upon
the uneasiness which had so long characterized
relations among governments in the area had con-
siderable basis. Whatever delay might be entailed
was felt to be expendable, in this instance, because,
on the whole, the charges did not point to a threat
or international dereliction of such imminence that
a thorough search for the truth could be dispensed
with. Many of the charges dealt with activities
which, however important in producing a state
of tension, were incidents of the past.

Shortly after the meeting of January 6, Chair-
man Quintanilla announced the appointment of
the representatives on the Council to the Investi-
gating Committee. These were Ambassadors
Jose Mora of Uruguay, Eduards Zuleta Angel of
Colombia, Guillermo Gutierrez of Bolivia, and
Paul C. Daniels of the United States, and Minister
Alfonso Moscoso of Ecuador. At an organiza-
tional meeting, held the following day. Ambassa-
dor Mora was chosen chairman of the group.

The resolution approved by the Council on
January 6 stipulated that the Bases de Actuacion —
or terms of reference — of the Investigating Com-
mittee would be described in detail in a subsequent
meeting of the Council, acting provisionally as
Organ of Consultation. Accordingly, a second
meeting was held on January 11, in which it took
significant actions and set important precedents.

Decision To Discuss Dominican Case Separately

Perhaps, the most significant decision of this
meeting was that the Organ of Consultation should
take up the Haitian and Dominican petitions sep-
arately— dealing with the note presented by Haiti

as "Case A" and with that presented by the Do-
minican Republic as "Case B." In a sense, the
necessities of the voting procedures of the Rio
treaty, which provides that "the parties directly
interested" shall be excluded from voting when
the Organ of Consultation is dealing with a situa-
tion or dispute between American states, dictated
this decision. The Haitian petition was based on
charges directed against the Dominican Govern-
ment, while the note of the latter Government re-
ferred to a more general situation, covering a
considerably longer period, in which several other
goveriunents w ere charged with international dere-
liction. On the basis of agreement on the distinc-
tion between the two cases, the Council considered
Haiti and the Dominican Republic to be the
directly interested parties in "Case A"; and it also
approved the document setting forth the functions,
powers, and attributes of the Investigating Com-
mittee for dealing with that case.

The Council generally assumed that the Investi-
gating Committee would examine the facts of both
cases. A difficult problem, however, arose when
the Council attempted to determine, for voting
purposes, which governments were "directly in-
terested" in "Case B." Although the Dominican
note had mentioned several governments, Ambas-
sador Salazar indicated early in the meeting that
his Government regarded only Haiti, Cuba, and
Guatemala as parties to an existing dispute or sit-
uation. Since the immediate issue concerned the
voting privilege and since Guatemala, because of
not having ratified the Rio treaty, held no voting
right, the problem was reduced to determining
whether Cuba and Haiti were, in fact, directly
interested parties to "Case B." Considerable de-
bate followed on this issue with general insistence
that a government may become "directly inter-
ested" either through accusing others or by being
itself accused of an international wrongdoing.
This determination the Council decided did not
in itself imply culpability on the part of the ac-
cused. Finally, the necessary two-thirds majority
concluded that the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and
Cuba were the Governments, among those which
had ratified the treaty, which were "directly in-
terested" in "Case B."

The Council, thus, ajiproved the Investigating
Committee's Bases de Actuacion as applicable to
both cases. This document described in detail the
powers and functions of the Committee, which had
been charged, in general terms, in the resolution of

Department of State Bulletin

January 6 Mitli conducting an "on the spot investi-
gation of the facts and their antecedents." Its
terms authorized the committee ". . . to hear wit-
nesses, to receive depositions and to avail itself
of any other sources of" information" which it
miglit consider pertinent to its task. Furthermore,
the terms instructed it to prepare a report or re-
ports containing a recital of the facts, pertinent
documentary material, and its conclusions as a
result of the investigation. Meetings of the Com-
mittee and the transmittal of its report to the
Organ of Consultation were to be in private session,
but the Council decided that the consultative body
would decide on the documents to be made public
as well as other action that might be considered
advisable.

The Investigating Committee planned to visit
the countries which figured in the charges of cur-
rent importance; but since it could accomplish
considerable preparatory work at Washington,
the Committee immediately initiated a series of
meetings in which it heard the representatives of
governments, including the Foreign Minister of
Haiti, high Foreign Office officials of the Domini-
can Republic, and others. In this manner, the
Conunittee prepared the way for a thorough and
intensive examination in the countries concerned
of the basis for charges which were both specific
and complex.

Investigating Committee's Examination

This examination, which began in Haiti, lasted
for more than 3 weeks, during which time the
Committee also visited the Dominican Republic,
Cuba, Guatemala, and, briefly, Mexico. The ac-
tivities of the Committee, in this period, included
interviews both of a formal and informal nature
with the Presidents and high officials of each of
the directly interested governments, hearings of
the testimony of numerous witnesses who had
either participated in or were acquainted with
details of revolutionary irregularities, visits by
members of the Committee to areas in which
activities were either alleged to have been carried
on or which had significance for some other reason,
to say nothing of constant reviewing and ordering
of data which were acquired. The Committee left
no doubt that it was determined to make its inves-
tigation as thorough as it was impartial. The
work of the Committee, particularly in this phase,
together with the assistance given by all the gov-

ernments involved, offers an encouraging example
of the effective implementation of procedures for
peaceful settlement undertaken by a regional col-
lective security body.

When the Committee returned to Washington, it
undertook immediately the task of winding up the
investigation and analyzing the extensive data
compiled regarding the facts of the cases. Fur-
thermore, the Committee was obligated to point
out what it believed to be the basic factors con-
tributing to Caribbean irregularities and offer its
conclusions regarding steps which could eliminate
these factors and thereby avoid repetition of the
difficulties. It gave considerable attention to pre-
paring general considerations and drafting 5 reso-
lutions, covering all essential aspects of the
problem, which the Organ of Consultation may
propose for action.

The Council of the Organization, acting pro-
visionally as Organ of Consultation, received the
Committee's 73-page report at a special meeting in
the Council Chamber on March 13, 1950.^ The
Council had decided, in its previous meeting, that
the session in which it received the report would
begin as a closed meeting. No objection was ex-
pressed though a suggestion was made that the
doors be opened immediately to the press and
public.

The report itself was withheld from publication
for 6 days in order that the representatives of dis-
tant governments might have time to forward it
to their Foreign Offices. The manner in which
the contents of the document appear to have been
kept in confidence until the date of publication,
which was March 20, 1950, is a striking example
of the cooperative spirit which all the members of
the Council showed throughout the entire period.

Wlien the consultative body released the con-
tents of the document, the governments and the
public quickly appreciated the work the Commit-
tee had accomplished. This report was no white-
wash, nor was it, in any sense, a surrender to dip-
lomatic camouflage. Rather, it was a straight-
forward, clear-cut analysis of the factual basis of
charges made by two governments, with conclu-
sions which fixed responsibility and proposed steps

' The full test of the report of the Investigating Com-
mittee has been Issued in English, Spanish, and French by
the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., as Docu-
ment C-I-67. Copies may be obtained by writing to the
Pan American Union.

July 3, 1950

for a solution of the immediate and underlying
difficulties. On March 22, Secretary Acheson ex-
pressed the full support of the United States for
the Committee's conclusions and recommendations
and i^raised the Committee for the thorougluiiess
and objectirlty of its work.*

Because oi its sigiiiGcance in the development of
the inter-American peace-keeping machinery, as
well as its importance in setting forth the basic
facts and considerations in the cases dealt with
the report itself merits careful attention as a his-
toric document. The following presents a sum-
mary of certain of its highlights.

Summary of Highlights in the Report

The Committee examined, first, "Case A," re-
sulting from the Haitian petition of January 3.
It found that several of the charges by Haiti
against the Dominican Republic had considerable
basis in fact. Of these charges several concerned
the activities of two Haitian exiles who were said
to have engaged in attacks upon the Haitian Gov-
ernment by radio from Ciudad Trujillo. The
Committee held that failure of the Dominican
Government to prevent incitement of this kind was
in violation of the Joint Declaration that each gov-
ernment had signed on June 9, 1949, in which each
had indicated that it would not tolerate activities
in its territory that had as their object the disturb-
ance of the internal peace of the neighboring
country. Recognizing the particular importance
of this Joint Declaration, as well as the subsequent
reaffirmation of it by the Dominican Government,
the Committee concluded that the Dominican Gov-
ermnent should have prevented certain of the
activities which were found to have taken place.

Of more immediate concern, however, was the
Haitian charge that the abortive plot of Novem-
ber-December 1949 (which Haitian police had
uncovered and suppressed) had involved, among
other things, contact between conspirators at
Port-au-Prince and the Haitian exile at Ciudad
Trujillo, ex-Colonel Astrel Roland, and that Do-
minican citizens and certain Government officials
had supported the preparations for the conspir-
acy. In this charge the Committee found much
truth. Not only did it establish the fact that a
conspiracy existed between persons in Haiti and
Roland for the purpose of overthrowing the Presi-
dent of Haiti, but it also found that certain Do-

* Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1950, p. 523.

minican officials aided this action, which a
Dominican diplomatic officer at Port-au-Prince
had transmitted $2,000 to the conspirators, and
that a Dominican citizen and former high official
". . . played a principal part in said cooperation."

In dealing with the petition of the Dominican
Republic, "Case B," the Committee indicated that
the complexity and scope of the complaints made
difficult an analysis of each in detail. After it
had dealt with certain examples of events, in-
dicative of the "state of unrest" of previous years,
which illustrated that no one government had felt
exclusively the problem of revolutionary activity,
it did analyze three of the situations which formed
a main basis of Dominican charges and the relation
of those to the "present situation." It found that
two of these, the Cayo Confites expedition of 1947
(which Cuba eventually thwarted) and the attack
at Luperon in June 1949 (in which one plane
actually made a water landing in Dominican ter-
ritorial waters) had gained considerable headway
as a result of toleration and, in some cases, open
support by officials of two Governments, Cuba in
the former case and Guatemala in the latter.

A third Dominican accusation was that fresh
preparations for warlike action against the Domin-
ican Government were undertaken, with aid from
the Cuban Red Cross, late in 1949 in Cuba. The
accusation also charged that the Cuban Red Cross
had engaged in constructing an airfield in Cuba
which was to be used as a starting point for an
attack on the Dominican Republic. In this case,
the Committee found that, although certain un-
usual circumstances surrounded the control of and
activities carried on in the name of the Cuban or-
ganization, the proposed airfield clearly could not
be used to facilitate a military invasion of the Do-
minican Republic.

Although the Committee found that the irregu-
larities in connection with the above specific Do-
minican complaints were matters of the past, it
stated that certain of the circumstances which
had contributed to them continued to exist and that
these were giving rise to new factors "indicative of
an abnormal situation in the Caribbean zone."
Specifically, it found (1) that various groups of
exiles ". . . not only persist in their struggle, but
also seek surreptitious support from govern-
ments"; (2) that some governmental authorities
were indicating a willingness to keep these exile
groups; (3) that certain agents of revolutionary
movements were occupying and using official posi-

Departmenf of State Bulletin

tions for their revolutionary purposes; (4) that
collections of war materials used in earlier revolu-
tionary attempts and a ''professionally subversive
element in certain sections" which were insuffi-
ciently controlled still existed.

All of these facts led to the conclusion that ele-
ments remained which were likely to create war-
like situations.

After it had dealt with the immediate factual
situation in each case, the Investigating Commit-
tee set forth a series of basic factors which, it be-
lieved, had contributed to Caribbean irregularities
and presented conclusions on steps which the coun-
tries concerned might take to eliminate such fac-
tors and avoid repetition of the irregularities.

Among those factors upon which the Committee
recommended sj^ecific action to the Organ of Con-
sultation were :

1. The limitations of the 1928 Convention on
Duties and Eights of States in the Event of Civil
Strife.^ This treaty, the inter-American instru-
ment which is specific and detailed regarding the
duties of states in situations such as those which
had troubled the Caribbean area, required review
in order to determine whether it should be made
more adequate and up to date in fixing the obliga-
tions of states in preventing ". . . the prepara-
tion and carrying out of activities which have the
purpose of fomenting civil strife in other coun-
tries." Although some members made suggestions
for strengthening it, the Investigating Commit-
tee's primary recommendation was that competent
inter-American organs should study this matter
thoroughly to determine what effective measures
they could work out on the matter.

2. The problem of political asylees, refugees,
and exiles. In this connection, the Committee
noted explicitly the problems created by the exist-
ence of an increased number of political exiles
in the Caribbean area, some with sincere and
idealistic purj^oses and others whose motives were
adventurous or mercenary. This problem is, in-
deed, implicit in almost every phase of the Com-
mittee's report. Here, again, the Committee
proposed that competent organs of the Oas make
a careful study to determine whether further in-
ter-American action might be practical or
desirable.

3. The lack of adequate measures to give effec-
tiveness to the principle of representative democ-

July 3, T950

racy, particularly as reflected in the free electoral
process. The relevance of this fundamental prob-
lem, although not set forth in explicit terms, was
implicit in many phases of the situation which the
Committee had examined. The difficulty of find-
ing means within a framework in which the non-
intervention commitment is precise and specific,
for promoting adequate respect for representative
democracy is quite clear, but the proposal that the
matter be subjected to careful study underlined
the need for seeking such means.

One aspect of the relation of the principle of
representative democracy to inter-American com-
mitments was, however, thought worthy of clari-
fication : the Committee proposed that the Organ
of Consultation declare in precise terms that, what-
ever might be the need for giving representative
democracy more effectiveness, it could find no
justification for asserting that the promotion of
that principle authorizes a government or gov-
ernments to violate international commitments
regarding nonintervention.

4. The need for some means to assure fulfillment
of the recommendations which the Organ of Con-
sultation might make with regard to the problems
presented to it. The establishment of a committee
with adequate powers to observe compliance with
whatever steps the Organ of Consultation might
agree upon was, therefore, proposed.

On the basis of the facts presented, the conclu-
sions reached on the Haitian and Dominican com-
plaints, and these general considerations, the In-
vestigating Committee prepared drafts of resolu-
tions, based upon the consultative organ's drafts,
which, in effect, summarized the Committee's con-
clusions regarding the factual situation in each
case and the steps which might be taken to correct
them as well as to deal with the general situation.
These, together with certain additional proposals
on more general questions, were the matters on
which the Organ of Consultation based its action
of April 8, referred to above.

At the meeting on March 13, the consultative
organ agreed that it would give approximately 3
weeks for governments to examine the Investigat-
ing Committee's report and formulate their views
on its recommendations.

The consultative organ began its consideration
on April 3. In this meeting and in others on the
two following days, it heard the points of view of
various governments, including those most directly
involved, and, during this time, members presented

various amendments to the Investigating Commit-
tee's draft resolutions. The first of these meet-
ings took on added significance since Foreign Min-
isters Ernesto Dihigo of Cuba, Ismael Gonzalez
Arevalo of Guatemala, and Vilfort Beauvoir of
Haiti were present.

The consultative organ's action culminated these
preparatory meetings and also concluded con-
sideration on the two cases.

With regard to that case in which Haiti was the
petitioner, the resolution of April 8 indicates that
irregularities for which the Dominican Govern-
ment had responsibility were contrary to inter-
American principles and that, although the danger
to peace which they represented had been dis-
pelled, their repetition would call for further
action under the Rio treaty. The resolution notes,
however, that the repeal of war powers which
President Trujillo had obtained in December
1949 — a grant of special power to declare war
which had figured in the Haitian petition and on
which Cuba also had requested action by the Organ
of Consultation — together with Dominican legis-
lation to prevent subversive activities in its terri-
tory, demonstrated the intention of that Govern-
ment to maintain peace and prevent events of the
kind which had been the basis of the Haitian
complaint.

Nevertheless, the resolution formally requests
the Dominican Government to "take immediate
and effective measures to prevent government offi-
cials from tolerating, instigating, encouraging,
aiding or fomenting subversive and seditious
movements against other governments" and to
comply strictly with the Joint Declaration of June
9, observance of which was held to be equally the
responsibility of Haiti. Furthermore, the con-
sultative organ pointed out to both governments
certain means for strengthening their relations.
It requested both to make every effort, within
limits of constitutional authority, to avoid sys-
tematic and hostile propaganda against each other
or other American governments.

The resolution dealing with the case emanating
from the Dominican complaint contains a clear
indication that revolutionary irregularities had
been directed against the Dominican Republic in
Cuba in 1947 and in Guatemala in 1949. Further-
more, the resolution establishes the fact that offi-
cials of those governments had not only expressed
their sympathy with these movements but also had,
in some cases, lent them aid. Certain of the facts

determined were held to be contrary to basic inter-
American norms, and the resolution indicates that
the irregularities, if repeated, will call for further
action under the Rio treaty. In this case, the reso-
lution notes that declarations "formulated by the
Chief Executives of Cuba and Guatemala, to which
reference is made in the Report of the Committee,
constitute a guaranty against future recurrence
of acts of this kind."

The resolution formally requests the Govern-
ments of Cuba and Guatemala, however, to take
adequate measures to prevent the existence in
their territories of armed groups conspiring
against other countries and to control war materi-
als of such groups as well as any illegal traffic in
arms. Favorable action on the resolution brought
the withdrawal of several more drastic proposals
for change. As a result of an amendment to this
resolution, the responsibility of the Dominican
Government for action contrary to inter- American
harmony was declared, and that Government was
also called upon to take adequate measures to in-
sure absolute respect for the principle of non-
intervention. Subsequent portions of the resolu-
tion (1) make a request, similar to that described
above, regarding hostile propaganda of all four
directly interested governments; (2) call upon
Cuba and the Dominican Republic to settle speed-
ily an outstanding controversy; and (3) reaffirm
the 14 conclusions approved by the Inter-Amer-
ican Peace Committee on September 14, 1949, that
contained a general restatement of existing prin-
ciples pertinent to the international difficulties
among Caribbean countries.

As a means of insuring effective fulfillment of
steps that the Organ of Consultation agreed upon,
the Investigating Committee recommended the
establishmenc of a committee with authority to re-
quest and receive pertinent information and to
promote, if necessary, a new meeting of the con-
sultative organ itself. This proposal, involving
significant precedent for future action, caused a
degree of uneasiness on the part of certain repre-
sentatives who feared that it might impinge, in
some way, on the principle of nonintervention.
Mexico proposed certain amendments that tem-
pered such apprehensions, and the consultative
organ approved the creation of a continuing com-
mittee, provisional in character.

This committee, to which Chairman Quintanilla
appointed the five members who had served on the
Investigating Committee, is to inform itself of the

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

manner in which the two resohitions are carried out
and to report to all the American governments
within 3 months after April 8, and again when its
work has been completed. The committee, which
has been installed, has taken the name "Special
Committee for the Caribbean" and is under the
chairmanship of Ambassador Mora of Uruguay.
The consultative organ gave unanimous approval
in the April 8 meeting to the Investigating
Committee's declaration that the principles of rep-
resentative democracy, of suffrage, and of partici-
pation in government do not authorize any gov-
ernment or group of governments to violate
inter-American commitments on nonintervention ;
the representative of Guatemala, although unable
to vote on the resolution, stated his Government's
full approval of the concept it expressed.

A fifth resolution, approved unanimously, stipu-
lates that the Council of the Oas, through its
competent organs, shall initiate studies of the diffi-
cult and complex questions that the Investigating
Committee propounded.

Such studies include the following subjects : (1)
the possibilities of stimulating and developing
the effective exercise of representative democracy,
with special emphasis on suffrage and the principle
of free elections; (2) means for strengthening and
improving the 1928 Habana Convention, prescrib-
ing measures governments should use to prevent
the preparation of activities designed to foment
civil strife in other countries ; and (3) the "regimen
of political asylees, exiles, and refugees."

That practical achievement rather than aca-
demic assessment is anticipated as a result of
these studies is attested by the careful stipulation
of procedures for handling them. These require
that, in the case of the 1928 Habana Convention,
a document be produced to be submitted directly
to the governments and that, on the other items,
topics be prepared for action at an Inter- American
Conference, the supreme organ of the Organization
of American States.

The consultative organ approved other resolu-
tions that urge the governments directly concerned
to normalize their mutual relations as soon as
possible and express the hope that governments
which have not ratified basic inter-American in-
struments will give this matter prompt attention.
Finally, the Organ of Consultation, after stating
that the members of the Investigating Committee
"have deserved well of the nations of America"

and merited a vote of "confidence and gratitude,"
formally terminated the action of the Council of
the Organization under the Rio treaty on the cases.

Conclusion

The success of international action may appear
to be measured in terms of resolutions and docu-
ments, detailed and often excessively wordy.
Nevertheless, the documents resulting from the
actions of the inter-American Organ of Consul-
tation summarized above reveal, in themselves,
achievements in the orderly development of free-
dom and international security in the Western
Hemisphere. Furthermore, many of the steps
which the various bodies took in producing that
finished work on specific cases constitute invalu-
able precedents which will either make the need
for future action less likely or strengthen the
means for meeting threats which, in the future,
may unfortunately occur.

The documents alone, however, can never tell
the whole story. Any impression that the 3
months in which the inter-American peace ma-
chinery was at work on these problems were com-
pletely devoid of rivalry, the struggle for political
advantage, or even hostility would be misleading.
Issues were involved which touch most directly
upon the sensitive spots in relations among the
American states. Basically, though, the spirit of
the "convivencia interamericana" — a term which
no English ti'anslation can adequately express —
characterized the proceedings from their begin-
ning to the successful outcome of the meeting of
April 8. This spirit was expressed in the unend-
ing efforts of all the members of the Investigating
Committee in their impartial search for facts,
in the cooperative assistance that the governments
directly involved gave to the Investigating Com-
mittee, and in the manner in which the losers as
well as those who had been successful accepted the
hotly debated issues, once they were solved.

The ultimate test of success for this venture in
inter-American peace-keeping will, of course,
depend upon the long-range results in reliev-
ing tensions and eliminating the basic causes of
the irregularities from which it stemmed. Early
indications of more than transitory success in this
regard are encouraging. In any circumstances,
the inter-American community has, once again,
demonstrated its capacity to use effectively the ma-
chinery for peace and security which it has
devised.

July 3, J 950

Upholding Principles and Rights

of Others in the Process of International Negotiation

hy Philip C. Jessup
Ambassador at Large '■

Negotiation is as old as human society. The
goal toward which we strive is the place where the
processes of negotiation eventually prevail and the
drums of war are silenced by the triumphant
symphony of peace. That is the goal of the for-
eign policy of the United States. International
negotiation is a process and means, not an end
in itself. To be successful, it must take place in
a situation where nations, for whatever reason, are
willing to reconcile their interests with each other.
The basic difficulty which we should keep in mind
in discussing the role of negotiation is the diffi-
culty of creating a situation wherein nations are
willing to reconcile and adjust their interests.

The process of international negotiation re-
quires concessions but not concessions at the ex-
pense of principles or of the rights of others. Ap-
peasement is again a distortion of negotiation and
creates instead of allaying tension.

There is unfortunately abroad in the world
today a philosophy which sees no evil in tension.
That philosophy, put into practice on a national
scale, is the natural and inevitable result of a dis-
regard of what the Charter of the United Nations
calls "faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person." The
system of the Soviet police state, like that of the
similar Nazi regime, sees no value in the individ-
ual. From this point they move with some logic
and no humanity to the denial of the concept of
the equality of states which is one of the principles
on which the United Nations is based. The ])olice-
state system cannot confine its theory of brutal
suppression within its own frontiers. This is in-
deed the absolute power which corrupts absolutely.
In international relations, it results in the practice
which we witness constantly of denying the right
of smaller states to assert or even to formulate

' Excerpts from an address delivered at Hamilton Col-
lege, Clinton, N.Y., on June 11 and released to the press
on the same date.

their own policies. Some smaller states have un-
happily been forcibly sucked into the Soviet orbit
and are compelled as satellites to revolve around
the Soviet Union. That is why a Bulgarian can
be tried for treason, not to Bulgaria but to the
Soviet Union. That is why Yugoslavia is itself
considered traitorous — again to the Soviet Union.

Difficulty in Peaceful Adjustments With U.S.S.R.

The process of negotiations between a govern-
ment which, like ours, believes in freedom and a
government like that of the Soviet Union which
does not is obviously difficult. We have differ-
ent sets of values and different objectives. It is
difficult, but it is not impossible. There have
been situations in which we have negotiated with
the Soviet Union, and we are prepared to do so
again. Particularly we are always ready to carry
on that form of multipartite negotiation which is
the essence of the United Nations system. The
difficulty wliich for the time being blocks that
channel of negotiation is the refusal of the Soviet
Union to particijjate in the various organs, com-
missions, and committees of the United Nations
because they are unwilling to have the majority
decide how the question of Chinese representation
should be settled.

Control of Atomic Weapons

I should like to discuss by way of example one
question which is of prime importance and on
which the Soviet Union now refuses to negotiate
in the United Nations though called upon by the
General Assembly to do so. The question is that
of the international control of atomic weapons.

Immediately after the revelation to the world
of the discovery of the atomic bomb, in August
1945, the United States voluntarily took steps to
insure that the development of atomic energy
would be f)laced under international control and

Deparfmeni of Sfate Bulletin

that atomic energy would be used only for peace-
ful purposes.

The first step was a meeting between the Presi-
dent and the Prime Ministers of tlie United King-
dom and Canada in November 1945. The three
agreed upon a declaration calling for international
action under the United Nations.

A month later, in December 1945, the Secretary
of State met in Moscow with the Foreign Minis-
ters of the United Kingdom and Soviet Union
and agreed to sponsor a resolution in the United
Nations setting up an international Atomic
Energy Commission. This resolution was unani-
mousl}' approved by the General Assembly at its
first session in 1946, and a Commission was es-
tablished within the United Nations.

This Commission and its Committees held over
200 meetings extending over a period of almost 2
years. After thorough study, a majority of the
members of the Commission evolved the basic out-
lines of an effective international control system
for atomic energy. Only the Soviet Union and
its satellites disagreed with the majority findings.
They proposed a completely different plan which
the majority found not to be a plan for effective
control. In 1948, the Commission finally reported
the deadlock which had developed to the Security
Council.

The deadlock in the Commission was paralleled
in the Council. The Council was barred from
approving the Conmiission's majority plan by the
Soviet veto.

The reports of the Commission were then con-
sidered by the General Assembly, and 40 member
governments voted to approve the Commission's
proposals. Only the Soviet bloc voted against
them. The Assembly called on the Commission
to resume its work. It also called on the per-
manent members of the Commission — the perma-
nent members of the Security Council plus Can-
ada—to consult together to determine if a basis
for agreement existed. The Soviet representative
opposed this proposal. He stated that there was
no basis for consultation, and that such discus-
sions were unnecessary.

After the Assembly session, the Commission
did start meeting again. But it found itself still
confronted by the impasse created by the Soviet
Union's unwillingness to negotiate on the basis of
a plan wliicli would provide adequate safeguards.
After long deliberation the Commission concluded
that no useful purpose was being served by con-
tinuing discussion until such time as the permanent
members found a basis for agreement.
_ Last fall, at New York, after several consulta-
tions among the permanent members had resulted
m no progress, the General Assembly considered
further the work of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission. The Assembly reaffirmed its support
for the United Nations plan. The Assembly again
called for consultations among the permanent
members and requested them to explore all avenues

July 3, 1950

which might lead to agreement. These consulta-
tions were begun. They were suspended in Jan-
uary of this year as a result of the Soviet walk-out.

The ]3lan evolved by the majority of the members
of the United Nations involves the concept of an
international agency which would manage all
atomic activities on behalf of the signatory nations.
This plan was based on proposals submitted by
the United States in 1946. We are justly proud
of these proposals. We offered, in effect, to turn
over our atomic resources and capacity to an inter-
national authority so that these resources could
benefit all mankind, and so that the world would
not live under the threat of an atomic war. Our
original proposals were modified and elaborated
in negotiations although their essential objectives
were retained. The plan finally worked out was
not an "American plan" but oiie formulated and
approved by the overwhelming majority of the
United Nations. It is a United Nations plan.

Tlie international agency to be established under
this scheme would :

a. Own all uranium and thorium, the basic
source materials, from the moment they are mined
until they are finally consumed as nuclear fuel.

b. Own, manage, and operate all facilities using
or producing dan<rcrous quantities of nuclear
fuel — such as Oak Ridge and Hanford.

c. License all nondangerous facilities and activ-
ities operated nationally.

d. Carry on research.

e. Exercise thorough-going rights of inspection
and survey in order to locate new ore sources and
to detect or prevent clandestine activities. Mili-
tary reservations would not be exempted from
inspection.

The agency would be a servant of the signatories.
The principles governing the agency's policies in
the production and stockpiling of production fa-
cilities would be spelled out in the agency's charter.
The treaty would also provide for the prohibition
of the manufacture, possession, and use of atomic
weapons. And it would make that prohibition
effective by the control system it established. The
treaty would provide for the disposal of existing
stocks, would prescribe the stages whereby controls
would go into effect, define violations, and provide
effective enforcement measures.

The Soviets reject the concept of a strong inter-
national authority. Atomic operations would
continue mainly on a national basis. Their pro-
posals provide that :

a. Atomic weapons would be "prohibited" by a
paper convention.

b. An International Control Commission would
be established but its powers would be limited to
making recommendations to governments and to
the Security Council, where the veto would apply.
Any one of the permanent members of the Coun-
cil could thus prevent action.

c. Nations would continue to own materials and

own, operate, and manage all dangerous atomic
energy facilities.

d. Atomic plants would be subject to some kind
of "periodic" inspection. But the Soviet Union
has not been clear as to how this inspection would
work. The Control Commission would have "ac-
cess" to facilities and "acquaintance" with pro-
duction operations, but inspections would be "pe-
riodic" and "normally inspectors will visit only
declared plants."

The basic issue between the United Nations
plan and the Soviet plan is that of effective versus
ineffective control, of real control versus a pre-
tense of control. The United Nations plan recog-
nizes that the nature of atomic energy production
dictates the need for close control at all stages of
development. From the time it leaves the mine
until it reaches the end product, the production of
atomic energy is a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde: It
can be turned to beneficial or destructive uses. It
can transform itself from Dr. Jekyll to Mr. Hyde
at any moment and at any stage.

No halfway measures — such as "Monday and
Thursday" inspections or "periodic" inspections —
would offer assurance against the diversion of
nuclear fuel from peacetime to military use. Our
federal or any state government would never be
satisfied with a system for inspecting banks or
meat-packing plants which was based on the no-
tion that the institution to be inspected should be
warned in advance when the inspectors would
arrive. Can we as a nation accept such a notion
where our very national existence may be
involved ?

The Soviet control convention is so devoid of
effective safeguards tliat all that remains in effect
is a convention on prohibition — a paper conven-
tion on prohibition. Such a convention is no bet-
ter than the good faith of its signatories. This
we must realize, as a result of bitter experience,
is not good enough. It is indeed worse than no
plan at all. It might deceive some with its il-
lusory security, but it would not in fact provide
the substance of security. It might bring atomic
disarmament in the West. But the West would
have no assurances as to the atomic disarmament
actually carried out in the Soviet world, behind
the Iron Curtain.

MEASURES FOR SECURITY

The difference between the United Nations and
the Soviet plans reflects a fundamental cleavage
between the aims of the majority and the minority.
Representatives of Canada, China, France, the
United Kingdom, and the United States reported
as follows to the General Assembly in 1949 :

All the Sponsoring Powers other than the U.S.S.R.
put world security first and are prepared to accept in-
novations in traditional concepts of international co-
operation, national sovereisnty and economic organiza-
tion where these are necessary for security. The
Government of the U.S.S.R. puts its sovereignty first and

is unwilling to accept measures which may impinge upon
or interfere with its rigid exercise of unimpeded state
sovereignty.

The willingness to accept some restrictions on
sovereignty is one of the great and hopeful at-
titudes in the world today. The Schuman pro-
posal with respect to the European coal and steel
inditstries is the most recent example of this pro-
gressive spirit.

The behavior of the Soviets in the atomic energy
negotiations shows these features :

1. Distrust of the proposals of other nations.

2. An effort to get concessions from other
nations without yielding anything themselves.

3. Bitter denunciation of the opposition, and
vicious propaganda attempts to sow discord and
arouse suspicion.

4. Finally, steady freezing of Soviet opposition,
as though their own propaganda had a certain
self-propagating quality.

This last feature is most disturbing. Yet the
Soviet system seems to have this effect. Public
statements from the Kremlin set the tone and
give the cue to many organizations and publica-
tions throughout the world which, in some form
or other, repeat the Kremlin's ideas. These are
then reported back as the sentiment of the peoples
of the world. These reinforcing echoes of their
own voices apparently solidify the original views
of the Kremlin. It is as though, in the words of
Mr. X, in his now famous article in Foreign
Affairs :

It is an undeniable privilege of every man to prove
himself right in the thesis that the world is his enemy;
for if he reiterates it frequently enough and makes it the
bacliground of his conduct he is bound eventually to be
right.

It seems that there could be no clearer statement
of what is happening in the Atomic Energy Com-
mission of the United Nations. At the start of
the negotiations, either from motives having to do
with their internal situation, or from suspicion
of the motives of others, the Soviet representatives
took the position that the majority plan was a
hostile gesture. Failing to make an objective
study of the elements essential to any real con-
trol, and with no informed body of public opinion
which could cause them to reconsider their original
position, the Kremlin has seemed to become in-
creasingly committed to a course which is as
dangerous to the Soviet Union as it is to the rest
of the world.

The appropriate forum for atomic energy nego-
tiations as approved by the last General Assembly
is the forum of the six permanent members of the
United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The
United States stands ready at all times to take part
in the consultations in that forum whenever the
Soviet Union chooses to return to it.

We believe the United Nations plan is an effec-
tive plan. It has our support. But, as the Presi-
dent said last February,

Department of State Bulletin

... It has our support not because of its form or its
words Init because we believe it would achieve effective
control. The stakes are too large to let us, or any nation,
stand on pride of authorship. We ask only for a plan
that provides an effective, workable system — anything
less would be a sham agreement. Anything less would
increase, not decrease, the dangers of the use of atomic
energy for destructive purposes. We shall continue to
examine every avenue, every possibility of reaching real
agreement for effective control.

But we will not rely merely on a paper conven-
tion "prohibiting" the use of the atomic bomb.
We must not only prohibit the use of the bomb,
we must also establish a system which will make
that prohibition effective. That is the crucial dif-
ference between the United Nations and Soviet
plans. It is the difference between eliminating or
continuing to live under the threat of atomic war.

Strength as Basis for Negotiating With Soviets

These negotiations illustrate the difficulty of
peaceful adjustments with the Soviet Union. It
would be dishonest to deny that the attitude and
action of the Soviet Union creates a threat to the
peace of the world. Their actions do belie their
peaceful protestations. They are devoting a
huge proportion of their resources to military pur-
poses. There is nothing in their history to indi-
cate that this great military machine of theirs is
dedicated to the cause of peace and freedom.
There is abundant evidence to the contrary.
There is nothing in their political literature or
philosophy to indicate that they respect weakness
even though it were weakness inspired by benevo-
lence and good will. Neither we nor other nations
who share our view of life and dedication to free-
dom are willing to place ourselves at the mercy of
the Soviet Union. The fate of the Baltic states,
of a Czechoslovakia, of a Hungary, or a Poland
is not one which we crave for ourselves or our
children.

In the face of such an aggressive imperialist
system as that of the Soviet Union, there is a pre-
requisite to negotiation. That prerequisite is
strength. It must be a strength sufficient to be
apparent to the rulers in the Kremlin. It must
be sufficient and sufficiently long maintained to
convince those rulers that their policies, their will
cannot be imposed. It must be an economic
strenght which continues to demonstrate the fal-
lacy of their Marxian concept that capitali.sm con-
tains the seeds of its own decay. It must be a
military strength which negates the possibility of
a repetition of the tragic histories of armed sub-
jection. It must be a spiritual strength which not
only stands firm but which marches confidently
forward to greater and greater well-being for the
common man and woman in every part of the
■world. On the basis of such strengtli in the free
world, the Kremlin may decide that it too has an
interest in avoiding conflict and reducing tensions.
Then negotiations may lead to their rightful goal.

Army Attache, Declared Persona
Non Grata, Withdrawn From Rumania

[Released to the press June 21]

The Rumanian Oovemment has declared persona non
grata Capt. Herschel Butsinpiller, United States Assistant
Army Attach^ of the American Legation, Bucharest, Ru-
mania. In conformity with customary diplomatic prac-
tice, the United States Government is tvithdraimng Cap-
tain Butsinpiller hut has denounced the basis of the
Rumanian Government's demand.

The United States Charge d' Affaires at Bucharest, Murat
Williams, on June 20 delivered informally to the Rumanian
Foreign Office the reply of the United States Government
as follows:

The Government of the United States has taken
note of the manner in which the Rumanian Gov
ernment has misrepresented an action on the part
of certain members of the American Legation re-
lating to the disposal of some obsolete small arms
ammunition. The United States Government has
also noted the Rumanian Government's demand in
this connection for the recall of Captain Herschel
Hutsinpiller, Assistant United States Army At-
tache at Bucharest.

It is illustrative of the conduct of diplomatic
relations by the Rumanian Government that,
through its organs of propaganda, it should have
launched a new virulent attack against the Ameri-
can Legation and the United States Government
on the basis of an artificially exaggerated and
distorted incident, without so much as first seeking
an explanation through the American diplomatic
representatives in Rumania.

It is also characteristic that, after stating on
June 9 that the Rumanian Government "would
leave it up to the United States Government to
decide what to do about Captain Hutsinpiller" and
without awaiting the transmission of a reply from
the Government of the United States, the Ruma-
nian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 14 should
have peremptorily demanded the recall of Captain
Hutsinpiller.

The quantity of the ammunition in question was
negligible. It was disposed of in an open manner
which belies assertions that this action had a clan-
destine or secretive character. The false construc-
tion placed by the Rumanian Government-con-
trolled press on the intentions of the United States
Government and its representatives in connection
with this insignificant incident is patent on its face.

The United States Government is withdrawing
Captain Hutsinpiller. At the same time, it repu-
diates the alleged justification for the Ministry's
demand. The use which the Rumanian authorities
have made of this episode and the abuse, on this as
on former occasions, of the right to declare a
foreign official unacceptable can only lead to the
conclusion that the Rumanian Government's action
is not really based upon the incident or upon the
conduct of Captain Hutsinpiller but is part of a
deliberate and centrally directed policy, being car-

July 3, 1950

ried out throughout Eastern Europe, to mterrupt
the normal conduct of diplomatic relations between
the United States and the states of that area.

On June 6, 1950, the official organ of the Ruma-
nian Workers Party (Communist) launched a new
propaganda attack upon the American Legation
at Bucharest by publishing a letter signed by a
janitor of its service attache's office. The letter
stated that the writer had been an eye witness to
the destruction by two enlisted men attached to
that office of "four cases and a small sack contain-
ing ammunition for pistol and automatic weapons."
This ammunition was said to have been thrown
into Lake Snagov, a small lake in the environs of
Bucharest, from the jetty of a "villa" occupied by
Captain Hutsinpiller.

The Rumanian press as a whole took up the
Government-inspired cry. It related the incident
to trials of the past few years which are purported
to demonstrate espionage and subversive activities
of the American and British diplomatic missions.
The most recent of these trials produced alleged
evidence that the British Legation was hiding
arms to be supplied to groups of Rumanian dissi-
dents. The ammunition-dumping incident was
given a similar interpretation.

The underlying facts of the situation appear
to be that the reported incident involved the dispo-
sal of a small quantity of outdated ammunition
left over from the supplies of the United States
military representation of the Allied Control Com-
mission for Rumania. During the Armistice
period, that mission represented the United States
as one of the three occupying powers. It was with-
drawn in December 1947 in conformity with pro-
visions of the Treaty of Peace with Rumania.

In addition to Captain Hutsinpiller, who has
been on duty in Rumania since March 191:7, the
Americans mentioned in the Rumanian account
are Sgt. John K. Reynolds and Corp. Byron L.
Bird. The two enlisted men left Rumania June
10 according to previous schedule, in line with the
current, reduction of our Legation's staff. Captain
Hutsinpiller is leaving June 2.5.

Rumania Protests Against Travel
Restrictions on Personnel in U.S.

Statement by Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press June 23]

Over the past 3 years, the Rumanian Govern-
ment has subjected our diplomatic representation
at Bucharest to progressively severe restrictions,
impediments, and discourtesies. These not only

drastically curtail the performance by our mission
of its normal diplomatic and consular functions,
but they also violate the existing consular agree-
ment with Rumania and effectively deprive our
chief of mission of rights and privileges to which
he is entitled by his special responsibilities under
the Treaty of Peace with Rumania.

For a year now, there have been in effect in
Rumania travel restrictions which, as adminis-
tered by the Rumanian authorities virtually con-
fine our representatives to Bucharest and its imme-
diate environs. Theoretically, these restrictions
are imposed on all diplomatic personnel. Theo-
retically also, our people may travel to a few des-
ignated" places by special permission. This is of
little value since the Rumanians as a rule delay un-
duly or fail to issue travel permits.

At the time the travel restrictions were imposed,
we were given informal assurance that we had only
to ask and we would be permitted to travel to
Constanza in connection with incoming shipments
for the Legation. This, like many other such as-
surances, has proved hollow.

The Rumanian Government has deprived our
personnel of premises for which they had rental
contracts at destinations where they might be per-
mitted to go. AVlien no other accommodations are
available, it is of little use for them to travel
there.

Altogether the restrictions and harassments to
which our mission in Rumania has been subjected
by the Rumanian Government are more compre-
hensively severe than those of any other country.
We do not accept the thesis that we must conduct
our relations toward one state and its representa-
tives, regardless of its behavior toward us and our
representatives, in the same way as we would
toward other states.

The institution on May 25 of the travel-pro-
cedure applicable to personnel of the Rumanian
Legation here involves reciprocity of diplomatic
comity, a principle which the Rumanians have em-
jjhasized to an extreme degree.^ As the Rumanian
Government was informed, our administration of
the travel procedure will be carried out with a view
to the current treatment of our representatives in
Rumania.

It is interesting to note that the Rumanian pro-
test recognizes that the imposition of travel re-
strictions by a receiving country upon the official
personnel of a sending country constitutes a lim-
itation on the normal activity of a diplomatic mis-
sion. When the Rumanian Government is disposed
to remove the restrictions which it has placed on
the travel of our representatives in Rumania, we
will be ready to alter appropriately the restrictions
which are presently applicable to ijersonnel of the
Rumanian Legation here.

' Bulletin of June 5, 1950, p. 921.

Department of State Bulletin

The Need for an International Trade Organization

Views of Howard W. McGrath
Attorney General

The following letter dated April I4, 1950, was sent
from the Attorney General, Hoicard W. McOrath, to the
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
John Kce.

My dear Mr. Congressman : This is in response
to your request for the views of the Department
of Justice with respect to tlie approval of tlie
Havana Charter for an International Trade Or-
ganization, commonly known as the Ito Charter.

The Department of Justice is primarily inter-
ested in Chapter V of the Ito Charter which
would provide the first international machinery
intended to cope with restrictive business prac-
tices. Since others will, or have, commented on
other parts of the proposed Charter which relate
more directly to the work of their particular de-r
partments, I would like to direct my remarks to
Chapter V.

As you are well aware, production and market-
ing of important raw materials and manufactured
commodities in world trade are frequently con-
trolled by cartels, combines and other restrictive
international business arrangements. In their de-
sire to increase profits and avoid competition these
organizations engage in practices which reduce
the volume of world trade and employment, such
as division of fields of activity, division of mar-
kets, allocation of production or export quotas,
restriction on new capacity and fixing of prices
and terms of sale. The policy of the United
States to eliminate restrictive practices in the
foreign trade of our country has long been es-
tablished.

In the successful negotiation of the Ito Char-
ter, in general, and Chapter V in particular, fifty-
four other nations important in international
trade have now indicated a willingness to work
together with the United States in extending the
general policy of eliminating restrictive practices
in world trade. The success of our Government's,
negotiations in getting such an agreement among
other delegations representing different national
experiences and traditions is in itself an accomp-

Jo/y 3, 7950

lishment, and a real step toward breaking down
barriers to world trade.

I should like to point out at the outset that the
Ito Charter clearly preserves the strength of our
competitive traditions and our antitrust laws and
their administration. The Ito is not given the
power to interfere with the domestic laws or pro-
cedures of the United States or any other nation.

The Charter contains an express provision that
"no act or omission to act on the part of the Or-
ganization shall preclude any Member from en-
forcing any national statute or decree directed
toward preventing monopoly or restraint of
trade." This provision keeps inviolate our anti-
trust legislation. It says in effect that if the Ito
does not find a violation of the Charter in a partic-
ular instance, but the United States nevertheless
finds that its laws have been violated, the right of-
the United States to enforce its laws is not im-
paired. Ito decisions or recommendations — or
lack of them — do not supersede, supplant or mod-
ify in any way our antitrust laws.

The Charter should provide a useful instrument
for extending the principles of our competitive
system to other countries and thereby render the
enforcement of the antitrust laws themselves in-
creasingly effective. While the Charter does not
write a Sherman Act for the world, it does set a
pattern, clearly recognizable as American in ori-
gin, for curbing restrictive business practices, such
as I have pointed out above, affecting international
trade. The Organization would be empowered to
receive complaints from Member governments,
initiate investigations, hold hearings, and make
reports and recommendations for remedial meas-
ures, with final action resting in the individual
governments. Subscribing nations, agreeing to
this pattern, commit themselves to take such meas-
ures as will achieve the objective of the Charter.
The effect of this commitment is to raise the stand-
ards of other countries for curbing cartels and
restrictive business practices toward our level —

and not the reverse. In this respect, the Charter
helps to extend the concepts of free enterprise
upon which our own antitrust laws are based.

The commitment of Members to take full account
of Ito recommendations for remedial action in
specific instances, can be most useful in prevent-
ing cartels and conspiracies in restraint of interna-
tional trade. Thus, the Ito provides machinery
for effecting a substantial measure of international
cooperation in avoiding restrictive business prac-
tices, and bringing about an increasing acceptance
of free enterprise objectives.

Frequently, in the course of investigating or
prosecuting restraints upon our foreign commerce
we find some of the guilty parties wholly outside
the jurisdiction of our courts. This means that
while we may cut off some parts of the offense,
complete and adequate relief cannot always be
achieved. The result in some cases may be to limit
the effectiveness of the Justice Department and of
our courts in eliminating violations of our anti-
trust laws. The Charter provides methods which
are designed to overcome these jurisdictional limi-
tations.

One of these methods consists of voluntary con-
sultation among Member nations. Wlien a 'Mem-
ber nation considers that in any particular in-
stance a business practice has or is likely to have
a harmful effect, it may consult directly with other
Members concerned "with a view to reaching mu-
tually satisfactory conclusions." Or, if Members
wish, they may request the Ito to facilitate such
consultation. This contemplates a cooperative
method by which Members may agree among
themselves as to the best means of dealing with
mutual problems of international cartels or re-
strictive business practices. In carrying out cor-
rective measures, each Member is to act within its
own jurisdiction in accordance with its own con-
stitution and economic organization. In this way
irritating jurisdictional obstacles may be avoided.
Another method for avoiding jurisdictional bar-
riers consists of cooperation among Members "for
the purpose of making more effective within their
respective jurisdictions any remedial measures
taken in furtherance of the objectives of this
Chapter and consistent with tlieir obligations
under other provisions of this Charter." By this
procedure restrictive or monopolistic practices
may be eliminated voluntarily and amicably.

The possibilities of Ito success, so far as Chapter
V is concerned, seem good. I am sure that many
other governments have had unhappy experiences
with international cartels and would welcome a
mechanism through which harmful practices of
these enterprises might be curbed. It is hearten-
ing to note that Sweden, Norway, Canada, and
more recently Great Britain, have passed statutes
providing for continuing commissions to investi-
gate restrictive business practices within their
respective jurisdictions. These laws will help im-
plement their obligations under the Charter. The

significance of the new British law relative to the
Ito Charter was indicated in the House of Lords
during debate on the Bill. In asking for a second
reading on July 5, 1948, the First Lord of the
Admiralty (Viscount Hall), stated:

The present Bill was drafted at the same time as the
Charter was being given its final shape at Havana. The
two documents are entirely consistent; the procedure of
the International Trade Organization will, like our own,
be one of investigation into particular restrictive arrange-
ments to try to establish what effects they have on inter-
national trade. If at a later date His Majesty's Govern-
ment ratify the Charter, and are called upon to take any
action under Chapter V, this Bill will provide us with
adequate power to carry out our international obliga-
tions . . . The Bill is in line with developments in other
countries ... It has the support of all Parties in its
general purpose.

Furthermore, the Austrian Government has re-
cently introduced antitrust legislation in its Par-
liament, a commission under the Minister of Com-
merce of Denmark is drafting anti-monopoly
legislation, and the French Government is also
drafting an antitrust law.

The significant progress that has been made in
assisting the economic recovery of Western Europe
has made possible an increasing emphasis under
the ERP for the creation of an integrated Western
European economy. The liberalization of trade
and the creation of a wide Western European
market as measures to obtain increased produc-
tivity, lowered costs, a higher standard of living
and the establishment of a viable European econ-
omy can be promoted by the Ito. Following the
termination of the European Recovery Program
the Ito may well become the most important
single international instrument for the attain-
ment of an expanding competitive international
trade. Under Chapter V machinery can be estab-
lished to help prevent the regrowth of cartel ar-
rangements which would nullify by private agree-
ment these economic objectives. Promptness in
getting the Ito under way will, I believe, help to
facilitate world economic recovery and promote
continued prosperity.

The Ito represents the high water mark in
efforts to establish a cooperative intergovern-
mental organization equipped with the machinery
and procedures necessary to solve common prob-
lems in the field of international business prac-
tices. If the Ito is competently and adequately
staffed, and properly administered, it should in
my opinion, prove most helpful in eliminating in-
ternational restrictive cartel arrangements which
have worked hardships on American and foreign
economies alike. This, in turn, would also remove
an important source of international ill-will gener-
ated by restrictive cartel activities. Participation
in the Ito could provide a valuable supplement
to the unilateral action to which we have in the
past been limited.

I therefore believe we should support this Char-
ter and should participate actively in the Ito.

Department of State Bulletin

Commission on Migratory Labor

FIRST MEETING HELD

The President's Commission on Migratory La-
bor held its first meeting on June 23 to hear facts
presented by Government agencies on migi'atory
labor problems.

The President appointed Maurice T. Van Hecke,
now professor of law, North Carolina University,
Chairman of the Commission, and named as the
other members:

Robert E. Lucey, Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio,

Texas
Paul Miller, Chief, University of Minnesota Extension

Service
William Leiserson, former Chairman of the Mediation

Board
Peter H. Odegard, University of California, Professor,

Political Science

The number of migratory workers in the United
States has been variously estimated at from 1 to 5
million workers.

During this meeting the Commission received
data from the Department of Labor on manpower
problems, existing legislation and housing diffi-
culties ; from tlie Department of Agriculture con-
cerning industries using migratory labor; from
the Department of State on international compli-
cations ; from the Department of Justice on immi-
gration aspects; and from the Federal Security
Agency on welfare problems.

The Commission will formally open its offices
on June 26, in Temporary Building V at 14th
Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.

The two Washington meetings will form the
background for public hearings in various sections
of the nation, beginning in California and Texas.

Previous studies have shown that in many in-
stances living standards among migratory workers
and their families are markedly below those of
other elements in the population, and that because
of the absence of a fixed residence as well as their
specific exemption in various laws, the migratory
workers are frequently denied the benefits of Fed-
eral, as well as State and local, social legislation.

Besides the domestic migratory workers, the
United States since tlie war has imported farm
laborers, principally from Mexico. The migra-
tion from Mexico is governed by an international
agreement which was renegotiated on several
occasions, the current agreement having been
signed in 1949. A number of organizations have
taken a stand against the further importation of
alien workers, contending that domestic labor can
fulfill the needs in the United States, while other
organizations have insisted that agricultural pro-
duction would suffer if employers could not fall
back upon alien labor in instances where domestic
labor proved to be insufficient.

EXECUTIVE ORDER 101291

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of
the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows :

1. There is hereby created a Commission to be known as
the President's Commission on Migratory Labor, which
shall consist of a Chairman and four other members to be
designated by the President.

2. The Commission is authorized and directed to inquire
into

(a) social, economic, health, and educational condi-
tions among migratory workers, both alien and domestic,
in the United States ;

(b) problems created by the migration of workers, for
temporary employment, into the United States, pursuant
to the immigration laws or otherwise ;

(c) responsibilities now being assumed by Federal,
State, county and municipal authorities with respect to
alleviating the conditions among migratory workers, both
alien and domestic ;

(d) whether sufficient numbers of local and migra-
tory workers can be obtained from domestic sources to
meet agricultural labor needs and, if not, the extent to
which the temjMrary employment of foreign workers may
be required to supplement the domestic labor supply ; and

( e ) the extent of illegal migration of foreign workers
into the United States and the problems created thereby,
and whether, and in what respect, current law enforce-
ment measures and the authority and means possessed by
Federal, State, and local governments may be strength-
ened and improved to eliminate such illegal migration.

3. The Commission shall make a report of its studies to
the President in writing not later than December 15, 1950,
including its recommendations for Governmental action,
either legislative or administrative.

4. In connection with its studies and inquiries, the Com-
mission is authorized to hold such public hearings and to
hear such witnesses as it deems appropriate.

5. To the extent that the studies, inquiries, and recom-
mendations of the Commission involve considerations of
international arrangements and policies the Commission
shall consult with the Department of State.

6. All executive departments and agencies of the Fed-
eral Government are authorized and directed to cooper-
ate with the Commission in its work and to furnish the
Commission such information and assistance, not incon-
sistent with law, as it may require in the performance of
its duties.

7. During the fiscal year 1950, the compensation of the
members of the Commission (including traveling expenses
and per-diem allowances) and the exjpenditures of the
Commission shall be paid out of an allotment made by the
President from the appropriation appearing under the
heading "Emergency Fund for the President" in the Inde-
pendent Offices Appropriation Act, 1950 (Public Law 266,
approved August 24, 1949) ; and during the fiscal year 1951
such compensation and expenditures shall be similarly
paid from any corresponding or like appropriation made
available for the fiscal year 1951. Such payments shall be
made without regard to the provisions of section 3681 of
the Revised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 672), section 9 of the Act
of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1027 (31 U.S.C. 673) and such
other provisions of law as the President may hereafter
specify.

8. Thirty days after rendition of its report to the Presi-
dent, the Commission shall cease to exist unless otherwise
determined by further Executive Order.

Haekt S. Teuman
The White House
June S, 1950

' 15 Fed. Reg. 3499.

July 3, 1950

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings'

Adjourned During June 1950

Port-au-Prince Bicentennial Exposition Port-au-Prince ....

Ilo (International Labor Organization): Governing Body: 112th Session Geneva

Congress of International Association for Protection of Industrial Property Paris

International Agricultural Genetics Congress Rieti, Italy

IcAO (International Civil Aviation Organization):

Council: Tenth Session Montreal

Assembly: Fourth Session Montreal

Legal Committee: Sixth Session Montreal

High Frequency Assignment Planning Meeting for European-Mediter- Paris

ranean Region.
United Nations:

Economic and Social Council:

Economic Commission for Latin America: Third Session Montevideo

Economic Commission for Europe: Fifth Session Geneva

Technical Assistance Conference Lake Success

Who (World Health Organization) :

Executive Board: Sixth Session . Geneva

International Meeting of Tonnage Measurement Experts Stockholm

Fag (Food and Agriculture Organization) :

Latin American Nutrition Conference: Second Session Rio de Janeiro ....

International Congress for the Education of the Deaf and Dumb . . . Groningen, Netherlands .

Biennial Session of the International Committee on Weights and Measures . Sfevres, France ....

Conference of World Organization for Brotherhood Paris

Brussels Colonial Fair, Third Brussels

Tenth International Ornithological Congress Upsala, Sweden ....

Twenty-fourth Session of the Journees M6dicales Brussels

International Wool Conference Stockholm

Nineteenth General Assembly of the International Criminal Police Com- The Hague

mission.

Third Session, International Wheat Council London

International Oil Shale Conference Glasgow

In Session as of June 30, 1950

United Nations:

Advisory Council for Libya Tripoli

Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in the Pacific Pacific Area

Trusteeship Council: Seventh Session Lake Success

International Law Commission: Second Session Geneva

Permanent Central Opium Board: 55th Session, Narcotic Drugs Super- Geneva

visory Body: 34th Session; and Third Joint Session of Pcob and
Ndsb.

National Capital Sesquicentennial Celebration Washington

Ilo (International Labor Organization):

33rd International Labor Conference Geneva

UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion) :

Seminar on Adult Education Salzburg, Austria . .

Swiss-Allied Accord, Four Power Conference on Bern

IcAO Council: Eleventh Session Montreal

Caribbean Commission: Tenth Meeting Martinique

Sugar Council, International: Meeting of Special Committee London

North Atlantic Council: Planning Board for Ocean Shipping London

Electric Systems, International Conference on Large High Tension: 13th Paris

Biennial Session.

' Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.
34 Department of Sfafe Bulletin

Feb.

12-June 8

May

26-June 3

Mav

29-June 3

May 30-June 2

May

16- June 5

May

30-June 20

May

30-June 20

June

6-June 26

June 5-

Mav

31-June 14

June

12-15

June

2-16

June

2-16

June

5-13

June

5-9

June

8-11

June

10-25

June

10-17

June

10-14

June

12-18

June 19-21

June

19-20

June

26-

Apri

U-

Apri

June

14-

April

15-

June

18-

June

20-

June

22-

June

26-

June

26-

June

27-

June

29-

Calendar of Meetings — Continued
Scheduled July 1-August 31, 1950

United Nations:

Economic and Social Council:

Eleventh Session Geneva July 3-

Commission on Narcotic Drugs: Fifth Session Lake Success Aug. 21-

Subcommission on Statistical Sampling: Fourth Session Lake Success Sept. 5-

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, Regional Conference Bangkok September

of Statisticians.

Special Committee on Information Transmitted under Article 73(e) of Lake Success Aug. 18-

the Charter.

General Assembly; Fifth Session Lake Success Sept. 19-

Meeting of the Council, International Organization for Standardization . Geneva July 3-

Thirteenth International Conference on Public Education Geneva July 6-

General Assembly of the International Union of Biological Sciences . . . Stockholm July 7-

International Congress of Private Law Rome July 8-

Eighth International Congress of Agricultural Industries Brussels July 9-

Fao (Food and Agriculture Organization):

International Meeting on Dairy Technology Reading, England . . . July 10-

Meeting of Fisheries Technologists Bergen, Norway .... Sept. 17-

Fourth World Power Conference London July 10-

Seventh International Botanical Congress Stockholm July 12-

Unesco (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza-
tion):

Seminar on "The Teaching of Geography as a Means of Developing Montreal July 12-

International Understanding."

Seminar on the Improvement of Textbooks, Particularly of History Brussels July 12-

Books.

Seminar on the Role of Public and School Libraries in Adult Education. Malmo, Sweden .... July 24-

North Atlantic Council: Military Production and Supply Board .... Copenhagen July 12-

Cancer, Fifth International Congress of Scientific Research and Social Paris July 17-

Struggle Against.

Sixteenth International Congress of Ophthalmology London July 17-

Second Meeting of the International Commission for the Regulation of Oslo July 17-

Whaling.

Fourth A.ssembly, World Organization of the Teaching Profession . . . Ottawa July 17-

Third International Conference of the Legal Profession London July 19-

Sixth International Congress of Radiology London July 2.3-

Sixth International Conference of Directors of Mine Safety Research . . Paris July 24-

Stations.

Sixth International Pediatrics Congress Ziirich July 24-

Fourth International Congress of Soil Science Amsterdam July 24-

International Institute of Administrative Sciences: Eighth International Florence July 25-

Congress.

Congress of the International Union for Prevention of Venereal Disease . Ziirich July 29-

First United States International Trade Fair Chicago Aug. 7-

Eleventh International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art Venice Aug. 8-

Radio and Television Exhibition Copenhagen Aug. 11-

Penal and Penitentiary Commission, Twelfth Congress of the Interna- The Hague Aug. 13-

tional.

International Congress of the History of Science Amsterdam Aug. 14-

Fifth International Congress on Microbiology Rio de Janeiro .... Aug. 17-

Edinburgh Film Festival Edinburgh Aug. 20-

Izmir International Trade Fair Izmir Aug. 20-

Eighth Convention of Speech and Voice Disorders Amsterdam Aug. 21-

Itu (International Telecommunication Union):

Fifth Session, Administrative Council Geneva Aug. 21-

Extraordinary Administrative Radio Conference The Hague Sept. 1-

First International Congress on Archives Paris Aug. 23-

Vineyards and Wine, Sixth International Congress on Athens Aug. 23-

International Federation for Housing and Town Planning: 20th Interna- Amsterdam Aug. 27-

tional Congress.

Ninth International Congress of the Historical Sciences Paris Aug. 28-

Ilo-Who Meeting of Joint Committee on Industrial Hygiene Geneva Aug. 28-

First International Conference on Alcohol and Traffic Stockholm Aug. 30-

International Conference of Mathematicians Cambridge, Mass. . . . Aug. 30-

iuly 3, 1950 35

U.S. Delegations to
International Conferences

Methods and Techniques of Adult Education

The Department of State announced on June 19
that the United States delegation to the Inter-
national Seminar on Methods and Techniques of
Adult Education, to be held near Salzburg,
Austria, June 18-July 29, is as follows :
Chairman

Watson Dickerman, assistant professor of education,
School of Education, University of California, Berkeley,
Calif.

Delegates

Ruth M. Brewer, assistant to director, Chicago Council on
Foreign Relations, Chicago, 111.

Robert H. Levin, national education director. Amalgam-
ated Clothing Workers, Headquarters, Congress of
Industrial Organizations, New York, N. Y.

Thomas A. Van Sant, director. Adult Education, Baltimore
Board of Education, Baltimore, Md.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization (Unesco) and the World
Federation of United Nations Associations are
jointly sponsoring the Seminar, which is being
convened in response to a recommendation of the
Unesco International Conference on Adult Edu-
cation held at Elsinore, Denmark, in June 1949.

The objective of the Seminar is to make a practi-
cal study of the methods and techniques of adult
education with a view to contributing to the ad-
vancement of such methods and techniques ; arriv-
ing at a general concept of adult education and
practical conclusions with regard to leadership
training and seminar techniques; and preparing
documents designed to assist adult education
leaders and workers not present at the Seminar.
An integral part of this study will be consideration
of ways and means by which adult education can
be used to promote international understanding.

It is expected that the Conference will establish
four working groups to deal specifically with the
following topics : organization and administration
of adult education programs; intellectual and
scientific training techniques employed to foster
the adult's mental development; the economic and
social training of adults; and methods and tech-
niques appropriate for initiating adults into the
arts, as well as activities suitable to the educational
use of spare time.

Ornithological Congress

The Department of State announced on June 12
that Dr. Alexander Wetmore, Secretary of the
Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C., has
been named chairman of the United States dele-
gation to the Tenth International Ornithological
Congress which convened at Upsala, Sweden, on
June 10. Dr. Wetmore is also President of the

Congress. Assisting Dr. Wetmore are the follow-
ing United States delegates :

Dr. Herbert Friedmann, curator of birds, United States

National Museum, Washington, D.C.
Dr. Alfred O. Gross, professor of biology and director,

Kent Island Scientific Station, Bowdoin College,

Brunswick, Maine
Frederick C. Lincoln, assistant to the director. Fish and

Wildlife Service, Department of the Interior
Dr. S. Dillon Ripley, curator of birds, Peabody Museum,

Yale University, New Haven, Conn.
Dr. Josselyn Van Tyne, curator of birds. Museum of

Zoology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich.

The Tenth Congress, the first since World War
II, was organized by the Ornithological Society
of Sweden. On the program of the Congress are
included discussions on bird bandino^ and bird
migration. In addition, delegates will have an
opportunity to observe the migration, hibernation,
estivation, and feeding habits of various birds
through excursions before and after the Congress
to many points of ornithological interest, such as
breeding places, in Sweden.

The United States is one of the few nations in
which ornithology is a matter of practical govern-
ment administration. This fact is the result of
the enactment of such basic laws as the Lacey Act,
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which imple-
mented conventions between the United States and
Canada and between the United States and Mexico,
and the Migratory Bird Conservation Act.

Consular Conference

The Department of State announced on June 5
the opening of a 3-day consular conference at Rio
de Janeiro. The American Ambassador to Brazil,
Herschel V. Johnson, ranking Embassy officers,
representatives from the Department, and prin-
cipal officers of the consular posts in Brazil are
meeting to discuss subjects of common interest,
with emphasis on consular and administrative
matters. This conference is being held in pursu-
ance of the Department's policy of bringing
together departmental and field officers fop
discussion of mutual problems.

Representing the Department are the following
officers :

William P. Hughes, executive director, Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs

Elbridge Durbrow, chief-designate. Division of Foreign
Service Personnel

William K. Ailshie, special assistant, OflSce of Consular
Affairs

Principal officers from consular posts attending
the conference are :

Julian C. Greenup, consul general, Sao Paulo

V. Lansing Collins, Jr., consul, Porto Alegre

George E. Miller, consul, Recife

Robert C. Johnson, Jr., consul, Salvador

Arthur G. Parsloe, consul, Santos

Williams Beal, vice counsul, Vit6ria

George T. Colman, consul, BeWm

Richard A. Godfrey, vice consul, Fortaleza

Department of State Bulletin

Technical Assistance

The Department of State annoimced on June 13
that the following United States delegation has
been designated to attend the first meeting of the
United Nations Technical Assistance Conference
which convened at Lake Success on June 12.

United States Representative

Willard L. Thorp, Assistant Secretary for Economic Af-
fairs, Department of State

Deputy United States Representative

Walter Kotschnig, Director, Office of United Nations Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, Department of State

Advisers

Eleanor Dennison, Office of United Nations Economic and
Social Affairs, Department of State

William O. Hall, Director, Office of International Admin-
istration and Conferences, Department of State

Louis K. Hyde, Jr., United States Mission to the United
Nations, New York

Paul W. Jones, Jr., Division of International Administra-
tion, Department of State

In recognition of the need for a broad attack on
problems of economic development, the President
of the United States, in his inaugural address of
January 20, 1949, called upon all countries to pro-
vide technical assistance for the development of
underdeveloped areas, such assistance to be ren-
dered where practicable through the United Na-
tions and the specialized agencies of the United
Nations.

After the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, pui-suant to a resolution of the Economic
and Social Council, had, in May 1949, issued a
report on the extent and manner in which the
United Nations and the specialized agencies could
contribute to a technical assistance progi'am, the
Economic and Social Council, meeting at Geneva
in the summer of 1949, studied such questions as
how the expanded program should be planned and
coordinated, how it should be financed, and how
it should be administered.

Arrangements were made, and, subsequently,
unanimously approved by the members of the
United Nations in the General Assembly in the
fall of 1949, for annual programs of technical
assistance to be planned by the secretariats of the
various agencies acting together; for the over-all
program to be financed through a special account
to be established by the United Nations, to which
all governments belonging to any of the partici-
pating organizations would be invited to contrib-
ute; for this fund to be distributed among the
organizations on the basis of agreed percentages ;
and for the respective secretariats to have respon-
5ibility for administering and operating the pro-
2;ram, while policy control would be vested in the
Economic and Social Council and ultimately in
-he General Assembly of the United Nations and
:he conferences or governing bodies of the
igencies.

The forthcoming Conference will be primarily

concerned with ascertaining the total amount of
contributions available from participating gov-
ernments for the execution of the technical assist-
ance programs of the United Nations and the spe-
cialized agencies during the first year of its opera-
tion. The Conference must also give final consent
to plans for the allotment of proportionate shares
of the total amount of contributions to the various
participating organizations.

Plans are now under way for the coordination
of bilateral programs to be carried out by the
United States with those of the United Nations.

Wlieat Council

The Department of State announced on June 16
that the third session of the International Wlieat
Council will convene at London on June 19
with the following United States delegation in
attendance :

Delegate

Stanley Andrews, director. Office of Foreign Agricultural
Relations, Department of Agriculture

Alternate Delegate

Elmer F. Kruse, assistant administrator for commodity
operations. Production and Marketing Administra-
tion, Department of Agriculture

Advisers

Maurice M. Benidt, chief. International Wheat Agreement
Staff, Production and Marketing Administration, De-
partment of Agriculture

James O. Foster, director. Commodities Division, Office of
International Trade, Department of Commerce

Francis A. Linville, assistant chief. Economics Resources
and Security Staff, Department of State

Paul O. Nyhus, agricultural attach^, American Embassy,
London

Adviser and Secretary

Gordon Eraser, United States member of Executive Com-
mittee of Wheat Council, London

The International Wlieat Council was estab-
lished in 1949 pursuant to the terms of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement of March 23, 1949, an
instrument designed to assure supplies of wheat
to importing countries and markets for wheat to
exporting countries at equitable and stable prices.
Administration of the provisions of the agreement
is the primary function of the Council which is
composed of the 39 exporting and importing
countries parties to the agreement. Each coun-
try may be represented on the Council by a dele-
gate, an alternate, and such technical advisers as
are necessary.

The forthcoming session of the Council will
discuss how quantities brought into the agreement
by accessions and by increase of quotas shall be
apportioned among the exporting countries. This
apportionment involves agreement among the
four exporting counties, i.e., Australia, Canada,
France, and the United States.

Ajnong other subjects for consideration by the
third session of the Council are: review of the

iuly 3, 1950

operative problems connected with the recording
of sales and the reporting of the status of quota
fulfillment to members by the Secretariat ; review
of changes in the rules of procedure suggested by
the Executive Committee and determination of
powers to be delegated to the Executive Commit-
tee; election of members of the Executive Com-
mittee for the crop year 1950-51; election of a
chairman and vice chairman ; elaboration of a
budget for 1950-51; and the time and place of the
next meeting of the Council.

Congress for Education of Deaf and Dumb

The Department of State announced on June 5
that Leonard M. Elstad, president of Gallaudet
College, Washington, D.C., and Maj. Jerome G.
Sacks, MSC, assistant chief of the Clinical
Psychology Branch, Office of the Surgeon General,
Department of the Army, will represent the
United States Government at the International
Congress for Education of the Deaf and Dumb at
Groningen, the Netherlands, beginning June 5.

The Netherlands Government is sponsoring this
Congress in commemoration of the establishment
160 years ago of the Royal Institution for the
Deaf and Dumb in Groningen.

Teaching by ear or vibration, by talking visibly,
and other methods of improving the means of
communication by the deaf will be intensively
studied at the forthcoming Congress. Although
considerable progress has been made in the United
States, in recent years, in developing improved
methods for teaching children born without hear-
ing to speak, in many other countries such instruc-
tion is confined to lip reading and sign language.

In many other countries, little stress is placed
on the education of deaf students after the com-
pletion of the elementary grades, in contrast to
the United States where the deaf are urged to
complete at least a hig'h school education and
where there is the only college in the world for
deaf students. In an effort to find means of rais-
ing educational standards for the deaf every-
where, the forthcoming Congress will discuss pro-
grams of vocational education, higher education,
and out-of-school education for the deaf.

Other topics which have a close correlation to
improvement of means of communication by the
deaf and their education will also be discussed.
Among the topics will be: the testing of the deaf;
language and thinking — psychological problems
of the deaf ; and aftercare of the deaf.

Journees Medicates

The Department of State announced on June 8
that two delegates have been named to represent
the United States Government at the 24th session
of the Journees Medicales (Medical Days of Brus-
sels) convening at Brussels on June 10. They are:
Col. Robert U. Merikangas, MC, USA, Chief of
Medicine, 97th General Hospital, Frankfort, Ger-

many; and Walter G. Nelson, Medical Director,
Public Health Service, American Embassy, Paris,
France.

Annual meetings of the Journees Medicales are
sponsored by the Belgian Government to bring
together distinguished doctors with the object of
keeping the practicing physician in touch with
current medical research. An International Expo-
sition of Sciences and Arts as applied to medicine,
surgery, pharmacy, and hygiene will, as in the
past, be held in conjunction with the 24th session.
Representatives of the United States Govern-
ment have participated in most of the meetings of
this organization since 1932.

U.S. Representative Named

to NAC Board for Ocean Shipping

The Department of State announced on June 19
that Huntington T. Morse, special assistant to the
administrator of the Maritime Administration of
the Department of Commerce, has been appointed
the United States representative on the North At-
lantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping. Mr.
Morse will fill this post in addition to his other
present duties.

At its fourth session in London, on May 18, the
North Atlantic Council announced that it had
established, in furtherance of article 9 of the
Treaty, a North Atlantic Planning Board for
Ocean Shipping.^ This Board will report directly
to the Council and will work in close cooperation
with other bodies of the Treaty organization in all
matters relating to merchant shipping in defense
planning.

Achieving a Community Sense — Continued from.'page 17
overcome the obstacles in our path must be con-
sonant with our aims, and must accord with our
deepest moral sense.

The fundamental moral value on which our
society rests is the brotherhood of man. To the
extent that our actions abroad, and our relations
among ourselves at home, are expressive of this
humanist principle, we shall create a good that
will live after us.

It is not in the words we profess, but in what we
do, and in how we do it, that our ends will be
found.

Justice Holmes expressed it:

Man Is born a predestined idealist, for he is born to act.
To act is to alfirm the worth of an end, and to persist in
aflirming the worth of an end is to make an ideal.

' Bulletin of May 29, 1950, p. 830.

Department of State Bulletin

The United States in the United Nations

[June 24-30]

Security Council

The Security Council on June 27 adopted a
resolution, introduced by the United States, rec-
ommending that United Nations members "fur-
nish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as
may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to
restore international peace and security in the
area."' ' The resolution, opposed only by Yugo-
slavia, received seven affirmative votes. The
Soviet representative was not present. Egypt
and India stated tliat they had not received in-
structions from their Governments and, therefore,
could not participate in the vote. However, at a
Council meeting on June 30, the Indian repre-
sentative announced that his Government accepted
the resolution, while the Egyptian representative
said that Egypt would have abstained in the vote,
because it considered that the Korean situation is
just another element of the East-West conflict.

In presenting the resolution, Warren E. Austin
of the United States called it a "logical conse-
quence" of the Council's resolution of June 25 ^ and
of the North Korean authorities' failure to observe
it. Ambassador Austin read President Truman's
statement of June 27 ^ announcing that United
States air and sea forces had been ordered "to give
the Korean Government troops cover and sup-
port." In concluding his remarks. Ambassador
Austin said that the "keynote of the resolution and
my statement and the significant characteristic of
the action taken by the President is support of the
United Nations purposes and principles — in a
word 'peace'." *

Two Yugoslav resolutions were defeated by the
Council. At the emergency meeting on June 25,
Yugoslavia proposed that the Council call for
cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of forces
and "invite the Government of North Korea to
state its case before the Security Council." At the
June 27 meeting, Yugoslavia presented a resolu-
tion by which the Council would renew its call

' See ante p. 7.
' See ante p. 4.
' See ante p. 5.
* See ante p. 6.

July 3, 1950

for cessation of hostilities, invite the North
Koreans to send a representative to the United
Nations, and, in addition, initiate a procedure of
mediation.

Economic Commission for Latin America

The Economic Commission for Latin America,
which held its third session at Montevideo, Uru-
guay, on June 5-21, adopted a number of resolu-
tions dealing with problems of economic develop-
ment, technical assistance, immigration, foreign
investments, foreign trade, and agricultural credit.
The most important of the resolutions, one on
economic development and anticyclical policy, con-
tains a declaration of general principles. The
resolution was strongly endorsed by the 17 Latin
American delegations present (Costa Rica, Peru,
and Venzuela were not represented) and ap-
proved by the French, Netherlands, and United
Kingdom delegations. The resolution is so sweep-
ing in character, however, that the United States
delegation felt compelled to state that, although
it would vote in favor of the resolution, it did so
"subject to study by its government to determine
whether there is anything in the resolution which
may not be in harmony with United States eco-
nomic policy and international commitments."

Trusteeship Council

Discussion of the annual reports on the trust
territories of British and French Togoland was
completed by the Trusteeship Council on June 29,
and a committee consisting of Belgium, Iraq, the
Philippines, and the United States was appointed
to draft the Council reports on these territories.

Excejit for an annex including individual opin-
ions of Council members, examination of the
drafting committee's report on Australia's annual
report on New Guinea was concluded on June 28.
Approval was given to the drafting committee's
report on New Zealand's annual report on Western
Samoa on June 29. On that day, the Council also
approved nine resolutions submitted by its ad hoc
Committee on Petitions dealing with petitions
from New Guinea and the British and French
Cameroons.

General Policy Page

North Korean Forces Invade South Korea:
U.S. Presents Cease-Fire Resolution to Se-
curity Council. Statement by Ambassador

Ernest A. Gross 3

U.S. Air and Sea Forces Ordered Into Sup-
porting Action. Statement by the Presi-
dent; Remarks by Secretary Acheson ... 5
U.S. Asks Security Council To Assist in Re-
pelling Attack. Statement by Ambassador
Warren R. Austin 6

The Korean Experiment in Representative
Government. Statement by John Foster
Dulles 12

Achieving a Community Sense Among Free
Nations — A Step Toward World Order.
Address by Secretary Acheson 14

Keeping Peace in the Caribbean Area. By

Edward A. Jamison 18

Upholding Principles and Rights of Others in
the Process of International Negotiation.
By Philip C. Jessup, Ambassador at Large . 26

Army Attach^, Declared Persona Non Grata,

Withdrawn From Rumania 29

Rumania Protests Against Travel Restrictions
on Personnel in U.S. Statement by Secre-
tary Acheson • • • • 30

Treaty Information

Soviet Violations of Treaties and Agreements. . 8

Page

Tax Treaty Negotiations To Open With Israel . 13
The Need for an International Trade Organiza-
tion. Views of Howard W. McGrath,
Attorney General 31

The United Nations and
Specialized Agencies

The United States in the United Nations ... 39

International information and
Cultural Affairs

Commission on Migratory Labor. Executive

Order 10129 33

International Organizations and
Conferences

Calendar of Meetings 34

U.S. Delegations:

Methods and Techniques of Adult Educa-
tion 36

Ornithological Congress 36

Consular Conference 36

Technical Assistance 37

Wheat Council 37

Congress for Education of Deaf and Dumb . 38

Journ^es Medical es 38

U.S. Representative Named to Nac Board for

Ocean Shipping 38

mmy&^mtdo^

Edward A. .Tamison, author of the article on keeping peace in the
Americas, is ofiicer in charge, Special Political Affairs, Office of Re-
gional American Affairs.

U. 5. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE) 19B0

tJne/ ^eha/yi7}teni/ ^ t/taie^

-fcti^

ACT OF AGGRESSION IN KOREA:

Address by Secretary Acheson '^^^^^' 43

Statement by John Foster Dulles 49

SUPPORT OF MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE

PROGRAM FOR 1951 • Statement by Secretary
Acheson 31

LABOR'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS • By Bernard

Wiesman 54

For complete contents see back cover

Vol. XXIII, No. 575
July 10, 1950

^ENX o^

<'^^^^*.

^Ae Qlefi€t/)tim,&rvt jCL ^ate V^ W i 1 \D L 1 i 1

Vol. XXIII, No. 575 • Publication 3906
July 10, 1950

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington 25, D.C.

Price:

62 issues, domestic $6, foreign $8.60

Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has
been approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (February 18, 1949).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
OF State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.

Tlie Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication compiled and
edited in the Division of Publications,
Office of Public Affairs, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the De-
partment of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes
press releases on foreign policy issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as special
articles on various phases of inter-
national affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and in-
terruitional agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department, as
well as legislative material in the field
of international relations, are listed
currently.

ACT OF AGGRESSION IN KOREA

REVIEW OF U.N. AND U.S. ACTION
TO RESTORE PEACE

Address hy Secretary Acheson'^

I would like to review with you the facts of the
situation which I am sure is uppermost in your
minds — the events which have been taking place
and are now going on in Korea.

I think you will agree that this has been what
newspaper men call a fast-breaking story.

The immediate events of the story go back less
than 5 days. On Saturday afternoon — it was just
before daybreak of Sunday morning in Korea —
without warning and without provocation, Com-
munist forces of the north launched a coordinated
full-scale assault on the Republic of Korea. After
heavy artillery fire, Communist infantry began
crossing the 38th parallel at three points, while
amphibious forces were landing at several points
on the east coast, some 20 miles to the south.

First reports to reach the capital at Seoul, 30
miles below the 38th parallel, were fragmentary
and confused. There had been small border
forays on many previous occasions, and the mag-
nitude of this attack was not immediately cleai'.

Our Ambassador at Seoul, John Muccio, imme-
diately got in touch with Korean Army headquar-
ters, through our Military Advisory Group, and,
as soon as it became evident that this was more
than another border incident, he cabled the State
Department.

Ambassador Muccio's cable reached the State
Department code room at 9 : 26 Saturday night,
having crossed an inquiry the Department had
sent to him a few minutes before, based on the
first press flash on the action.

' Delivered before the 17th annual convention of the
American Newspaiser Guild, Washington, D. C, on June 29
and released to the press on the same date.

Within a matter of minutes, the message was
decoded and the Department was alerted for
action.

By 10 : 30 p.m., our Assistant Secretary for Far
Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk, and the Secretary of
the Army, Frank Pace, were conferring at the
Department.

By 11:00, Secretary Pace had alerted the De-
partment of Defense, a full operating staff was on
duty at our Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, and I
had discussed the situation by phone with the
President.

Action developed along two fronts in the State
Department during the night.

One group of Department officers worked
through the night preparing for a meeting of the
Security Council which we had immediately re-
quested. The United Nations had established the
Republic of Korea and had, since early 1948, main-
tained a Commission in Korea. We, therefore,
felt a primary responsibility to bring this matter
to the immediate attention of the United Nations.

By Sunday afternoon, within 20 hours of the
time the first official word of this invasion was re-
ceived here, the Security Council had taken its
first action. Representatives of 10 member na-
tions of the Security Council had been assembled
from their Sunday places of rest — the eleventh
was the representative of the Soviet Union, who
stayed away. After hearing the report of the
United Nations Commission concerning the un-
provoked act of aggression, the Security Council
passed a resolution which called for an immediate
end to the fighting and for the assistance of all
members in restoring the peace. All actions
taken by the United States to restore the peace in
Korea have been under the aegis of the United
Nations.

Another group of Department officers, mean-
while, were working with their colleagues in the

Jo/y TO, 7950

Defense Department, consulting on measures to
be taken within the framework of existing policy
and plans and the emergency orders of the
President.

Complete Study Ready for President

The President flew to Washington. By the
time he had arrived, at 7 : 20 Sunday evening, com-
pleted staff work and recommendations had been
prepared and were laid before him. The De-
partments of State and Defense had worked as
one department, with complete agreement and co-
ordination of effort.

During Sunday night and early Monday morn-
ing, actions flowing from the conference with the
President were set in motion. General MacAr-
thur was authorized to respond at once to urgent
appeals from the Govermnent of Korea for addi-
tional supplies of ammunition and in a matter of
hours was flying into Korea loaded transport
planes with fighter protection to assure their safe
arrival. At about the same time, the Seventh
Fleet with all men aboard was steaming north out
of Subic Bay, to be on hand in case of need.

It became possible on Monday to get a clearer
picture of the military situation, by sifting the
fragmentary and sometimes conflicting reports
we had been receiving from many different
sources.

From the size and speed of the Communist at-
tack, it was evident that it was a premeditated ac-
tion ; that it had been carefully plotted for many
weeks before. The initial thrust, supported by
planes and tanks, had clearly caught the Korean
Government troops by surprise. Although the
defending forces rallied and launched several
small counteractions, it did not appear that they
were in a position to bar the tank-and-plane-sup-
IJorted Communist thrust down the corridor to the
capital city.

By Monday night, in the light of this situation,
recommendations were prepared by the President's
civil and military advisers on the course of action
to be taken. In preparing these recommendations,
it was clear to all concerned that this act of ag-
gression had brought in issue the authority and,
indeed, the continued existence of the United Na-
tions and the security of the nations of the free
world, including the United States and its forces
in the Pacific. These recommendations were pre-
pared with the sober realization of the issues in-

volved and with the full agreement of all the
President's advisers.

As in many other situations which have arisen
in the years in which I have served as Under
Secretary and Secretary, the President was faced
with difficult decisions which had to be made
quickly. And as in the previous cases, the Presi-
dent assumed the responsibility, made the deci-
sions, and has given leadership and direction to
the entire action of the Government of the United
States.

Consultations with Congressional leaders on
Tuesday morning demonstrated a complete unity
in understanding the problem and the course of
action which needed to be taken.

At Tuesday noon, the President announced the
actions which this Government would take to sup-
port the United Nations and uphold a rule of law
in the Pacific area.

In the interval between the meetings of the Se-
curity Council on Sunday and again on Tuesday,
the United Nations Commission on Korea had con-
firmed tlie fact that the Communist authorities in
North Korea had ignored the cease-fire order and
defied the authority of the United Nations. There-
fore, the Security Council recommended at its
meeting Tuesday night that member nations give
aid to the Rei^ublic of Korea and help to restore
peace and security to the area.

Yesterday — i days after the fighting began — the
fall of Seoul was confirmed, but American air
and sea support for Korean Government troops
was beginning to make itself felt, and peace-loving
nations the world over were able to hope that this
act of brutal, unprovoked, and naked aggression
would not be allowed to succeed.

Historical Background

It may be useful at this point to review briefly
the background of recent history against which
the present act of aggi'ession against Korea is to
be considered.

Since the nineteenth century, American mission-
aries, doctors, and educators have been especially
active in Korea, so that through the years of
Japanese occupation, which began in the first dec-
ade of this century, the Korean people came to
regard the United States as a symbol of the free-
dom and independence to which they aspired.

In the Cairo Declaration of December 1943, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and China
pledged their determination that Korea would be-

DeparlmenI of Sfafe Bulletin

come free and independent. This pledge was re-
affirmed in the Potsdam Declaration of July 26,
1945. and was subscribed to by the Soviet Union
when it entered the war against Japan 13 days
later.

The defeat of Japan made it possible for Korea
to look forward to the realization of its desire for
independence.

On the day following the first Japanese offer
of surrender, which was made on August 10, 1945,
the Secretary of War submitted to the Secretary
of State a plan for the arrangements to be fol-
lowed in accepting the surrender of Japanese
troops in various places. To meet the immediate
problem, it was proposed that the nearby Soviet
troops accept the surrender of Japanese armed
forces in Korea down to the 38th parallel and that
American troops be brought up from Okinawa
and the Philippines to accept the surrender of
Japanese troops in the southern part of Korea.
This arrangement was approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee, and the President and, after it had
been accepted by Generalissimo Stalin, was in-
corporated in the first general order to be issued
by General AlacArthur as Supreme Commander
for the Allied Powers on September 2, 1945.

Soviet troops had occupied the northern part
of Korea on August 12. The Soviet desire and
intention to put troops into Korea had been made
evident at the Potsdam discussions, 1 month be-
fore. On September 8, American troops had been
landed to accept the surrender of the Japanese in
the southern part of Korea, 4ind we began efforts
to negotiate with the Soviet Union for the unifi-
cation and independence of the country.

We soon found that the Soviet Union consid-
ered the 38th parallel not as a line drawn on a
map for the sake of administrative convenience
but as a wall around their preserve.

U.S.S.R. BLOCKS KOREAN UNITY

At the Moscow meeting of Foreign Ministers in
December 1945, a joint commission for the unity
and independence of Korea was agreed to between
the Soviet Union and ourselves, but we found that
every effort to give effect to this agreement and
i:irevious agreements was blocked by Soviet in-
transigence.

The United States was unwilling to permit this
situation to delay further the realization of Korean
independence.

This Government therefore laid the question
of Korean independence before the United Na-
tions. The General Assembly of the United Na-
tions, in November 1947, called for an election in
Korea under the observation of a United Nations
Commission, to choose a representative national
assembly for the purpose of drafting a democratic
constitution and establishing a national gov-
ernment.

The Soviet Union refused to allow the United
Nations Commission to enter its zone. Conse-
quently, the right of the Korean people to par-
ticipate in a free election to establish a free govern-
ment was confined to southern Korea. The
election was held there, and the Government
of the Republic of Korea was established on
August 15, 1948.

U.S. EFFORTS TO SUPPORT REPUBLIC

It has been the aim of the United States to pro-
vide the people of the Republic of Korea with suf-
ficient assistance and support to enable them to
progress through their own efforts toward free-
dom and independence. The transfer of functions
from the United States Army Military Govern-
ment to Korean agencies was carried out
progressivelj' from the moment of the establish-
ment of the Republic.

The United States has continued to give assist-
ance and support to the Republic, both within the
framework of the United Nations and directly.
We have trained and equipped Korean defense
forces, we have extended economic aid and tech-
nical advice, fostered exchange of students and
professors, and, in general, done everything pos-
sible to help the people of Korea in establishing
a democratic jiolitical and economic structure re-
sponsive to their needs.

The Government of the Republic of Korea was
accepted by the United Nations, in December 1948,
as the validly elected, lawful Government of the
area in which elections were permitted — and the
only such Government in Korea. The General
Assembly established a reconstituted Commission
to continue to work for unification and a repre-
sentative government for the entire country.

The United States recognized the new govern-
ment on January 1, 1949. Many other members
of the United Nations have since done the same.
Membership of the Republic of Korea in the
United Nations has been blocked by the Soviet
veto.

July 10, 1950

38TH PARALLEL— A PART OF THE IRON CURTAIN

Meanwhile, the 38th parallel had become a part
of the Iron Curtain. Behind that curtain, the
Soviet Union established a Communist regime.
The formal creation of this regime was proclaimed
on September 9, 1948, as the so-called "Democratic
People's Republic of Korea," claiming jurisdiction
over the entire country. This regime has lived,
as it was created, in complete defiance of the
United Nations.

The great single fact which stands out from this
summary history is that a peaceful people ruled
by a sovereign independent government of their
own choosing, brought into being by the United
Nations and recognized by the great majority of
the free nations of the world, was attacked in a
cynical and brutal act of aggression.

We are confronted with a direct challenge to
the United Nations. Whether this organization,
which embodies our hopes for an international
order based on peace with justice and freedom,
can survive this test will depend upon the vigor
with which it answers the challenge and the sup-
port which it receives from free nations.

Free Nations Answer Aggression

The President has enunciated the policy of this
Government to do its utmost to uphold the sanctity
of the Charter of the United Nations and the rule
of law among nations. We are, therefore, in con-
formity with the resolutions of the Security Coun-
cil of June 25 and June 27, giving air and sea
support to the troops of the Korean Government.
This action, pursuant to the Security Council reso-
lutions, is solely for the purpose of restoring the
Republic of Korea to its status prior to the in-
vasion from the north and of reestablishing the
peace broken by that aggression.

In order that the Communist movement may
not further threaten the security of the Pacific
area by force of arms, we shall increase military
assistance to the Philippines and to the forces of
France and the Associated States in Indochina.

The President has also ordered the Seventh
Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa, and we
have called upon the Chinese Government on
Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against
the mainland. This action is not intended to
determine the future status of Formosa, which

can be settled only upon the restoration of peace
and security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with
Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.

As a further measure toward the restoration of
peace, we have, through our Embassy in Moscow,
asked the Soviet Government to exercise its in-
fluence with the North Korean authorities for the
withdrawal of the invading forces and the cessa-
tion of hostilities in Korea.

In conclusion, the action of the United States
Government in Korea is taken in support of the
authority of the United Nations. It is taken to
restore peace and security to the Pacific area.

It is taken in the conviction that peace and
security cannot be obtained by sacrificing the in-
dependence of nations to aggression.

Free men the world over have spoken out with
one voice since this dawn attack was launched 5
days ago. They endorse our resolve and stand
with us in support of the United Nations. Those
Governments in a position to provide armed forces
to assist in the support of the Republic of Korea
are already taking steps to provide that support.

It is now clear to all — if indeed, it was not clear
before — that free nations nmst be united, they
must be determined, and they must be strong, if
they are to preserve their freedom and maintain
a righteous peace. There is no other way.

THE PRESIDENT AUTHORIZES
USE OF GROUND UNITS

[Released to the press hy the White Bouse June 30]

At a meeting with Congressional leadere at the
White House this morning, the President, together
with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reviewed the
latest developments of the situation in Korea.

The Congressional leaders were given a full
review of the intensified military activities.

In keeping with the United Nations Security
Council's request for support to the Republic of
Korea in repelling the North Korean invaders and
restoring peace in Korea, the President announced
that he had authorized the United States Air Force
to conduct missions on specific military targets in
Northern Korea, wherever militarily necessary,
and had ordered a naval blockade of the entire
Korean coast.

General MacArthur has been authorized to use
certain supporting ground units.

Deparimeni of Sfafe Bulletin

ANSWER TO CHINA'S OFFER
TO SEND TROOPS

[Released to the press July 2]

On June 29 and 30, the Chinese Qovernment informed
the Ooveniniciit of the United States of the willinciness of
the Chinese Qovernment to send land troops to South
Korea to assist in the operations now going on in that
country. The Chinese Qovernment asked for the opinion
of the United States Government on this matter. The
aide-mimoires received from the Chinese Qovernment
follow.

Aide-memoire of June 29

The Government of the Eepublic of China re-
ceived today a communication from the Secretary-
General of the United Nations requesting it, in
accordance with the resohition adopted by the
Security Council on June 27, 1960, to furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be
necessary to help repel the armed attack from
North Korea. The Chinese Republic is willing
to send land troops to South Korea to assist in the
operations for the purpose. The Chinese Govern-
ment will be glad to be apprised of the opinion of
the United States Government at its earliest con-
venience. In view of the urgent situation in South
Korea, the Chinese Government is instructing the
Chief of the Chinese Mission in Japan to approach
General MacArthur and inquire about the pos-
itive measures which may be desired.

Aide-memoire of June 30

The Chinese Government will make available
for use in South Korea to repel the armed attack
of North Korea one army of seasoned troops of
approximately 33,000 men suitable for operations
in plains or hilly terrain.

These troops carry the best equipment at China's
disposal.

For the transportation of these troops the
Chinese Government will provide 20 air trans-
ports of the type of C-46 ancl, if necessary, can give
a reasonable amount of air cover. If the troops
are to be transported by sea, the Chinese Govern-
ment can provide a moderate amount of naval
escort.

These troops can be ready for embarkation in
five days.

The United States Qovernment, icithont assuming in
any way to speak for the United Nations, expressed its
opinion to the Chinese Qovernment on July 1 in the fol-
loiving terms.

In response to the request contained in the
Chinese Embassy's Aide-Memoire of June 29,
1950, the appropriate authorities of the Govern-
ment of the United States have given considera-
tion to the expression of willingness on the part

of the Government of the Republic of China to
furnish ground forces for service in Korea in sup-
port of the United Nations.

The Secretary of State desires to inform His
Excellency the Ambassador of the Republic of
China of the deep appreciation of the United
States Government for this prompt and substan-
tial demonstration of support for the United
Nations on the part of the Government of the
Republic of China. In light, however, of the
threat of invasion of Taiwan by Communist forces
from the mainland, a threat repeated in the last
day or so by spokesmen for the Chinese Com-
munist regime in Peiping, it is the view of the
Government of the United States of America that
it would be desirable for representatives of Gen-
eral MacArthur's Headquarters to hold dis-
cussions with the Chinese military authorities on
Taiwan concerning the plans for the defense of
the island against invasion prior to any final de-
cision on the wisdom of reducing the defense forces
on Taiwan by transfer of troops to Korea. It
is understood that General MacArthur's Head-
quarters will be in communication with the ap-
propriate Chinese military authorities on Taiwan
with a view to the dispatch from Tokyo of repre-
sentatives of General MacArthur's Headquarters
for this purpose.

U.S.S.R. RESPONDS TO REQUEST
FOR MEDIATION

[Released to the press June Z9'\

The American Embassy at Moscow on June 27,
1950, communicated with the Soviet Foreign Of-
fice in regard to the invasion of the Republic of
Korea by North Korean armed forces.

The Embassy called to the attention of the So-
viet Foreign Office the fact that forces of the
North Korean regime had crossed the 38tli paral-
lel and had invaded, in force, the territory of the
Republic of Korea at several points. It was also
pointed out that the refusal of the representative
of the Soviet Union to attend the Security Coun-
cil meeting in New York despite the clear threat to
the peace and despite the obligations of a Council
member under the United Nations Charter re-
quired the Government of the United States to
bring this matter directly to the attention of the
Government of the U.S.S.R.

The Embassy concluded by calling attention to
the universally known close relations between the
Soviet Union and the North Korean regime and
stated that the United States Government was
asking assurances that the Soviet Union would
disavow responsibility for this unwarranted and
unprovoked attack and that it would use its influ-
ence with the authorities of North Korea to with-
draw their invading forces at once.

Ambassador Alan G. Kirk today was read the

Ju/y 10, 1950

following statement by Deputy Soviet Foreign
Minister Andrei Gromyko :

In connection with the statement of the Government of
the United States of America transmitted by you on June
27, the Soviet Government has instructed me to state the
following :

1. In accordance with facts verified by the Soviet Gov-
ernment, the events talking place in Korea were provoked
by an attacli by forces of the South Korean authorities
on border reuions of North Korea. Therefore the respon-
sibility for these events rests upon tlie South Korean
authorities and iipon those who stand behind their back.

2. As is known, tlie Soviet Government withdrew its
troops from Korea earlier than the Government of the
United States and thereby confirmed its traditional prin-
ciple of noninterference in the internal affairs of other
states. And now as well the Soviet Gdvernment adheres
to the principle of the impermissibility of interference by
foreign powers in the internal affairs of Korea.

3. It is not true that the Soviet Government refused to
participate in meetinss of the Security Council. In spite
of its full willingness, the Soviet Government has not been
able to take part in the meetings of the Security Council
in as much as, because of the position of the Government
of the United States, China, a permanent member of the
Security Council, has not been admitted to the Council
which has made it impossible for the Security Council to
take decisions having legal force.

PRECEDENT CONTRADICTS SOVIET
ALLEGATION OF ILLEGALITY IN U.N. ACTION

[Released to the prcus June SO]

In its reply to the United Nations and to the
United States, the U.S.S.K. alleges that the ac-
tion of the Security Council with respect to Korea
was illegal, since, the action taken did not have
the concurring votes of all the permanent mem-
bers. In its reply of June 29, to the United States
communication of June 27, asking the U.S.S.R. to
use its influence with the North Korean authori-
ties to cease hostilities, the U.S.S.R. made the same
point and contended, further, that the action of
the Council was illegal because the representative
of China participating in this action was not the
representative of the Feiping regime.

With respect to article 27 of the Charter dealing
with Security Council voting, it is provided that
substantive questions be decided by an affirmative
vote of seven members including the concurring
votes of the permanent members.

By a long series of precedents, however, dating
back to 1946, the practice has been established
whereby abstention by permanent members of the
Council does not constitute a veto.^

In short, prior to the Soviet allegations, every
member of the TTnited Nations, including the
U.S.S.R. accejjted as legal and binding decisions of
the Security Council made without the concur-
rence, as expressed tlirough an affirmative vote,
of all permanent members of the Council.

As to the Soviet claim concerning the Chinese
vote, the rules of procedure of the Security Coun-

' See Bulletin of July 4, 1948, p. 3.

cil provide the machinery for the seating of an
accredited representative of the Security Council.
No affirmative action has been taken which, by
any stretch of the imagination, could give force
to the contention of the U.S.S.R. that a representa-
tive of the Peiping regime should be regarded as
the representative of China on the Security Coun-
cil. The credentials of the representative of the
National Government of China were approved by
the Council, and the Soviet attempt, at a later
date, to withdraw this approval was defeated.
Therefore, the vote of the Nationalist representa-
tive on June 25 and 27 was the official vote of
China.

A list of some of the more important prece-
dents involving action by the Security Council on
substantive matters taken without the concurrence
of an affirmative vote by the Soviet Union follow :

Palestine Case

On April 16, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained
on a resolution which called for a truce in
Palestine.

On IMay 22, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained on
a resolution for a "cease-fire"' in Palestine.

On July 15, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained
on a resolution ordering a "cease-fire" in Palestine
and giving instructions to the Mediator there.

On November 4, 1948, the Soviet Union ab-
stained on a resolution calling upon all govern-
ments concerned to withdraw beyond positions
they held in Palestine on October 14. 1948.

In none of these instances has the Soviet Union
challenged the legality of the action taken by the
Security Council.

Kashmir Case

On January 17, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained
on a resolution calling upon the parties concerned
to avoid actions aggravating the situation.

On January 20, 1948, the Soviet Union ab-
stained on a resolution for setting up a United
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and
which gave that Commission broad terms of ref-
erence.

On April 21, 1948, the Soviet Union ab-
stained on a resolution expanding the terms of
reference of the United Nations Commission for
India and Pakistan and which set the terms for
bringing about a "cease-fire" and the conditions
for the holding of a plebiscite.

On June 3, 1948, the Soviet Union abstained
on a resolution which affirmed previous resolution
and ordered the United Nations Commission to
proceed to the area.

In none of tiiese instances has the Soviet Union
challenged the legality of the action taken by the
Security Council.

Indonesian Case

On December 24, 1948, the Soviet Union ab-
stained on a resolution calling upon the parties

Deparfmenf of Sfafe Bulhfin

to cease hostilities and ordering the release of
Indonesian officials. In that ease, the French also
abstained.

On January i2S. 1949, the Soviet Union abstained
on a nnmber of paragraphs of a resolution setting
up tlie United Nations Commission for Indonesia
with wide powers.

In none of these instances has the Soviet Union
challenged the legality of the action taken by the
Secnritj' Council.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union has never ques-
tioned the legality of action taken by the Security
Council in which it voted with tlie majority but
on which other permanent members of the Council
abstained.

This action has occurred in at least thi'ee sub-
stantive decisions :

1. In the action of the Council on December 28,

1948, in which a resolution was passed calling on
the Netherlands to set free political prisoners in
Indonesia (a resolution introduced by the repre-
sentative of China). France and the United
Kingdom abstained on this resolution.

2. In the action of the Council on March 4,

1949, recommending to the General Assembly that
Israel be admitted to United Nations membership.
The United Kingdom abstained on this resolution.

3. In the action of the Council on March 5,
1948, i-ecommending consultation of the perma-
nent members of the Council in connection with
the Palestine situation. The United Kingdom
abstained on this resolution.

Tlie voluntary absence of a permanent member
from the Security Council is clearly analogous to
abstention.

Furthermore, article 28 of the Charter provides
that the Security Council shall be so organized
as to be able to function continuously. This in-
junction is defeated if the absence of a repre-
sentative of a permanent member is construed to
have the effect of preventing all substantive action
by the Council.

No one of the 10 members of the Council par-
ticipating in the meetings of June 2.5 and June
27 raised any question regarding the legality of
the action — not even the member who dissented
on June 27.

ECA AIDS SOUTH KOREA

The Economic Cooperation Administration an-
nounced on June 26 that it took immediate action
to back up the resistance of the South Korean
people in their heroic struggle to maintain their
independence.

Dr. Edgar A. J. Johnson, Director of ECA's
Korean pi-ogi-am, stated that "primary emphasis is
being placed upon the setting up of machinery for
the jH'ompt procurement of supplies and equip-
ment that can be shipped to Korea from Japan or
the United States." Dr. Johnson said that 'Sve

July 10, 1950

will bend every effort to meet the ci'isis that immi-
nently threatens a free nation."

ECA"s immediate-action program consisted of:

1. Diverting all vessels carrying war nonessen-
tials to ports where they would not fall into Com-
munist hands.

2. Rearranging shipping schedules so that all
available supply vessels could be used to rush mili-
tary supplies to the besieged peninsula.

;3. Insuring that nonmilitary supplies, such as
fertilizer, are diverted to other ports to keep dock
workers free for unloading of guns and ammuni-
tion.

4. Switching its procurement progi-am to an
emergency basis. (Essential commodities like
petroleum and foodstuffs would be given priority
over such normal peacetime exports as fertilizer
and raw cotton.)

5. Coordinating its activities with the United
States Army Forces in Japan.

A MILITARISTIC EXPERIMENT

Statement by John Foster Dulles ^

I have just returned from 2 weeks in Korea and
Japan. Last week I was in Seoul, the capital of
Korea, on the invitation of President Ehee. Now
he is a fugitive, and the Embassy residence where
Mrs. Dulles and I were staying is being looted by
the Reds.

Earlier this week, Mrs. Dulles and I were quietly
dining at our Embassy in Tokyo with General
and Mrs. MacArthur. Now the General is lead-
ing the American and Allied air, sea, and land
forces, fighting the Red aggressors in Korea.

Events have happened fast. The Communists
of North Korea struck hard and suddenly with
strong forces well-equipped with Russian tanks,
Russian planes, and Russian heavy artillery.
They have made big initial gains, and it will not
be easy to stop them and throw them back.

Why did the North Korean Reds make this
armed attack on the peaceful Republic of South
Korea ? One thing is certain, they did not do this
purely on their own but as part of the world
strategy of international communism.

It is possible to make a good guess as to why
Communist strategy directed this present attack
against the Republic of Korea.

Reason for Attack

In the first place, the Republic of Korea was
growing in such a healthy way that its presence
on the continent of Asia was an embarrassment to
the Communist areas. In South Korea, I talked

' Prepared portion of a radio interview over CBS at
Wasliinfiton, D.C., on July 1 which was released to the
press on the same date.

with all sorts of people, and everywhere I got the
impression of a happy, wholesome society. There
had just been the second general election, which
was watched by representatives of the United Na-
tions. It was a free and fair election ; 80 percent
of the eligible voters had gone to the polls, and
the representatives elected were men and women
of fine character. I attended the opening of the
Assembly, and it was an inspiring event.

The economy of the country was picking up
with some American economic help. All in all,
the prospects were good.

This Republic of Korea was attracting a con-
stant stream of refugees from the north who
wanted to escape from Communist despotism.
Just 2 weeks ago tonight, at this very hour, I was
meeting at Seoul with a group of 3,000 Christian
refugees from the north. We were in a great new
church which was in process of construction. I
talked to the refugees through an interpreter, and
I have never seen men and women more clearly
dedicated to Christian principles.

The Communists seem to have felt that they
could not tolerate this hopeful, attractive Asiatic
experiment in democracy. They had found that
they could not destroy it by indirect aggression,
because the political, economic, and social life of
the Republic was so sound that subversive efforts,
which had been tried, had failed. The people
were loyal to their Republic. Therefore, if this
experiment in human liberty was to be crushed,
this crushing could only be done by armed attack.
That is what is being attempted.

A second reason which doubtless influenced them
was the desii-e to embarrass our plans for putting
Japan more and more onto a peace basis, with in-
creasing self-government in the Japanese people
themselves. I went to Japan so as to be able to
advise the President and the Secretary of State
as to what our next moves should be in carrying
forward the program of making Japan a full mem-
ber of the free world. Secretary of Defense John-
son and General Bradley, the Chief of Staff, were
in Japan at the same time looking into the situa-
tion from the standpoint of its security aspects.

The Communists must have feared the positive
and constructive steps which we were considering
in regard to Japan. They probably felt that if
they could capture all of Korea this would throw
a roadblock in the path of Japan's future develop-
ment. The Russians already hold the island of
Sakhalin, just to the north of Japan, and Korea is
close to the south of Japan. Thus, if the Com-
munists have not only Sakhalin to the north but
also Korea to the south, Japan would be between
the upi^er and lower jaws of the Russian Bear.
That, obviously, would make it more difficult to
provide the Japanese people with security as self-
governing, unarmed members of the free world.

Broadly speaking, the United States was de-
veloping positive and constructive policies to check

the rising tide of communism in Asia and the
Pacific. The Communist leaders doubtless expect
their action in Korea to dislocate our plans.

Attack Strengthens Free World

They will, I think, be disappointed. The result
of their armed attack on the Republic of Korea
will be to strengthen both the resolution and the
capabilities of the free world. We now know we
have to meet a new danger to world peace and
security. We have always known that Commu-
nists believed in advancing their cause by methods
of violence. We have, however, hoped, up to now,
that they would limit themselves to violence of an
internal character such as strikes, sabotage, and
possibly guerrilla and civil warfare. We hoped
that they would not use military might to attack
and conquer peaceful countries in open violation
of the principles established by the United Na-
tions to insure international peace and security.

The Korean attack marks a new phase in Com-
munist recklessness. If the members of the United
Nations sat idly by and did nothing to repel the
present armed attack, then almost certainly that
method would be used elsewhere. One country
after another would be conquered by Red armies,
and the result would be to make a third world war
almost certain. Also, by that time, the Russian
position would be so strong that the United States
and other remnants of the free world would be in
great peril.

Fortunately, the world is organized for peace
better than in 1939. The United Nations Security
Council acted almost instantly to condemn the ag-
gression on Korea and called on the member states
to help repel the attack. The j^rompt response of
the United States and other members shows that
aggressors cannot now act with impunity.

The President of the United States, with bi-
partisan backing, has given our nation, and indeed
the entire free world, fine leadership. Tlie Ameri-
can people are united for action, not only in Korea
but also, as the President has pointed out, to pre-
vent Formosa, Indochina, and the Philippines
falling into Communist aggression.

In my recent book. War or Peace, I said that
men would never see lasting jjeace unless they
were willing to mobilize for peace the moral and
material resources that they would mobilize for
war.

We are now waging peace. I think we shall
win it. It will not be won easily. It will require
sacrifices and will involve risks. It seems that
the immediate risk is not general war but rather
that of an experimental probing effort to find out
whether, under present world conditions, armed
aggression pays. That militaristic experiment
nuist fail. If we, with other free nations, make
it fail, then we will have made an epochal step
toward lasting peace.

Department of State Bulletin

Support of Mutual Defense Assistance Program for 1951

Statement by Secretary Acheson ^

I appear before you today to support an ap-
propriation for the continuance of the Mutual De-
fense Assistance Program during fiscal year 1951.
This appropriation is required for three purposes :
First, to provide new obligational authority for
the program which is proposed for the forthcom-
ing 12 months ; second, to provide cash to liquidate
this year's contract authority ; and third, to make
available, for use in fiscal year 1951, that small
portion of cash and contract authority which is
required to complete the current program and
which may still remain unobligated on June 30.

On October 28, 1949, Congress appropriated
$814,010,000 in cash and $500,000,000 in contract
authority for the purposes of carrying out the
Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949. This
represented a total of $1,314,010,000 in new obli-
gational authority.

The appropriation of these funds did not occur
until late last year. Their expenditure, in large
part, was made contingent upon certain condi-
tions precedent which were not fulfilled until late
in January. Nevertheless, as was estimated in
hearings before this Committee last year, it has
been possible to obligate these funds almost com-
pletely. Thus, we have been able to inaugurate
the planned programs of aid which are so essen-
tial to our security and to proceed with further
plans and programs which are solidly based on
the foundations thus constructed. The legisla-
tion before this Committee includes a request that
that the small proportion of authorized funds not
yet obligated be made available for future obli-
gation. This is necessary in order to complete the
1950 progi-ams already begun. Also in the legis-
lation before you is a request for appropriations
to liquidate $455,523,729 worth of contract obli-
gations which have been entered into pursuant to
the authority granted last year.

The most important aspect of the proposed

" Made before the Senate Appropriations Committee on
June 26 and released to the press on the same date.

legislation, is, of course, the provision of funds
for the continuation of the Mutual Defense As-
sistance Program in 1951. For this purpose,
$1,222,500,000 is requested. The total is proposed
to be allocated as follows :

Allocation of 1951 MDAP Funds

A total of 1 billion dollars for provision of
military assistance to our partners in the North
Atlantic area; $131,500,000 for provision of mili-
tary assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Iran;
$16,000,000 for provision of military assistance to
the Republics of the Philippines and Korea, and
$75,000,000 for provision of assistance in the gen-
eral area of China.

I want to assure this Committee that I fully
appreciate that these are not small sums. It is
equally true that the problems we face are neither
small nor susceptible of cheap and easy solution.
The most careful and extensive consideration of
the need for these appropriations has been given
by the three agencies of the executive branch pri-
marily concerned — the Department of Defense,
the Economic Cooperation Administration, and
the Department of State. We have sought care-
fully to determine what is necessai-y in the present
world situation to maintain and enhance our se-
curity, what are the most effective and best means
for achieving that result, and what is required to
assure that we will obtain the maximum return.

When this Committee and the Congress last
year considered and approved an appropriation
for military assistance for nations in the North
Atlantic area, there had been a similar careful ex-
amination of requirements and methods, but there
was absent then an element of great importance
which is present now. That element is experience.
This year, we have the benefit of actual operation
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(Nato) . The results to date are highly encourag-
ing ; they are real ; they are substantial ; they augur
well for the future.

The members of the North Atlantic Treaty have

July 10, 1950

achieved an amazing record, a record of peace-
time cooperation for peace unprecedented in his-
tory. Let us quickly review these remarkable
accomplishments from the point of view of what
they signify with respect to the next year.

Achievement of NAP Countries

The quick agreement of the North Atlantic
Treaty countries upon a strategic concept for the
integrated defense of the North Atlantic area as-
sured us that all the member nations are agreed
that tlie defense of the North Atlantic area can
not and will not be based on 12 individual and
separate nationalistic defense schemes but, rather,
on a coordinated and integrated defense plan for
the entire area, under which each nation would
play the role for which its location and resources
best fit it. We knew last year that such an agree-
ment must be reached if the task of defending the
area was to be met efficiently and effectively. The
fact that it was reached, and that it was reached
quickly, is significant of the mutual realization
and acceptance of the need for it by all the Treaty
members.

The progress made under the North Atlantic
Treaty is not confined to the acceptance of the
basic principles contained in the mutually agreed
and approved strategic concept. This was but
the fii-st step in a long series required to give life
and strength to the compact.

An effective organization, designed to meet and
solve the problems involved, has been established
by the North Atlantic Treaty countries. That or-
ganization, on its military side, provides the
means to reach sound collective military judg-
ments, with respect to the defensive requirements
for the North Atlantic Treaty area. On its fi-
nancial and economic side, it provides a means for
tackling the difficult problems involved in finding
ways and means to meet the common need for in-
creased strength. Illustrative of common prob-
lems are those involved in agreeing upon
production location and procedures, financing of
production, and transfers, standardization, and
the like. The agreement reached at the recent
North Atlantic Treaty Council meeting to estab-
lish a permanent Council of Deputies will provide
a mechanism in continuous operation to guide,
coordinate, and integrate the work of the various
subordinate bodies of the organization.

Outstanding in the progress of the Nato to date
is the resolution of the North Atlantic Treaty
Council urging governments in developing forces
for the defense of the North Atlantic area to con-
centrate on the creation of balanced collective
forces rather than balanced national forces. This
resolution, which, significantly, also urged the
progressive build-up of defense forces, exemplifies
the realistic and forthright determination of all
members to proceed vigorously and to base their
efforts on a principle of fundamental importance.

The bilateral agreements between the North

Atlantic Treaty countries and the United States,
under which our aid is provided, are solemn under-
takings wliich assure that our assistance is but a
part of, and is matched by, a cooperative self-help
program designed to increase the defensive
strength of the area. That these undertakings
were sincere and earnestly supported by all par-
ticipants has been borne out by the implementing
deeds thereunder. Thus, in spite of the continued
necessity of attaining economic recovery and sta-
bility, wliich is essential to the success of any
defense effort in Western Europe, oiu- European
partners are progressively devoting greater effort
and more funds to meeting defense needs. In spite
of the violent and full-scale Soviet propaganda at-
tacks against the program of defense, and despite
Soviet efforts to promote strikes and violence to
prevent the unloading of material being shipped
under this program, these nations have proceeded
courageously, steadily, and effectively to increase
the defensive strength of the area, through their
own efforts and with our help. The fact that they
have and are so acting is significant of a new spirit
which is being developed in Eui'ope, a spirit which
is based upon the conviction that the job can and
will be done.

The proposals recommended by the Administra-
tion for fiscal year 1951 are specifically related to
these accomplishments. The manner in which
next year's program has been developed demon-
strates this fact. "Wliile based on a variety of
factors, those fundamental to our consideration
here are: First, the program consists of those
items most urgently needed at this time, based
on the i-equirements for the defense of the area as
they have been developed by the planning of the
Treaty Organization; second, it takes account of
the ability of the European nations, actively co-
operating together on the basis of self-help and
mutual aid, tlirough their own increased military
production, to fill these requirements without
destroying their economic stability; third, it is
limited by the capability of the European nations
to support forces and the capacity of those forces
to assimilate the aid which can be furnished; and
fourth, it is governed by our own military supply
position and capacity to furnish aid.

Assistance Promotes Security of U.S.

What has been agreed to, accomplished, and
undertaken to date offers us full assurance that
our aid will contribute to the integrated defense of
the area; that it will be utilized solely for the
build-up of balanced collective defense forces, and
that we will, thereby, promote the security of the
United States.

This program for next year will certainly not
complete the task of building adequate defensive
strength in the North Atlantic area. Much re-
mains to be done; Soviet Russia still pursues the
course of arming for aggression, threatening the
weaker nations, jn-obing for their weakest spots,

Department of State Bulletin

refusinp; to work through the United Nations for
peace. We have not yet been able fully to deter-
mine the exact size and nature of the defensive
strength required to insure us against future ag-
gression against the North Atlantic area. We do
know that our defenses are far too weak; we do
know that we must aid our partners to build up
their forces swiftly.

We also know that the spirit of the peoples of
the North Atlantic area is progressively more
hopeful, reflecting an increasing conviction that
free peoples, working freely together on terms of
equality and mutual understanding, can make
their own defense a real and attainable objective.
We and our partners must continue to work hard;
we must work effectively. Each must do what he
best can to achieve the goal. By working together,
our cherished freedoms can be maintained.

Turning to the recommendation of continued
militaiy assistance for Greece and Turkey, we find
ourselves with a more extensive and equally en-
couraging record. The success which has been
achieved by the peoples of Greece is clear proof
that the forces of aggression can be halted by in-
voking the pi'oper measures at the proper time.
The Greek Government now has full control of
all its territories for the first time since 1940.
These hard-won gains must not be lost. Greece
must continue to build up its defensive strength in
order to maintain its internal security which is
so essential to the attainment of economic and po-
litical stability. The people of Greece must be aole
to subdue, quickly, any possible recrudescence of
Communist guerrilla activities. The successes so
far, which United States aid enabled the Greeks
to attain, do make it possible for military assist-
ance from the United States to be reduced sub-
stantially below that provided last year. The
Greek program is a concrete illustration of the
practical values of providing military assistance
to peoples determined to defend themselves and
their liberties.

The record of our program of military assistance
to Turkey is another one of which we can be proud.
The Turkish people, even before any provision of
assistance by us, and unprepared for modern war-
fare though they were, withstood Soviet pressures.
With our assistance, supplementing their own de-
termination, this strong resistance against con-
tinued Soviet pressures has been based on an in-
creasing ability to meet force with force. The
Turkish will to resist is characterized by its ex-
penditure of 35^0 percent of its revenues for

military purposes. These heavy expenditures,
which cannot be increased without serious en-
dangering of the Turkish economy, cannot provide
the equipment which is required to complete the
modernization of the Turkish armed forces and
to provide the further training in modern warfare
which is needed. Our continued assistance will
enable Turkey to meet the requirements imposed
by a ruthless potential aggressor.

I need not, in discussing the request for the con-
tinuation of military assistance to Iran, elaborate
on its strategic position and the importance to the
free world of maintaining its security. To main-
tain its security, Iran needs modern well-equipped
forces. Iran cannot, in its present economic con-
dition, meet its needs without help. It requires
assistance to modernize its forces and to meet its
most urgent military deficiencies. We propose to
aid Iran in filling some of its most urgent needs
in order that it may become capable of meeting
its security problems.

The situation in the Far East was never more
than today a matter of the gravest concern to this
Government. The bill before the Committee pro-
vides $16,000,000 in additional funds for aid to
Korea and the Philippines and $75,000,000 for aid
in the general area of China. The importance of
obtaining these funds need not be underlined.
All matters relating to United States aid in the
Far East are now in the hands of the President
for his decision so far as the executive branch is
concerned. Under these circumstances and at his
direction, I shall not talk today about possible
courses of action in that area. It must be obvious
that the immediate passage of tlris bill, with the
funds which it will provide for use in the Far East
and the flexibility which it contains, is of the
greatest importance.

In summary, I would like to repeat what I said
earlier : It is our sincere and honest judgment that
this program, and every dollar of it, is urgently
needed for the security of our friends and our-
selves. Military assistance is not a panacea of
all the ills of the world, nor will this pi-ogram solve
all the problems with which we must deal. I am
convinced, however, that this aid will contribute,
and materially contribute, to the creation of situ-
ations in which we may be able more efl'ectively to
deal with and to solve those problems.

Our objective is peace. If we are to have peace,
the free nations of the world must be strong.
This program will aid them in the achievement
of that strength which will discourage aggression
and promote peace.

July 10, 1950

LABOR'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

hy Bernard Wiesman ^

American labor is so important a segment of the
American population and so dynamic a force in
American economics and politics that it must play
a major part in the shaping of American diplo-
macy. Even if labor were to remain completely
silent, its very silence would influence American
policy and remove one of the most potent in-
fluences which now constitute America's activity
in world affairs.

Labor's role in world affairs is obviously that
of one section of the American people and pre-
supposes similar activity by other elements of
American life whether they be in industry or
agriculture, in religion or in education.

Labor is more than a numerical portion of the
American population so far as world affairs are
concerned. Labor has a special significance in
the production of essentials of national life and
of international trade. In addition, it has a par-
ticular importance in people-to-people relation-
ships. In the present phase of world progress,
working people are in the lead in what might be
described as a revolutionary development. In
some of the older industrial countries, labor has
come of age and has begun to exercise the duties
of the head of the family. In newer countries,
there is an almost frantic haste to bridge within
months or years the experience of many centuries.
In such areas, working people are being invited
to take on roles of responsibility in the political,
social, and economic life of their country for which
they have lacked even the most elementary of the
three E's. Whether this situation is good or bad

' This article is based on an address delivered before
the eight annual conference of the Labor Education As-
sociation at Swarthmore, Pa., on June 17.

is not the question. It is a fact, and we must try
as a nation to face facts and to build upon them
the structures which, in the long range, will be
in the best interests of all concerned.

Control of the organized labor movement of the
world is among the foremost objectives for which
the Kremlin is now waging its cold war. Labor's
role in world affairs, therefore, becomes a matter
of major significance to our country as a whole.
Leaders in AFL, CIO, and Railway Brotherhoods
have a keen realization of that fact and have taken
effective steps aimed to checkmate the Comin-
form's program as exemplified in the so-called
World Federation of Trade Unions (Wrru).

Labor's Role in Promoting Freedom

What organized labor can do to promote the
basic freedoms in the present world is a respon-
sibility for labor to decide. The Department of
State has no desire to dictate to labor what it
should do or to try to control what labor does.
We know that we neither have the right nor the
wisdom to manage the affairs of a free world labor
movement. The Department of State realizes the
fundamental truth in what President Truman re-
cently said concerning the effectiveness of Ameri-
can labor's testimony among workers in other
lands.

The Department, therefore, asks the trade-union
leaders of this country to carry America's message
abroad through all available channels and to see
that workers in other lands come to know what
our freedoms mean and to choose those freedoms
as their way of life. We want American trade
unionists to show other workers that the strength
of our nation is in its freedom, its friendliness, its

Department of State Bulletin

hope of helping others, its moral principles. We
want American trade unionists to show workers of
otlier lands that the American worker is about as
close as anyone can get to the average American
citizen, that he is a hard-working decent guy who
aims to earn his pay and get more of it, using it
for a comfortable living for his family, going to
church on Sunday, and sending his youngsters to
school and many of them to college.

If the masses of workers in other lands could
know American workers as they are, they would
reject instinctively the deceits of the Cominform,
which are predicated upon the thesis that Ameri-
can workers are either fools or knaves. The kind
of false propaganda which they peddle is based
upon the fiction that American labor leaders are
the tools of the State Department and that the
State Department is the tool of Wall Street.

The propagandists of the so-called World Fed-
eration of Trade Unions attack the new Inter-
national Confederation of Free Trade Unions as
a sort of Titoist deviationism and label it the
"Yellow Internationale." They use that label in
countries outside of the Orient. In that area, they
presumably use a different adjective.

Labor's Contribution

to International Cooperation

The trade-union centers of this country, AFL,
CIO, and Railway Labor Executives, are actively
committed to a program of international co-
operation to advance free trade unionism and to
unmask and discredit the Wftu as the satellite
of the Cominform. The AFL, the CIO, and the
United Mine Workers all participated in the
founding, last December at London, of the In-
ternational Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(IcFTu). The Railway Labor Executives under-
standably make their international cooperation
through the IcFTU-affiliated International Trans-
portworkers' Federation (Itf). Credit should be
acknowledged to the part played by two great
American trade unionists in bringing about the
affiliation of the Railway Labor Executives with
the Itf at a time when it was the sole rallying
point of international opposition to the Wftu.
I refer to the late Bob Watt, of the AFL, and the
late Harry Frazer, of the Railway Labor Exec-
utives.

Membership in these world organizations is by
no means the only evidence of AFL or CIO ac-
tivity internationally. Both have standing in-

ternational committees composed of executive
council members and full-time international
representatives. Both devote an extensive por-
tion of the time of the aimual conventions to in-
ternational affaii's and the President and Secre-
tary-Treasurer of each take direct personal in-
terest in the international activity.

The Free Trade Union Committee of the AFL
has been an active and constructive force in Europe
and Asia. Tlie Amalgamated Clothing Workers
is an example of international activity by one of
the great trade unions of the CIO. The UAW
is another CIO union which has shown initiative
in international activity. A further example, per-
haps the most dramatic because of its far-reaching
influence is the International Ladies Garment
Workers Union.

The specialized Latin American activities of the
AFL, and of the CIO, should also be noted espe-
cially in view of this country's good-neighbor
policy.

Traditional ties with other countries have also
brought fraternal relations between the trade-
union movements. A half-century practice of ex-
changing fraternal delegates has knit a bond be-
tween the AFL and the British Trades Union Con-
gress, while both AFL and CIO have sent special
representatives to Italy and Israel to help the
trade-union movements there meet their postwar
problems.

Trade-union dollars are backing up the words
of convention resolutions, and day-to-day efforts
of trade-union leaders abroad are translating the
policies of international committees.

Activities of International Labor Organizations

The International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions is the trade-union center of the free world
to which belongs almost every major labor organi-
zation which is free to choose. Those affiliated
with the International Federation of Christian
Trade Unions and a small handful of others re-
main outside at present, for cogent national rea-
sons. American labor leaders have tried hard to
secure the affiliation of all trade-union centei-s of
the free world, but the Christian unions, which
are of great importance in certain European coun-
tries, have a long tradition of international col-
laboration to seek Christian ideals of employer-
worker relations as distinguished from the Social-
ist philosophy which permeates the thinking of
their major rivals. Italy now has a unified trade-

July 10, 1950

union center of major non-Communist unions to
compete with the Communist-controlled Federa-
tion headed by Di Vittorio.

The International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions with headquarters at Brussels was cre-
ated only in December. Late in May, the Icftu
held its first Council meeting and gave evidence
that it has begun to function. Icftu is sending a
delegation of five members, including two Ameri-
cans, to make a 3-month survey of the situation in
Asian countries with a view to determining what,
if any, regional organization should be established.
Later in the year, the possibility of a Latin Amer-
ican regional set-up will be investigated. A re-
cent meeting at Dusseldorf, to consider the prob-
lems of the Ruhr, indicates the possible develop-
ment of a European unit. The Icftu is getting
under way as a nongovernmental organization with
category A consultative status with the Economic
and Social Council of the United Nations, the In-
ternational Labor Organization, etc. The Icftu
intends to be the voice of free world labor, sustain-
ing the cause of legitimate trade unions as essen-
tial in any economic democracy and as bulwarks
of any political democracy. All major American
trade unions have shown their support for the
Icftu, but it is to be expected that the unions ex-
pelled by the CIO for devotion to the Communist
Party will confirm that misguided zeal by affiliat-
ing with the Wftu.

The AVorld Federation of Trade Unions wears
a resjiectable label, placed upon it by a great
American labor leader who had thought that
active participation in Wftu would contribute to
a democratic peace. He was eager to emphasize
that it should be a bona fide trade-union system,
rather than a political mechanism for labor, but
he has long since concluded that the ideals he
sought could not be achieved in a Wftu controlled
by the Kremlin. The Wfitt was Moscow's major
postwar front organization through which Mos-
cow sought to manipulate world opinion, to con-
trol the international policies of national trade-
union centers, and to infiltrate national centers.
It was founded in 1945, and, in 1949, the three
major free trade-union members withdrew. They
had decided that they could no longer associate
with a Wftu which in 1945 appealed for all pos-
sible aid for reconstruction of Europe and which
in 1947 refused even to publicize the Marshall
Plan. The Wftu, free of the restraining influ-
ence of the legitimate trade unionists from the

United States, United Kingdom, and Nether-
lands, has enrolled itself in the service of the Com-
inform even to the extent of denouncing the
Wftu Executive Council member from Yugo-
slavia severing ties with him as a Titoist, and of
divorcing tiie Yugoslav labor oi-ganization of
which he is Secretary General, from contact with
other members of the Wftu. The color of the
Wftu was also shown by the pronounciamentos
at its Peiping meeting late last year. In language
of plainly incendiary character, it called upon the
workers of Asia to follow the example of China
and to overthrow their alleged exploiters in the
governments of the new and old nations of Asia.
The Wftu delegates at Peiping included a choice
collection of Asian representatives who have been
in process of education at Moscow for many years
and who are evidently being returned to their
native lands for subversive activities among the
workere in such countries as India, Indonesia, and
Malaya.

Perhaps, the best description of the Wrru of
today is that it is the company union for the Com-
inform in which membership ordinarily is com-
pulsory for Communist-dominated unions and
through which the Wftu management hopes to
sabotage and destroy legitimate, and hence free,
trade unionism.

In this hemisphere, the Confederation of Latin
American Workers predated the Wftu but rarely
has deviated from the master pattern.

AFL and CIO leaders are now working with
the Icftu leadership toward a legitimate demo-
cratic regional organization. The sponsors of the
Inter-American Confederation of Labor, estab-
lislied only 2 or 3 years ago as a rallying point for
iniions free of Communist control, are eager to
take such steps as will effectuate their original
intent in union with the Icftu. Similiar
strengthening of two other regional organizations
is expected through the Icftu. I refer to the
Asian Federation of Labor which held its first
regional meeting in Ceylon last January and to
the ERP-Trade Union Advisory Committee in
Europe.

Mention must be made of another form of inter-
national cooperation among workers. I refer to
the international trade secretariats or, as they
might be called, the international industrial or
craft federations. There are more than a dozen
of these affiliated with the Icftu in a cooperating
arrangement which preserves the essential auton-

Department of State Bulletin

omy of these federations. This group includes
the International Federation of Transport work-
ers wliich combines national organizations repre-
senting between 4 and 5 million workers in marine,
rail, highway, and air transport in countries all
over the world. The International Metal Work-
ers, the Miners' Federation, the Textile "Workers
are among the next largest. Only one of these
groups has chosen to desert freedom and that one
is the journalists' union where leadei-ship was
secured on a narrow margin and the organization
perverted to Communist aims. Organizations
such as the Newspaper Guild have accordingly
left the group.

In Europe, most of these international trade
secretariats have functioned since early in this
century. They have supplied fraternal ties among
workers in the great industries, and those which
have enjoyed any substantial income have been im-
portant factors in the economic life of the Conti-
nent. They are not competitors of the Icftu.
They have their own financing through dues col-
lected from national affiliates such as the Kailway
Labor Executives, the Machinists, the UAW-CIO,
the Mine Workers, etc.

The importance of their work is emphasized by
the energy with which the World Federation of
Trade Unions, having failed to capture the secre-
tariats, has undertaken to set up rival organiza-
tions. The Wrru program, originally, was to
transform the autonomous secretariats into indus-
trial departments of the Wrru. Wlien the major
free unions left the Wrxu, it undertook to estab-
lish international unions with the appearance of
autonomy which could invite the affiliation of out-
fits such as the International Longshoremen's and
Warehousemen's Union. There Wrru agencies
have sought to get the affiliation of any national
unions of like-minded leadei'ship even when the
national trade-union center has repudiated the
Wftu itself and denounced all of its arms and
legs.

Labor's role in world affairs is recognized in
the operations of the United Nations and its organs
and specialized agencies. On the one hand, many
national delegations include among their dele-
gates or advisers men and women from labor-
union leadership. On the other hand, as author-
ized in the Charter of the United Nations,
international nongovernmental organizations have
been accorded consultative status with the Eco-
nomic and Social Council and its commissions.

The Icftu and the Ifctu now are among the cate-
gory A consultants which also include the Wftxt.
The Transport workers are in category B which
consists of the more specialized groups. Ameri-
can labor leaders have been among the United
States delegations to the International Trade Or-
ganization Preparatory Conference and to confer-
ences of the World Health Organization and of
the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organization as well as on the National
Commission for Unesco.

The Operation of the ILO

I have reserved mention of the International
Labor Organization until now. The Ilo is the
unique intergovernmental organization which,
since 1919, constitutionally includes in its confer-
ences and Governing Body, representatives of
employers and workers who jointly share author-
ity on a par with those of governments in formu-
lating international labor standard treaties. It
was created at the urgent demand of a few great
progressive leaders at Versailles. The Ilo is ded-
icated to the principle that enduring peace must
be founded on social justice and that the pro-
gressive improvement of conditions among work-
ers anywhere is essential to the well-being of
people everywhere. At Philadelphia, 6 years ago,
the principles of 1919 were reviewed by the repre-
sentatives of employers, workers, and governments
of member nations so that social progress could be
charted even while war was being desperately
waged. The solemn declaration of Philadelphia
has since been annexed to the Ilo Constitution and
demonstrates general acceptance of the facts that
"poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to pros-
perity everywhere," that "labor is not a commod-
ity," and that "freedom of expression and of
association are essential to sustained progress."

Another quote from the declaration of Phila-
delphia expresses a concise and far-reaching phi-
losophy about labor's role in world affairs :

The war against want requires to be carried on with
unrelenting vigour within each nation, and by continuous
and concerted international effort in which the represent-
atives of workers and employers, enjoying equal status
with those of Governments, jdin with them in free dis-
cussion and democratic decision with a view to the pro-
motion of the common welfare.

In the framing of that declaration, representa-
tives of the workers and employers of this coun-
try shared with representatives of this Govem-

July 70, 1950

ment. The declaration itself was transmitted by
President Roosevelt to both Houses of the
Congress.

What is an objective estimate of Ilo's contribu-
tion to the world?

The Ilo has substantially benefited the world by
building within the minds and consciences of gov-
ernments, employei's, and workers a realization of
national duty and international responsibility,
progressively, to improve the conditions of life
among working people. Many tangible proofs
exist of Ilo service to member nations, but it has
most significantly served by causing responsible
leaders to recognize the need and to accept the
challenge that remedies must be found together.

Role of the Trade Unionists

In the State Department, the importance of
having expert knowledge of what labor is think-
ing and doing is evidenced in several ways. The
Department itself, under the reorganization of
1949, has a labor adviser in each of the four geo-
graphic areas, headed by Assistant Secretaries of
State, one in the German Affairs office, which has
equivalent status because of its operating respon-
sibilities, in addition to the Labor Adviser to the
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, who
has active responsibility for relations extending
beyond the limits of any single area. Their duties
concern the activities and interests of national and
international labor organizations which extend
beyond the areas of any single geographic area and
involve political as well as economic matters.

The Department of State has trade-union con-
sultants from the AFL and the CIO who provide
valuable advice and liaison.

Top officers of the Department, beginning with
Secretary Acheson, have meetings with represen-
tative labor leaders from time to time. On some
matters, such as policy concerning relations with
Spain and the Argentine, trade unionists freely
criticize the Department's policies after careful
considerations of general over-all character which
included American labor's well-known views on
the subject. On most matters, however, American
trade unions stand firmly in support of American
foreign policy.

The Foreign Service of the United States now
includes about 30 labor attaches and labor re-
porting officers, including several trade unionists,
whose duties include knowing what the trade
unions are thinking and doing, advising Embassy

and Departmental officers of any significant de-
velopments and helping to transmit some under-
standing to trade unionists and government of-
ficials about what American labor is and does.

The Department of Labor also recognizes the
responsibility of our Govermnent to promote
understanding and cooperation among the work-
ing people and the trade unions of all countries
accessible to us. Under the Assistant Secretary
of Labor, Philip Kaiser, there is an Office of In-
ternational Labor Affairs with which our office
works closely and cooperatively. The State De-
partment does not duplicate the technical services
of the Department of Labor in connection with
international labor standards. An interdepart-
mental committee on international social policy
provides the vehicle for formal cooperation among
the several departments concerned with specific
problems. Through that device, position papers
on labor matters which may arise at Ilo or United
Nations meetings are normally formulated.

The Labor Department has a trade union ad-
visory committee on international labor affairs
which has furnished a useful channel for con-
sultation and cooperation.

EGA, of course, has formalized labor's partici-
pation in its top councils here and abroad.

Labor's role in world affairs would be meaning-
less if economic isolation were to govern its poli-
cies. The IcFTu Constitution declares as one of
its aims to —

advocate with a view of raising the general level of pros-
perity, increased and properly planned economic coopera-
tion among the nations in such a way as will encourage
the development of wider economic units and freer ex-
change of commodities and to seek full participation of
workers' representatives in olBcial bodies dealing with
these questions.

The pressing need among free peoples is to
reduce, as rapidly as consistent with the general
welfare, such artificial barriers as lead to mis-
understanding, suspicion, or exploitation. It is
to be devoutly hoped that trade unionists in all
free countries, including our own, can lead in pro-
moting the brotherhood of peoples and finding
the ways to make the adjustments necessary to
prevent or minimize local repercussions.

Conclusion

My experience in 20 years of intimate collabora-
tion with the trade-union movement of the United
States and of considerable experience with the

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

trade-union movements of other countries leads
me to assert that what is good for labor inter-
nationally is generally good for our country and
all other countries which shai'e our basic beliefs.
Workers constitute around one third of the popu-
lation, and, in many countries, the trade-union
movement which speaks on their behalf includes in
its membership one out of every three or four
workers.

The chief area of controversy usually comes in
the exercise of judgments as to whether a specific
program is good for labor and for the general
public. Honest men of good will can diiler objec-
tively in reaching a decision and, once taken, can
work to carry out that decision even if it does not
appear to any of them to be perfect. One of the
most unfortunate aspects of the trial by accusation
through which the Department is now passing is
that real common goals have been obscured by con-
troversy which should have been avoidable.

I refer to that controversy as I approach what
to me is perhaps the greatest contribution which
American labor can make in world affairs at this
time. Basic American foreign policy is, I hon-
estly believe, designed to accomplish goals which
are good for mankind and which are essential in
combating the threatened enslavement of the
minds and bodies of men.

If that objective is true, as I believe it to be, the
next problem is how to persuade the people of our
country and of the world that these goals are
their goals and that we should all work together
to attain them. It is my opinion — and one shared
widely within the Department of State — that the
American trade unions, in cooperation with the
International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions — can best convince the workers of other
lands that they should support these goals in their
own self-interest.

If I know trade unions at all, I know that they
must rest their first judgments on the credentials
a man carries. If he carries a card in a union, it
takes him as a brother unless he proves himself
to the contrary. If he carries a message to that
union, it goes on the assumption that it is designed
to be in its interest. So with American foreign
policy. If American trade unionists will take
these basic American foreign policies which they

believe are in the best interests of their brothers
and sisters of the Icfttj and endorse them for the
consideration and support of associated free trade
unions around the world, they will strike a deadly
blow at the propaganda of the Cominform and the
Wftu. Labor's endorsement is worth far more
than tons of newsprint or hours of radio time by
official spokesmen so far as convincing workers in
other lands that we are really their friends.

The essence of trade unionism, whether non-
denominational, or Socialist, or Christian, is to
be a good provider and to share its strength with
its brothers. It combines the patriotism of the
loyal citizen with the brotherhood among workers
which is truly international. With that combina-
tion Labor's role in world affairs must be active
and should always be a firm foundation for the
building of a peace and social justice.

Special Staff To Assist
Ambassador Grady in Iran

[Released to the press June 28]

Dr. Henry F. Grady, whose appointment as
United States Ambassador to Iran was confirmed
by the Senate on June 26, will have the assistance
of a special economic staff, some of whose members
have preceded him to Tehran in the past few days.
Ambassador Grady, who has been in Athens con-
cluding his duties there as Ambassador and Chief
of the American Aid Mission, is expected to arrive
in Tehran shortly.

The special staff will assist the Ambassador in
assessing the present economic situation in Iran
with authority to recommend to both Governments
appropriate steps which might be taken to bring
about improved conditions in the economic life of
this important Middle Eastern country.

The economic staff, which is expected to remain
in Iran for about 3 months, will include Leslie A.
Wheeler, a senior Foreign Service officer and well-
known specialist in agricultural economics;
George Woodbridge, officer in charge of economic
affairs, Office of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Af-
fairs of the Department of State ; and Paul Parker,
the Middle East representative of the Treasury
Department. Leslie L. Kood, a Foreign Service
officer assigned to the Embassy, will serve as execu-
tive secretary of the staff. It is expected that a
few additional specialists may be added at a later
date.

My 10, 1950

Answer to Soviet Protest on MacArthur Clemency Circular

U.S. NOTE OF JUNE 8, 1950 >

• The Department of States aclmowledges the re-
ceipt of note No. 74 of May 11, 1950 from the Em-
bassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Kepublics.
The note calls attention to Circular No. 5 "Clem-
ency for War Criminals" issued by command of
General MacArthur on March 7, 1950. It is al-
leged that the circular runs counter to the Charter
of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East and the decision of the Far Eastern
Commission of April 3, 1946, relating to the appre-
hension, trial and punishment of war criminals
in the Far East. The Government of the United
States is urged to take measures to have Circular
No. 5 revoked.

Inasmuch as the matters referred to in the note
are vrithin the jurisdiction of the Far Eastern
Commission, the request of the Soviet Government
should have been addressed to the Commission.
In this connection the attention of the Soviet Gov-
ernment is called to the minutes of the 193d meet-
ing of the Fec, May 18, 1950 which contain a
statement of the views of the United States on the
parole of Japanese war criminals. Nevertheless,
as the position of the Soviet Government is at
variance with the views of the Government of the
United States, those views are set forth for the
Soviet Government's information.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
is the sole executive authority for the Allied
Powers in Japan, and as such, has the responsi-
bility for carrying out the judgments of any inter-
national courts appointed by him. This is spe-
cifically recognized by Article 17 of the Charter
of the International Military Tribunal for the
Far East and by paragi-aph 5 (b) (1) of the Far
Eastern Commission policy decision of April
3, 1946.

Under Article 17 of the Charter of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal for the Far East the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers may
"at any time" reduce or otherwise alter a sentence
of the Tribunal except to increase its severity and
paragraph 5 (b) (2) of the Far Eastern Commis-

' Delivered on June 8 to the Soviet Embassy at Wash-
ington, and released to the press on the same date.

sion policy decision of April 3, 1946, confirms that
he has "the power to approve, reduce or otherwise
alter any sentences," imposed by any international
courts appointed by him. Whether the Supreme
Commander can exercise his power to reduce or
otherwise alter a sentence "only while considering
the question of the approval of this sentence" as
contended in the Soviet Government's note or
whether this may be done "at any time" as provided
by Article 17 of the Charter quoted above is un-
necessary to consider at this time as no reductions
or alterations in the sentences imposed by the In-
ternational Military Tribunal for the Far East
have been made by the Supreme Commander and
none are contemplated by him.

The Soviet Government is apparently under the
impression that paroles such as are provided for
by Circular No. 5 are alterations of the sentences
imposed by the International Military Tribunal.
This is fundamental error. A parole is in no
sense an alteration of a sentence but permission by
the appropriate authority for the convicted crimi-
nal to serve part of his sentence outside of prison
under certain conditions and controls and subject
to being returned to prison for serving the re-
mainder of the sentence if the conditions of the
parole are violated. This method of dealing with
convicted criminals is in accordance with the prac-
tice in enlightened and democratic countries.

For the reasons indicated the Government of
the United States declines the request of the Soviet
Government that it take measures looking to the
revocation by the Supreme Commander of his Cir-
cular No. 5.

SOVIET NOTE OF MAY 11, 1950

[Translation]

The Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, under instructions from the Soviet
Government, has the honor to communicate to the
Department of State of the U.S.A. the following.

On March 7 of this year. General MacArthur,
Commander-in-Chief for the Allied Powers in
Japan, issued Circular No. 5 by which it was es-
tablished that all the war criminals who are now
serving terms in prison in Japan, according to

Department of State Bulletin

sentence, may be released before the completion
of their terms.

As is well known, 16 Japanese major war crim-
inals who were sentenced to imprisonment by the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East,
for the gravest crimes against humanity, are serv-
ing their sentences in Japan.

The circular of the Commander-in-Chief repre-
sents an attempt to free by a unilateral order the
major Japanese war criminals from completing
their punishment, which was determined and came
into legal force by the sentence of the Inter-
national Tribunal, in which representatives of the
U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., Great Britain, France,
China, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, India, and the Philippines participated.
Such acts of the Commander-in-Chief, directed
towards changing or entirely reversing the de-
cision of the International Tribunal established
on the basis of the agreement between the U.S.A.,
Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and China, authoriz-
ing the said Court to determine the degree of
punishment for the major Japanese war criminals,
guilty of committing the gravest crimes against
humanity, constitute a gross violation of the ele-
mentary norms and principles of international
law.

According to Article 17 of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, as well as accord-
ing to clause "B" (2) of paragraph 5 of the de-
cision of the Far Eastern Commission of April 3,
1916 concerning "the apprehension, trial, and pun-
ishment of war criminals in the Far East," the
Commander-in-Chief has the right to reduce or
otherwise alter the sentence pronounced by the
International Tribunal only while considering the
question of the approval of this sentence. Neither
the Charter of the Tribunal nor the afore-men-
tioned decision of the Far Eastern Commission
contain any provisions which would give the Com-
mander-in-Chief the right to reduce or otherwise
alter the sentence after it has been approved and
put into effect.

The sentence pronounced by the International
Tribunal in regard to Sadao Araki, Kiitsiro Hir-
anuma, Mamoru Sigemitsu and 13 other defend-
ants was approved by the Commander-in-Chief
after consultation with the Allied Council and
with the representatives of other powers which are
members of the Far Eastern Commission. On
November 24, 1948, the Commander-in-Chief an-
nounced his approval of the sentence of the In-
ternational Military Tribunal in the case of the
said Japanese major war criminals. In addition,
the Commander-in-Chief declared that he did not
find any omissions which could serve as a basis
for introducing any modifications in the sentence.
By his approval of the sentence of the Inter-
national Military Tribunal, the Commander-in-
Chief exhausted the authority granted him by the
Charter of the International Military Tribunal
for the Far East and by the decision of the Far

Eastern Commission of April 3, 1946, concerning
the introduction of modifications in the sentence
pronounced by the said International Military
Tribunal. By issuing the circular mentioned
above, the Commander-in-Chief exceeded his
authority, strictly limited by the provisions of the
appropriate international documents, which are
the Charter of the International Military Tri-
bunal and the policy decision of the Far Eastern
Commission of April 3, 1946, concerning "the
apprehension, trial, and punishment of war crim-
inals in the Far East."

The Soviet Government calls the attention of
the Govermnent of the United States to the acts
of General MacArthur, mentioned above, which
violate the agi'eement concerning the establish-
ment of an International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, reached between the U.S.S.R., the
U.S.A., Great Britain, China, and other countries
participating in the Tribunal, and which run
counter to the Charter of the International Mili-
tary Tribunal for the Far East and the decision
of the Far Eastern Commission of April 3, 1946.
The Soviet Government urges the Government of
the United States to take measures immediately
to revoke the afore-mentioned illegal Circular No.
5 of March 7 of this year in regard to the Japanese
major war criminals sentenced by the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal for the Far East.

Soviet Walk-Outs Flout

Democratic Process in United Nations

Statement hy Francis B. Sayre

U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council'^

The withdrawal of the Soviet representative
from this meeting repeats what now appears to
be the standard Soviet practice in the United Na-
tions organizations where China is represented.

Under the Council's rules of procedure, any
question regarding the credentials of any repre-
sentative on the Trusteeship Council is decided
by the majority vote of the Council after exami-
nation of the credentials by the Secretary-Gen-
eral. This has been done and the Council has
made its decision.

The United States accepts the decision just
taken by the Council. If the decision had been
otherwise, the United States, although opposed
to it, would have been prepared to abide by that
decision and continue its cooperation in the work
of the Council. I would ask the Trusteeship
Council members to consider the prospects for ef-
fective action by the Council or any other United
Nations organizations if all the members showed

" Made on the occasion of the withdrawal of the Soviet
representative from the meeting of the Trusteeship Coun-
cil on June 1, 1950, and released to the press by the U.S.
Mission to the United Nations on the same date.

July 10, J 950

the same arbitrary and dictatorial attitude as the
representative of the U.S.S.R. and absented them-
selves or refused to recognize decisions of the
organizations concerned whenever their own views
on any particular problem were not accepted.
Clearly, such an attitude would make it impossible
for the United Nations organizations to operate
effectively.

Needless to say, neither this Council nor other
United Nations organizations and agencies can
for one moment agree to the doctrine that the will-
ful absence of a single member can have any ef-
fect whatever upon the validity of decisions taken.
As members of this Council are well aware, the
Trusteeship Council operated during most of its
first two sessions as well as during its last session
without the benefit of Soviet participation. The
Council is fully able to do so again.

The very kernel of democracy is the acceptance
by all of the will of the majority under a system
which protects the rights of the minority. With-
out this, democratic government and world co-
operation become impossible. The growing prac-
tice on the part of the Soviet Government to re-
fuse to accept the vote of the majority is an attack
upon the fundamental principles of democracy and
upon the United Nations itself. It is tantamount
to an open flouting of the burning desire of well-
nigh all the peoples of the world for peace and
world cooperation.

Czechoslovak U.N. Representative
Resigns; U.S. Grants Asylum

[Released to the press June 13]

Vladimir Houdek, on May 16, 1950, announced his resig-
nation as permanent representative of Czechoslovakia to
the United Nations and wrote as follows to the Acting
Secretary-Oeneral of the United Nations.

The recent events in Czechoslovakia forced me as
Permanent Representative of the Czech Republic
to the United Nations to subject my relations to the
government I represent to a thorough and funda-
mental examination. These events show me that a
few individuals installed in a "Rokossowski way"
in the top positions mechanically apply methods
which are flagrant contradiction to our best tradi-
tions. Czechoslovak thus ceased to exist as an in-
dependent state. In protest of this development I
am submitting my resignation from the post of
the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia
to the United Nations.

At the same time, Mr. Houdek addressed the following
communication to President Truman.

JVIr. President : As a result of the recent events
in Czechoslovakia I deemed it my duty to resign
today from the post of the Czechoslovak Perma-
nent Representative to the United Nations. I did
so in order to protest before the whole world
against the methods which are being used in
Eastern European countries, including my own,
against the people who have brought the greatest
sacrifices in the interest of their nation both dur-
ing the war and after. These methods have been
imported to our country by a few individuals in-
stalled in a "Rokossowski way" in the top positions.
They ai'e in flagrant contradiction to our best tra-
ditions. The treatment of the American diplomats
by the Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Aii'aira
recently was but another expression of this atti-
tude. I cannot agree with this development. I
have therefore resigned from my present position
and ask you to grant me an asylum for me and my
family in the United States.

I arrived in the United States with my wife and
daugliter in 194G, and have been here ever since,
first as the member of the Czechoslovak Embassy
in Washington and later as the Permanent Repre-
sentative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations.
During our stay in Washington a second daughter
of ours was born. Prior to my arrival in the
United States I was the Secretary for Slovak Af-
fairs to the late President Benes.

In submitting my request, I wish to say that the
only relatives we have in this world outside Czech-
oslovakia are living in the United States. This
not being the only reason I hope that the asylum
for us will be granted.

These public statements indicate that Mr. Hou-
dek can retain no ties with the Czechoslovak Com-
munist dictatorship. Were he to be returned to
Czechoslovakia, his life would of course be forfeit,
other potential defectors would be effectively dis-
couraged, and the Communist security apparatus
would, thereby, have gained a marked benefit.

It has been the traditional policy of the United
States to give sympathetic consideration to the
granting of asylum to political refugees. How-
ever, when requests are made to this Government
for political asylum, the Department considers
each according to its individual circumstances.
After careful consideration of Mr. Houdek's re-
quest, this Government, in accordance with the
procedure for dealing with such matters, has deter-
mined that it will not require him to depart from
the United States at this time.

Department of State Bulletin

CARRYING OUT POINT 4: A COMMUNITY EFFORT

Address hy Secretary Acheson^

It is a great pleasure for me to be with you tliis
morning and, particularly, a great pleasure to be
introduced by my own governor of Maryland.
Last night, as Governor Lane said, you listened to
Mr. Hoffman who gave you a very broad and com-
prehensive survey of the problems which exist in
the field of the foreign relationships of the United
States. This morning, I want to take one of those
problems and put it in a much narrower frame
than we had last night. I am taking this particular
problem, because it is of very great practical im-
portance to all of us here. It is of great impor-
tance to the United States. It is of great impor-
tance to the Secretary of State as one who will
have charge, I hope, of administering the law
which is about to be implemented by the Congress,
and it is a program in which you governors as a
practical matter can be of very great assistance.

First of all, let me put this program in its
frame.

I have recently come back from meetings abroad
in which we have been dealing primarily with the
defensive system of the Western world. That
whole defensive system is to create a shield behind
which the great constructive actions of the world
can go on. Our military programs are not an end
in themselves; they are a means, and, just as in
the early days, some members of the community
have to protect those people who are working in
the fields, who are building houses, who are doing
the constructive tasks of the community. So, to-
day, we must have this protective shield. I have

' Made before the Council of State Governments, White
Sulphur Springs, W. Va., on June 20 and released to the
press on the same date.

spoken in other places about the keystone role of
the Atlantic community in the constructive tasks
of the world, and I shall not talk about that this
morning. This great Western community with its
tremendous skills, with its great productive ca-
pacity, must be in the very center of the whole
effort of the free world to make itself strong, and
virile, and self-reliant.

What I should like to mention today is a task
which belongs to the Western world in its rela-
tions with less fortunate peoples. We have many
I^roblems of our own, and we will work those out
in the West. We have to take barriers away from
the flow of trade ; we have to get greater coopera-
tion in the intellectual and other spheres ; we have
to make our own views known throughout the
world much more vigorously than we are doing
at present ; but those are intra-Western problems.
There are another series of problems which have
to do with the relation of the Western world to that
vast unnumbered millions of people who live in
Asia, and in Africa, and in the Middle East. These
areas are called the underdeveloped portions of
the world.

It is in regard to this problem that I should
like to talk with you this morning and that, to be
very brief, has to do with what has become known
as the Point 4 Program — that is, the program of
technical assistance. It is a program which was
originally announced by the President in his
inaugural address in 1949. The law which permits
us to go forward with technical assistance has
been passed by the Congress, and the matter of
providing funds for it is now before the House
and the Senate ; and I want to talk for a few mo-
ments about the nature of that problem and about

Jo/y JO, 7950

the help which you governors can give to us in
carrying it out.

I think the program has been very much mis-
understood. In many areas, it is talked of as
though it were a give-away program, a program
which is going to take hundreds and hundreds of
millions of dollars.

That is not what we are talking about. We are
talking about a program of technical assistance.
It is a jirogram which costs comparatively little
money, and the money which we have asked from
the Congress is very small indeed compared to
what may be accomplished. It is very hard for
you in the United States to understand what can
be accomplished by the program because the things
we are doing are common phrases to you.

Every one of j'ou governors has under you de-
partments which are doing the sort of thing which
we want to carry to peoples in other parts of the
world, and I venture to say that it does not take 20
minutes a week, or 20 minutes a month, perhaps,
of your time. Take, for instance, the question of
the water supply. I am not talking about the
quantity — I undei'stand that Governor Dewey has
a problem about that, and I know there are prob-
lems in the Western States that have to do purely
with the quantity of water which is available. I
am talking about the purity of the water which is
available. To you, that is just a thing that
happens automatically.

Every one of your cities, every one of your towns,
has a water supply. There is a municipal official
in most cases, sometimes a State official, who every
few hours takes a sample out of the tap into his
test tube, does some things which I do not under-
stand with it, and automatically issues some orders
so that the chlorination is increased, or something
else is put in the water. You never pay any atten-
tion to it, and, yet, this is one of the most funda-
mental problems to millions and millions of people
in the world.

There are areas where there is not a single drop
of water which we can drink without getting some
dreadful intestinal disease, and one of the ex-
traordinary things to visitors from the underde-
veloped parts of the world who come to the United
States is to see people go to a tap, get some water
in a glass, and drink it. They are perfectly
amazed by what happens. One man who came to
us from the Far East was on the fifteenth floor of
his hotel, and he saw somebody taking some water
out of the tap, and he was amazed by this — and we

said : "Are you impressed by the fact that we have
running water on the fifteenth floor?" And he
replied : "We are not so much surprised by that as
by the fact that you drink it!"

That is the sort of thing that is so important.
And how can you help us? Well, here is a prac-
tical illustration.

State Assistance

A few years ago, we asked Governor Youngdahl,
of Minnesota, if he would lend us one of his
experts from the Minnesota Department of Health.
His name was Edmund Wagner, and the State of
Minnesota lent him to us, and we sent him to
Brazil to work out a water system on an experi-
mental basis for a small town. Tliis town was on
the banks of the Amazon, and people would go to
the river, and then dip out a bucket of water, take
it home, and wash, and use it for cooking and
drinking ; and everybody in this town was ill from
intestinal parasites which came from this water,
and it had a very serious effect on the people.

Mr. Wagner worked out a very simple water
system for this town on the Amazon, the sort of
system which would be almost too primitive for
most American communities, put it in operation,
and within 2 or 3 years this town began to be
trebled, and again people came from miles around,
because this was one place where you could get
pure water. And then, the pumping system al-
lowed the town to get away from the banks of the
Amazon, and it went into the higher gi-ound, and
the water went up there. But here in the middle
of Brazil is a city which is the envy of that entire
country because one officer from the State of
Minnesota went down and put in an experimental
system.

Not long ago, we asked Governor Dever, of the
State of Massachusetts, to lend us Clarence Ster-
ling of their Department of Sanitation. He went
to Santiago, Chile, and there he put into effect a
sewer system. The effect of this was so startling
in Chile that all of Latin America asked for Mr.
Sterling, and he spent several years in South
America putting these systems into country after
country, and now he is back again in Massachusetts
with this work well-done.

Governor McMath has lent us William Bell,
one of their sanitary engineers, who went to Mex-
ico to install a sanitation system. The city of
Seattle, Washington, recently released its Public
Health Director, Dr. Emil Palmquist, and its Di-

Department of State Bulletin

rector of Sanitation, Frederick Aldrich, and they
undertook a public healtli mission in Iran. An-
other liealth man from Governor Langlie's State of
Washington, Herbeit Colwell, went out with the
ECA mission to Greece to fight malaria. He
started working witli the United Nations Organi-
zation, the World Health Organization, and the
ECA ; and this man, and a half dozen people work-
ing on this whole scheme in Greece, have reduced
the incidence of malaria in Gi'eece from 2 million
cases a j'ear to 50 thousand.

Now, there is another area in which we need
help from you. When one of you governors takes
office, you have whole operating school systems, tax
systems, road systems. All of that is working.
You have school boards and road districts, and
all of tliat sort of thing. Since the end of the war,
there are nine countries in Asia which have become
independent. Those nine countries have a popu-
lation of over 600 million people, and, in many of
them, the entire system of government has to be
started from the ground up.

Success of Individual Effort

Many of these governments have asked us for
experts who will go out to help them to organize
the simple administration of government depart-
ments, and we are going to ask you for help in
getting them to do that work. Just a few years
ago, for instance, the Government of Bolivia
wanted to set up a system for running rural schools.
They did not know how to do that. So, we asked
the Governor of New Mexico if he would lend us
one of his men, which he did. That man went
down to Bolivia, and set up a very simjile system
of count}' school administration. This was so
sensational in Bolivia that six countries in South
America asked for this officer, Ernest Maes, of
New Mexico, who went to the six countries and set
up this county school administrative system.

Governor Duff has lent us Dr. Powers, who is
reorganizing the normal schools in Ecuador. The
Director of Vocational Education of Connecticut,
Dr. A. S. Boynton, has been lent to us by Governor
Bowles, who is setting up industrial schools in
Panama.

Now there are dozens of other State officials and
municipal officials who are out doing this work in
the area in which we have been j^ermitted to do
it in the past — which has been largely in South
America. Now, if this Point 4 legislation is
passed, we will have an oi^portmiity to carry this

work into other areas of the world which need it
very badly, and those are particularly in Asia and
Africa.

In the agricultural field, for instance, in which
you are so rich in talent, we will need a great deal
of help. Recently, we had a problem in Liberia.
The dry season in Liberia used to be called a
"hungry season," because they did not know how
to grow food during that dry period, and there
was a great deal of starvation and a great deal of
siclmess in Liberia during the dry season. We
asked Governor Fuller Warren if he would lend us
a man who could work on that problem, and he
lent us Frank Pindar, who went to Liberia.

Now, this did not take millions of dollars or
vast equipment. In fact, Frank Pindar went off
with a small amount of baggage, and he had a sack
of corn, half dozen ordinary hoes, and a shotgun.
We asked him who the shot gun was for, and he
said that was for crows, so we thought it was all
right to let him take it. He went to Liberia, and
there he taught people how to gi-ow vegetables in
a dry season — the simi^lest kind of irrigation, the
simplest sort of cultivation of the soil to bring
whatever moisture there was up to the surface —
and the result of all of that now is that the work
of this one man in Liberia has completely dissi-
pated this "hungry season." People can now eat
during the dry season in Liberia.

Now, these people that we send out are not
merely technicians; they are not merely people
to teach this, that, or the other technique; but
they are the great apostles, the gi-eat spreaders of
democracy. One of the things that we have
learned — and we have learned it the hard way —
is that great programs which seem so important
to us from the American side look quite dif-
ferently to the people who are on the receiving
end. We often think that when we put forward
a program which fills ship after ship of commodi-
ties, and off they go to various parts of the world,
that the people on the receiving end must be very
much impressed by our tremendous productive
power, by our generosity, and all that sort of
thing. We see it from the outgoing point of view.
We see great warehouses full of goods; we see
tremendous ocean liners full of things.

That is not the way it looks on the other end.
The way it looks to the person in the Far East or
Southeast Asia is not from the point of view of
the vast ship crowded with material coming in,
but it looks to him like a bowl of rice. Wlien there

July 10, 1950

is a little bit of rice in it, it is not terribly impres-
sive. That is what he sees, and we have to look
at our program through other people's eyes. One
of the important things is that we should have
these apostles of democracy who go out and work
with people — not merely officials who work with
officials of government, not merely people who live
in the good hotels and walk into government
offices, but men who go into the back country; a
man who can take a simple agricultural instru-
ment and show people how to use it, a man who can
explain the difference between different types of
seed. If you can improve by 10 percent the quality
of rice seed in Asia, you have almost solved the
food problem. It is as simple as that. And, yet,
the men who go out have to work with the people.
You can not say to them, "This is the way it is
done in the agricultural college of Iowa," or some-
thing of that sort. You have to understand their
nature. You have to understand their back-
ground, their religious or other prejudices, and
you have to teach them how to help themselves.

Cooperation: An American Tradition

That is what these men that you have lent us
have been doing. This is in the American tradi-
tion. This is the right way for America to act.
If you think back over our history, and you think
of tlie great people who did this sort of thing in
our early days, you remember Eleazer Wheelock
going up the Connecticut Kiver Valley when the
frontier was at Springfield — and going beyond the
frontier up to Hanover to start a school for the
Indians. And you remember Pere Marquette going
out into the Micliigan area with nothing except
what he had on his back — but going out to teach
and instruct and live with these people. And over,
and over, and over again this was true in the early
days of the United States. Now, the fi'ontier has
gone very much beyond our own country, and here
is another challenge to Americans. And we need
not only these highly skilled men that you can give
us, but we need younger men, too. I have often
wondered whether that spirit of adventure and
hardship still exists in the United States. I think
it does, but I think it is an open question. 1 won-
der how many volunteers from all our colleges,
who are graduating this June, you would get if
you went to them and said, "I want to offer you a
hard life; you are not going to be paid much; you
are going to live in backward areas of the world
where there is disease lurking everywhere; you

are going to work and to live with people who
know nothing and are going to be very suspicious
of you. But here is one of the great tasks which
the United States, and the United Nations, and
the other Western countries can bring to the under-
developed parts of the world. Will you go out and
take this missionary task with you?" How many
would go? I think we would be surprised. I
think a lot of boys and girls would do that.

I am talking to j'ou about this program not be-
cause it is exciting or anything of that sort ; it is not
nearly as much fun to talk about this or to listen
to this as it is to talk about what men in the Krem-
lin are up to; that is much more fun than this sort
of thing, but this is something we can do.

People come to me, and they say foreign policy
is all right, and we like to read this, and that, and
the other columnist, but how can the American
people — how can a person participate in our for-
eign policy ? Well, here is a way you can partici-
pate in it. Every one of you governors can helj)
us. We will be coming to you and asking you for
men, and it is going to be very inconvenient for
you. You will not want to let some of these people
go, but we are going to ask you to do that. You
can explain to your people how important it is, and
we are going to ask you to get some volunteers
from the younger people in your States, and you
can explain that to them. And it seems to me that
if the people of your communities could feel that
they had a part in this work because their city
engineer or the head of their State health depart-
ment is going to a particular country, and if they
could follow his work, and if they could get letters
from him which are printed in the papers, and if
everybody in that community could follow what a
man they know, with a few assistants, is doing in
some distant part c f the earth, then you would get
this real feeling that the world is, after all, one
world and it is not as large as it seems.

This program is now before Congress. It went
before the Congress as a complete bipartisan pro-
posal. It was worked out in the House and Senate,
and bills were put in by Republicans and Demo-
crats jointly. The Senate Conunittee on Foreign
Relations reported it out unanimously. The
House committee was practically unanimous. It
was passed by a very large majority in both
Houses. Now, we come to the very difficult thing
of getting the money for it, and, now, we are
running into attacks — a narrow attack, isolation-
ist points of view are brought up, and the whole

Department of State Bulletin

program is being misrepresented and damaged.
The sort of attack that we have was ilhistrated the
day before yesterday by two men who attacked it
for exactly opposite reasons. One attacked it be-
cause we had been talking with various countries
about programs in advance of the Congress appro-
priating the money, and we were criticized very
severely by him for doing that. He said, "Here
you are putting pressure on the Congress. You go
and talk to this, that, and the other country about
a program before Congress has given you money.
That is very bad." And he had hardly gotten
through with that before another man got up and
said, "The trouble with you fellows is that you
haven't got a fully detailed program. Why don't
you talk to these countries and find out exactly
what it is going to cost before you come in and ask
us for the money T' Well, you cannot win. You
get it coming and going on that basis.

But I believe that the Congi'ess is going to give
us the money for this program. I believe it will
have the most tremendous effect in parts of the
world which it is very difficult to reach in any
other way. I have been asked: Wliy don't you
set up a great Marshall Plan for Asia ? Perhaps,
later in the day, Ambassador Jessup can talk with
you about the problems of Asia. But you will find
that it is wholly different from the problem of
Europe. In Europe, you have a more or less
homogeneous community with problems which are
fairly identical, people who are used to working
together and understand that each one is depend-

ent on the other. In Asia, you have vast distances,
different peoples, peoples who are quite ditferent
racially, whose languages are wholly different, who
have absolutely no common experience of any sort
at all. Most of these Asian countries have had
their connections with the world through individ-
ual Western countries and not with one another.
They do not want a Marshall Plan for themselves;
they do not want to be brought into one common
operation. Each one is dealing with its own prob-
lem in its own way, and we have got to adapt our-
selves to the world in which we live. We might
wish it were different, but it is not different, and,
therefore, we must adapt ourselves to the situation
which confronts us. In doing that, we can, with
this technical assistance program, be of real help to
individual people in this great part of the world
and make them realize that it is not merely the
Communists who send people out to live in the
country and teach them doctrines of one sort but
that we also are willing to send people who will live
with them and that we are not teaching them
doctrines. They must realize that we are teach-
ing them how to do things which are going to let
them develop in their own way and that we are
helping them, not trying to coerce them, or rule
them, or use them for our own purposes. That, I
submit to you, is the purpose, the significance, the
object of this Point 4 Program.

I hope very much that we can have the support
of all of you governors not only in getting the
authority to do it but also in carrying it out after
we have gotten that authority.

The Need for an International Trade Organization

Statement hy Charles F. Brannan
Secretary of Agriculture ^

In appearing before you to discuss the proposed
charter for an International Trade Organization,
I should like to speak particularly of the relation
of this charter to United States agriculture.

Agriculture has a very real interest in this
charter. American agriculture produces a good
deal more of many important agricultural prod-
ucts than is consumed in the United States, in-
cluding wheat, cotton, tobacco, lard, and many
fruits and vegetables. In the crop year 1948^9,

' Made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
on May 1, 1950.

our agricultural exports were valued at over 31^
billion dollars. We sent abroad about 40 percent
of our wheat, 32 percent each of our cotton and
our rice, 22 percent of our tobacco, almost 30 per-
cent of our raisins and over 40 percent of our
prunes, 30 percent of our peanuts, and 25 percent
of our hops — to mention some of the more strik-
ing items.

The level of our agricultural exports during
recent years has been higher than normal because
of emergency and postwar requirements. Much
of this was implemented by the financial assist-

iuly JO, 7950

ance this country has been giving the purchaser
countries. With the progressive restoration of
agricultural production abroad, we can expect an
over-all shrinkage of our agricultural exports from
the high level reached during the emergency
period.

This return of our farm exports toward more
normal levels will require adjustments in our agri-
cultural production. Should our agricultural ex-
l^orts drop to the levels which prevailed in the
late thirties, serious production curtailments
could not be avoided. On the other hand, to the
extent we succeed in maintaining our agricultural
exports at their present levels, the domestic ad-
justment i^roblem will be reduced.

The history of the 1930's indicates that we cannot
hope to maintain a high level of agricultural ex-
ports unless conditions favorable to multilateral
nondiscriminatory trade are restored in the portion
of the world economy with which we carry on the
bulk of our trade. You will recall that the trade
restrictions and exchange controls employed by
foreign countries in the thirties hurt our agi-icul-
tural exports considerably more than they did our
industrial exports. This was because foreign
countries turn to alternative sources of supply,
such as stinndation of domestic production, for
many of the agricultural products normally pur-
chased from the United States more readily than
they did for the products of our industry which
they found more difficult to purchase elsewhere.

IJnder the impact of the war and postwar emer-
gency, foreign governments have greatly increased
their intervention in trade by such means as eni-
bargoes and quotas, exchange controls and arti-
ficial exchange rates, state-trading monopolies,
and bilateral or regional trade and payment ar-
rangements. Recourse to these restrictive and
discriminatory measures has sometimes been justi-
fied by the difficidties encountered by many foreign
countries in balancing their trade and payments
with the United States and other so-called hard-
currency countries. EGA assistance is helping
many of those countries overcome their acute finan-
cial difficulties. But if the world is to obtain last-
ing benefits from the rebuilding of the war-torn
economies, it is necessary that those abnorrnal trade
restrictions and discriminations be discontinued as
I'apidly as improvements in international financial
and trade conditions permit.

To assure international cooperative progress to-
ward this objective, and thus to provide for a
revival of multilateral nondiscriminatory trade, is
the principal objective of the Ito charter.

EHorts on Behalf of World Trade

Thus — as has been pointed out by those who
have already testified before this Committee — it
would supplement our efforts through EGA. It
would also supplement o>ir trade agreement pro-
gram and the international monetary and finan-
cial arrangements of Bretton Woods. Further-

more, it would help achieve the United Nations
Food and Agi'iculture Organization's objectives
of improved nutrition and standards of rural liv-
ing throughout the world. Signatory countries
to this charter would undertake to work together
to avoid the type of situation we had in the thirties.
In addition to the interest of American farmers
in the charter because of the need to export farm
products, they have an overwhelming interest in
the maintenance of other portions of the United
States economy in an active healthy condition.
It is my belief that the cooperation of nations in
the establishment of the International Trade
Organization provided for in the charter being
considered by this Committee will advance those
interests. Other witnesses will elaborate on these
aspects of the charter. I would like now to turn
to the specific provisions of the charter as they
relate to matters of most direct interest to Ameri-
can farmers.

The charter approach is a realistic approach.
The Habana conference and the other interna-
tional meetings in which this charter was drafted
did not stop with the establishment of broad
principles. They studied specific difficulties likely
to be encountered, and they wrote into the charter
provisions allowing for sufficient flexibility to deal
with the realities of the trade situation.

For example, there is a "general escape clause"
similar to that included in the more recent trade
agreements. It provides, in essence, that any
countiy may suspend obligations undertaken
under "the charter or may withdraw tariff conces-
sions if, as a result of unforeseen developments,
increased imports of a product cause or threaten
serious injury to domestic producers.

As concerns import restrictions on agricultural
products, the charter develops what I believe to be
a fair basis for meeting the very difficult problem
of imports of products on which we have domestic
support programs. As you know, we have tradi-
tionally imported substantial quantities of agri-
cultural pi'oducts of kinds similar to, or supple-
mental to, those we produce in this country. We
have a serious basic problem because imports of
these commodities, many of them interrupted dur-
ing the war, are resuming just at the time when we
are struggling hardest with the problem of adjust-
ing our agriculture to a peacetime basis through
the support of the domestic market.

It is obvious that we cannot permit imported
products to take advantage of a market support
operation designed to help United States pro-
ducers. On the other hand, it would be unwise for
us to take the other extreme and completely pro-
hibit imports of a product traditionally imported
into the United States. The one action would be
unfair to us. The other would be unfair to foreign
countries. Moreover, it would lead to a type of
economic warfare which, in the long run, would
harm the export market for United States agricul-
tural products.

Department of State Bulletin

The churtcr deals with fhis problem by pennit-
ting restriction upon imports of an agricnltnral
conunodity beino- supported under any domestic
program in the same proportion as the domestic
produceis benefiting trom that program accept
restrictions on the production or marketing of
that con)niodity.

This is not a simple rule to apply, but I am
sure that the Committee will recognize it as a
fair principle on which to base any continuing
import restriction. Moreover, it does not prevent
the mutually beneficial development of trade be-
tween countries that sign the charter.

In addition to this principle regarding continu-
ing import restrictions, the charter permits tem-
porary use of restrictions on imports of agricul-
tural products in connection with operations to
remove temporary surpluses.

Subsidy Provisions and Commodity Studies

I would next like to mention the relationship
between the subsidy provisions of the charter and
our agricultural programs. One objective of our
farm legislation is to maintain a fair relationship
between agricultural and nonagricultural incomes.
Sometimes our price-support program results in
holding domestic prices up when world prices are
falling. This tends to price us out of our foreign
market. Export subsidies can be used to offset
such differentials. The charter permits this in
special cases, even though it bans export subsi-
dies in general. Again, however, it imposes a
limitation that, I believe, we must recognize as
fair. It requires that a country using export sub-
sidies does not use them to push its export quanti-
ties beyond an equitable share of world trade in
the commodity involved. This limitation aims
to prevent international economic warfare which
would be harmful to all producers of the com-
modity anywhere in the world.

The charter recognizes, however, that limita-
tions on subsidized exports alone cannot solve the
problems arising in the world economy as a re-
sult of the accumulation of burdensome surpluses
of a primary product. Therefore, there is a spe-
cial chapter — chapter VI — on international com-
modity agi'eements. It provides machinery for
intergovernmental study of world connnodity
problems and for cooperation among the inter-
ested governments in efforts to achieve a solution
of those problems in a manner fair to both pro-
ducers and consumers. International bodies
studying commodity situations are already in ex-
istence in the instances of such important products
as wheat, cotton, and sugar.

We already have an international agi-eement for
wheat approved by the Congress last year. That
agreement gives a specific example of one way in
which an international commodity problem can
be handled under the charter chapter on interna-
tional commodity agreements. I should add that

the extended international discussion that led to
the initialing of the commodity agreement chap-
ter of tlie charter by representatives of 513 coun-
tries was an important preparatory process that
helped make possible the final negotiation of the
Wheat Agreement.

I might say just a word about the Wheat Agree-
ment. American wheat growers responded whole-
heartedly to the war and jDostwar appeal to pro-
duce in abundance to feed a hungry world, and
they have developed wheat production so that it
can be maintained substantially above prewar
levels. Thus they have a real and legitimate in-
terest in their share in foreign markets. During
the life of the Wheat Agreement, they will have a
large guaranteed export market in the participat-
ing importing countries.

The producers of other export staples, as for
example cotton, who also may in the future be
faced with the threat of an accumulation of bur-
densome surpkises, are interested in the Wheat
Agreement because they may want to use a simi-
lar technique in future years.

The over-all importance of the Wlieat Agree-
ment, and of other commodity agreements that
might be concluded in the future, from the view-
point of international economic relations, cannot
be underestimated. There is a basic interdepend-
ence among the leading trading countries of the
world, and this is particularly important in the
field of agriculture. You cannot satisfactorily
solve the problem of wheat in terms of United
States pi'oduction for the United States market,
any more than the British can solve it in terms
of production and consumption in the Uiiited
Kingdom alone. Unless all of the governments
principally concerned get together to discuss the
pi'oblems that arise out of their common interest in
wheat, all will suffer more than need be. The same
is true for many other agricultural commodities.
Only by friendly cooperation among the main con-
suming and producing countries will we be able
to assure a measure of stability in the world's com-
modity markets.

There is one additional point I should stress in
respect to the commodity agreement chapter of the
charter. It does not permit the indiscriminate use
of intergovernmental agreements to control trade.
It limits recourse to control agreements to cases
of real difficulty. In fact, the charter permits such
agreements only when there is or threatens to be a
burdensome surplus of a primary commodity
which cannot be corrected by normal market forces
in time to pi'event hardship to a large number of
small producers.

I would like, in conclusion, to stress that leading
farm organizations have expressed support for the
principles of the Ito charter.

American farmers recognize the need to supple-
ment international political cooperation by eco-
nomic cooperation.

I urge favorable action on this charter.

July 10, 1950

The Need for an International Trade Organization

Statement hy Charles Sawyer
Secretary of Commerce ^

The Department of Commerce has a vital in-
terest in the international trade of the United
States. It has this interest because it is charged
with serving the American business community
and aiding in the maintenance of a strong domes-
tic economy in addition to the part it plays in the
development of our foreign economic policy.
Bearing these responsibilities in mind, I want to
make clear at the outset that, in our judgment,
adherence to the charter will have beneficial re-
sults for our country.

Over the past few weeks, you have heard the
testimony of many witnesses. Most of these have
spoken in favor of joining the Ixo. Since you
have heard both sides of the question, I shall not
impose on you a repetition either of the arguments
or the charter's details. What I should like to
do is to comment on the attitude of business toward
the Ito.

I am aM'are of the criticisms that have been
made by a number of business organizations.
Nevertheless, while these groups have differed re-
garding details in the chaiter, I believe that they,
as well as those which have spoken in favor, agree
with the basic principles of the Ito. All are con-
vinced that something is wrong in world trade
today, and all are of like mind that something
needs to be done about it.

Criticisms of Charter

Criticisms of the charter have been many and
varied. On the one hand, the charter has been
called an impractical idealistic document; on the
other hand, it is criticized because of its conces-
sions to the realities of the world in which we are
now living. While some have said that the char-
ter is too technical and complicated, others feel
that it is full of platitudes and generalizations.
The most frequent criticisms, however, have been

' Submitted to the House Foreign Affairs Committee
on May 11, 1950.

leveled at the so-called "exceptions" to the charter
and the fact that it might cause an increase in
imports which these people feel would be bad for
the country.

I do not believe that these criticisms should be
ignored. They have been made in the main by
sincere and conscientious individuals and organi-
zations which have studied the charter. I should,
therefore, like to devote a few lines to them. The
avenues of trade are still congested with restric-
tions and discriminatory arrangements instituted
to deal with abnormal economic conditions with
which you are all familiar. Our businessmen com-
plain about them every day. The point is that
the charter did not create those conditions ; yet it
cannot fail to recognize their existence. In other
words, many of the criticisms which have been
leveled at the charter should really be directed
against world conditions. If the charter did not
recognize the state of affairs today it would not
be worth having because it would be based on illu-
sions and wishes — not on realities.

The establishment of the Ito, however, will give
us an opportunity to work continuously at the
ailments which now afflict international trade.
For adequate diagnosis and treatment we need a
continuous appraisal. Nations must consult with
one another to find out what is wrong and reach
agreement on what must be done.

I do not believe that the charter will usher in
a new era; neither am I so cynical as to believe
that it is worthless. It is a step forward; it is
more than we have now. It ]>rovides for the elim-
ination of many nuisances and unnecessary trade
barriers that plague the trader today. I have in
mind, for example, the field of customs formali-
ties— often referred to as "invisible tariffs." What
the charter seeks to do in tliis, as in other fields,
is to establish agreed rules or principles of rea-
sonableness or fairness in the administration of
customs and related regulations and thus to elim-
inate or cut down some of the foi-malities and
complexities that have become a part of customs
administration all over the world.

Department of State BuUelin

I should like to direct your attention to two
points with which critics of the Ito have been
principally concerned. One of these relates to
the so-called "exceptions." The critics feel that
the charter would be unfair to the United States
because our trade would be carried on without
exceptions while the trade of other countries
would be carried on under the exceptions. This
arjiument does not hold water. The charter binds
all of the member nations to live up to its terms.
Some of these terms are unqualified. Those
which relate to customs procedures, internal taxes
and regulations, and restrictive trade practices
are examples.

It is true that exceptions ai'e written into the
charter to provide for the unusual conditions to
which I have already referred. It should be kept
in mind, however, that some were put in at our
request for our benefit. Some benefit no other
country, an example being the preference excep-
tion regarding trade between the United States
and the Philippines and Cuba. Other exceptions
we asked for and got were those relating to secu-
rity considerations, import quotas on certain agri-
cultural products, and the use of the "escape
clause" in connection with tariff concessions.

Need for Compromise

Now in order to get these exceptions, and to get
otlier countries to agree to general principles
which both the proponents and opponents of the
charter have agreed are desirable, we had to com-
promise on some issues. After all, we were deal-
ing with a large group of sovereign independent
nations, many of whom have varied backgrounds,
traditions, and customs. We have always com-
jiromised in order to reach mutually satisfactory
conclusions in dealing with other nations. If we
were unwilling to give and take we would make no
progi-ess.

Some criticism of the charter has also come from
those who fear the effects of greater imports into
the United States. This is a problem in which
I am intensely interested. The charter, as you
know, provides certain rules for trade. It does
not in itself cause trade to flow. Thus, it will not
by itself create more or less imports. And it does
not require us to take any action with respect to
tariffs to which we are not already committed
under the Trade Agreements Program.

With regard to the question of imports, I should
like to point out that the great bulk of the business
community not only does not fear imports but is
taking active steps to encourage them. Among
the national organizations which have taken this
position are such diverse groups as the National
Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of
Commerce of the United States, the United States
Council of the International Chamber of Com-
merce, the National Foreign Trade Council, the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, the Ameri-

can Farm Bureau Federation, and a host of other
organizations well-known to you. In an expand-
ing economy, more goods will be exchanged, not
less, and goods must flow into the United States
as well as out if we are eventually to avoid subsi-
dizing our foreign trade with dollar loans and
grants.

I should also like to call your attention to the
provisions dealing with so-called restrictive busi-
ness practices. Experience has shown that cer-
tain activities of private international cartels,
such as the allocation of trade territories and in-
dustrial fields, limitation of production, and price
fixing, can restrict the flow of trade and limit
competition just as effectively as any government-
imposed tariff or quota. For a long time, it has
been our general policy in this country to elim-
inate such practices, but very few other countries
have heretofore been concerned with this subject
to any appreciable extent. Under the Ito char-
ter, however, each member nation would be re-
quired to take steps to assure that enterprises in
its jurisdiction do not engage in practices which
restrain international trade and interfere with the
realization of any of the objectives of the charter.

In the light of the hard facts and realities of
the present world, I believe that the Ito charter
is in the interest of the United States — and I want
to emphasize that by participating in the Ito,
we do not prejudice our ability to seek improve-
ments as soon as they can be achieved. I believe
we are right in hoping for a day when world
trade will conform more nearly to the conditions
of business practice within the borders of this
country. We should, therefore, in my judgment,
approve an agreement that advances us toward
our objective even if it is not entii'ely perfect.

Whatever the shortcomings of the Ito charter,
I am convinced that our failure to ratify would be
a mistake. The alternative is likely to be a period
of more restrictive and conflicting systems of for-
eign trade control on the part of many countries.
We would probably see greater efforts at national
self-sufficiency, and wider governmental interven-
tion in commerce. Controls which become no
longer justifiable on economic grounds might be
continued for bureaucratic or political reasons,
and our only recourse would be retaliation which
would be bound to have depressing effects upon the
economic progress and prosperity of the United
States.

Stated simply, I believe the charter should be
approved because its fundamental premises are
good and agreed to by most businessmen ; because
most of its provisions are constructive; and be-
cause there is nothing in it which will harm the
position of the United States or its businessmen.
The common-sense approach to this problem
would seem to be to approve this charter and then
to work with other member countries through
the International Trade Organization to accom-
plish our purposes.

July 10, 1950

Relaxing Restrictions on Foreign Investment in Germany

PROCEDURE ESTABLISHED

BY ALLIED HIGH COMMISSION

[Released to the press June 15]

At its meeting in Berlin today, the Council of
the Allied High Commission approved the detailed
procedure prepared by its financial advisers for
the first stage in the i^rogressive relaxation of the
present i-estrictions on foreign investment in
Germany.

The formulation of this procedure, which is to
be operated on a licensing system under the direc-
tion of the Allied Bank Commission and based on
Military Government Laws No. 52 and No. 53,
follows the approval in principle by the Council,
on May 31, 1950, to the reopening of Germany to
foreign investment. The new opportunities,
which are to be granted to foreign owners of prop-
erty and funds in Germany and to foreigners wish-
ing to bring new capital into Germany, were the
subject of discussions with the Federal Finance
Minister on June G, 1950, and with the representa-
tives of the Benelux Governments on June 9, 1950.
The decision of the High Commission has eifect
in the area of the Federal Eepublic of Germany
and in the American, British, and French sectore
of Berlin.

In deciding on the new procedure which, it is
hoped, will contribute to the economic recovery of
the Federal Republic, the High Commission has
had to take into account a ninnber of considera-
tions of which the most important are the need
to safeguard Germany's foreign-exchange posi-
tion, to prevent undue concentration of foreign
capital in German industry, and to provide equal-
ity of opportunity and treatment (for foreign in-
vestment made from blocked funds now held in
Germany and new funds from abroad) as between
existing foreign owners of property, prewar cred-
itors, and new foreign investors and German
investors.

Further measures of liberalization and relaxa-
tion will be introduced in the light of the experi-
ence gained in the operation of the present new
procedure. However, it is not foreseen that con-
vertibility in foreign exchange of capital or in-

come from old or new investments will be per-
mitted.

Pi'incipal features of the scheme are:

(1) Cajiital equipment, raw materials and semi-
finished goods, and engineering and other techni-
cal services may be brought into the Federal Re-
l^ublic for investment purposes under special
license ;

(2) Deutchemarks may be acquired from the
Bank Deutscher Laender at the current rate of
exchange against acceptable foreign currencies
and may be used in Germany under the same con-
ditions as govern the use of existing foreign
balances ;

(3) Foreign owners of claims, expressed in for-
eign currencies against German persons, corpora-
tions, or German public bodies will be permitted
by special license to enter into voluntary agree-
ments with the debtors for repayment in deutsche-
marks ;

(4) Foreign-owned real estate or other non-
monetary property may be sold in Germany or
transferred to another foreign owner for foreign
exchange consideration by special license ;

(5) Foreign owners of deutschemark bank bal-
ances (including deutschemarks acquired by the
above methods) and foreign-owned or -controlled
German corporations will be allowed by general
license to invest in real estate, in securities issued
b}' public bodies, and in pul)licly-dealt-in securi-
ties and, by special license, will be allowed to ac-
quire investments in private business enterprises
and loans ;

(6) The permitted daily drawings from foreign-
owned deutschemark balances for travel expenses
in Germany will be increased to DM 75 per person
with a maximum of DM 200 per day per family.
General licenses imder Military Government Laws
Nos. 52 and 53 to give legal effect to the above
arrangements will be issued by Bank Deutscher
Laender in the near future.

In reaching its decision to relax restrictions on
foreign investment in Germany, the Allied High
Commission lias been influenced by the urgent need
for new capital investment in Germany to insure

Department of State Bulletin

the continued economic recovery of the Federal
Republic. It recognizes that tlie foreign investor
has a part to phiy in providing tlie necessary
cajiital for this purpose.

In order to attract new foreign capital to Ger-
many and to encourage productive use of existing
foreign funds in Germany, the High Commission
ap]ireciates tliat the regulations governing the em-
l^loyment of foreign funds must be as liberal as
possible and that exchange-control restrictions
must be kept to a minimum. At the same time,
the overriding necessity of safeguarding the sta-
bility of tlie currency and of maintaining foreign-
exchange accruals, upon which the general stand-
ard of living and the level of imports so largely
depend, must be borne in mind. It is for these
reasons that it is possible to proceed only by pro-
gressive stages in the removal of the restrictions
on existing foreign owners of assets and on new
investors and in restoring the normal contractual
relationship between creditors and debtors.

In opening the way for an increase in foreign
investment in Gei-many, certain additional safe-
guards are essential. These have been provided
for in the detailed scheme. The development of
new foreign investment is to be kept under con-
stant survey to prevent any undue concentration
of economic power. Finally, the same opportu-
nities as are afforded to new foreign investors are
made available to old creditors and existing prop-
erty owners.

Inquiries in connection with this policy and
applications for special licenses should be ad-
dressed to the Bank Deutscher Laender at Frank-
fort, Germany, or to the appropriate Land Cen-
tral Banks in the Federal Republic of Gennany.

REGULATIONS GOVERNING
FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN GERMANY

Tlie Department of State on June 16 released to the press
the details of the new policy concertmiri foreign invest-
ments in the Federal Republic of Qermany and, the Ameri-
can. British, and French sectors of Berlin. This policy
was apprnrid by the Allied High Commission at its meet-
ing in Berlin on June 15, 19.50, and was announced in sum-
mary in the Department's press release 638 of June 16,
1950. The details of the new regulations are as follows:

A. Subject to the provisions of paragrapli B. below :

(1) Foreign owners of DM balances may utilize and
dispose of .such balances, including DM proceeds from
settlements referred to in paragraph (6) below, as follows :

(i) disbursements which are now or which may
hereafter be permitted by general licenses issued pursuant
to Military Government Laws Nos. 52 and 53. General
licenses will l)e issued which will enable foreign owners
to utilize and dispose of their DM balances subject to the
same limitations as apply to German owners but only in
so far as foreign exchange control objectives of the Federal
Republic are not contravened. In particular, the existing
general license for travel expense will be amended to per-
mit the account owner to withdraw up to DM 75 per day
per person to cover the travel expenses in Germany for

himself and members of his family provided the total of
such withdrawals does not exceed DM 200 per day.

(ii) investments in real estate and in securities
issued by public bodies and their agencies and securities
publicly dealt in to be permitted in accordance with a
general license to be issued pursuant to M. G. Laws Nos.
52 and 53 which will provide tliat re.'il estate and se-
curities so acquired shall be subject to the provisions of
such laws.

(iii) investments in private business enterprises
and loans will be permitted in accordance with special
licenses to be issued on a case bv case basis pursuant to
M. G. Laws Nos. 52 and 53.

(2) Foreign owners of real or other property in the
Federal Republic of a nimmonetary nature will be per-
mitted in accordance with special licenses to be issued on
a case by case basis pursuant to M. G. Laws Nos. 52 and 53 :

(i) to dispose of such property subject to the same
limitations which apply to German owners of similar
property on condition that any DM or other proceeds
accruing therefrom shall be paid into a blocked account
in the name of the foreign owner, which may be utilized
in the same manner as outlined in paragraph (1) above;

(ii) to transfer title to any such property to other
foreigners for foreign-exchange considerations provided
that such transfers are not for the purpose of avoiding
foreign exchange control objectives of the Federal Repub-
lic and that such property was not acquired after the date
of the lifting of the investment moratorium.

(3) Foreign-owned or -controlled business enter-
prises organized under German law and operating in the
Federal Republic will be freed by way of a general license
from any restrictions under 51. G. Laws Nos. 52 and 53
which do not affect the operations of German enterprises
except for the control of investments to the extent set
forth in paragraphs 1 (ii) and 1 (iii) above.

(4) Foreign persons will be permitted in accordance
with special licenses to be issued pursuant to M. G. Laws
Nos. .52 and 53 to bring into the Federal Repul)lic capital
equipment, raw materials and semifinished goods, engi-
neering and other technical services for use in the Federal
Republic subject to the same regulations as apply to
German-owned properties on condition that any DM or
other proceeds accruing therefrom shall be jiaid into a
blocked account in the name of the foreign owner, which
may be utilized in the same manner as outlined in para-
graph (1) above.

(5) (i) The Bank Deutscher Laender will be author-
ized, under the supervision of the Allied High Commission
or its designated agency, to sell deutschemarks, at the
current rate of exchange, against acceptable foreign cur-
rencies including those placed at the disposal of the Bank

Information on Doing Business
With Germany and Austria

The Economic Cooperation Administration an-
nounced on June 12 that materials on Doing
Business With Austria and Doing Business With
Germany are now available from its OflBce of Small
Business at Washington.

These materials, prepared by the OflBce of Inter-
national Trade, Department of Commerce, con-
tained detailed information of interest to American
businessmen engaged in, or contemplating, trade
witli German and Austrian firms.

In addition to describing general trade possibil-
ities with these ECA countries, the materials
discuss exchange controls and capital movements,
exchange rates, and trade procedures and regu-
lations.

July 10, 1950

Deutscher Laender under existing payment agreements or
pursuant to such subsequent payment arrangements as
may be set up. Foreign excliange derived under tliis pro-
vision shall be held by the Bank Deutscher Laender sub-
ject to the same controls as other foreign exchange
resources.

(ii) DM balances created or other assets acquired
as a result of the foregoing, including income, shall be
held subject to the provisions of M. G. Lavps Nos. 52 and
53 and may be utilized in the same manner as outlined
in paragraph (1) above.

(6) (i) Foreign owners of securities, claims or other
obligations expressed in foreign currencies which repre-
sent debts of private persons, firms or coiiiorations in the
Federal Republic will be permitted in accordance with
special licen.ses to be issued pursuant to M. G. Laws Nos.
52, 53 and 63 to enter into voluntary agreements with the
debtors for the settlement of such debts in DM provided
that :

(a) Such securities were issued or the claims or
other obligations arose prior to September 1, 1939, and
were, except in the case of bonds, held by the present owner
on the date the lifting of the investment moratorium is
announced.

(b) Any DM received by the foreign owners as
a result of any such settlements shall be paid into a
blocked account in the name of the foreign owner, which
may be utilized in the same manner as outlined in para-
graph (1) above.

( c ) The security, claim or other obligation, if sub-
ject to the provisions of the Law for the Settlement of
Matters Concerning Foreign Currency Securities (Vali-
dation Law) when enacted, shall have been duly validated
pursuant to the provisions of such Law.

(d) It is established that all other foreign credi-
tors of the German debtor involved have been given at least
60 days notice of the proposed .settlement by publication
and by registered letter where possible; such notice to
inform creditors that any ob.iections to the proiX)sed set-
tlement must be registered with the designated licensing
authority within the stipulated time. The licensing
authority shall be empowered to withhold licenses for a
settlement when in its opinion a prima facie case of
reasonable objection has been established by one or more
creditors within the stipulated time on the ground that
the proposed settlement would lead to a preference be-
tween creditors or to bankruptcy of or foreclosure pro-
ceedings against the debtor.

(ii) Public bodies and their agencies will be per-
mitted in accordance with special licenses issued pur-
suant to M. G. Laws Nos. 52 and 53, to enter into volun-
tary agreements with foreign owners of foreign currency
claims to settle such claims in DM provided that such
settlements can be made by the public body or agency
thereof without impairing other obligations or causing
additional "borrowing and that the conditions .set forth
in subparagraphs (6) (i) (a) (b) (e) and (d) above
are met.

(ill) As used herein, the term "foreign owners"
shall mean owners who are not residents of the area
constituting "Das Deutsche Reich" as it existed on 31
December 1937.

B. It is not intended that the provisions of paragraph
A. above will result in unduly increasing foreign owner-
ship in industry and commerce in the Federal Republic.
Therefore, appropriate limitations may subsequently be
imposed on the provisions of paragraph A. should deter-
mination be made that an undue proportion of industry
and commerce in the Federal Republic would otherwise
come under foreign ownership. Moreover, any licenses
issued pursuant to the provisions of paragraph A. above
shall provide that the parties to the transactions are not
thereby exonerated from the requirement of full com-
pliance with decartelisiation and deconcentration legis-
lation in force in the Federal Republic.

U.S. Will Designate Civilian
High Commissioner for Austria

Following is the te.i-t of the United States note sent by
Ambassador Alan O. Kirk to A. Y. Yyshinsky, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, on June 12, 1950,
and released to the press on June 15.

I have the honor to refer to the situation in
which the deputies for the Austrian treaty nego-
tiations have been unable to reach agreement on
tlie terms of an Austrian state treaty. It will be
recalled that Austrian independence was pledged
in the Moscow Declaration of 1943, and my Gov-
ernment regrets exceedingly the failure to reach
an agreement which would result in the fulfillment
of this pledge.

The Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom,
France, and the United States at their meeting
in London on May 18 reaffirmed that their policy
with respect Austria requires the earliest possible
completion of an Austrian treaty which will lead
to the restoration of a free and independent Aus-
tria in accordance with the pledge given in the
Moscow Declaration and to the withdrawal of the
forces of occupation. The three governments
further agreed that they are ready at any time to
settle without delay all outstanding issues of the
treaty, provided that this will definitely bring
about agreement on the treaty as a whole.

In the absence of a treaty, the three governments
agreed that they are prepared to carry out such
measures as may properly be taken to strengthen,
within the framework of existing quadripartite
agreements, the authority of the Austrian Gov-
ernment and to lighten the burden of the occupa-
tion on Austria to the greatest extent possible as
requested by the Austrian Government in recent
notes to the occupying powers. The three For-
eign Ministers further agreed to proceed at an
early date to appoint civilian high commissioners
in Austria in accordance with the provisions of
Article 9 of the Control Agreement of June 28,
1946.

My Government would be pleased if the Gov-
ernment of the Soviet Union, pending final de-
cision on the treaty, would associate itself with
the program determined upon by the three For-
eign Ministers. In the meantime, my Govern-
ment will, on its part, as a first step in such a pro-
gram, proceed at an early date to designate a
civilian high commissioner to replace its present
military commander in Austria and hopes that the
Soviet Government will take similar action.

Visit of Burmese Banker

Mr. Tin Tun, chief accountant of the Union
Bank of Burma, has arrived in Washington to
begin a 3-month visit in the United States for the
purpose of observing financial institutions.

Department of State Bulletin

REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION

iy George L. 'Warren

The General Council of the International Ref-
ugee Organization (Iro) held its fifth session in
Geneva from March 14 through March 22, 1950.
The Executive Committee met concurrently from
March 8 through March 21, 1950.

At the fourth session of the Council held in Ge-
neva in October 1949, the General Council decided
to extend the period of Iro operations from June
30, 1950, to March 31, 1951, in order to complete
the task of resettling all eligible refugees in central
Europe who might qualify for resettlement and to
complete arrangements for the continuing care of
refugees requiring permanent institutional treat-
ment. It was planned at the fifth session of the
Council to review the remaining tasks facing Iro
to reach more specific decisions as to the termina-
tion of services and to give further consideration
to the organization of legal protection for refugees
under the objectives of the United Nations after
the termination of Iro. The Executive Committee
was convened on March 8, 1950, to consider and
to comment upon reports of the Director-General
to be transmitted thereafter to the General Council
for action.

Of the 18 member governments of Iro, 16 were
represented at the meeting ; China and Iceland not
being represented : ^

Australia

Luxembourg

Belgium

Netherlands

Canada

New Zealand

Denmark

Norway

Dominican Republic

Switzerland

France

United Kingdom

Guatemala

United States

Italy

Venezuela

Chairman; Dr. V. Montoya of Venezuela as Sec-
ond Vice-Chairman ; and Mr. A. B0gh-Andersen
of Denmark as rapporteur.

Executive Committee

The Executive Committee considered the semi-
annual report of the Dii-ector-General for the pe-
riod July 1 through December 31, 1949; partial
financial reports for the first and second quarters
of the fiscal year 1949-50; and gave attention to
the problems of the resettlement of refugees re-
maining in Shanghai and on the island of Samar
in the Philippines. Incidental to its consideration
of the Director-General's report it recommended
that the Council approve the recommendation of
the Director-General that all refugees qualifying
for resettlement for whom definite destinations
were available should be maintained in Iro camps
after June 30, 1950, until their resettlement had
been accomplished.

This decision while maintaining the principle
of earlier resolutions was taken in the conviction
that such action would facilitate the movement of
these refugees and contribute to the greater ac-
complishment of the task remaining before Iro.

The Committee noted with satisfaction that the
Director-General had made available without cost
to the United Nations Relief for Palestinian Ref-
ugees, in accordance with authority previously
given, approximately 600,000 dollars in supplies

Dr. P. J. de Kanter of the Netherlands presided
as Chairman of the Council for the session. Mr.
P. Zutter of Switzerland served as First Vice-

' Representatives of the Governments of Israel, Mexico,
and Sweden, of the United Nations, the Vatican, Ilo, and
Who also attended as official observers and representa-
tives of many voluntary agencies serving refugees were
present.

Jo/y ?0, 1950

surplus to Iro operations and that Iro had com-
pleted arrangements to make an interest-free loan
to the United Nations in an amount of 2,800,000
dollars in other currencies than United States dol-
lars for the relief of Palestinian refugees.

The Committee also welcomed information from
the Director-General that negotiations with the
Western European countries for the transfer of
Iro responsibility with respect to residual refugees
who will remain on their territories had proceeded
satisfactorily. The plan of expenditure for the
supplementary period of operations 1950-51 pre-
sented by the Director-General totaling 55,165,456
dollars was recommended to the General Council
for adoption. Included in these expenditures was
an item of 27,219,000 dollars for transportation
covering the cost of movement of approximately
100,000 refugees to the United States, 20,000 to
Australia, 10,000 to Canada, and 17,000 to all other
countries.

General Council

The General Council accepted the reports of the
Director-General; adopted the plan of expendi-
ture for the supplementary period after June 30,
1950; and approved the decision to maintain re-
settleable refugees in camps after June 30, 1950,
until their resettlement had been accomplished.
The Council gave serious attention to the financial
reports and urged the Director-General to pay
particular attention to the control and reduction
of inventory supplies in order that all resources
of the organization might be fully applied to the
accomplishment of the remaining tasks. The
Council also gave special consideration to the
problems of refugees remaining in Austria and
Italy and urged the Director-General to make
special efforts to reduce the number of refugees
in those countries in order that they might not be
further burdened after the termination of Iro by
refugees remaining in their territories. AVith re-
spect to the problem of protection of refugees
particularly in Germany the Council recom-
mended to the High Commission for Germany
that the German Federal Government be requested
to give consideration to adherence to the draft
convention on the protection of refugees presently
under consideration by the Economic and Social
Council when this convention becomes open for
signature.

On the initiative of the representative of
France, the Council sent a further communication

to the United Nations with respect to the afford-
ing of protection to refugees by the High Com-
missioner for Refugees when he assumes office on
January 1, 1951. It was recommended that cer-
tain listed provisions of the Iro constitution which
were deemed no longer applicable to the provi-
sion of protection to refugees should not be ap-
plied and that the High Commissioner should not
be bound in his activities by decisions which the
Iro had found it necessary to take restricting its
services to refugees for administrative or financial
reasons. In the course of the discussion on the
adoption of this recommendation to the United
Nations, the United States representative made a
statement that the United States Government
would not find it possible to make a further con-
tribution to Iro after the contribution for the sup-
plementary period June 30, 1950-March 31, 1951,
then under consideration in the Congress, had been
made. This statement reflected the judgment that
ujion the conclusion of Iro services in 1951 the
need for international funds for the direct as-
sistance of refugees would no longer exist because
the numbers of refugees remaining in any par-
ticular country will not constitute more than a
normal burden upon that country.

A decision was also reached by the General
Council with respect to the termination of the In-
ternational Tracing Service which has done com-
mendable work in reuniting members of families,
in locating missing children, and in supplying in-
valuable records concerning the experiences of
refugees and displaced persons during the war.
The Director-General was instructed to reduce the
staff of the Service progressively with the view to
the ultimate transfer of the function of tracing
missing persons to the High Commission for Ger-
many on March 31, 1951.

The Director-General re^Dorted satisfactory
progress in concluding arrangements for the con-
tinuing care of refugees for whom institutional
treatment must be provided after the termination
of Iro. The details of such arrangements with
Norway, Sweden. Belgium, and New Zealand were
made known to the Council, and during the course
of the session the French Government announced
its agreement to receive 900 aged persons from
Germany for permanent care in private institu-
tions in France.

The Council adjourned its fifth session on March
22, 1950, after resolving to convene its next session
at Geneva on or about October 9, 1950.

Deparfment of State Bulletin

THE DEPARTMENT

PUBLICATIONS

Report on Department's
Security Program Being Studied

[Released to the press June 15]

The Department has just received the report
of the Subcommittee of Two ^ concerning tlie
practical operations, enforcement, and day-to-day
policing of the security program in the Depart-
ment of State. The Department is very happy to
observe that they felt that the security officers
■whom they interviewed are alert, capable, and
well-trained men with a thorough grasp of their
subject. The report contains suggestions de-
signed to improve the Department's security pro-
gram in certain particulars. These suggestions
were made in a constructive spirit, and we are
examining them most carefully in order to deter-
mine whether they should be put into effect and
whether they are possible in the light of our cur-
rent budgetary situation.

One suggestion on which particular comment
might be appropriate is that aliens employed by
the Department abroad should be replaced as rap-
idly as possible with United States citizens. The
difficult administrative, budgetary, and human
problems which such a project presents have been
under consideration for some time, and a gradual
program of replacement is now under way.

In considei'ing this problem, however, it should
be borne in mind that the great bulk of these em-
ployees are engaged in routine and administrative
tasks completely removed from matters involving
any classifaed data or questions relating to national
security. Many of these aliens have been in the
employ of the United States Government for 10,
20, and 30 years. They have demonstrated, often
in exceedingly trying circumstances and some at
the cost of their lives, that they are carrying out
their assigned duties faithfully and with great
credit both to the United States and to themselves.
The value of their services must not be overlooked.

'The subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, that is investigating the charges of Senator
McCarthy of Communist penetration of the Department
of State, appointed a subcommittee, consisting of Sen-
ators Theodore Francis Green and Henry Cabot Lodge,
Jr., to inspect precautions that the Department is taking
in its missions abroad against Communist espionage. The
Senators made an 11-day inspection trip abroad and
submitted their report on June 14.

Recent Releases

For sale hy the Superintendent of Documents, Oovem-
ment Printing Office, Wushinriton 25, D. C. Address re-
quests direct to the Suixrinlcndcnt of Documents, except
in the case of free puhlications, which may he obtained
from the Department of State.

Air Transport Services. Treaties and Other International
Acts Series 1955. Pub. 3011. 15 pp. 10«f.

Agreement and accompanying exchange of notes be-
tween the United States and the Dominican Re-
public— Signed at Ciudad Trujillo July 19, 1949; en-
tered into force July 19, 1949.

Economic Cooperation With Sweden Under Public Law
472 — 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other
International Acts Series 2034. Pub. 3776. 9 pp. 5^.

Agreement between the United States and Sweden,
amending agreement of July 3, 1948 — Effected by ex-
change of notes, signed at Washington January 5 and
17, 1950 ; entered into force January 17, 1950.

Foreign Service List, April 1, 1950. Pub. 3792. 165 pp.
30^ a copy ; $1.50 a year domestic, $2 a year foreign.

Lists officers in the American Foreign Service, their
po.sts of assignment, and 2 indexes : geographic and
personnel.

United States Educational Foundation in Egypt. Trea-
ties and Other International Acts Series 2039. Pub. 3799.

11 pp. 5^.

Agreement between the United States and Egypt —
Signed at Cairo November 3, 1949 ; entered Into force
November 3, 1949 and exchange of notes — Signed at
Cairo November 3, 1949.

Economic Cooperation With Denmark Under Public Law
472 — 80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other
International Acts Series 2022. Pub. 3802. 9 pp. 5(f.

Agreement between the United States and Denmark
amending agreement of June 29, 1948 — Effected by ex-
change of notes, signed at Wa.shington February 7,
1950; entered into force February 7, 1950.

Economic Cooperation With Italy Under Public Law 472 —
80th Congress, as amended. Treaties and Other Inter-
national Acts Series 2028. Pub. 3804. 9 pp. 5^.

Agreement between the United States and Italy-
Effected by exchange of notes, signed at Washington
February 7, 1950 ; entered into force February 7, 1950.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Treaties and Other Inter-
national Acts Series 2016. Pub. 3805. 21 pp. 100.

Agreement between the United States and Norway —
Signed at Washington January 27, 1950; entered into
force February 24, 1950.

U.S. National Commission UNESCO News, April 1950.

Pub. 3807. 16 pp. 100 a copy; $1.00 per year, domestic;
$1.35 per year, foreign.

Prepared monthly for the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

July 10, 1950

The United States in the United Nations

Security Council

[July 1-7]

On July 7, the Security Council approved a joint
French-British resolution which recommends that
United Nations members providing military forces
under the Council resolutions on Korea make such
forces available to a unified command under the
United States and requests the United States to
designate the commander of such forces. This
unified command is authorized, at its discretion,
to use the United Nations flag in the course of
operations against North Koi'ean forces, together
with the flags of the various nations participating.
The United States is asked to report to the Coun-
cil, as ajapropriate, on the course of action taken
under the unified command. Seven votes sup-
ported the resolution, and none opposed it.
Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia abstained.

Ambassador Warren R. Austin told the Council
that the United States accepted the responsibilities
placed upon it by this resolution, adding that the
United States Government had not sponsored the
resolution because of the "special responsibilities"
imposed on her by the resolution.

Secretary-General's Communique on Korea

Following the adoption by the Security Council
on June 27 of a resolution recommending the
United Nations members "furnish such assistance
to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to
repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in that area," the Secretary-
General of the United Nations sent the following
telegram to member governments :

I have the honour to call the attention of your Govern-
ment to the resolution adopted by the Security Council
at its 474th meeting on 27 June 1950 which recommends
that the Members of the United Nations furnish such
assistance to the Republic of Korea as may he necessary
to repel the armed attack and to restore international
peace and security in that area. In the event that your
government is in a position to provide assistance, it would
facilitate the implementation of the resolution if you were
to be so good as to provide me with an early reply as to
the type of assistance. I shall transmit the reply" to the
Security Council and to the Government of the Republic
of Korea.

By July 10, the following states, in communica-

tions to the Secetary-General, had indicated their
support of Security Council action with respect
to Korea :

Afghanistan
Argentina
Australia
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Burma
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Denmark
Dominican
Reimblic
Ecuador

El Salvador

Ethiopia

Greece

Guatemala

Haiti

Honduras

Iceland

India

Iran

Iraq

Israel

Lebanon

Luxembourg

Mexico

Netherlands

New Zealand

Nicaragua

Norway

Panama

Pakistan

Paraguay

Peru

Sweden

Syria

ThaUand

Turkey

Union of

South Africa
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela

The following states had not replied to the
Secretary-General's communication on Korea :

Byelorussia Ukraine

Egypt ' Yugoslavia ^

Liberia

The U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, and Poland have
rejected as "illegal" the Security Council action
on Korea. Yemen took note of the resolution of
June 25, calling for a cease-fire in Korea, and Saudi
Arabia took note of the-resolution of June 27.

The Council of tlie Organization of American
States on June 28 adopted a resolution declaring
"its firm adherence to the decisions of the compe-
tent organs of the United Nations." Italy, a non-
member of the United Nations, has also indicated
general support for Security Council action on
Korea.

Following is a letter, dated July 6, 1950, from Ambassa-
dor Warren R. Austin to Sccretary-Oeneral Trygve hie
concerning United States assistance to Korea:'

Upon the instruction of my Government, I have
the lionor to acknowledge receipt of your com-
munication of June 29, 1950, in which you request
information concerning the type of assistance the
Government of the United States is prepared to

' These two states are members of the Security Council ;
Yugoslavia voted against the resolution of June 27 ; and
Egypt did not participate in the decision.

' U.N. doe. S/1580.

Department of State Bulletin

offer pursuant to the resolution adopted by the
Security Council on June 27, 1950, which recom-
mends that the Members of the United Nations
furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea
as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and
to restore international peace and security in the
area.

In response to your request, I am authorized to
inform you that, in support of the resolutions
approved by the Security Council relative to the
attack upon the Republic of Koi'ea by invading
forces from North Korea, the President of the
United States has ordered United States air and
sea forces to give the Korean Government troops
cover and support and has authorized the use of
certain supporting ground units. The President
has also authorized the United States Air Force
to conduct missions on siJecific military targets in
Northern Korea wherever militarily necessary and
has ordered a naval blockade of the entire Korean
coast. The United States will continue to dis-
charge its obligations as a member of the United
Nations to act vigorously in support of the Se-
curity' Council's resolutions.

The United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia,
Canada, China, and the Netherlands have offered
specific military assistance. In addition, Chile
has offered "regular and adequate supplies of
cooper, saltpetre, and other strategic materials to
countries responsible for operations"; Thailand
has offered foodstuffs, such as rice; Denmark has
offered to make available certain medicaments;
Norway has suggested that its tonnage might be
offered for transportation purposes; Nicaragua
has stated that she is prepared to assist in food-
stuffs and rubber, and if deemed advisable, to
contribute pei'sonnel; and the Philijipines is pre-
pared to contribute, as called upon, such amounts
of copra, coconut oil, soap, rice, and certain medi-
caments as may help to facilitate the implementa-
tion of the resolution.

Economic and Social Council

The United Nations experts' recommendations
on full employment, the related item on methods
of financing of economic development of under-
developed countries, and the draft Covenant on
Human Rights are among the main topics on the
52-item agenda adopted by the Economic and
Social Council at the opening of its eleventh ses-
sion at Geneva on July 3. The Council will also
review reports of a number of its subsidiary bodies
and of the specialized agencies. Representatives
of the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
were absent.

The Council decided to refer the draft Human

Rights Covenant to the Social Committee for con-
sideration of the draft's broad aspects with a view
to transmitting it with relevant documentation to
the General Assembly. The United States repre-
sentative supported this proposal on the under-
standing that the Committee would consider only
the general aspects of the Covenant, although
earlier he had supported a recommendation to send
the Covenant to the General Assembly without
discussion.

The Secretary-General's arrangements for a
training program in public administration were
noted with approval by the Council, which recom-
mended that additional activities undertaken in
the field of training in public administration, at
the request of member governments, be considered
under the expanded program of technical assist-
ance. The United States representative's endorse-
ment of this Council action was based on the under-
standing that activities financed under the tech-
nical assistance account would be limited to re-
quests from underdeveloped countries.

Trusteeship Council

On July 5 and 6, the Trusteeship Council heard
and discussed statements from representatives of
various groups in French and British Togoland
to which the Council had earlier agreed to grant
oral hearings in connection with certain petitions.
Following statements by representatives of the
All-Ewe Conference, the Togoland Union, the
Supreme Council of Natural Rulers of Togoland,
and the Togoland Progress Party, Council mem-
bers questioned them on their various proposals
for unification of the Ewe people and Togoland
and on the comparative strength of Togolese ad-
herence to their views.

The first two parts of the Council's report on
the United States annual report on the trust terri-
tory of the Pacific Islands and the entire Council
report on Australia's annual report on New Guinea
were adopted on July 6.

International Civil Aviation Organization

The assembly of the International Civil Avia-
tion Organization, after a 3-week review of the
entire field of international air transport, con-
cluded its fourth session at Montreal on June 20.
The Assembly approved the report of the Icao
Council relating to its work of the past year and
elected a new Council of 20 nations to serve as
IcAo's executive body for the next 3 years. The
Assembly also took action on a number of matters
in the technical, economic, legal, and administra-
tive fields.

July 10, 7950

Genera! Policy

Act of Aggression in Korea: Page

Review of U.N. and U.S. Action To Restore

Peace. Address by Secretary Acheson . 43

Tlie President Authorizes Use of Ground

Units 46

Answer to China's Offer To Send Troops . 47
U.S.S.R. Responds to Request for Media-
tion 47

Precedent Contradicts Soviet Allegation of

Illegality in U.N. Action 48

ECA Aids South Korea 49

A Militaristic Experiment. Statement by

John Foster Dulles 49

Special Staff To Assist Ambassador Grady in

Iran 59

Czechoslovak U.N. Representative Resigns;

U.S. Grants Asylum 62

The United Nations and
Specialized Agencies

Soviet Walk-Outs Flout Democratic Process
in United Nations. Statement by Francis
B. Sayre 61

Report on International Refugee Organiza-
tion. By George L. Warren 75

The United States in the United Nations . . 78

Economic Affairs

Labor's Role in World Affairs. By Bernard

Wiesman 54

Treaty Information

The Need for an International Trade
Organization :
Statement by Charles F. Brannan, Secre-
tary of Agriculture 67

Treaty Information — Continued

Statement by Charles Sawyer, Secretary of ^^^^
Commerce 70

Occupation Matters

Answer to Soviet Protest on MacArthur
Clemency Circular:

U.S. Note of June 8, 1950

Soviet Note of May 11, 1950

Relaxing Restrictions on Foreign Investment

in Germany

U.S. Will Designate Civilian High Commis-
sioner for Austria

Technical Assistance

Carrying Out Point 4: A Community Effort.
Address by Secretary Acheson

National Security

Support of Mutual Defense Assistance Pro-
gram for 1951. Statement by Secretary
Acheson

International Information and
Cultural Affairs

Visit of Burmese Banker

The Department

Report on Department's Security Program
Being Studied

Publications

Recent Releases

72
74

Bernard Wiesman, autlior of the article on labor's role iu
world affairs, is Acting Labor Adviser, Office of Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic Affair.'^.

Oeorge L. Wurren, author of the article on the Iko, is adviser on
refugees and displaced per.sons, Department of State. Mr. Warren was
United States representative to the fifth session of the General Council
and to the seventh session of the Executive Committee of Iro.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1960

J/ie/ ^eha^t^^en(/ ,c^ t/iaie/

U.S. COMMANDS U.N. MILITARY FORCES IN

KOREA • Text of Security Council Resolution .... 83

THE UNITED NATIONS AND KOREA • By Ambassador

Philip C. Jessup 84

U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS IN KOREA • Address by

John Foster Dulles 88

POINT 4: AN INVESTMENT IN PEACE • Address by

the President 93

For complete contents see back cover

Vol. XXIII, No. 576
July 17, 1950

^vi®"'' o*.

^'ATBS o*

^^»HT o.

*^.wy*. bulletin

Vol. XXIII, No. 576 • Publication 3913
July 17, 1950

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents

U.S. Government Printing Office

Washington 25, D.C.

Peice:

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Single copy, 20 cents

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been approved by the Director of the

Bureau of the Budget (February 18, 1949).

Note; Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
or State Bulletin as the source will be
appreciated.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication compiled and
edited in the Division of Publications,
Office of Public Affairs, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government u)ith information on
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partment of State and the Foreign
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ment, and statements and addresses
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Publications of the Department, as
well as legislative material in the field
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U i. W^+- '>4

U.N. Places Unified Command

of Military Forces in Korea Under United States

(Otr.

s-v*-vr^i, (. V Va

III 11 jt^

TEXT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION'

"The Security Council,

"Ha\'ing determined that the armed attack upon
the Kepublic of Korea by forces from North
Korea constitutes a breach of the peace.

"Having recommended that the members of the
United Nations furnish such assistance to the Re-
public of Korea as may be necessary to repel the
armed attack and to restore international peace
and security in the area,

"1. Welcomes, the prompt and vigorous sup-
port which Governments and peoples of the United
Nations have given to its resolutions of 25 and 27
June 1950 to assist the Republic of Korea in de-
fending itself against armed attack and thus to
restore international peace and security in the
area;

"2. Notes that members of the United Nations
have transmitted to the United Nations offers of
assistance for the Republic of Korea ;

"3. Recommends that all members providing
military forces and other assistance pursuant to
the aforesaid Security Council resolutions make
such forces and other assistance available to a uni-
fied command under the United States;

"4. Bequests the United States to designate the
commander of such forces ;

"5. Authorises the unified command at its dis-
cretion to use the United Nations flag in the course
of operations against North Korean forces concur-
rently with the flags of the various nations
participating;

"6. Bequests the United States to provide the
Security Council with reports as appropriate on
tlie course of action taken under the unified
command."

GENERAL MacARTHUR DESIGNATED
AS COMMANDING GENERAL

Statement by the President

[Released to the press by the White House July 8]

The Security Council of the United Nations, in
its resolution of July 7, 1950, has recommended
that all members providing military forces and
other assistance pursuant to the Security Council
resolutions of June 25 and 27, make such forces and
other assistance available to a unified command
under the United States.

The Security Council resolution also requests
that the United States designate the commander
of such forces, and authorizes the unified command
at its discretion to use the United Nations flag in
the course of operations against the North Korean
forces concurrently with the flags of the various
nations participating.

I am responding to the recommendation of the
Security Council and have designated General
Douglas MacArthur as the Commanding General
of the military forces which the members of the
United Nations place under the unified command
of the United States pursuant to the United Na-
tions' assistance to the Republic of Korea in repel-
ling the unprovoked armed attack against it.

I am directing General MacArthur, pursuant to
the Security Council resolution, to use the United
Nations flag in the course of operations against the
North Korean forces concurrently with the flags
of the various nations participating.

' Introduced by France and U.K. (S/1588) and adopted
on .luly 7 by a vote of 7 to 0, with 3 abstentions (Egypt,
India, and Yugoslavia) ; Soviet Union was absent.

July 17, 1950

Ambassador Austin Comments on Resolution

On July 7, Ambassador Austin told the Security
Council that the United States accepts the responsi-
bility and makes the sacrifice that is involved in
carrying out these principles of the United Nations.
In spirit, if not in word, this resolution has been in
efCect since the very first resolution was adopted
in response to the call for help from Korea.

The United Nations and Korea

hy Philip 0. Jessup
Atribassador at Large ^

The Communist-inspired attack on the Repub-
lic of Korea is the most barefaced attack on the
United Nations itself. An assault upon the
United Nations headquarters at Lake Success
could hardly have been more direct or more re-
vealing. Of all the countries in the world, none
is more closely identified with the United Nations
than the Republic of Korea. Despite the ac-
tions of the Soviet Union, from March 20, 1946,
to September 23, 1947, to prevent the establish-
ment of Korea as a free and independent nation,
the United Nations helped to set it up when the
United States laid the case of Korea before the
world organization.

As could be expected, the propaganda of world-
wide Communist imi^erialism has tried to hide its
aggression under a flood of lies. As Al Smith
used to say, "Let's look at the record."

Record on Korea

Fortunately, the record is crystal clear. There
have been times in history when serious and con-
scientious scholars have debated the question
"Wlro started the war?" No serious or conscien-
tious scholar can have any question here. The
North Korean Communist forces attacked the Re-
public of Korea without warning, without provo-
cation, without any justification whatsoever. It
has never been more true than in this case that
actions speak louder than words. Communist
peace propaganda has sought to lull the peoples
of the free world at the very moment when Com-
munist imperialism was preparing and launching
this war of aggression.

Knowledge of the facts of the situation does
not depend upon statements by the Korean Gov-
ernment nor upon statements by the Americans

* Highlights of an address made before the Institute of
Public Affairs, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.,
on July 10 and released to the press on the same date.

on the spot. The United Nations has a Commis-
sion in Korea. At the last meeting of the General
Assembly, this Commission was specifically au-
thorized to have teams of observers to watch the
38th parallel, north of which the Communist
forces were entrenched. This United Nations
Commission is composed of representatives of the
following countries: Australia, China, India, EI
Salvador, Turkey, the Philippines, and France.
The Commission's team of observers had con-
cluded an on-the-spot survey, barely 24 hours be-
fore the Communist forces attacked. Here is
what these impartial United Nations representa-
tives reported.

U.N. COMMISSION REPORT

The principal impression left with observers after
their field tour is that the South Korean Army is organized
for defense and is in no condition to carry out an attack
on a large scale against forces of the North . . .

This impression, they said, was based on eight
observations including the facts that "there is no
concentration of [South Korean] troops and no
massing for attack visible at any point".

At several points, North Korean forces are in effec-
tive possession of salients on the south side of the par-
allel, occupation in at least one case being of fairly recent
date. There is no evidence that South Korean forces
have taken any steps for or making any preparation to
eject North Korean forces from any of these salients . . .

So far as the equipment of South Korean forces Is con-
cerned, in absence of armour, air support, and heavy
artillery, any action with object of invasion would, by
any military standards, be impossible . . .

In general, they reported, the attitude of South Korean
commanders is one of vigilant defense. Their instruc-
tions do not go beyond retirement in case of attack upon
previous prepared positions . . .

Immediately after the Communist forces of the

Hepaiimen^ of Stale Bulletin

North attacked and began their invasion of the
Eepublic of Korea the United Nations Commis-
sion reported as follows to Secretary-General Lie :

Commission met this morning 1000 hours and con-
sidered latest reports on hostilities and results direct
observation along parallel by Uncok Military observers
over period ending forty-eight hours before hostilities be-
gan. Commission's present view on basis this evidence
is first that judging from actual progress of operations
Northern Regime is carrying out well-planned concerted
and full scale invasion of South Korea, second that South
Korean forces were deployed on wholly defensive basis in
all sectors of the parallel and third, that they were taken
completely by surprise . . .

The Security Council had the evidence and
passed judgment immediately. The judgment of
the Security Council is the judgment of the world
organization. The Communist invaders have been
adjudged as having launched an armed attack and
no amount' of Communist propaganda will succeed
in hiding the "mark of Cain" on their foreheads.

U.N. RESOLUTION

In view of the attemjit of Communist propa-
ganda to confuse the issue let us get one other
point clear on the record. The Communist forces
attacked on Sunday, June 25, at 4 : 00 a.m., Korean
time. The United Nations Security Council met
at 2 : 00 p.m. Washington time on Sunday, June
25th, and by 6 : 00 p.m. that afternoon adopted a
resolution determining that the armed attack of
the North Koreans constituted a breach of the
peace. They called upon all members of the
United Nations to assist.

AVliat had the United States done before the
Security Council issued this judgment and ap-
peal? The only steps which the United States
took prior to 6 : 00 p.m. on Sunday were :

U.S. ACTION

(1) It took the initiative in the early morning
hours of Smiday to call the Security Council to
consider this aggression immediately.

(2) It began the evacuation of American women
and children from the danger area.

(3) In the immediate vicinity of Seoul, the
capital of Korea, it provided the necessary mili-
tary protection to keep these women and children
from being killed during the course of the evac-
uation.

It was not until 10 : 30 p.m. on June 25, after
the Security Council had passed its resolution, that
the first orders were issued by the President of
the United States directing that assistance should
lie given to the Republic of Korea in pursuance of
the Security Council resolution.

During the next day, as the armed forces from
North Korea advanced southward, the United
States continued to carry out the resolution of
June 25 by increasing its aid to the Korean
Government.

'\\1ien the Security Council met again two days
later, on June 27th, and made more specific its ap-
peal for help to the Republic of Korea, the Presi-
dent of the United States ordered an intensifica-
tion of our help. The free world greeted these
actions with enthusiastic approval and forty-six
members of the United Nations have already sig-
nified to the headquarters of the United Nations
their approval and support of the Security Coun-
cil resolution. The armed forces of six members,
in addition to those of the United States, are either
already participating in giving help to the Repub-
lic of Korea or have announced that these forces
are being made available. Other members have
offered other types of material assistance. Here
indeed is collective security in action.

Before going back to consider these matters in
more detail let us summarize these essential points
which the record proves.

(1) The Communist forces in North Korea at-
tacked without warning and without provocation.
They started it. That is what the Prime Minister
of India, Pandit Nehru, calls the "Major fact of
well-planned invasion and aggression of South
Korea".

(2) The Security Council as the authorized rep-
resentative of the world's organization responsible
for the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity has found that these are the facts which
were established by the report of its own United
Nations Commission on the spot.

( 3 ) The United States acted promptly as a loyal
member of the United Nations and everything
which it has done has been in support of the action
of the United Nations in the effort to stop the
Communist armed attack and to restore peace in
the area.

Let us now go back to consider some of these
items in more detail. Let us first look at the Com-
munist propaganda line which says in effect that
the United Nations has no right to keep the peace
when it is Communist imperialists who have com-
mitted a breach of the peace.

Answer to Soviet Illegality Charge

The Soviet Union argues that the Security
Council is without power to act if their represent-
ative violates his Charter obligation to participate
in its meetings.

It is necessary first to recall that article 24 of
the Charter says that the members of the United
Nations confer on the Security Council "primary
responsibility for the maintenance of interna-

Ju// 17, 7950

tional peace and security". In the next place
article 28 of the Charter says that —

The Security Couucil shall be so organized as to be able
to function continuously. Rach member of the Security
Council shall for this purpose be represented at all times
at the seat of the Organization.

This is the language of the Charter. It is per-
fectly clear that a state which is a member of the
Security Council is obligated to be in a position
at all times to take part in its work. This provi-
sion would have no meaning if in spite of having
a representative at the seat of the organization
the representative should have a right to refuse to
attend the meetings. The Soviet Union has thus
violated its obligations under the Charter by re-
sorting to the tactics of "walking out."

Disregarding this question, the Soviet Union
argues that it nevertheless has the power to
cripple the functioning of the Security Council
because article 27 of tlie Charter says that deci-
sions of the Security Council on substantive
matters —

. . . shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven
members including the concurring votes of the permanent
members.

Since the Soviet Union is a permanent member,
it is argued that the absence of their concurring
vote invalidates the action of the Council.

The history of the drafting of this article and
of its application in practice leads to quite a differ-
ent conclusion. The provision which I have just
cited from article 27 about the concurring votes
of the permanent members iSj of course, the legal
language describing the decision at the San Fran-
cisco conference to give the permanent members
a veto on substantive questions. The Charter is
a constitutional document and like all constitu-
tions, including that of the United States, the
exact meaning of its words is developed by
practice.

U.S.S.R. PAST ACTIONS CONTRADICT CHARGE

One of the practices in the Security Council
which has developed over the years is the prac-
tice of abstaining from voting on questions which
are put to the vote. The Soviet Union, begin-
ning in April 1948, abstained in four instances
on Security Council resohitions dealing with
Palestine.^ Beginning in January 1948, the So-
viet Union abstained on four resolutions dealing
with the Kashmir case. Beginning in December
1948, the Soviet Union abstained on two resolu-
tions in the Indonesian case. In none of these
ten cases has the Soviet Union challenged the le-
gality of the action taken by the Security Council.
Furthermore, tlie Soviet Union has never ques-
tioned the legality of action taken by the Security
Council in which it voted with the majority but

' See BtTLLETiN of July 10, 1950, p. 48.

on which other permanent members of the Coun-
cil abstained. This has occurred in at least three
instances. We thus already have over a dozen
cases in which it has been established that the
meaning of article 27 of the Charter is that, while
the negative vote of a permanent member can de-
feat the substantive resolution, the failure of a
permanent member to vote for a resolution does
not defeat it.

Clearly it can make no difference in terms of
the application of the Charter on this point
whether the representative of a permanent mem-
ber sits at the table and abstains or whether he
fails to come at all. The essential difference re-
lates to tlie question of a member's sense of re-
sponsibility and willingness to discharge its obli-
gations under the Charter. The Soviet Union
had the legal power to attend the meeting of the
Security Council and, by taking the responsibility
before the world, to cast a veto to block Security
Council action. The U.S.S.R. did not have the
power to block action by staying away from the
meeting in violation of its obligations under ar-
ticle 28.

The consideration of this part of the Soviet
Union's argument would not be complete without,
mention of the excuse which the Soviet Govern-
ment has given for its recent refusal to cooperate
with the United Nations. The excuse is that a
majority of the members have not accepted the
Soviet view that the representative of the Chinese
Communists should be seated as the representative
of China. The position of the United States on
this point has been frequently stated. Our po-
sition is that we are always ready to abide by the
decision which is made by any one of the organs
of the United Nations in accordance with the es-
tablished procedures of that organ. We have
never taken the position that we will disregard
decisions merely because we do not agree with
them. We have made it very clear that we do not
believe that this question of deciding what repre-
sentative is entitled to sit for his government is
subject to the veto. We believe that under es-
tablished rules this is a procedural question to
which the veto does not apply.

It is also necessary to recall that the Soviet
tactics of resorting to a walk-out in the United
Nations has not been confined to the pretext of
the issue of Chinese Communist representation.
Mr. Gromyko resorted to the same tactics in the
case of Iran in 1946; the trick was unsuccessful
then as now. If the question is asked whether
China was represented at the meetings of the Se-
curity Council on June 25th and 27th, the answer
is clearly yes. The Security Council had consid-
ered the claim of the Soviet Union that the Chinese
Government was not entitled to represent China,
and it rejected this claim. Until this decision is
changed by a duly authorized organ of the United
Nations, it obviously stands as the decision which
the members are bound to follow.

Department of State Bulletin

U.S. vs. U.S.S.R. Policy Toward Asia

It is a familiar pattern of international Com-
munist propaganda that they loudly accuse others
of the sins which they themselves have committed.
It is therefore not surprising that they accuse the
United States of imperialism in Asia, because the
Russian imperialistic design is the same in Asia
today as it was under the Czai's. The Soviet en-
croachments upon Chinese sovei"eignty in Man-
churia, Mongolia, Sinkiang, and elsewhere have
frequently been pointed out. The Soviet Union
and its satellites were the only members of the
United Nations which refused during the last Gen-
eral Assembly to join in approving a resolution
reasserting the historic American doctrine of
respect for tlie integrity of China.

The experience of so-called Communist "libera-
tion" of strongly nationalist states like Poland,
Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia
holds out the gloomiest prospects for the peoples
of Asia. During the period of this type of Soviet
"liberation,"' what has been the record of the
Western world? The Philippines and Burma
have become separate independent states. India,
Pakistan and Ceylon have become independent
states, members of the Commonwealth. Indonesia
has also become independent and a member of the
Netherlands-Indonesian Union. Cambodia, Laos,
and Vietnam have become independent members
of the French Union. Once again, the record is
the proof to which we turn. The Communist
propaganda cannot wipe out the facts.

The Ignited States has steadily supported the
development of independent nationalism through-
out Asia. We supported the cause of Indonesia
in the United Nations Security Council when the
Communist international movement was denounc-
ing the Indonesian patriotic leaders, Sukarno and
Hatta as "traitors." It was the United States
which took the case of Korea to the United Na-
tions and sought United Nations guaranties for
Korean independence. It was the Soviet Union
which by walkout and noncooperation blocked the
union of the country which all real Korean patriots
desire.

The objective and purpose of the United States
in Korea today is to support the United Nations
effort to restore and maintain peace. We are help-
ing to carry out Security Coimcil resolutions which
call for a cease-fire, the withdrawal of the North
Koreans to the SSth parallel, and for the restora-
tion of international peace and security in the
area. Thereafter, we shall continue our policy
of supporting the United Nations in its efforts to
secure a permanent adjustment of the situation
in Korea in the interest of the Korean people. We
have no other or separate interest of our own.

Other Attaclts To Be Defeated

It is always true that at times when thought and
action are concentrated upon meeting an emer-

gency a conscious effort is required to keep in
mind the importance of moving forward with
long-range plans. The present situation in Korea
requires and is receiving the concentrated atten-
tion of the Government of the United States. But,
at the same time, we must go forward with many
other plans and policies. It should be particularly
emphasized that this great demonstration of com-
bined action under the United Nations cannot be
allowed to slacken the efforts of this world organi-
zation to grapple with the fundamental problems
affecting the peace and welfare of mankind. One
of the most important of the long-range efforts of
the United Nations is the program of technical
assistance which is allied to our own Point 4 Pro-
gram. Sudden aggressive armed attacks on
peaceful, independent states must be met and rolled
back, but the peace and welfare of mankind are
always under attack by poverty and disease. Our
resources are adequate to cooperate in this peren-
nial struggle at the same time that we are meeting
the emergency of the moment. We have demon-
strated to the world our will and our ability to
meet the emergenc_y; surely we will not fail
through support of the Point 4 Program to do our
full part in the longer campaign.

Charging South Korea as Aggressor
Reminiscent of Nazi Tactics

Statement hy Secretary Acheson

[Released to the press July 5]

In regard to the Korean hostilities, four sunple
points must be recognized and long-remembered
by all the world. The people of this free nation
have clearly shown that they know the truth and
are not going to be misled by false versions of it.
These are the facts:

1. The present troubles in Korea started not
when the United Nations Security Council acted
or when the United States and others acted in
support of the Security Council. It all started at
dawn on Sunday, June 25, Korean time.

2. At that time, troops from North Korea, with-
out any provocation whatever, crossed the 38th
parallel and launched an aggressive attack against
the Republic of Korea. All the reliable witnesses,
on the scene, at the time, including the United
Nations Commission, have established that the
North Korean forces were the aggi'essors.

3. The Security Council of the United Na-
tions acted in support of tlie Republic of Korea
only after it was satisfied that this was a case of
utterly unprovoked aggression.

4. Any contention that hostilities were started by
the Republic of Korea is clearly in the category of
the Nazi claims of 1939 that Poland started hos-
tilities by attacking Nazi Germany.

July 17, 1950

U.S. Military Actions in Korea

Addresses iy John Foster Dulles
Consultant to the Secretary

NEW PHASE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY >

The Korean affair obviously brings us nearer
to the day of fateful decision. Also, it makes it
more probable that we will make the kind of
effort needed to fend off the utter disaster of war.

The danger of war has lain largely in our past
failure to see clearly and respond adequately to
the peril that stems from Soviet communism.
That slowness is probably inevitable in a democ-
racy when national policy depends on public
opinion. However, even now it is not too late
to put peace onto a more stable basis than ever
before.

The nature of the Soviet Communist threat has
been fully set out by Stalin himself in his Prob-
lems of Leninism. The latest English edition,
printed in Moscow, is dated 1940. Stalin there
outlines the program, whereby, Soviet commu-
nism expects to extend its system throughout the
world and establish its "one world" of state so-
cialism. The plan is to conquer the weaker coun-
tries, one by one, by methods of propaganda,
penetration, subversive warfare, and, as a last
resort, open war. The strongest non-Communist
countries, notably the United States, will be left
to the last and, gradually, encircled and their
economies weakened until, finally, they are sup-
posed either to capitulate voluntarily or be over-
thrown by open assault which the Communist
countries will presumably then have the power to
launch successfully. Stalin points out, and this
dates back to 1925, that the "road to victory"
oyer the West lies through "revolutionary al-
liance with the liberation movement" in the col-
onies and countries of the East. The hostile tide
of communism in Asia, which looms so danger-

'An address made at Colgate University Conference on
American Foreign Policy, Hamilton, N. Y., in July 7 and
released to the press on the same date.

ously today, has been announced and actively nur-
tured for 25 yeai-s.

Stalin's Strategy

Stalin's book, which is the present-day Commu-
nist bible, except in Yugoslavia, gives us the same
preview that Hitler gave in Mein Kamvf.
There is, however, an important distinction be-
tween the Hitler program and the Stalin pro-
gram. Hitler felt that his whole program had to
be achieved in short order, during his own life-
time. That required intensive and sustained of-
fensive action. In the case of the Communist
program, there is no such time urgency. It is
anticipated that full realization of the Commu-
nist conquest may take what Stalin refers to as
"an entire historical era." And, he teaches, that
"tactics of retreat" are as important as tactics of
attack. Also, he teaches, the necessity of com-
promise when, as he puts it, this is necessary "to
buy off a powerful enemy and gain a respite."

Therefore, under the Connnunist program, war
by Russia is not necessarily inevitable or immi-
nent if we are powerful enough to make it seem
expedient to the Soviet Communist leaders to use
tactics of delay or compromise.

U.S. Awakens to Reality

We have only recently begun to take seriously
Stalin's world program for comnumism, long an-
nounced, superbly implemented, and already one-
third consummated. Our national attitude has
only gradually moved toward realism. There has
been an evolution through four phases:

1. Cooperation. — That was the war phase.
When Hitler made the Soviet Union and the
United States war allies, there was a military ne-
cessity of cooperation that made it expedient to
draw a veil over the basically hostile attitude of
Soviet communism toward the United States. We

Deparfment of Stale Bulletin

emphasized the courageous fighting qualities of
the Russian people, and we ignored the basic an-
tipathy toward us of the Communist leaders. On
the theory that the Soviet Union had to be given
inducements to prevent her making a separate
peace with Germany and to get her to enter into
the war against Japan, we agreed to go along
with large Soviet postwar expansion in both cen-
tral Europe and in Asia.

2. Non€ooperation.—T\\& second phase of our
policy came immediately after the close of the
fighting. The Soviet Union then sought to secure
continuing support from the United States for
her expansionist policj'. Her leaders argued that
postwar cooperation of the Soviet Union and the
United States was necessary in order to assure
world peace and that that cooperation neces-
sitated the United States acquiescing in the ex-
pansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union. That
■was in essence the Molotov thesis which was pre-
sented at the first Council of Foreign Ministers
meeting at London, in September 1945, which I at-
tended with Secretary Byrnes. We then made the
momentous decision that we would not continue in
time of peace the Yalta type of appeasement which
had seemed necessary in time of war.

That decision taken at London, in the fall of
1945, did not, however, immediately make itself
felt throughout all aspects of the United States
foreign policy. Notably, there was a lag in bring-
ing our Eastern policy into line with our Western
policy. Many Eastern students were impressed by
the abuses and deficiencies of existing Eastern gov-
ernments and felt that a good dose of Communist
reform might be healthy.

3. Prevention. — The third phase of American
policy was marked by realization that there was
in fact an irreconcilable conflict between the am-
bitions of Soviet communism and the interests and
welfare of the United States and that we needed
to assert ourselves positively to prevent the ex-
tension of Soviet communism. This new ap-
proach came out of the 1947 Moscow and London
Conferences of the Council of Foreign Ministers
which I attended with Secretary Marshall. Be-
tween these two Council meetings came the Mar-
shall Plan proposal (June 1947) . We then clearly
saw that we were threatened by a so-called "cold
war," and we made up our minds to make positive
efforts to strengthen the free world and to fill up
military, economic, and moral vacuums into which
Soviet communism was moving.

Our maximum efforts were directed to Europe.
But there was also a change of policy in the Far
East, as indicated by the fact that in August 1948
Secretary Marshall advised our Embassy in China
that "the LTnited States Government must not
directly or indirectly give any implication of
support, encouragement, or acceptability of
coalition govermnent in China with Communist
participation."

We have, however, up to now, assumed, and

that was a fair working hypothesis, that com-
nuniism would probably limit itself to "cold war"
tactics and that there would not be open military
attack. However, some preparations were made
as against the possibility of armed attack, notably
in Western Europe. We made the North At-
lantic Treaty and adopted the Military Assistance
Program.

4. Opposition. — The fourth phase of policy is
marked by the North Korean attack upon South
Korea and our active fighting opposition under
the direction of the United Nations. The Korean
affair shows that communism cannot be checked
merely by building up sound domestic economies.
The South Korean experiment in democracy was
as hopeful as could be expected. There was politi-
cal, intellectual, and economic freedom. The sec-
ond national election had just been held, and the
majority elected were independent of the party
in power which controlled the police force and the
election machinery. The fact that that could hap-
pen is good evidence of political freedom. As
recently as 2 weeks ago, I met with the Korean
National Assembly, with leading educators, with
religious groups, businessmen, and representa-
tives of labor. I conferred with our mission, and
economic advisers, and with the Korean Commis-
sion of the United Nations. All the evidence was
that the Republic of Korea provided a wholesome,
free society and one which could not be over-
thrown by subversive efforts. Such efforts had,
indeed, been repeatedly tried and had failed. The
military blow from the north dissipates the thesis
that internal reform and well-being is itself a
sufficient defense against Communist aggression.

Korea Attack Part of Communist Plan

The armed attack that occurred shows that,
while the Soviet Union seems not at the moment
prepared to engage its own army, nevertheless,
international communism is prepared to use, in
open warfare, the armed forces of puppet and
satellite Communist states which are equipped
with armament of Russian manufacture.

It was realized for some time that the Republic
of Korea was in danger of attack from the north.
Proof of that is found in the fact that the United
Nations continued its Korean Commission after
the government of the Republic had been set up
under United Nations supervision, and in the fall
of 1949, the General Assembly added to the func-
tions of the Commission the task of maintaining
military observation along the northern frontier.

When, I, myself, went to the Far East, on June
14th, it was primarily to look into the possibilities
of the Japanese peace treaty. But I went first to
Korea to acquaint myself personally with a situa-
tion which, for several years, I had dealt with
as a United States delegate to the United Nations.
I was concerned about the increasing insistence
by the North Korean Communist regime that it
must rule all of Korea and the intensive Com-

Jo/y 17, 7950

munist propaganda in South Korea that it had
better succumb to communism without resistance,
because neither tlie United Nations nor the United
States would give protection if the Republic
should be attacked.

Before leaving Washington, I drafted a speech
to be made in Korea. In it I said that if the
Republic of Korea were attacked, it could expect
support from the United Nations. I pointed out
that the United Nations Charter required all na-
tions "to refrain from any threat or use of force
against your territorial integrity or political in-
dependence" and, I added, that the United States
stood behind the United Nations. I concluded
with these words:

You are not alone. You will never be alone so long
as you continue to play worthily your part in the great
design of human freedom.

That address was made on June 19th at the
opening of the Second National Assembly. It
was broadcast in the Korean language, through-
out Korea, and Korean language leaflet copies
were widely distributed. Nevertheless, 6 days
later the North Korean army struck, in a long-
prepared and fully implemented effort. There
were ample supplies of Russian-made planes,
tanks, and heavy artillery. The Republic's army
fought bravely iDut hopelessly. It had no combat
planes, no tanks, and no artillery heavy enough to
stop the invading tanks. Unopposed enemy
planes flew low, strafing the civilian population,
setting fire to gasoline supplies, and spreading
terror throughout the capital area. In 3 days,
Seoul, 30 miles south of the northern border, was
captured, and the tank formations moved on to
the south.

New Phase in American Foreign Policy

This open military attack and United Nations
resistance to it opens a new phase in American
foreign policy. It will, I hope and believe, arouse
us to a greater effort than any we have yet made
to fend off the danger of war. It may require
us to devote a greater percentage of our vast eco-
nomic productivity to military production so that
other free nations will not be exposed to being
overrun by Communist satellite forces equipped
with armament furnished by Russia.

What has happened to the Republic of Korea
shows, I fear, that the communistic assaults can-
not be prevented merely by economic aid or merely
by developing good societies. The open military
assault on the Republic of Korea occurred be-
cause the Republic of Korea was too good a so-
ciety to be tolerated on the otherwise Communist-
dominated mainland of north Asia, and because
it was so good that it could not be overthrown
from within by indirect aggression. Dii-ect ag-
gression was the only way to blot out this moral
salient on the Communist mainland.

There are probably two further reasons for the
attack. One was that if it succeeded it would

envelop Japan both from the north, where the
Russians now have already gained hold of all of
Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands, and from
the south, where Korea is only separated by a
narrow strait from the south of Japan. There
was doubtless a desire to throw a roadblock in
the way of the positive program of the United
States for putting Japan onto a peaceful and self-
governing basis, as part of the free world.

Furthermore, the Communists doubtless calcu-
lated that if the attack failed through the use of
United States force to repel the attack, the process
would bog down the West in the mire of anti-
colonialism in Asia.

As we have seen, Stalin long ago calculated that
the best way to conquer the West was to involve
it in fighting the anticolonial aspirations of Asia
and the Pacific. The colonial powers, including
the United States in the Philippines, Britain in
India, Burma, and Ceylon, and the Dutch in In-
donesia, by wise statesmanship, extricated them-
selves largely from this trap. No doubt the Korean
venture is designed in part to draw the Western
world back into that trap. That is a danger that
has to be carefully avoided by relating our conduct
to the policies of the United Nations which, as an
organization, is strongly dedicated to self-gov-
ernment and independence for the non-self-gov-
erning peoples of the world.

Prospects for Peace

The situation is certainly fraught with danger.

However, if the members of the United Nations
support and make good the Security Council de-
cision to repel and throw back the unprovoked
military aggression in Korea; if the defensive
military position around the periphery of Soviet
control is strengthened, so that satellite forces can-
not easily break through with violence ; if the colo-
nial powers support the newly born nations and
avoid general entanglement with the legitimate in-
dependence aspirations of the Asiatic peoples;
then there will be a condition where peace is
likely, unless the Soviet Union itself connnits its
total might to total war. It may not be prepared
to do this because of its relative economic weak-
ness.

Speaking in Tokyo on June 22, 1950, I pointed
out that, in terms of key commodities such as
steel, aluminum, electric power, and crude oil, the
United States had an advantage over the Soviet
Union of anywhere from five or ten to one. I
concluded "Any struggle that openly pitted the
full might of the free world against that of the
captive world could have but one outcome. That
would be the total demolition of the artificial,
rigid, and relatively weak structure that Soviet
communism has built." I believe that that is a
correct analysis of the present situation. I do
believe, however, that it will be necessary for us
to convert more of our economic potential into
present strength in order that the free nations who

Department of State Bulletin

are menaced by Communist military attack can
be better protected.

In the case of Korea, it was felt necessary to
give a very low priority to the military position
of the Republic of Korea because of the great
shortage of available military equipment. Con-
gress had appropriated funds to extend the Mili-
tary Assistance Program to Korea. However, it
had not yet been found possible to convert that
appropriation into a reality. When I was there,
the Korean defense establishment pointed out
that while the morale and discipline of the Re-
public's army was first class, they could not
be expected to hold for long without a single com-
bat plane, without any tanks, without antiaircraft
guns, and without artillery sufficient to stop the
known concentrations of enemy tanks on the
border.

We are now having to make good that deficiency
in a costly way.

What has happened in Korea will, I think,
bring home to the American people the need of
adequate measures to strengthen the free world
as against the possibility of sudden, armed attack.
If we do that, we can close the most dangerous
remaining loophole for war.

If we have strength ; if we and the other mem-
bers of the free worlcl put that strength at the
disposition of the United Nations ; if the United
Nations continues to show a capacity for decisive
action, that will check the likelihood of a series
of little wars which could develop into a big war.

Relations between the free world and the Com-
munist world are no doubt in a dangerous phase.
It is a period of testing. Out of it could come
great disaster. Equally, the test could supply
proof that peace has been established on a basis
sounder than ever before in history.

THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF INDEPENDENCE ^

The Declaration of Independence is expressed
not in terms of American rights but in terms of
the natural moral rights of all men. It proceeds
from the promise that all men "are endowed by
their Creator with certain inalienable Rights," and
the Founding Fathers made it clear that they were
setting a pattern of freedom for men everywhere.

Largely under the inspiration of that example,
the nineteenth century became a great period of
liberalism, when human beings freed themselves
from the yoke of despotism. Wherever they
sought to do so, they had the support of the United
States.

We early established the Monroe Doctrine, to
warn Czarist Russia and its allies to keep their
hands off the republics of this hemisphere whose

' In an address made at the Sesquicentennial Fourth of
July Celebration, at Washington, D.C., and released to
the press on the same date.

July 17, 1950

continuing independence, we said, was vital to our
own peace and happiness. Toward the end of the
nineteenth century, we enunciated the "Open
Door" policy for China, to help the Chinese people
develop in their own way, free of alien domination.
In this twentieth century, we have joined in two
world wars when the freedom of the West was im-
periled by military despotism. Five years ago,
we signed the United Nations Charter and,
thereby, pledged ourselves to seek universal re-
spect for human rights, and fundamental free-
doms, and the preservation of political independ-
ence as against violent attack.

U.S. Tradition — Support of Human Freedom

The history of our Nation makes a consistent,
unfolding pattern. We have supported human
freedom and political independence throughout
the world, both as a matter of good morals and
because we saw that our own freedom was an inte-
gral part of total human freedom.

The United States can never be isolationist, and
it never will be so long as we are true to our herit-
age. An isolationist America would be a contra-
diction in terms, for America has from the be-
ginning been a symbol of the universal cause of
human liberty. Wltat we are doing today is in
keeping with the tradition of our past.

I was in Korea only 2 weeks ago and saw with
my own eyes that that Republic was a land of
freedom. The people had just had their second
general election. Eighty percent of the eligible
voters had gone to the polls. A majority of the
representatives elected were independent of the
party which controlled the election machinery and
the police force. That is proof of real political
liberty.

I talked with leading educators and attended
a gathering of professors and students at one of
their leading universities. I spent an evening of
religious worship with 3,000 Christian refugees
who had fled from the northern dictatorship of
atheistic communism so as to enjoy the religious
and intellectual liberty of the Republic of Korea.
There was no doubt as to the reality of that liberty.
The people were happy and industrious and using
energetically and cooperatively their new-found
freedom.

The society was so wholesome that it could not
be overthrown from within. That had been tried
and failed. So early Sunday morning, 9 days
ago, open aggression was brought into play.
Without warning, heavy tank formations drove
down from the north, moving through the valleys
to converge first upon the capital of Seoul, then to
fan out to the south. They were preceded and
covered by combat planes which, swooping low,
machine-gunned and terrorized the civilian popu-
lation. The forces of the Republic had no combat
planes, tanks, or heavy artillery with which to
oppose them.

Korean Attack— Military Despotism

Tlie long-prepared, suddenly exploded, ruthless
attack was characteristic of military despotism.
It was, in miniature, the kind of attack that could
hit us if we are content to live in a world where
such methods are tolerated. The struggle in Ko-
rea represents the timeless issue of whether lovere
of liberty will be vigilant enough, brave enough,
and united enough to survive despotism.

The United States, as a member of the United
Nations, had helped to create the Korean Kepublic.
We had given it economic aid. We alone of the
free world had military strength in the immediate
area. We were the logical first defenders of the
liberty that had been assaulted.

It was, however, important that we should not
act alone or without international sanction. The
United Nations had been established for the very
purpose of dealing with such situations. Its Se-
curity Council met within a few hours of the open-
ing of the assault. All of the members were
present, except the Soviet Union, which sought by
absence to veto restraint on the aggressive action
of its satellite in North Korea. The Council,
nevertheless, acted. It had a direct report from
its own Commission in Korea and, in the light of
that report, unhesitatingly, branded the attack as
a breach of the peace. It called upon the member
states to assist in repelling it.

President Truman, with bipartisan support,
acted promptly and vigorously to bring the United
States to respond to that appeal. The Govern-
ments of many other members of the United Na-
tions did likewise.

Thus, we see international authority at work to
prevent the committing, against the Republic of
Korea, of what I call "international murder."

The task undertaken is not a light one and be-
fore it is finished we shall all of us have to pay a
price. Already, today, in Korea, our youth are
beginning to pay the final price of life itself. The
rest of us may have to cut down on our economic
indulgence so that, out of our great productive
capacity, we can help our friends to match the of-
fensive power which the Soviet Union, out of its
economic poverty, supplies to its friends.

Threat to Liberty

I am confident that what has happened in Korea
will arouse the American people. We have never
flinched when a great principle was involved. We
are engaged, toclay, in the same battle which was
begun in 1776. Our own liberty cannot long be
safe in a world where despots can strike down lib-
erty, piecemeal, with fire and sword.

We have, today, the great opportunity to join
with the other fi-ee societies to prove that unpro-
voked aggression does not pay. If we sternly
teach that lesson in terms of the North Korean
adventure, then our own peace will be more secure
than ever before. But if the free world fails to

rally to the support of one of its stricken members,
then one by one others would be struck down and
military despotism, intoxicated by repeated vic-
tories, would lose all sense of restraint.

The United States has been ever bound, by faith
and by sacrifice, to the cause of righteousness.
Washington, under the shadow of whose monu-
ment we stand, committed our Nation in its youth-
ful dedication. Lincoln, whose shrine adjoins,
said that our Declaration of Independence en-
visioned liberty "not alone to the people of this
country but hojje for the world for all future time."
We have never sat idly by when despots attempted
by violence to snuff out that hope. Today, we face
a new test. I am confident that our response will
be worthy of our great heritage and that we shall
not be afraid to live sacrificially and even danger-
ously in a righteous cause.

U.N. Commission Reestablishes
Headquarters in Korea

[Released to the press by the

U. N. Department of Public Information July 1]

The United Nations Commission in Korea on
July 1 adopted, in Tokyo, the following resolution :

Whekeas information has been received from the Com-
mission's advance party, including the Chairman and the
Rapporteur, at present in Pusan (ITusan), Southern Ko-
rea, that satisfactory arrangements have now been made
for the return of the Commission to the Republic of Korea.

Recalijng the Commission's decision of 27 .June 1950
to ti'ansfer its headquarters temporarily from Seoul and
to hold itself ready to return to Korea immediately sub-
ject to developments,

Decides to reestablish its seat forthwith in the Republic
of Korea, and

Whereas facilities at present available in the Republic
of Korea are limited, the Commission further decides to
constitute the members of the Commission at present in
Tokyo as an Ad Hoc Committee for the purpose of en-
abling the Commission in the Republic of Korea to keep
in close touch with international developments and in
particular with the Security Council.

The Commission members, at present in Pusan,
Southern Korea, who, in accordance with this res-
olution now constitute the United Nations Com-
mission on Korea, are : the Commission Chairman
Dr. Yu-wan Liu (China), Henri Brionval
(France), A. B. Jameison (Australia), who is the
rapjDorteur of the Commission and C. Kondapi,
deputy representative of India. The represent-
atives of the remaining three member states of the
Commission — El Salvador, Philippines and Tur-
key— will remain in Tokyo to constitute the Ad
Hoc Committee.

Col. Alfred G. Katzin, personal representative
of Secretary-General Lie in Korea, arrived in that
country on July 7 ; and, on July 8, he presented his
credentials from the Secretary-General to the
Korean Government.

Department of State Bulletin

Point Four: An Investment in Peace

Address iy the President ^

It is hard for us to realize just how bad eco-
nomic conditions are for many peoples of the
world. Famine, disease, and poverty are the
scourge of vast areas of the globe. Hundreds of
millions of people in Asia, for example, have a
life expectancy of 30 years or less. Many of
these people live on inadequate diets, unable to
perform the tasks necessary to earn their daily
bread. Animal plagues and plant pests carry
away their crops and their livestock. Misuse of
natural resources exposes their land to flood or
drought.

Conditions such as these are the seedbed of po-
litical unrest and instability. They are a threat to
the security and growth of free institutions every-
where. It is in areas where these conditions exist
that communism makes its greatest inroads. The
people of these areas are eagerly seeking better liv-
ing conditions. The Communists are attempting
to turn the honest dissatisfaction of these people
with their present conditions into support for
Communist efforts to dominate their nations.

In addition to these attempts at persuasion, the
Communists in these countries use the weapon of
fear. They constantly threaten internal violence
and armed aggression.

The recent unprovoked invasion of the Republic
of Korea by Communist armies is an example of
the danger to which the underdeveloped areas par-
ticularly ai'e exposed.

It is essential that we do everything we can to
prevent such aggression and to enforce the prin-
ciples of the United Nations Charter. We must
and we shall give every possible assistance to
people who are determined to maintain their in-
dependence. We must counteract the Communist
weapon of fear.

But we must not be misled into thinking that
our only task is to create defenses against aggres-
sion. Our whole purpose in creating a strong

" Made at the annual convention of the American
Newspaper Guild, at Washington, D.C., on June 28 and
released to the press by the White House on the same
date.

defense is to permit us to carry on the great con-
structive tasks of peace. Behind the shield of a
strong defense, we must continue to work to bring
about better living conditions in the free nations.

Strengthening Undeveloped Nations

Particularly in the underdeveloped areas of the
world, we must work cooperatively with local gov-
ernments which are seeking to improve the welfare
of their people. We must help them to help them-
selves. We must aid them to make progress in
agriculture, in industry, in health, and in the edu-
cation of their children. Such progress will in-
crease their strength and their independence.

The growing strength of these countries is im-
portant to the defense of all free nations against
Communist aggression. It is important to the eco-
nomic progress of the free world. And these
things are good for us as well as good for them.

For these reasons, I recommended in my in-
augural address the program that has become
known as "Point 4." Tlie Congress has recently
authorized technical assistance to underdeveloped
areas under this program. This new law marks
Congressional indorsement of a practical and sen-
sible course of action that can have tremendous
benefits for the future of the world.

It is possible to make tremendous improvements
in underdeveloped areas by very simple and inex-
pensive means. Simple measures, such as the im-
provement of seed and animal stocks, the control
of insects, the dissemination of health information,
can make great changes almost overnight. This
does not require vast expenditures. It requires
only expert assistance offered to the people on a
genuinely cooperative basis. We have already
seen, on a relatively small scale, what can h&,
accomplished.

I am going to give you a factual — a reporter's —
account of a few technical assistance projects which
have raised living standards in the countries where
they were carried out. These are a preview of

Ju/y ?7, 1950

what a full-scale Point 4 Program can mean in
the future.

Successful Assistance Projects

In northern India, there is a very rich farming
area known as the Terai district. In recent years,
the malaria mosquito forced people to leave this
land. One hundred and four villages were aban-
doned. Even in the face of India's tragic food
shortage, no crops were planted in this rich soil.

India called on the World Health Organization
for help, and that organization sent a malaria con-
trol team which arrived in northern India in April
1949. In the face of great difficulties, this inter-
national group sprayed the area with DDT.

Today, a year later, no infected mosquito is to
be found in any village in the Terai district.
Local workers have been trained to continue the
spraying. Families who were refugees from ma-
laria, only 1 year ago, are back in their homes, and
their fields are green again.

This demonstrates how a simple program can
make tremedous improvements in a short time.

Let me give you another example of what Point
4 can mean; this one in Iran. This story con-
cerns not an international organization but one
of our American voluntary groups, the Near East
Foundation.

Four years ago, the Government of Iran asked
the Foundation to set up a demonstration project
in a group of 35 villages not far from the capital
at Tehran. The Foundation brought village lead-
ers to a series of training courses. It won their
confidence, and through these leaders, it began to
carry out agricultural and health improvements.
The Foundation met a water shortage by drilling
deep wells. It overcame water-borne diseases
with an inexpensive water filter. It sprayed
homes with DDT. It sprayed crops with insecti-
cides. It helped to organize schools in each of
the 35 villages.

Today, only 4 years later, the village people are
at work in new carpentry shops, vegetable gardens,
and orchards. And, most startling of all, the
yield of grain in this area has tripled.

The effects of the Near East Foundation's work
are spreading throughout Iran. This story will
be matched many times over, under the Point 4
Program.

IVIy next illustration is in the Eepublic of Li-
beria on the west coast of Africa. Here a United
States Government economic mission has been
working since 1944 — headed, incidentally, by a
former agricultural extension agent from Mis-
souri. This mission in Liberia has laid out roads,
and mapped the timber supply, and helped to open
up an iron deposit. Agricultural technicians have
helped to expand rice production for the local
market and the production of palm oil and cocoa
for export.

The effect of these steps has been remarkable.
In one village near Monrovia, the cash income of

the people, derived from selling rice, cocoa, and
palm oil, has increased from 5 dollars per pei-son
a year to 35 dollars, since the arrival of our eco-
nomic mission.

Our mission — which has only five Americans in
it — has worked in close cooperation with the Li-
berian Government. That Government already
has built three new agricultural experiment sta-
tions. This is remarkable progress, but it is only
the beginning of the economic development which
Liberia needs to become a prosperous member
of the family of nations.

Point 4: Equipment for Independence

These achievements I have cited are samples of
the kind of work that needs so badly to be done
in underdeveloped areas all over the world.

Under the expanded Point 4 Program, we can
greatl}' enlarge the scope of these activities. There
are tremendous opportunities to improve living
standards for wide areas of the globe. It may
prove altogether possible, for example, through
the activities of the Food and Agriculture Organi-
zation, to wipe out the scourge of rinderpest, the
fatal animal disease that is responsible for much
of the rural poverty of the Far East. The devel-
opment of hybrid rice seed, which the Food and
Agriculture Organization is now working on,
could conceivably increase rice production by 10
percent and improve the health and living condi-
tions in the Orient immeasurably. As an example
of what hybrid seed can do, our corn hybrids,
where they have been used in Italy, have increased
corn production by over 25 percent.

Aside from these basic improvements in agri-
culture and health, it is equally important, in
many areas, to build modern communication and
transportation systems and to establish local in-
dustries. Without these, the underdeveloped
areas cannot put their natural resources to use for
their own benefit and in profitable trade with the
rest of the world. Building roads, and railroads,
and factories will require considerable amounts of
public and private capital. To aid the flow of
American capital abroad, I have recommended
that the Congress provide for limited guaranties
to encourage greater investments overseas. I am
hopeful that this legislation will be enacted soon.

Point 4 is not now — and should not become — a
matter for partisan differences of opinion. How-
ever, some critics have attempted to ridicule Point
4 as a "do-good" measure; others have said it is
a waste of money. This is the most foolish kind
of shortsightedness. If we fail to carry out a
vigorous Point 4 Program we run the risk of
losing to communism, by default, hundreds of
millions of people who now look to us for help
in their struggle against hunger and despair.

Point 4 is an investment in a peaceful and pros-
perous world. It is a program which will bring
increasing results over the years. It will bring
about a chain reaction in economic development.

Department of Slate Bulletin

It will serve to create economic health where pov-
erty existed, and to equip the people of under-
developed areas to carry forward their economic
gains and preserve their independence.

A major share of this world campaign to im-
prove the livelihood of peoples will be carried out
under the United Nations.

U.N. Technical Assistance Program

In the United Nations Charter, each member
government pledged that it would promote so-
lutions of international economic, social, health,
and related problems.

At its last session, the General Assembly voted
unanimously to support a technical assistance
program for raising the standard of living in
underdeveloped areas.

Two weeks ago, the United Nations conducted
a Technical Assistance Conference to make plans
and to raise funds for this new program. Fifty-
four nations attended and 50 of them offered
contributions.

By the end of the Conference, more than 20
million dollars had been pledged. The United
States pledged 12 million dollars, subject, of
course, to the appropriation of the necessary funds
by the Congress. This was the largest single
contribution, but, in relation to their resources,

a number of other nations contributed more.

The outstanding characteristic of this Technical
Assistance Conference is the fact that it demon-
strated clearly the common desire of the peoples
of the world to work together for human advance-
ment. In a world dark with apprehension, the
Point 4 idea offers new hope.

All our citizens must play a part in making the
Point 4 Program a success. Our missionary
groups, our philanthropic and charitable agencies,
must continue the efforts they have been making
over the years for the improvement of conditions
in foreign lands. Our young people can find
careers in the pioneering woi'k of bringing tech-
nical assistance to these countries. Our unions
and our business organizations should enlarge
their foreign contacts and bring the benefits of
their experience to less developed countries. You
newspaper men and women can help Point 4 to
achieve its aims by telling its story to the Ameri-
can people and to the people of the world.

Our Point 4 Program and the work of the
United Nations are constructive ways to build the
kind of world where all nations can live in peace-
ful prosperity, dedicated to the purpose of cre-
ating better lives for their people. We support
this program because we seek a peaceful world,
and a free world, where all men can live as good
neighbors.

Foreign Relations Volumes Released

American Republics

The Department of State announced on June 17
that it released on that date Foreign Relations of
the United States, 1933, Volume IV, The Amer-
ican Republics. This volume contains the general
section on problems of a multilateral nature and
on relations with Argentina. Volume V, con-
taining papers on bilateral relations with the
other republics of the Western Hemisphere for
1933, will be published later. Volume II, dealing
with the British Commonwealth, Europe, the
Near East, and Africa, and Volume III, on the
Far East, have previously been published.

Efforts to restore peace and to maintain good
relations between the states of the Western Hem-
isphere are the chief subjects of this volume.
Leading jDlace is given to the Seventh Interna-
tional Conference of American States held at
Montevideo in December 1933. Other major chap-
ters of this volume record the combined efforts of
the League of Nations and of the United States
and other American governments to settle the
Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay and
the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru.

Copies of this volume (Ixxxiv, 812 pp.) may be
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
United States Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington 25, D.C., for $3.00 each.

Political and Economic Problems

The Department of State released on June 27
Foreig?!, Relations of the United States, 1933, Vol-
ume I, General. This volume contains more than
800 documents on international political and eco-
nomic problems, the multilateral aspects of which
cannot be listed under separate country headings.
Volumes II (British Commonwealth, Eui'ope,
Near East, and Africa), III (Far East), and IV,
dealing with diplomatic negotiations among the
American Republics and on relations with Argen-
tina, have previously been published. Volume V,
covering bilateral relations with the other Ameri-
can Republics, will be issued later.

Documents in volume I relate to the Conference
for Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the
major political problem.

Other documents in this volume are devoted to
the London Economic Conference.

Negotiations ancillary to the London Economic
Conference, such as those relating to silver, copper,
and wheat, are separately treated; similarly are
those concerned with intergovernmental debts,
initiation of the reciprocal trade agreements pro-
gram, and the Foreign Bondholders Protective
Council.

Copies of this volume (xciii, 991 pp.) may be
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents,
for $3.75 each.

Ju/y U, 7950

New Challenges to American Diplomacy

hy George C. McGhee^ Assistant Secretary

for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs '

American policies grow out of the attitudes and
vital interests of the American people. The pur-
pose of our policies is, of course, to preserve and
advance those interests. Now, what are the most
important, the most vital of our American in-
terests in the year 1950 ?

First, you will agree that our fundamental
national interest is in peace and security. There-
fore, it is our policy to create and maintain a world
climate of peace; to eliminate the recurrent threat
of war.

Second, we have a vital interest in being able
to continue to enjoy, here in this country, our
own democratic way of life. Our policies are,
therefore, designed to strengthen, both here and
abroad, the rights and freedoms of the individual
which are basic to our system.

Third, we have an interest in economic progress,
both as an end in itself and as a means of achieving
our other objectives. Our policies must aim at
improving our own standard of living. They
must help to promote healthy economic conditions
generally throughout the world.

A New American interest

Now if we look back over the past half century,
we see that these vital interests in peace, freedom,
and economic progress have been continuously
threatened and periodically attacked. The ex-
perience of two world wars and a major depres-
sion has taught us that we have a fourth vital
interest. It has become clear that the peace, the
freedom, the economic progress — more than
these — the very survival of our country — depend
on a clear recognition and a vigorous pursuit of
that fourth national interest.

We have learned, in short, that we have a vital

' An address made before the Northwest Institute of
International Relations at Portland, Oreg., on June 22 and
relea.sed to the press on the same date.

interest in building an international community
based on principles which have become universally
accepted among civilized men but which have not
been universally practiced among nations. Such
an international community would permit the
application, between nations, of the same basic
principles that apply between individuals within
a democracy. Each country would be able to
make its own unique contribution to the world
community in the light of its own particular his-
tory, interests, and capabilities.

Such a community, we have come to believe,
offers the best and perhaps the only chance of
preserving and promoting our national interests.
I think it is accurate to say that the building of
this community constitutes the boldest challenge
to American leadership in the world today. To
the present generation of Americans, it offers a
tangible hope for a better world.

We have, moreover, already taken the lead in
creating such a community, and much progress
has been made. The Charter of the United
Nations embodies the principles, and the organi-
zation of the United Nations provides a founda-
tion, on which an international community can be
built. We have taken further action to strengthen
the foundation by means consistent with the
Charter, such as the Rio pact and the North At-
lantic Treaty.

I need not recount to you all that the free
nations of the world have done to organize and
strengthen themselves in the 5 short years since
the end of hostilities. I predict that men will
look back on this period as one of remarkable
progress toward this end. Indeed, I think we
tend to underestimate our achievements, to play
down what we have succeeded in doing, and to
highlight what we have not done.

Perhaps, on the other hand, we have not always
correctly estimated the difficulties that were in-
hei-ent in what we were trying to do. Perhaps,
we did not foresee, and could not have foreseen.

Department of State Bulletin

that some of these difficulties would become serious
obstacles to the building of an intei-national
community.

Obstacles To Building a World Community

One of those obstacles was a direct consequence
of the war. It was nothing less than the tem-
porary eclipse of Western Europe as a produc-
tive and jjrogressive force in the world. What
had been a great workshop, the largest single
aggregation of skilled people in the world, an
essential link in world trade, and the center of
far-flung empires, was a continent in chaos and
despair. Iklillions of its people were homeless,
jobless, hungry, and without hope at the war's
end.

With our help, these people are rebuilding their
lives, reorganizing their societies in a new and
more cooperative spirit. Today, Western Europe
is still a stronghold of freedom. The gi-atifying
response to the bold proposal of FrencTi Foreign
Minister Schuman for the integration of the basic
European industries, and to the proposed forma-
tion of the European Payments Union, shows that
its members are playing an active and creative
part in the building of our international
community.

The postwar collapse of Western Europe might
have delayed indefinitely and even prevented the
building of a strong community of free nations.
The fact that the trend has been reversed by a
combination of creative imagination, planning,
and sheer hard work, is, as General Marshall put
it, a "near miracle." The fact that the Western
European countries have not all rebuilt their
economies on strictly American lines seems to
trouble some people. To me, it demonstrates that
there is room for wide diversity of approach to
the problems of a free world. We Americans
should welcome that divei'sity, for it is a funda-
mental principle of our own way of life.

THREAT OF SOVIET IMPERIALISM

A second serious obstacle to the building of an
international community is, of course, the threat
of Soviet imperialism. We have watched the So-
viet design unfolding over the past 5 years. We
see it at work, today, in many parts of the world,
including the Far East, and we have been forced
inescapably to the conclusion that it is hostile to
the creation of a community of free nations. Its
facade of Marxist communism has been clearly re-
vealed as a mask for naked aggression.

The men in the Kremlin want to organize the
world, to be sure. But they want to organize it
on principles that civilized men have rejected and
fought during hundreds of years. The Soviet
principle is rule by absolute power, the power of
a small group of men over other men, the power
of one nation over other nations. The means of
achieving this power are the police state, subver-
sion, and concealed aggression.

July 17, 1950

894368—50 3

We believe that we have learned how to meet
that threat. We may not always be able to con-
tain it at every point, but we are confident that
we can not only contain but overcome it in time
by a great cooperative effort of free men. We
shall overcome it in the very act of building an
international community so strong, so free, and so
prosperous that all peojile will want to be a part
of it, even those whose governments are now
opposing it.

UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS

But even if Western Europe had not suffered a
temporary eclipse, even if the Soviet Union had
been a strong and willing partner, we would still
have had to deal with a third obstacle to the build-
ing of an international community. We would
still have been faced with the fact that large areas
of the world and hundreds of millions of people
are not yet in a position to make t'heir full con-
tribution to the economic and political life of an
international community.

I want to talk tonight about some of these areas,
in South Asia, Africa, and the Near East, which
constitute my special responsibility in the State
Department. Although these areas have rich ma-
terial resources and human potentialities, they are
included in the "underdeveloped" regions of the
world. This region contains almost 700 million
people. It includes the great subcontinent of India
and Pakistan, two nations which have only re-
cently joined the international community as fully
independent members. It includes the expanses of
the Near East, with states as old as Greece and
Iran and as young as Israel and Jordan. It in-
cludes also the continent of Africa, with its inde-
pendent peoples of Liberia and Ethiopia and its
numerous protectorates, colonies, and trust terri-
tories administered by European powers.

The people of this area practice five great re-
ligions: Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism,
and Buddhism. They speak more than 145 lan-
guages. Much of what we now know and value
in the realm of science, art, religion, and philos-
ophy, we drew from their early cultures.

How can one generalize about an area so vast?
If there is a common denominator among these
lands and their peoples it is the fact that all have
great potentialities which have not yet been real-
ized. Another common characteristic of these
people is their growing realization that they have
not participated fully in the world's progress and
their desire to make up for lost time.

Symbols of Progress

They have made substantial progress in terms
of political independence, representative govern-
ment, and personal freedom. In the period be-
tween the two world wars, Egypt, Saudi Arabia,
and Iraq gained full independence. More recently,
this area has given birth to nine other nations:

Syria, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan in the Near
East; India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and Burma in
South Asia. Libya has been promised its inde-
pendence by 1952 and Italian Somaliland within
10 years.

Political independence, however, is only one
symbol of progress . It is not the only symbol.
These people are beginning also to associate prog-
ress with a chance to better their lot in the world.
They want better food, better housing, better
schools, better health, and they are willing to make
great efforts in order to obtain them. Although
this new urge creates great dislocations and on
occasion disappointments, it is on balance an en-
couraging development. It shows a growing
understanding on the part of these peoples of their
ability to help themselves. It shows a will to
change. It is a force which, if used for construc-
tive ends, can help achieve our objective of creating
a stable international community.

Now what do these distant events mean to Amer-
icans? Do they affect our vital interests, and, if
so, how should we shape our policies ? Whenever
these questions are asked of me, in one form or
another, I think of the tragic and ironic remark
that Neville Chamberlain made at the time of
Munich, when he said, in a broadcast, that Czecho-
slovakia was a far-away country of which we knew
little.

During the past year, I have visited almost all
of the countries under discussion. The places and
the peoples I have been describing may seem far
away to you, and we Americans may still know
little about them. But surely we know — or should
know by now — that there is no corner of the world
so remote that its fate cannot affect our own.

Community Problems on a Familiar Scale

But let us assume that our interest in these far-
off peoples still needs to be demonstrated. Most
of the states, I have mentioned, belong to the in-
ternational community of which we have been
speaking. Let us, by the convenient device of
oversimplification, reduce this community problem
to a familiar scale. Let us suppose that a com-
parable community problem existed in a city like
Portland.

Suppose you could apply the term underdevel-
oped to two-thirds of the people of that city, whicli
is about the proportion of peoples of underdevel-
oped areas to the population of the world as a
whole. That figure would mean that two-thirds
of the men, women, and children of Portland
are now living in dire poverty, hunger, disease,
and ignorance, amidst one-third that are enjoy-
ing all of the benefits of the good life in this
beautiful city.

In this imaginary Portland, it would mean that
among the citizens you would have an annual death
rate of 28 per thousand, compared with 10 for the
more favored citizens, although the birth rate
would be 44 per thousand, rather than 26. Infant

mortality would be 153 per thousand live births,
instead of 25. Deaths from tuberculosis might
be as high as 283 per hundred thousand, instead
of 33. These are figures from a representative
part of the underdeveloped area.

More than eight out of ten adults in this group
could not read or write. In other words, they
would have an illiteracy rate of 80 percent instead
of 3 percent. Their per capita income would be
somewhere between 5 and 85 dollars a year, instead
of the average American figure of 1,410 dollare.
Suppose that the life expectancy of this two-thirds
of Portland's population, instead of C3 yeai-s, were
about 30 years ; that, in other words, these particu-
lar citizens of Portland could expect to die when
the rest of your citizens were approaching the
most productive and useful years of their lives.

If you can imagine such a situation, I think you
will agree that it would create a grave problem
for the whole imaginary community of Portland.
Indeed, the two-thirds would scarcely be convinced
that the community as organized offered them
adequqate oiDportunities. They would have little
incentive to support the community but would seek
to change it or — failing that- — to overthrow it by
force. They would form an easy foil for trouble-
makei-s and agitators. The privileged one-third
would, indeed, have an uneasy and insecure
existence.

I have not talked about the underdevelo])ed
lands of South Asia, Africa, and the Near East
in terms of the Soviet threat, and I shall not do
so. Communism in these particular areas is not
an immediate danger. The problem in these areas
is not to put out fires, since the sparks of com-
munism have not found adequate fuel there. But
comnuuiism may well become a threat if the grow-
ing aspirations of these peoples are frustrated.
The problem is to help the peoples of these areas
build a house that will be fireproof. And when
we think of the time required for the building, we
think in terms not of months or years but of
decades.

What should our policies be toward these un-
derdeveloped peoples'? What type of assistance
can we render them that is within our means and
will be effective in meeting their particular
problems ?

Policies Toward Asia, Africa, and Near East

First, we must keep in mind that we are deal-
ing with proud and independent peoples. In
many instances, they are the direct inheritors of
distinguished civilizations that provided the basis
for our own more recent civilization. Their de-
velopment will not take place along the same lines
as ours. They must develop in their own way, and
their way— for them— can be just as right as is
our way— for us. The goals toward which they
strive, although not always identical with ours, can
assure them the same fullness of life and the

Department of Sfafe Bulletin

same opportunities to make a contribution to the
world eomniunity as does ours.

In any event, they intend to shape tlieir own
future. Fortunately, that future is, today, in the
hands of some ^I'^i^t leaders, with whom we are
working on a basis of mutual understanding and
respect. Several of these leaders have only re-
cently visited the United States at our invitation.
We hope, increasinfjly, to convince them that our
attitude toward them is friendly and disinter-
ested: that we have no desire to dominate them,
to enlist them in any "bloc" in pursuit of our
own interests, or to force our economic system or
ideologies upon them.

We must also not think of assistance as being,
exclusively, in terms of financial aid. Indeed, I
am afraid that we have, as a result of the highly
successful European Recovery Program, which
was basically financial in nature, come to attach
too much importance to financial assistance and
too much confidence in its ability to meet all prob-
lems. There are in the underdeveloped areas too
many other limiting factors, too many other basic
problems to be overcome to permit the useful ex-
penditure of large amounts of capital in a short
time, even if such funds existed in inexhaustible
supply, which they do not. Dreams of a Ten-
nessee Valley Authority for the Tigris-Euphrates
Valley must await the achievement of less am-
bitious beginnings with smaller dams and works.

But beginnings must be made. Our efforts must
begin where the people of the underdeveloped
areas now are. We must help them with all the
various means at our disposal — financial, tech-
nical, administrative, and moral assistance,
to meet their basic problems in their way, to in-
crease production of food, to pi'ovide better
houses, better roads, schools, health, and public
administration.

We know that we cannot oifer them our own
standards. We cannot, even within the city of
Portland, guarantee absolute uniformity of liv-
ing standards even though there is an opportunity
for all people. We can, however, demonstrate our
desire to assist by means of tangible evidence of
progress. We can give these peoples hope which
will provide the incentive to seek their future in
continued cooperation with us and the other free
nations of the world, within the framework of the
United Nations.

What have we done so far? Is it enough?

FORMS OF U.S. ASSISTANCE

Apart from the magnificent work which our
private organizations have carried on in these
areas for many years, American aid has thus far
been modest. It has taken a number of forms, in
response to many diverse situations.

We have extended loans, through the Export-
Import Bank, for development projects in Greece,
Turkey, Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Afghanis-
tan, Ethiopia, and Liberia. We have supported

loans to India and Iraq by the International Bank
for Eeconstruction and Development. The Euro-
pean Recovery Program has enabled us to con-
tribute, directly, to economic rehabilitation and
development in Greece and Turkey and to eco-
nomic development in the overseas territories of
European nations in Africa; In Greece and
Turkey, and now Iran, we have met special
emergencies with a highly successful program of
military aid, under the Mutual Defense Assistance
Program.

We have, as you know, been carrying on a pro-
gram for the exchange of teachers, students, and
technicians of various kinds. We can now pro-
vide scholarships under Fulbright agreements
with Greece, India, Burma, Egypt, Iran, and
Turkey. We set great store by these exchange
programs. We hope to extend them considerably.

Congress has now authorized the Point 4 Pro-
gram of technical assistance, and we hope that
approjiriation will soon be made to perinit that
vital program to get under way. The area under
discussion, which includes a large portion of the
underdeveloped part of the world, was very much
in Pi'esident Truman's mind when he first an-
nounced his program of technical assistance.

UNITED NATIONS AID

From now on, a sizable part of our technical
assistance will go forward through the United
Nations and its specialized agencies. I want to
mention just one of these projects which is now
being put into operation. That is a United Na-
tions program of relief and works projects for the
Arab refugees from Palestine, for which the Con-
gress has recently authorized an American con-
tribution of about 27 million dollars.

This project grew out of a United Nations Eco-
nomic Survey Mission headed by Gordon Clapp,
Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley
Authority. I can give you no better statement of
our policy toward the underdeveloped areas than
by quoting from his report.

Higher living standards [says the Introduction to this
report] cannot be bestowed by one upon another like
a gift. An improved economy does not come in a neat
package sold or given away in the market place. A higher
standard of living must grow out of the application of
human skill and ingenuity to the physical resources of
a country or region.

The highly developed nations of the world did not make
their way by wishing. By work and risk they forced
the earth, the soil, the forests and the rivers to yield
them riches. They pooled their energy and resources by
taxation and mutual enterprise to discover new ways of
doing tilings. They worked, they invented, they edu-
cated and trained their children, and they invested in
their national and in their private enterprises. This they
must continue so to do, if they are to maintain the standard
of living they have achieved.

There is no substitute for the application of work and
local enterprise to each country's own resources. Help

July 17, 1950

to those who have the will to help themselves should be
the primary policy guiding and restraining the desire
of the more developed areas of the world to help the less
developed lands.

This, I believe, is both an accurate and a realistic
statement of our policies toward the peoples of
the underdeveloped areas of the world. Our ap-
proach to these jjeople, and it is a characteristically
American approach, is on the level of partnership.
We know that human progress cannot be bestowed ;
that it must grow out of cooperative effort ; out of
mutual respect. We know also that it can only
be made to grow among those who have the will
to help themselves.

Among the many who have that will and who
look to us for cooperation, there is a natural im-
patience to get on with the job, a tendency to feel
that the United States is not doing enough to as-
sist the underdeveloped areas to play their part
in the building of a community of free nations.
Indeed, we must do so, since it is in our own vital
interests to achieve this objective. We must make
certain that we leave nothing undone that is within
our capability to assure that other peoples are con-
vinced that their own aspirations can best be
served within the community of free nations.
Only by so doing can we assure the realization of
our own aspirations.

Support for an Expanded Information and Education Program

Statement hy Secretary Acheson ^

I welcome warmly the action of Senator Benton
and the 12 Senators ^ associated with him in intro-
ducing Senate Resolution 243, calling for "a
greatly expanded program of information and ed-
ucation among all the peoples of the world to the
full extent that they can be reached." The spon-
sors of this resolution have accurately diagnosed
one of the elements not only vital but, in fact, indis-
pensable to the conduct of American foreign rela-
tions today. We must make the truth known to
the peoples of the world. This is a task that calls
for greatly expanded and intensified efforts.

Truth in the world today is a political force,
Nothing makes plainer the power of this force, I
think, than the Communist fear of it. Behind
the Iron Curtain, it has been said, "Truth is trea-
son." We are familiar with the immense machin-
ery of the police states for insuring that the words
and acts of their citizens conform slavishly to the
doctrines advocated publicly by their masters.
That machinery has also, as one of its primary
tasks, to exclude the truth, to suppress facts. Some
of tliese facts seem to us curiously harmless, but
once you begin to exclude the truth, to found your
state on deliberately preserved ignorance and de-
liberately disseminated falsehood, even very simple
facts have a potentially explosive force.

' Made before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations on S. R. 243 on July 5 and released to
the press on the same date.

' Submitted by Senator Benton on March 22 for himself
and Senators Douglas, Flanders, Fulbright, Graham. Hen-
drickson, Lehman, McMahon, Morse, Mundt, Smith
(Maine), Sparkman, and Tobey.

100

Communist States Fear Truth

The Communist states have not only shown their
fear of truth by elaborate internal controls and
policing. They have set up at their borders bars
against free communication and free movement of
men, books, ideas — against all the carriers of truth
and information. They have pursued a policy of
deliberate self-isolation. They are afraid to let
their citizens look out, and they are afraid to let
others look in. The recent demands that the
United States close its information services in Ru-
mania and Czechoslovakia are witnesses to the
power of truth as a political force. So is the Soviet
jamming of our radio broadcasts.

If totalitarian regimes cannot flourish where the
truth is fully available, free and democratic coun-
tries cannot flourish unless their citizens do have
access to the truth. The freedom of free nations
grows out of the minds of its citizens. Free men
make up their own minds, on the basis of free
access to the truth, to the facts.

The growth of an international community of
free and democratic nations depends upon the
ready and free flow of facts, ideas, and people.
Only this free flow of facts, ideas, and people can
make clear the common bonds and interests of na-
tions and allow them to settle their differences
peaceably and justly.

International Communist propaganda has been
engaged in a great campaign of falsification, dis-
tortion, suppression, and deception. We have had
recently in Korea an illustration of the cruel de-
ception being practiced by Communist propaganda
on the universally felt desire for peace. Just a

Department of State Bulletin

few weeks before Cominmiist armed forces
launched tlieir carefully planned attack across the
38tli parallel, over half the population of North
Korea was reported to have signed Communist-
circulated petitions for peace. The cynical ag-
gression of communism in Korea, and the false-
hoods that have preceded and accompanied it,
make inescapably clear the unportance of the ob-
jectives in this proposed resolution.

This country has been a special target of the
Communist campaign of falsehood and abuse.
We have not been selected as a target simply be-
cause the Communists do not love us. The Com-
munist effort to misrepresent and discredit the
aims and nature of American life, and the aims
and nature of American foreign policy, has pri-
marily a great strategic value in the furtherance
of Communist world objectives. This Commu-
nist campaign, therefore, jeopardizes the security
of the United States and is a threat to the security
of the free world.

Objectives of Communist Campaign

One of the strategic objectives of this Commu-
nist campaign is to divide the free world, whose
unity is essential to its strength and essential to
the elimination of Communist expansion.

Another is to confuse the world about the nature
of democratic aspirations and ideals and to weaken
the moral force and attraction of the free world.

Another is to spread deception about the free
world's strength and resources, of every kind, and,
thus, to weaken the free world's confidence in itself.

Another is to sow doubts regarding the free
world's firmness of purpose, its determination to
fulfill the international obligations it has accepted
in the cause of freedom, and, thus, to produce ir-
resolution, fear, and uncertainty.

So far as Communist efforts to foster falsehood
about the United States are successful, they serve
these Communist designs. They help to drive
wedges between the United States and other coun-
tries, to create hesitancy, and to prevent clear,
effective, imified resistance against Communist
aims.

We must, therefore, make unmistakable the
truth about the United States and the other free
nations. In doing this, we will make plain the
essential bond of common beliefs, and common in-
terests that underlie differences in national cus-
toms and circumstances. We must make plain the
facts of international relationships today, so that
every man has an opportunity to make a true judg-
ment on the immense issues and decisions that con-
front him. We must make plain the difference
between Communist pretensions and Communist
performance.

The President, in his address before the Ameri-
can Society of Newspaper Editors on April 20,^
said,

Our task is to present the truth to the millions of people

wlio are uninformed or uiisiuformed or unconvinced. Our
task is to reach them in their daily lives, as they work
and learn. We must be alert, ingenious, and diligent in
reaching peoples of other countries, whatever their edu-
cational and cultural backgrounds may be. Our task is
to show them that freedom is the way to economic and
social advancement, the way to political independence, the
way to strength, happiness, and peace.

. . . We must pool our efforts with those of the other
free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote
the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery.
We must make ourselves heard round the world in a
great campaign of truth.

The President directed me at that time "to plan
a strengthened and more effective national effort
to use the great power of truth in working for
peace." In accordance with that directive, the
Department of State has submitted to the Presi-
dent a plan for a broader and stronger program of
information and education designed to carry out "a
great campaign of truth," in the interest of a free
and peaceful world. That plan is presently being
considered by the President. It is dedicated to the
achievement of the principles and purposes so
clearly set forth in the proposed resolution.

Necessity for a Truth Campaign

The task of telling the truth, as the President
has emphasized, is not "separate and distinct from
other elements of our foreign policy. It is a
necessary part of all we are doing to build a peace-
ful world." It is essential to the success of our
foreign policy that the military, political, and
economic measures we are taking be accompanied
by an effective information program. The Mar-
shall Plan, Point 4, military aid must be seen fully
and truthfully in the widest context of the United
States' hopes and aspirations. The facts about
what we do, the facts about why we do it, the facts
about the way we do it, are integral parts of what
we do in foreign affairs.

We must remember in these efforts that the truth
is a hard master.

We must always be on our guard against per-
mitting what we say to outrun what we do. We
must recognize that the more fully our principles
are understood, the more closely our practice will
be inspected. Our performance must not lag be-
hind our principles. We must remember, too, that
jieoples speaking to peoples involves peoples lis-
tening to peoples. We must remember that the
truth cannot be monopolized.

In the struggle for men's minds and men's al-
legiances, the free nations have great advantages.
The truth is on their side. In addition, the free
nations have developed to a high degree as in-
tegral parts of their free institutions, technical
resources and skills for discovering the truth and

' For a complete text of President's address, see Bttlle-
TiN of May 1, 1950, p. 669.

July 17, 7950

101

for telling the truth. The democratic concept has
depended on the ability of every man to learn the
truth and to act as an individual on the basis of it.
Just as totalitarian states by their nature are
equi^Dped to suppress the truth, so the free nations
are equipped by their nature to discover and dis-
seminate it. These great resources, implicit in
democratic life, must be utilized to the fullest.
The emphasis placed in the sixth point of Senate
Resolution 243 on the efforts of private American
citizens seems to me to recognize this essential
principle, and I welcome particularly this em-
phasis on private participation. Governments can
do only a very small part of the task. It is the
individual citizens, the private organizations, the
independent groups, who make the major contribu-
tion to insuring that the truth is known.

There has never been a time when men every-
where who value freedom had a greater need to
know the truth.

Senate Resolution 243

Whekeas the struggle now raging between freedom and
communism is a contest for the minds and loyalties of
men ; and

Whekeas in such a struggle force and the threat of
force do not change men's minds or win their loyalties ;
and

Whereas the real methods of Communist aggression
are incessant and skillful propaganda designed to prepare
the way for political Infiltration, for sabotage, and for
the consolidation of power by suppression and terror ; and

Whereas these tactics have poisoned and continue to
poison the minds of hundreds of millions throughout the
world; and

Whereas we have learned that such Communist meth-
ods cannot be beaten back by arms and dollars alone but
require world-wide offensive in behalf of the ideas which
express our democratic principles and aspirations : There-
fore be it

Resolved, That the United States should initiate and
vigorously prosecute a greatly expanded program of in-
formation and education among all the peoples of the
world to the full extent that they can be reached — with a
view to closing the mental gulf that separates the United

States from other peoples and that now blockades the
universal hope for freedom and peace ; be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that any
such program should encompass, among other things —

(1) maintenance, through the United Nations and
through our own diplomacy, of a steady and steadily in-
creasing pressure in behalf of world-wide freedom of
information ;

(2) acceleration of the work of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to the
point where, with effective leadership, it has a chance to
make a significant, perhaps decisive, contribution to
peace ;

(3) development of the activities of the Offices of
International Information and Educational Exchange in
the Department of State, in the following ways among
many others —

(a) preparation and execution of a comprehensive
world-wide program to exhibit documentary and educa-
tional motion pictures designed to explain the democratic
principles and ideals which underlie our foreign policy ;

(b) significant and immediate expansion of our
program for bringing foreign students to the United
States ;

(c) creation of a world broadcasting network
capable of broadcasting on long wave, short wave, or
medium wave, with an ultimate goal of reaching virtually
every radio set in the world ;

(d) use of any and all possible means to reach
people who are shut off from the free world by censorship
and suppression ;

(4) promotion of democratic education abroad, not-
ably in the occupied areas of Germany and Japan ;

(5) convening of a conference of non-Communist na-
tions now conducting international information programs,
with a view to reaching a better understanding on com-
mon themes and on greatly increasing the effectiveness of
the projection of such themes ;

(6) encouragement of the establishment of a nongov-
ernmental agency to help inspire and guide the efforts of
the millions of private American citizens who might use
their talents and resources and contacts overseas in fur-
therance of the programs and objectives of this resolution,
and be it further

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the in-
ternational propagation of the democratic creed be made
an instrument of supreme national policy — by the develop-
ment of a Marshall plan in the field of ideas.

102

Department of State Bulletin

Forging a Free World With a Truth Campaign

hy Edward W. Barrett

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs '

Since the early 1940's, it has been apparent to the
American people that a new era had arrived in
world affairs — the era of the interdependence of
nations, making international cooperation an im-
perative.

In order to defeat the Axis Powers in World
War II, we discovered that we had to pool our
physical and moral resources with those of our
Allies and organize a high command to direct our
collective effort. And by reaching the minds of
the enemy peoples, we weakened their resolution
and brought peace nearer.

Along with other free nations, we realized while
the fighting was still going on that voluntary
collaboration would also be required to deal with
the problems of the postwar world. We agreed
that intensive information activities would be
needed to mobilize the support of the peoples of
the world in a determined effort to rebuild shat-
tered economies, to extend human freedoms, and
to avert a recurrence of war. We joined in the
establishment of the United Nations, only to see
the United Nations — despite its great accomplish-
ments— deprived of the power to safeguard world
peace by tlie peculiar tactics of the Soviet Union.
We found that the struggle between tyranny and
freedom was still going on. The only difference
was that the enemies of freedom were using not
guns but threats of war, political and economic
pressures on weaker countries, and the subversive
activities of fifth columnists in every land, in-
cluding our own.

I doubt very much whether the United States
has ever faced a more difficult and perilous world
situation than now, even allowing for the events
in recent weeks which have signalized a forward
leap in the collective strength of the free nations
at the expense of Soviet imperialist ambitions.

' An address made at Bard College, Annandale-on-Hud-
son, N.y., on June 17 and released to the press on the same
date.

The world situation is still precarious. This is no
time to be baselessly undermining public confi-
dence in those to whom the all-important conduct
of our foreign policy is entrusted.

But, unfortunately, we still have with us those
who are perfectly willing to undermine confidence
in the United States at home and abroad for cheap
political reasons, who do not hesitate to make loose
charges first and search for evidence later, who
resort to reckless smear tactics. However, it is
heartening to know that at Washington there are
many, many more men of both parties who have
submerged political rivalries in the field of foreign
affairs — men, for example, like Herbert Lehman
and John Foster Dulles, to cite but two from this
State. Such men are working devotedly, and
without headlines, to strengthen their Govern-
ment in the international field, to help their Gov-
ernment in the difficult job of eliminating any
possible security risks, and to help devise ever
stronger international policies for their Govern-
ment. We should bow to such fine decent public
servants who realize there is a limit to politics.
It is because of them that the damage done by
selfish irresponsibles is now being repaired. The
passage by the Congress of the full foreign aid
bill while Secretary Acheson was in Europe, for
the recent London meetings, gave an impressive
demonstration that a unified Am'^rica is still back-
ing up a consistent line of policy. The strong pleas
by leaders of both of our major political parties
for increased two-party collaboration in the mak-
ing and the carrying out of our policy has also
had a salutary effect at home and abroad. The
signs point clearly now to a renewed, indeed inten-
sified, bipartisan policy, enabling us to cooperate
with our friends abroad to even better effect.

Building a Community of Free Nations

Certainly there is no mistaking either the need
for the closer association of the Atlantic pact na-

Jo/y J 7, J 950

103

tions or the real progress that is being made in
that direction. The agreements reached by the
North Atlantic Treaty Council at London show
that the powerful democracies of this Atlantic area
are forging a true community of free nations.
Through the increasing coordination of their mili-
tary, moral, economic, and political strength, they
are reducing the likelihood of war and bringing
nearer the day when at least the majority of the
world's peoples can realize the goals of the United
Nations Charter.

So far as it is within our power to prevent them,
there are two things that we must not allow to
occur — that is, for the industrial complex of West-
ern Europe to fall into the grip of the Soviet Union
or for any more of the potentially great nations of
Asia and the Far East to suffer that fate. If either
happened, our hopes for a free world society would
be set back. If both happened, so far as we were
concerned, the ballgame would be oyer.

Those two eventualities are precisely what the
Soviet Union is aiming for, and precisely what we
and our friends are determined shall not take
place.

There is no need for me to review now the vig-
orous actions which we are taking in concert with
the nations of Western Europe to shatter the So-
viet ambitions. AVe believe we can make Soviet
aggression too hazardous to be risked. We seek
to render Soviet subversion ineffective by building
up economic, social, and political stability.

In the Far East and Asia, as you know, we have
respected and supported movements toward na-
tional independence. We encourage emerging new
nations to prove to themselves that only democ-
racy— in the words of Nehru — can "deliver the
goods, materially and spiritually," and by direct
aid, support their efforts toward advancement.
Now that Cliina has fallen under the control of
Moscow, an already delicate political situation has
worsened. We must act wisely and firmly in help-
ing to prevent the further spread of communism
among the Asian millions. As a newcomer in gov-
ernment, I feel we are doing so.

In Europe, in Asia, and the Far East, in other
world areas, we must continue to act positively
wherever freedom is in danger for our own free-
dom is at stake.

Truth as a Tool f r Freedom

I am especially concerned with the positive ac-
tion of supplying truth and promoting mutual un-
derstanding. My job, in the State Department,
is to see that we do not neglect the vitally impor-
tant factor of world public opinion in our interna-
tional relations. The description of 1;he so-called
"cold war" as a contest to win the minds of men
has been worked to death, but it remains a decisive
guidepost for shaping our policies and actions.

In his recent address to the American Society of
] .ewspaper Editors, President Truman cut to the
] eart of the matter. He said:

The cause of freedom is being challenged throughout the
world today by the forces of imperialist communism. . . .
Deceit, distortion, and lies are systematically used by them
as a matter of deliberate policy. . . .

We cannot run the risk that nations may be lost to the
cause of freedom because their people do not know the
facts.

It is hard for me to conceive that anyone in this
day could question the need for us to reach into
every nation in the world with a barrage of truth-
ful information about the kind of people we are,
how we really live, and what our intentions are
toward other peoples. It is surely self-evident
tliat we must make the citizens of other free na-
tions understand that we have a real community of
interests and that we must pull together if we
are to have a world in which a decent kind of life
is possible.

It may sound dry as dust to us, but the clear
explanation of United States foreign policy and
the views of our leading statesmen and of the
American people on the world situation are of the
liveliest interest to people abroad. The more we
reach people abroad with that kind of factual in-
formation, the better our prospects of pulling to-
gether in the common cause of freedorn. We are
building mutual trust and understanding on the
only basis on which they can be built — that of
knowledge of the facts as they exist. Any man
who really knows what is going on is a long way
toward knowing what to do about it.

The power of the simple, unadulterated truth is
precisely our answer to the distortions of Com-
mimist propaganda, and I, for one, am confident
that if we hit with the truth hard enough, long
enough, and on a sufficient scale — and that means
no less than a world-wide scale — we can make the
Communist propaganda start backfiring not only
outside the Iron Curtain but inside it as well. I
do not want to make it sound easy ; it is not. It is
a terrific and arduous job, but it is one that we
must get done — through both public and private
cliannels.

I believe that we must intensify greatly our ef-
forts along these lines. In the Department of
State, we are now completing a thorough study
and analysis of the complete range of our infor-
mational, educational, and cultural exchange pro-
grams to appraise the results we are getting and
to discover ways of getting better results. We
are very eager to measure up to what the Presi-
dent recently described as the need for a great
new "campaign of truth."

Meanwhile, we have encouraging evidence that
we are accomj^lishing something very wortliwhile
in what we are now doing through the world-wide
broadcasts of the Voice of America, the daily
Morse code transmission of official texts and in-
formation to missions abroad for public release,
tlie showing of documentary films and photo-
graphic displays, the services of libraries and in-
formation centers open to the general public, the
legwork of public affairs and information and

104

Department of State BuUefin

cultural officers of the Foreign Service, and our
practice of bringing students, teachers, laborers,
and jirofessional people to the United States so
and they can go back home with first-hand infor-
mation about American democracy.

Very briefly, I would like to give 3'ou a few
highlights which will suggest the promise this
type of activity offers.

The radio Voice of America is now operating on
a 24-hour schedule, with a total of 70 daily pro-
gi-ams in 24 languages. About 30,000 words are
beamed out daily in news reports, commentaries
and news analyses, and features on American life.
It is impossible to be accurate about how many
people we are reaching with this international
radio network, but we estimate our potential listen-
ing audience at 300 million people. We do have
one solid basis of measurement — letters from
listeners. In 1949, excluding the Iron Curtain
countries, the Voice received from abroad around
10,000 letters a month. The number has now in-
creased to a monthly rate of 25,00. I think that is
impressive evidence of the impact which the Voice
is making.

A German recently wrote the Voice in colorful
English as follows:

Having just returned from Russian captivity, I wish
to inform you tliat I have experienced in Russia that your
transmissions in Russian language are paid attention to
and that the Russians lUje very much to listen in for them.

Even the officials of the Slinistry of National Security
occupied in our camps sent off the prisoners of war whom
they were trying at 9 o'cloclv in order to hear the Voice of
America. Next day the party men of course assured one
another that it was a big twaddle what they had told on
the Voice of America — but they heard it every one !

From many sources, we are able to piece together
bits of information which add up to this: That
we are still reaching a hard core — a substantial
core — of listeners in the Soviet Union. There are
many Russian citizens whose experience in slave
labor camps and the like have left them with little
fondness for the Communist dictatorship. We
are reaching them with the truth about what is
going on in the outside world, and I think it is
most unlikely that what they are learning stops
with them. They are surely passing it on through
the grapevine to be found in any land smothered
by oppression and denied access to news of the
outside world. There is always a great hunger
for news where it has been arbitrarily cut off. This
is our opportunity to keep alive, even in Russia,
the possibility of ultimate cooperation between
our people and a free Russian people. Meanwhile,
the more we reach the Russian people with honest
news, the more we force the Russian dictators to
beware of an explosion within if they step too far
in their adventures abroad.

Soviet Reaction

Probably the best measure of the impact of the
Voice is the case of jitters it seems to have instilled

in the men in the Kremlin. As you know, the
wholesale Russian jamming operation which began
April 24, 1949, is still going on 24 hours a day. In
devoting several hundred Soviet transmitters to
this jamming operation, the Soviet Government
is spending more money to keep our broadcasts
out than we are spending on our entire world-wide
Voice operations. You know, too, that we have
long had engineers devising methods of breaking
through the jamming. That costs money, and the
Congress voted it — 11.5 million dollars. We are
now getting through the jamming on a scale which
is still less than can satisfy us but is enough to
keep the Soviet rulers acutely uncomfortable. We
mean to make them more so. I can now announce
that, as a result of recent frantic Russian attempts
to shut us out of Czechoslovakia, we are today
doubling our Voice of America output in the Czech
and Slovak languages. We shall not let them shut
out the truth as long as we can help it. The more
we can keep the Russian bear busy scratching his
own fleas, the less likely he is to molest the rest of
the world.

The jamming of the Voice is by no means the
only evidence of the fear of all the Iron Curtain
governments of having their peoples reached by
truthful information. Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech-
oslovakia, and Communist China have adopted
oppressive tactics to prevent people from listening
to our broadcasts, such as heavy fines, imprison-
ment, and confiscation of the radios of those caught
listening. For an extreme example, on April 22,
1950, a Hungarian court at Gyor sentenced Agos-
ton Rohring, Jr., t6 death on charges of hiding
arms and of listening — in the words of the court
"to the United States imperialistic radio which
incites to war." Nevertheless, a Hungarian-born
United States citizen, who returned March 27
from a visit in Hungary, said he did not speak with
anyone who did not eagerly await the daily VOA
broadcast, despite the severe punislunent they
would face if detected.

We are now witnessing a systematic campaign
to black-out our information activities entirely in
the Iron Curtain countries. Most of our informa-
tion centers have been shut down in the Iron Cur-
tain countries or so cramped by Governmental
edicts as to render them practically useless. The
Iron Curtain is seeking daily to increase the isola-
tion of the peoples within from any and all healthy
contacts with the outer world. This development
points all the more emphatically to the importance
of the Voice broadcasts and the value of increasing
its power. Foy Kohler, who returned last year
from long duty in Moscow to head up the Voice,
said recently that he would like to see an expanded
Voice of America which could reach loud and clear
throughout the world in all languages. I go along
with him in that, and I agree that it would be
worth to us every cent it would cost. That cost,
incidentallj^, would amount annually to about the
cost of 6 minutes of the kind of shooting war which
we financed in World War II.

July 17, 7950

105

other Measures of Strength

I would like to highlight another way in which
we are cultivating understanding between our-
selves and other peoples and correcting miscon-
ceptions about the American people and our way
of life which are circulated abroad. I refer to our
educational exchange and exchange of persons pro-
grams, under which we bring to this country a
great number of foreign teachers, officials, editors,
industrialists, labor leaders, students, and people
from other walks of life. We welcome every op-
portunity to enable these visitors to move freely
among us, to work and study with us, to see the bad
with the good, and then go back to their own lands
to i-eport on what they have seen and learned. I
would like to see this program expanded until we
had a stream of visitors from every country in the
world. As an illustration of the importance of
this activity, there are now 5,000 Chinese students
studying in American schools and universities and
learning about us while living among us. Most of
them will probably go back to China, where they
can potentially serve as a potent corrective to the
attacks now being made on us by the Communist
regime. I ask you to ask yourselves only one
question : What would we not give to have an equal
number of Soviet students live among us and then
go back to their own land to report on what they
had seen ?

The simple, unadulterated truth that we are

trying to get across to the citizens of other coun-
tries is that the United States is pursuing a gen-
uine policy of peace. We are spending billions
and sending thousands of our ablest people abroad
to assist other nations in solving their difficulties,
so that they may join their growing strength with
ours in creating a world free of war, free of polit-
ical oppression, and free of economic or any other
foi'm of human slavery. As a result of what we
and other free nations are accomplishing together,
we are beginning to see new horizons in interna-
tional understanding, the light of the day in which
the peoples of the world will have what they
want — a world in which the diversity of human
skills and the force of human energies can be con-
centrated on lifting standards of living, materially
and spiritually, throughout civilization.

I think that there is no higher purpose to which
you could give your support. As American citi-
zens, you have the opportunity to make your in-
fluence felt by supporting these ultimate aims of
American policy. We cannot remind ourselves
too often that the Voice of America is the collec-
tive voice of this nation. You are a part of that
voice.

We can eventually forge a world of decency, of
freedom, and of peace if we push ahead, if we
boldly use the great weapons of economics and
truth at our command — and if we keep our heads
and use our heads.

Analysis of Senator McCarthy's Public Statements

MILWAUKEE SPEECH

The Deportment of State on June 17 made public^ the
following analysis of some of the factual inaccuracies in
the speech delivered hy Senator McCarthy at Milirnukee,
Wisconsin, to the Reputjlican State Convention of 'Wiscon-
sin on June 9, 1950.

Several misstatements which Senator McCarthy
made at Milwaukee, he has repeated since in his
speech of June 15 at New London, Connecticut, to
the convention of the National Editorial Associa-
tion. In particular, he repeated at New London
the first misstatement dealt with here — Senator
McCarthy's perversion of the record of Secretary
Acheson's position in the matter of the loan to
Poland. The actual record of the Senate Commit-
tee which explored this matter is set forth in this
release. He has also since repeated his asser-
tions— which are here once again shown false —
about United States policy with regard to Poland
and China and about State Department files.

' Department of State press release 648.
106

1. SENATOR McCarthy said: Prom October 1945,
to March of 1947, Acheson's law firm was retained by
the Communist government of Poland to obtain a 90 mil-
lion-dollar loan from the United States. The loan was
put through and Acheson's firm received a fee of over 50
thousand dollars, according to Acheson's sworn testimony.
During this time, Acheson was Assistant Secretary. . . .
He admitted in January 1949, that he was charged with
responsibility of making that loan ! Fifty million of that
90 million went to equip and arm the Communist army
and the dreaded . . . Communist secret police ... It
was Mr. Acheson who placed the guns, the whips, the black-
snakes, and the clubs in the hands of those Communists,
[and] . . . who furnished them with bullets to keep a
Christian population under Soviet discipline . . .

The Facts : This charge, with its innuendoes, is
utterly false and based on a deliberate distortion of
the public record. The circumstances of the loan
to Poland were carefully scrutinized by the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations in January 1949,
prior to the confirmation of Mr. Acheson's nomi-

Deparfment of State Bulletin

nation as Secretary of State. The Committee's
hearings establislied that Mr. Acheson had severed
all connections with his former law firm 5 years
before the Polish loan wns approved by the De-
partment of State; that he acted on the loan only
after it had been recommended by the various divi-
sions of the Department, including Will Clayton's
economic divisions and the political divisions ; and
that the Department, at that time, still had hopes
that the Mikolajczyk government, then in power
in Poland, might be saved from Russian domina-
tion.

Any person really desiring the facts would care-
fully have examined the record of the Committee
on Foreign Relations. The entire published record
of this Committee's hearings dealing with this
question is set forth below:

The Chairman: There have been charges over the radio
that there was some activity by that firm [Covington, Bur-
lin.u', iiublee, Achesoa & Sliorb] with regard to a Polish
loan while you were in the State Department. Can you
tell us about that?

Mr. Acheson: Yes, Mr. Chairman. I shall be glad to do
that.

The Chairman: I assume, of course, that while you
were in the State Department you had severed your
relationships with the firm as far as the receipt of any
iwrtion of their revenues as compensation.

iff. Acheson: On the 1st of February 1945 [subsequently
corrected to February 1, 1941], when I took the oath as
Assistant Secretary of State, I severed all connection of
any sort with my tirm. The interest which I had in it was
valued, computed, and paid to me by the firm, and I had
no further connection with it until I returned to private
practice on July 1, 1947.

The Chairman: Was your name dropped from the firm?

Mr. Acheson: My name was not dropped from the title
of the firm. It was dropped from the list of partners who
were connected with the firm. The name and style of
the firm remained the same.

The Chairman: Like many firms, they wanted the firm
name to go on, as I understand.

Mr. Acheson: That was the desire of my partners, a
desire in which I acquiesced.

I'he Chairman: But on the list of attorneys in the firm,
your name was not included?

Mr. Acheson: Certainly not.

Senator Wiley: You had no financial interest in it?

Mr. Acheson: No, sir.

The Chairman: You were starting to tell us about the
charge with respect to the Polish loan in which your
firm, while you were in oflice, had some unusual inter-
est. Tell us about that.

Mr. Acheson: This matter, Mr. Chairman, was a matter
which was begun and finished at a time when I had no
connection with the firm whatever. In October 1945, the
Polish Supply Mission employed the senior partner of
that firm, Mr. Edward B. Burling, and some of his asso-
ciates, to work with that Supply Mission in the drafting
of contracts, papers, and so forth, having to do with a
loan which the Supply Mission wished to make with the
Export-Import Bank. That work continued from Octo-

ber 1945 until March 1947. It consisted In drawing up
in legal form various conditions which were to be imposed
to the granting of that loan. After the loan was granted
and approved by the Export-Import Bank, there were
various legal documents having to do with the nature of
the payment and repayment, in which the firm assisted.
After the loan began to be paid out, there were contracts
which were made between the Polish Supply Mission and
various suppliers in the United States. The firm assisted
in that matter.

In March 1947, after the President of the United States
made a strong statement of disapproval of the activities
of the Polish Government, the firm notified the Polish
Supply Mission that they were no longer at its service.

It has been stated somewhat extravagantly that the
firm received in the neighborhood of a million dollars for
its services. Its services for the period October 1945 to
March 1947 were paid for on the basis of the time of
the various people engaged in it, and the total fee was
50,175 dollars.

The Chairman: And not a million?

Mr. Acheson: No, sir ; it was not that.

I think it would be appropriate at this point, in view
of the charges that I had something to do with the grant-
ing of this loan, which was of benefit to a firm with which
I had been connected, to state the facts in regard to that
matter. The Polish Supply Mission and the Polish Gov-
ernment approached the United States in 1945 for two
credits. One was a credit of 40 million dollars to be
used for the purchase of coal cars. The other was a
credit of 50 million dollars to be used for the purchase
of surplus supplies owned by the United States and located
in Europe. The matter of this loan was discussed in the
State Department for sometime and was also discussed
with the Secretary of State, who was in Europe. It was
discussed in 1945 and 1946.

On April 24, 1946, at a time when I was Acting Secre-
tary of State, the various divisions of the State Depart-
ment, including the economic ones under Mr. Clayton
and the political ones under the political ofiicers, recom-
mended that these credits should be granted on certain
conditions. That recommendation was approved by me,
and on April 24, 1946, a release was given stating what
the conditions were and stating an exchange of notes
between the Polish Government and the Government of
the United States.

Subsequently, some of the conditions imposed were, in
the opinion of the Government of the United States, not
fulfilled by the Government of Poland, and again, as
Acting Secretary of State, I suspended the loan until
those conditions were met.

A matter which was not stated as a condition of the
loan, but was a consideration which entered into the
making of it, was that there should be free elections in
Poland. Those elections were held. They were not re-
garded by the State Department or by the President
of the United States as free elections. The President
made a statement on that subject, and so did I. How-
ever, since this matter was not a condition to the loan,
the loan was not again suspended.

The consideration which led to the granting of 40 mil-
lion dollars for the purchase of coal cars was the great
necessity of supplying Polish coal to western Europe.

iu\Y 17, 1950

107

That coal is now being supplied in very substantial quan-
tities with the use of these cars.

The Chairman: May I ask you one question : Did your
former firm have any relation whatever to the policy
matters that were determined or was it purely a legal
arrangement about these contracts and drafting of the
instruments that were necessary to bring about the loan?

Mr. Achcson: It was purely a legal matter, Mr. Chair-
man. The firm had nothing to do with the question of
whether or not the loan should be granted.

The Chairman: That is what I had in mind.

Senator Vandenhcrg: At that point, Mr. Acheson, was
it the policy of the Government to make the loans sub-
ject to these suspensions and reservations that you have
indicated?

Mr. Acheson: That was correct. Senator Vandenberg.

Senator Vandenberg: Would the.se be the instructions
also to our Ambassador at Warsaw?

Mr. Acheson: I do not think I understand that question.

Senator Yandenl)crg: To come right down to the bare
bones of it, why would there then be a dispute, or an
alleged dispute, between the American Ambassador at
Warsaw, in respect to this thing and our representatives
in Paris?

Mr. Acheson: There was throughout the consideration
of this loan a difference of opinion between the American
Ambassador in Warsaw and the officers of the State
Department, including the Secretary and myself, who were
charged with responsibility in it. That was a difference
of view. It was one in which the unanimous opinion of
the officers of the State Department was on one side and
the Ambassador took a different view.

It has been stated, and I have seen it in the press, that
the Ambassador resigned on account of this loan. That is
not the fact. The loan was made on the 24th of April 1946.
The Ambassador resigned on the 31st of March 1947.

Senator Vandenhcrg: Was this PolLsh Government,
which your firm represented in this connection, what we
would call a satellite government or was it still a govern-
ment which pretended — at least, through the cooperation
of Mikolajczyk — to still be, in pretense at least, a coalition
government?

Mr. Acheson: It was the latter, Senator Vandenberg.
This was the Mikolajczyk government, and there was,
during that period, a hope that it might in some respects
be free from complete Russian domination.

Senator Wiley: I want to make an inquiry. I under-
stand, Mr. Acheson, that you claim that you yourself,
personally, in no way profited from this transaction that
your firm had ; that at the time that the firm was engaged
by the Government of Poland you had no legal or financial
interest in the firm ; that you had really stepped out from
it; is that correct?

Mr. Acheson: That is correct. Senator.

Senator Wiley: And never since have you received any
remuneration from this transaction?

Mr. Acheson: That is correct, Senator.

Senator Smith: Mr. Chairman, might I ask another
question in that connection?

The Chairman: Yes.

Senator Smith: Mr. Acheson, I understood you to say
that in February 1945, when you became Under Secretary

of State, you severed your connection with the firm. I also
understood you to say that prior to that time, in 1944, if I
have the figures correct, you were Assistant Secretary of
State in other matters in the State Department. Were
you an active member of your law firm during that period?

Mr. Acheson: No, Senator. You misunderstood me, I
think. What I believe I said was that on the 1st of Febru-
ary 1941 I entered the service of the Government. At that
time, I severed all connection with my firm and did not
reestablish any connection with it whatever until July
1947, wlien I returned to private life.

Senator Smith: Thank you. That is what I wanted to
bring out. I was not quite clear about that.

Senator Tydings: I think you said in your direct testi-
mony that at one time this loan was suspended. Is that
correct?

Mr. Acheson: That is correct. Senator Tydings.

Senator Tydings: At that time, was your former law
firm still representing the Polish Government?

Mr. Acheson: Ye.?, sir; that is correct.

Senator Tydings: Then it seems to be an inference that
the steps and your part in the suspension of the Polish
loan were adverse to the interests of your law firm. Is
that correct?

Mr. Acheson: That is correct. Senator Tydings.

Senator Tydings: I would like to ask you now if the
first name in your firm does not represent the name of a
man who is deceased, Mr. Harry Covington.

Mr. Acheson: That is true.

Senator Tydings: Isn't it a matter of fact that when
a law firm is organized, in a matter of law, and any
member dies or withdraws from the firm, that in the
nature of the partnership the goodwill of the name itself,
even though a member leaves the firm, the remaining
partners can continue to keep his name as a part of the
firm?

Mr. Acheson: That is true. Senator Tydings. It is a
very common practice.

Senator Tydings: I think it is supported by numerous
cases in the court.

Mr. Acheson: I should believe so.

Senator Tydings: Where a man leaves a law firm, the
remaining partners are entitled to the goodwill created
by the old name, and in case of death the same thing
applies. It belongs to the partnership and not to the
individual once the goodwill label is created. Is that
correct?

Mr. Acheson: I believe so. I can't answer authorita-
tively. I have not looked it up.

Senator Tydings: During the negotiations between the
State Department and the Polish Government concerning
this loan, did your law partners at any time talk to you
about tlie loan or urge its rejection, adoption, modification,
or alteration?

Mr. Acheson: No, Senator. I had no conversation with
any of them of any sort.

Senator Tydings: Then, when you severed your con-
nection with your law firm as you have stated, during the
time you filled the Government position, none of your
partners or associates in your office in any manner, shape,
or form contacted you to assist them in work that was in

108

Department of State Bulletin

the office that might also have some connection in the
State Dopartniont ; is that correct?

Mr. Achesoii: That is correct, Senator.

As I can recall it, and I think my memory is clear, in
the 6I2 years in which I was in the State Department I
had one call from one member of that firm and that was
to tell me that a client that he represented, who was an
exporter of materials, would like to know whether the
State Department would be pleased if that firm ceased
exporting materials to Japan. I told him that the State
Department would indeed be pleased at that action and
that action was taken, and I believe that is the only
conversation on any matter of business which I had with
any one of my partners in <i\n years.

Senator Tydings: That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Vandcnberp: Do you think there is any chance
for public misunderstanding through the retention, let us
say, of the name of the Secretary of State in the title of
a law firm?

Mr. Aclicson: I should think that there might very
easily be, and it will be my recommendation to my part-
ners that they would please me very much, and I think
serve themselves, by dropping my name from the title of
the firm. [The firm name now is Covington, Burling,
Rublee, O'Brian and Shorb.]

2. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID : I pointed out to the
Senate 4 days ago that some of those men who the FBI
listed as Soviet agents are still working in the State
Department shaping our foreign policy at this very
moment.

The Facts: Wliat Senator McCarthy actually
had said to the Senate 4 days before was that:

At least three of those listed as Communist agents by
the FBI 3 years ago are still holding high positions in
the State Department. . . . Those names I have checked
and I know the persons are working in the State Depart-
ment. . . . I . . . have the proof that those men are
working in the State Department as of this very moment.

Instead of proof, Senator McCarthy now pro-
duces a watered-down version of his previous
charge, which the Department also refuted in its
statement of June 9.

In his speech to the Senate, Senator McCarthy
further stated that the names of the three so-called
"agents" still in the Department were also among
the 106 submitted by bim to the Tydings Subcom-
mittee. In actuality, of a total of 20 persons
hypothesized on the cliart as ''agents," there is only
one who — after thorough reinvestigation, includ-
ing a full P"BI investigation, and clearance uitder
the Department's loyalty and security proce-
dures— is still in the employ of the Department.
That one does not hold a "high position." His
grade is GS-9. Furthermore, that one is not on the
list of 106 which Senator McCarthy gave the Sub-
committee.

3. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID: (immediately after
asserting that "untouchables" in the State Department
were plotting the "Communistic enslavement of the world"
and that the Administration was protecting "Communists

July 17, 1950

and traitors in Government") : As an example, I would
like to give you the complete case proven on Dr. Philip
Jessup, the State Department's Amhassador-at-Large. . . .
This is the man who, under the guidance of Lattimore,
is determining to a large extent our Far Eastern pol-
icy. . . . The documentary evidence shows that Jessup
belonged to five organizations which had been officially
declared as fronts for and doing the work of the Commu-
nist Party . . .

The Facts : On the Senate floor on June 6, and
under the protection of his Senatorial immunity,
Senator McCarthy had gone even farther — he vir-
tually said that Ambassador Jessup was a member
of the Communist Party :

Their [The Communist Party's] top aim was to get
some of their members on that Executive Committee [of
the Institute of Pacific Relations], to control that. For
example, we find Frederick V. Field, we find Philip C.
Jessup, and Harriet Moore, a very well-known Commu-
nist.

Ambassador Jessup, in his testimony before the
Tydings Subcommittee, demonstrated the com-
plete falsity of Senator McCarthy's allegations,
and the Department has repeatedly set forth the
facts — particularly in its analysis, on May 28,^ of
Senator McCarthy's May 25 speech at Rochester,
New York, and of the various documents which
he presented at that time as "evidence."

4. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID: So far, those who
object to our methods in this present fight have offered
as their only alternative that we go back to the method
used for the past 16 years during which the Communists
have been permitted to take control of our State Depart-
ment, infiltrate our Government, and work with the Soviet
Union to accomplish the two major Russian aims :

1. To create a Red China ; and

2. To create a Red Poland.

The Facts : The Department of State has stren-
uously objected to the methods adopted by Sen-
ator McCarthy. The objection stems from the
irresponsible and destructive approach which the
Senator has seen fit to adopt in his attacks. The
Department has actively solicited constructive
suggestions and criticism from the Congress, pri-
vate organizations, and individual citizens regard-
ing the conduct of our foreign relations, so that
the policies of the Department may be as repre-
sentative of the best thinking of the American
people as possible. Senator McCarthy's repeated
misstatements concerning the Department and its
policies obviously do not fall into this category.

In Poland, the Department did everything in its
power to bring about free elections and the estab-
lishment of an independent democratic govern-
ment. That this effort so far has been unsuccess-
ful is strictly attributable to the realities of the
situation which Senator McCarthy deliberately
ignores ; viz., the geographic proximity of Poland
and the Soviet Union combined with the political

' Bulletin of June 19, 1950, p. 1013.

109

blackjack of scores of Red divisions in and around
Polish territory. Soviet intransigence left the
United States Government only the alternative of
force which even Senator McCarthy, under the
circumstances, might hesitate to recommend.

In China, the United States Government poured
out billions of dollars for economic, fiscal, and
military assistance of the anti-Communist forces.
This effort was frustrated by the fact that there
ultimately ceased to exist in China any political
entity with the organic integrity and determina-
tion to combat communism on a scale which would
make further support practical and effective.

5. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID : For nearly 20 years
we have allowed dilettante diplomats to do the "fighting"
for us with kid gloves in perfumed drawing rooms . . .

The Facts : The members of the United States
Foreign Service are drawn from all States of the
Union and from all walks of life. Angus Ward,
Consul General in China, for almost a year im-
prisoned with his staff of 18 by the Chinese
Communists, saw none of Senator McCarthy's
imaginary perfumed drawing rooms. He and
his people suffered real hardship in real risk of
their lives. Departmental obsei'vers were fre-
quently under fire during the Greek civil war
and similarly exposed in the war between the
Israeli and the Arabs for Palestine. Consul Gen-
eral Thomas Wasson was killed by a sniper at
Palestine in 1948. Officers assigned to certain
posts in Southeast Asia are required by Depart-
mental order to carry firearms for their personal
protection. Out of some 8,000 officers in the
Foreign Service, about 2,000 are veterans. Sen-
ator McCarthy is simply repeating, here, frayed
cliches based on ignorance or malice.

6. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID: This letter [from
the Secretary of State to Representative Sabath] shows
that the Department insisted on hiring 205 individuals
who had been declared unfit ... by the President's own
Security and Loyalty Board ... I told him [the Presi-
dent] I had the names of 57 individuals whose files would
indicate that they were with Communists or loyal to the
Party ... My continual investigation has increased that
list to 81 ... I have given them 25 more names, totaling
106 .. . The FBI gave the State Department a detailed
chart . . . showing that there were a total of 124 .. .
2 months later 106 .. . were still working in the Depart-
ment . . .

The Facts: At Wheeling, West Virginia, on
February 9, 1950, Senator McCarthy asserted in a
Lincoln Day address:

. . . While I cannot take the time to name all the men
in the State Department who have been named as active
members of the Communist Party and members of a spy
ring, I have here in my hand a list of 205 — a list of
names that were made known to the Secretary of State
as being members of the Communist Party and who
nevertheless are still working and shaping policy in
the State Department.

The next day, he said he had the names of "57
card-carrying members of the Communist Party"
allegedly working in the Department. Later, he
talked in terms of 81 security risks of various
sorts. Then, he said he would stand or fall on his
ability to prove that there was one "top espionage
agent" in the State Department. Recently, he has
directed his attention to the Civil Service clear-
ances, 7 years ago, of two Chinese for Office of
War Information employment. Reverting to his
numbers game, he now injects a new "106," paired
with another big "3."

To date, Senator McCarthy has utterly failed
to prove that there is a single Communist or pro-
Communist in the State Depai-tment.

7. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID : He [President Tru-
man] announced that he would make available not all
of the files, but the loose-leaf, raped, and denuded State
Department files in some of the cases — files which, ac-
cording to a House Committee rejiort based on an FBI
survey, had been extensively tampered with.

The Facts : Here, Senator McCarthy dishes up
once again a previous assertion already refuted
by the Department — most recently in its May 25
analysis^ of the Senator's May 15 speech in
Atlantic City.

As the Department then pointed out, these files
are now as rigidly controlled, accurate, and com-
plete as it is possible to make them. The files de-
livered to the Subcommittee are complete files —
State Department reports, FBI reports, interro-
gations, hearings, administrative memoranda,
even pencilled working papers — everything. On
May 10, when the Committee started examining
the files, Senator Tydings is quoted as having
said :

These 81 files contain not only all of the data which
the State Department investigators have assembled, but
also all of the loyalty data which the FBI has gathered
and referred to the State Department and which has
been made a part of these files.

Thus the Committee will have the complete record from
all sources . . .

8. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID : It is the Lattimore-
Acheson plan for Soviet conquest of the Pacific . . . This
is what he [Owen Lattimore] says . . . This ... by the
architect of our State Department Far Eastern policy
. . . Lattimore's master plan . . . bought lock, stock and
barrel by Acheson . . . The Lattimore-Acheson axis
served the purpose of the Kremlin . . .

The Facts : Both the State Department and Mr.
Lattimore himself have rejaeatedly reiterated the
falsity of these assertions. Mr. Lattimore is not
an employee of the State Department and is not
the "architect" of its Far Eastern policy. Senator
Tydings asked Secretaries Hull, Byrnes, Marshall,
and Acheson * whether such a characterization oi

' Bulletin of June 12, 1950, p. 968.
* Bulletin of June 12, 1950, p. 972.

110

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

Mr. Lattimore was true or false. They all replied
that it was false.

9. SENATOR MCCARTHY SAID: "This is the Ache-
sou who reinstated and put in charge of personnel in the
Far East, John Stewart Service . . ."

The Facts : The following letters from the then
Secretary of State, Mr. James F. Byrnes, and for-
mer Undersecretary Joseph C. Grew clearly set
forth the circmnstances of Mr. Service's rein-
statement to the Foreign Service — by Secretary
Byrnes on the reconnnendation of the Foreign
Service Personnel Board:

August 14, 1945

My deak Mr. Service : I am advised that the Grand
Jury, after hearing the testimony of witnesses, has found
nothing to warrant an indictment against you.

One of the fundamentals of our democratic system is the
investigation by a Grand Jury of criminal charges. By
that process you liave been cleared.

T am advised that at the time of your arrest you were
placed on leave of absence with pay. I am happy to
approve the recommendation of the personnel board that
you be returned to active duty. You have now been
reassigned to duty in the Department for important worlj
in connection with Far Eastern Affairs.

I cnngratulate you on tliis happy termination of your
ordeal and predict for you a continuance of the splendid
record I am advised you have maintained since first you
entered the Foreign Service.

With all good wishes,
Sincerely yours,

James F. Byrnes

August 14, 1945

Dear Service: The Secretary has just told me of the
letter he has written you expressing his pleasure at your
complete vindication. I just want to add a personal word
of my own.

When I learned, only a few days before your arrest,
that your name had been coupled with thefts of official
documents I was inexpressibly shoclsed. Having known
you for some time and of the high calibre of your work
I could not believe that you could be implicated in such
an affair. As the Secretary has stated, you have been
completely cleared of any such imputation by operation
of our democratic machinery of investigation and law
enforcement.

I am particularly pleased that you are returning to duty
in the field of your specialization. Far Eastern Affairs,
where you have established an enviable record for integrity
and ability.

With all good wishes,
Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Mr. Service has never been in charge of per-
sonnel in the Far East. At the end of 1948, Mr.

Service was assigned to the Department in line
with the established policy of rotating Foreign
Service officers and bringing back to the United
States those who, like Mr. Service, have spent
considerable time in the field. For 3 months in
1949, Mr. Service served on the Foreign Service
Selection Board, which includes public as well as
governmental members. The Board recommends
promotions throughout the Foreign Service, but it
does not deal with assignment and is not in charge
of field personnel in the Far East or anywhere else.
During the remainder of his Washington assign-
ment, in 1949, Mr. Service served as a special assist-
ant in the Division of Foreign Service Personnel
but had nothing to do with appointments or assign-
ments in the Foreign Service. He has never been
in charge of the Foreign Service personnel in the
Far East.

10. SENATOR McCarthy said : . . . Jessup was in
charge of the publication of a Communist-front known as
the Institute of Pacific Relations. This publication under
Jessup spearheaded the Communist Party line and spewed
forth the Communist Party line perfumed sewerage . . .
This publication was supported by Communist money.
Along with the material being furnished you are photo-
stats of checks totaling $6,000, all signed by the self-pro-
claimed Communist, Frederick Vanderbilt Field.

The Facts : Once again — as it has done follow-
ing each of Senator McCarthy's ASNE, Chicago,
Atlantic City,^ and Rochester ^ speeches — the De-
partment states these facts :

a. Senator McCarthy grossly exaggerated Dr.
Jessup's relationship with Far Eastern Survey,
the publication to which he refers, based on the
single fact that, in 1944, Dr. Jessup sei'ved on the
Research Advisory Committee of the American
Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

b. As for Senator McCarthy's charges and im-
plications that the Institute or its publication were
bought and paid for by "Communist money," about
half of the Institute's budget was met by the
Rockefeller Foundation and the Carnegie Corpo-
ration. Mr. Field's contributions were only a drop
in the bucket as compared witli the generous dona-
tions of large industrial concerns.

Senator McCarthy in previous speeches, had
claimed to have "evidence" of contributions from
Mr. Field totaling $6,500 in 2 years. Signifi-
cantly, however, following the Department's ex-
posure of the fact that one of the photostated
checks included in that "evidence" was payable not
to the Institute of Pacific Relations but to the
American Council on Soviet Relations, a totally
unrelated organization, he now reduces his figure
to $6,000.

" See Bulletin of June 12, 1950, p. 963, 966, 96S, for
analysis.

" Bulletin of June 19, 1950, p. 1012.

My 77, 7950

Where We Stand Today

hy Francis H. Russell

Director, Office of Public Affairs ^

It is a good thing for us to give some attention
every once in a while to that famous bit of advice
of Daniel Webster. "When the mariner," he said,
"has been tossed for many days in thick
weather ... he naturally avails himself of the
first pause in the storm to take his latitude and
ascertain how far the elements have driven him
from his true course. Let us," said Webster, "im-
itate this prudence."

The storm Webster was concerned about had
been a storm of words. The American people to-
day are entitled to feel that they know what Web-
ster meant. In fact, we may wonder whether
Webster could possibly have had any idea of what
a storm of words can really be. In a time of the
nation's most pressing need for unity, vision, and
clear-headedness, the air has been filled instead
with patently false accusations, trumped-up sus-
picion, and artificial schisms. Our energies have
been diverted from the dangers that are real to
bogies that are fictitious.

But we are beginning to emerge from this emo-
tional and mental orgy. Although this impres-
sion that we are on the point of enjoying a pause
in the storm may jirove wholly illusory, it may
be prudent to make believe there is a jaause while
we try to "take our latitude" in the real world
that lies about us.

Let us first remind ourselves that in the impor-
tant struggles of mankind victory has never come
easily and at once. Always along the way there
are ebbs and flows. If it were a matter of all
victories and no setbacks, we should not have to
spend our concern on the issue.

I should like to examine broadly this evening
how we stand with respect to the ebb and the flow
in the two great tasks that today face the people
of the world : the first, of course, being the task
of creating a healthy world order with adequate
political instrumentalities to make possible world

' An nddress made at Radcliffe College, Boston, Mass.,
June 19 and released to the pre.ss on the same date.

peace and economic and social progress; and the
second, the task of protecting and advancing hu-
man freedom.

It is a ticklish business plotting broad trends
contemporaneously but that is what anyone must
do who wants to "take his latitude" and map his
course.

This plotting does not call for a discourse on
the successes that we have achieved in our foreign
policy during the past half decade : the setting up
of international institutions on a democratic pat-
tern, the United Nations with its specialized agen-
cies, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the
Organization of American States; the program
for economic recovery in Europe; the plans for
military security of the democracies, and all the
rest. They are firmly in the record. So are the
obstacles that have been faced : inertia, ancient
hatreds, totalitarian measures of aggression.
Wliat I would like to do, rather, is to examine two
or three of the most crucial world situations and
to point to some recent developments that bear
on our current reckoning.

The Far East

The major development in the Far East has
been, of course, the seizure of China by the Chinese
Communists.

There is a tendency sometimes for Americans
to ask themselves and those who have been most
immediately responsible for our policies in that
area, "Wliat went wrong? Wlio was asleep at the
switch ? "Wliat was it that should have been done
that was not done?" China constitutes a large
chunk of the world's surface, and the people who
inhabit that area are a sizable portion of the
world's population. The overrunning of that
area by forces allied to the Kremlin is, obviously,
an adverse factor of some magnitude in the cur-
rent issue between totalitarianism and democracy.

It is natural for people who have been largely
preoccupied with domestic jjroblems, over which

112

Department of State Bulletin

we liave a larpe measure of control and where, if
something goes wrong, we can pin the responsi-
bility, to assume the same attitude toward prob-
lems abroad. But, obviously, there is a oasic
difference. Since we believe in the right of each
people to work out their own way of life, we
realize, when we stop to think of it, that it is not
and should not be possible for the people of one
country to have the final deteiunination on what
shall take place in another country. We may^
take a friendly interest. We may offer help. We
may recognize the importance of what takes place
in another country to the cause of world peace
and freedom, but, in the final analysis, it is for
the people of each coimtry to determine whose help
they will accept, what use they will make of it,
and wliat leaders they will follow.

The Chinese people for more than a generation
have been in a mood of revolt against the feudal
system that had prevailed in their country since
the dawn of history. They knew that modern
methods of government and modern technology
made possible a higher standard of living than
they enjoyed. For a decade, they pinned their
hopes for the accomplishment of their objective
of a better life on the Kuomintang. Gradually,
however, the idea became fixed in the minds of
the Chinese people that the Kuomintang had
come under the domination of a small clique of
men who had no interest in the welfare of the
Chinese people as a whole and that the Kuomin-
tang was either unable or unwilling to make the
necessary changes in Chinese life. With the
spread of this conviction, support for the regime
disappeared.

Many of the soldiers in the Nationalist Army
merely laid down their arms when they came into
the presence of the Communist forces, because they
felt the Government they were supposed to be
fighting for offered no hope for them or their
families. The Nationalist Government was driven
farther and farther back and, finally, off the main-
land of Asia onto Formosa.

U.S. POLICY IN ASIA

There were three things that the United States
could do to stem this development. Two of them
she did. The first was to provide substantial as-
sistance to the Nationalist Government in the
form of military equipment, food and other sup-
plies, and funds. More than half of the total in-
come of the Nationalist Government, during tlie
4 years following the cessation of the war with
Japan, came in tlie form of assistance from the
United States. In all major engagements, the
Nationalist Armies had a superiority in equip-
ment over the Communist forces.

The second thing that we could do, and did, was
to send a great American of our time, one whose
integi'ity and persuasiveness are unexcelled,
George Marshall, in an effort to convince the
Kuomintang of the necessity of measures on its

part to reestablish itself with the Chinese people
and to offer American economic aid in any such
effort. General Marshall failed in this effort. It
can be assumed that any other person that coidd
have been sent would have failed too.

The third thing that we could have done, but
did not do, was to send American generals, Ameri-
can aviators, American soldiers, to take part in
the Chinese civil war. If we had sent forces on a
sufficient scale there can be little doubt but that
the Communist armies would have been turned
back — but with two results :

First, we would, thereby, have committed our
limited resources to China, whose productive
power and strength from the point of view of in-
ternational strategy is very small, at the expense
of Western Europe which is second only to the
United States in its peacetime and wartime
potential.

Secondly, and even more important, if we had
sent American armed forces to take part against
the Chinese Communists, we would have wound
up with the resentment of the Chinese people who
would have considered that we had crammed down
their throats a government in which they had lost
all confidence and all respect. More tlaan that,
we would have incurred the resentment of other
hundreds of millions of people who live on the
periphery of China. We would have "won a
battle and lost the campaign" in the effort to forge
ties of friendship between ourselves and the peo-
ple of the East. We could not and we cannot
afford to make enemies of the entire population
of the Far East either in terms of our current ob-
jectives or in terms of the long-range relations
between the peoples of that area and the West.

The determination of the Chinese people to
abandon the Nationalist Government, and the re-
sulting seizure of power by the Communists, is an
adverse development which should not and cannot
be minimized.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

But I said I was going to talk in terms of recent
developments and their significance for the imme-
diate future. The significant change in the situa-
tion in the Far East is this :

Up to the present time, we have been attempting
to deal with a situation in a country where the
Government was losing the support of the people,
disastrously and increasingly, day by day. For
that reason, the aid which we gave in large
amounts was ineffective. There was no govern-
ment that was representative of the people with
whom the United States could work to preserve
and extend the freedom of the Chinese people.
The creation of such a government was a matter
beyond the power of the United States.

Now, however, the situation that we face in the
Far East, while still one of great difficulty, is one
that has less of the characteristics of a quagmire.

July 17, 1950

113

It is sometimes better to take a step or two back
and get a firm footing.

In the case of China, the possibilities of action
on our pait for the immediate future are severely
limited, but they are definable. We intend to do
everything we can to maintain communication
with the Chinese people ; to make it plain to them
that we are prepared to aid them in their efforts
to improve their lot to the extent they make pos-
sible by renouncing the foreign domination which
sooner or later they will know has been foisted
upon them.

By contrast, there are countries like Australia,
New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan where
democracy is well-established and where we shall
do everything that is necessary to prevent their
independence and democracy from being success-
fully attacked.

In between are the countries like Indonesia,
Indochina, Burma, and Korea, where independ-
ence has only recently been won and where the
new Governments and their people are struggling
against fearful odds to get democratic institu-
tions started and to improve the desperately low
standards of living. They are faced with nearly
overpowering problems : illiteracy, wretched
health, an utter lack of experience in self-govern-
ment, frequently not even adequate means of
communication laetween the government and the
people. These people are not interested in becom-
ing party to the world's ideological struggle, in
being cannon fodder in what they regard as other
people's battles. They feel that they have prob-
lems enough of their own. They will shy away
from any effort to involve them.

If, however, we can convince them that our
objectives with respect to them are only to help
them accomplish their own objectives of internal
development and improvement they will welcome
our aid, and, through it, they will be better able
to prevent Soviet penetration or domination.

The United States is the best able of all coun-
tries in the world to assist these people. Our big
job is to convince them that we desire to assist
them without requiring them to assume commit-
ments.

We are, therefore, dealing with a manageable
situation now in the Far East. We are dealing
with a situation wliere the things that we wish
to do can be done and not, as before, with a de-
teriorating situation that was beyond our power
to influence. We are dealing with a situation
where there are long-term factors which can work
strongly in our favor. There is not only the good
will that will accrue to us from our past and
present policies, but there is the ancient deep-
seated determination of tlie Chinese people to
throw off any outside domination. Tliere is the
ability of the American people to cooperate with
other peoples who are engaged in improving their
standard of life. There is the appeal of human
freedom, an appeal which becomes stronger the
more it is denied.

In the Far East, then, we are in a situation
where one of our valued allies has temporarily
gone under. We have witnessed an eastern "Bat-
tle of France." But the lines in this struggle for
peace and freedom are now drawn on more fav-
orable territory. The struggle in this area for
freedom and progress is by no means irretrievably
lost.

The European Situation

Let us look at the situation in Europe. The
Economic Recovery Program is well under way.
Much of the rubble has been cleared away. The
factories ai'e in operation. The people are being
fed. Two problems remain of serious dimen-
sions.

GERMANY

First is the problem of Germany. Germany is
the greatest center of productive power outside the
United States. It is a matter of first importance
that this power not come into the hands of those
who are directing the Soviet conspiracy against
the freedom of tlie world. It is equally important
tliat the German people themselves not be per-
mitted again to become a threat against the world.
Both of these ends can be met only by making
Germany an integral part of a closely knit pattern
of Western Europe.

It has been apparent that the leadership in this
effort would have to come from the French. For
a few years following the war, the French gave no
indication that they had tlie will or the capacity
to undertake this leadersliip. Their morale had
been sliattered by the experience of the war. The
British, concerned with their own special eco-
nomic problems and wanting to maintain their po-
sition as the center of the British Commonwealth
of nations, were unwilling to merge their political
and economic sovereignty in sucli a pattern of
Western Europe. Now, however, with the pro-
posals recently made by Mr. Schuman for a
French-German coal and steel pool, in which other
European countries would be invited to join, the
action that can and must be taken to solve the
problem of Germany and of Western Europe has
become much clearer. This reemergence of
French statesmanship is one of the most encour-
aging signs of the postwar period. Tlie "flow"
here is setting in.

PROBLEM OF SECURITY

The second problem of Europe is security
against the possibility of aggression by the Soviet
Union. This security has been profoundly and
favorably affected by tlie developments that have
recently taken place in weapons of war. The
countries that want peace and security today are
more fortunate than those that wanted them when
Hitler was on the march. The rise of Hitler coin-

114

Departmenf of State Bulletin

cided with a period of superiority of weapons of
aggression over weapons of defense. The ar-
mored division and the bombing pUme were
mightier tlian the means cf defense against them.
The only elfective defense then was to construct a
more powerful offense.

Today, there are indications that the pendulum
is swinging buck, that the balance will be in favor
not of countries who are threatening to engulf
other peoples but in favor of those who wish to
defend themselves, their peace, and their liberties
against aggression. This development is un-
favorable from the point of view of the Soviet
Union, which has made abundantly clear its pur-
pose of extending as far and as rapidly as possible
the number of countries satellite to it. The jet
fighter plane, the guided missile, the improved
bazooka, and radar are all weapons of defense,
not weapons of aggression. They are, therefore,
weapons that strengthen the hands of the people of
the world who covet no additional territories, no
domination over other peoples. They strengthen
the non-Communist world which wishes only for
the right of each people to work out its own way of
life in its own way. The "flow" here in the di-
rection of peace is strong.

BATTLE OF IDEOLOGIES

The third problem today relates to the struggle
for the minds of men. It has fallen to our lot to
be living at the point in world history when two
great concepts of human existence are pitted in
what may be the conflict from which one or the
other will emerge and prevail for as long into the
future as we can see.

One concept is, of course, the belief that the life,
the interests, the integrity, the growth, the hap-
jjiness of the individual human being is the ulti-
mate value and that human institutions exist to
promote that value. This belief is the concept of
life that emerges from the great religions of the
world. It has been developed by the political
philosophers of the Western world. It has pro-
duced among other ways of life our American de-
mocracy. The preamble to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts puts it like this :

The end of government is to furni.sh all of the individuals
who compose it with the power of enjoying the blessings
of life.

The other philosophy, that also has roots going
far back into history, is premised upon the con-
cept of the state, the corporate entity, as the ulti-
mate value. Human beings exist only as expend-
able items, as cogs, of no value in themselves other
than as they contribute to this artificial entity.
This philosophy asserts that all human thought,
all human activity must be dominated by the state
and devoted to the ends of the state. This con-
cept, the intellectual product of Hegel, Fichte,
Feuerbach, and Kant, produced as one of its off-
shoots nazism; as another, Soviet communism.

The results of its application are found in the
present-day police state, slave labor, the drive for
world domination, the effort to create artificial eco-
nomic chaos and want, the efforts to render inter-
national institutions ineffective, in the drive to
intensify international insecurity and tension, and
in the all-out assault upon human freedom.

The Soviet leaders have several kinds of head-
start in the race for the minds of the people of the
world. They have been carrying on an energetic
propaganda campaign for several score of years.
Their philosophies are rigid and uniform so that
they lend themselves to packaged thinking and
packaged explanation. It is easier to tear down
and to destroy than it is to build. It is easier to
create doubt and suspicion than it is to create con-
fidence. It is easier to set forth a rigid monolithic
theory than something whose virtues flow from
diversification and flexibility.

But here, too, there has been a "flow." There
has been growing discrimination by the great ma-
jority of people in appraising various proposals
for an easy out from their problems. There has
also been a growing awareness of the spurious na-
ture of many proposals to which the attractive
word "peace" has been affixed.

For example, the Communists have recently
been active in Europe in obtaining signatures to
what they call "an appeal." This appeal reads as
follows :

We demand the absolute banning of the atom weapon,
arm of terror and mass extermination of populations.

We demand the establishment of strict international
control to insure the implementation of this banning
measure.

We consider that any government which would be lirst
to use the atom weapon against any country whatsoever
would be committing a crime against humanity and
should be dealt with as a war criminal.

We call on all men of good will throughout the world
to sign this appeal.

The Communists are now making plans to cir-
culate this appeal in this country in a campaign
beginning in the next 2 or 3 weeks and extending
through next October.

What is the background of this "appeal?"

True Nature of the Soviet "Appeal"

The United Nations has been tackling the prob-
lem of how to achieve security against the de-
structiveness of the atom bomb for the past 4 years.
All of the member nations outside of the Soviet
Union with its satellites are agreed on the essen-
tials for effective control. The basic factors of the
situation have led to these essentials with the in-
evitability of the multiplication table. Because
the stuff that is used for atomic power to run fac-
tories can in a matter of hours be put into a piece
of machinery that converts it into an atom bomb,
it is necessary to have some international agency,
in which all nations will have confidence, in con-
trol of atomic materials from the time the minerals
are first extracted from the earth until the last

July 17, 7950

115

ounce of energy has been expended. Mere prom-
ises will not suffice. We have found that Soviet
promises are often broken. We must assume that
they would be broken in the future. Production
and control by an international agency is the only
guaranty of security. All the members of the
United Nations except the Soviet Union and its
satellites have indicated their willingness to take
this course.

Why has the Soviet Union I'efused? Because
the operations of an international agency would,
to some degree, breach the Iron Curtain that the
Soviet Union has erected around the area of the
earth that it controls. Faced as it was by the ne-
cessity of a choice between cooperating in a pro-
gram of secui-ity against the atom bomb and main-
taining the Iron Curtain, the Soviet Union chose
the latter. To put a better front on this position,
however, it has come up with some alternatives —
alternatives whicli place a premium upon bad faith
and evasion. The Soviet Union proposals are:
First, that all countries agree not to make any
atomic bombs and, second, that all countries agree
not to be first to use the atom bomb.

The first of these proposals means that coun-
tries with democratic institutions whose budgets
and policies are necessarily matters of public
knowledge would be at the mercy of countries
which operate behind an iron curtain and whose
every activity is a state secret.

The second agreement would mean that during
the period when the Soviet Union was supreme in
mass armies, which it refuses to reduce, and com-
paratively weak in its development of atomic
weapons, it would be asking the rest of the world
to discard atomic weapons and leave itself at the
mercy of the Soviet armies. The "appeal" which
the Communists are circulating is an appeal to
provide these strategic advantages for the Soviet
Union.

It is necessary in the present world for people
to read the fine print in resolutions that are pre-
sented to them; even more, to read between the
lines of the fuie print.

In spite of propaganda barrages, however,
democracy and freedom still remain for the great
majority of the people of the world the most at-
tractive way of life. This fact is shown by the
votes in the United Nations. It is shown by the
vast dissatisfactions among many of the people
living in police states behind the Iron Curtain.

Moreover, believers in democracy are once again
becoming articulate. We are beginning to reex-
amine and define the things by which we live.
There has been an encouraging increase in articles
and books on the philosophical foundations of
democracy. We are once again taking on the job
of becoming political philosophers and are meet-
ing the adversary in that field.

These, I believe, are some of the developments
in the world's situation during the last few weeks
and months that future historians may point to as
milestones at the midpoint of the twentieth cen-

tury having significant bearing on the effort to
build a world marked by confidence and coopera-
tive effort.

They are not guaranties of success. No genera-
tion can pass on to its successors the boon for
human freedom fully forged and forever guaran-
teed. The most each age can do is to bequeath to
the next a living freedom, to be extended, strength-
ened, and, if necessary, defended. The most that
any generation can ask is to have a freedom to
defend.

There are, as we have seen, those who get greater
zest out of throwing stones at those who are in
the front line than in joining in the effort. But
that has always been.

I said when I began that there were two issues
in the world. One was creating the structure of
peace and the other protecting our freedoms. In
fact, however, they are one and the same. The
struggle for freedom today is the struggle for
peace. Those who menace our peace would de-
stroy our freedom. It is because freedom is being
challenged all over the world that we have become
universally preoccupied with the defense of peace.
It is because freedom is won or lost in so many
different ways and in such varying degr-ees that
these efforts reach into every kind of activity and
every area of life, compelling us to work on a
universal front.

Present U.S. Strategy

It is for this reason that the broad strategy
which we must follow is the strategy of doing
what has to be done. It used to be a tenet of
nineteenth century international political philos-
ophy that the people of the United States should
concern themselves only with the things that they
are able effectively to control. That was true in
the nineteenth century world. It is not true in
the world of today. The people of Arizona, can-
not make their will absolutely effective in Massa-
chusetts, but they have a right, indeed a duty, to
take a position on matters in Massachusetts that
affect the national interest. Similarly, the world
today is one, and we cannot make it otherwise.

The history of the last 3 years in Greece is a
case in point. There were those who said that
we should not give assistance to the Greek Gov-
ernment in its effort to preserve the freedom of
that country from outside aggressions, because
we were not in a position to exercise absolute au-
thority in that sector of the world, because we
could not guarantee the outcome. However, be-
cause the Greeks were threatened with engulf-
ment, and because the free world could not afford
to see one country after another succumb, we
provided help, and, today, Greece and Turkey,
and the Near East to which they are the path-
way, are still free. A world order is emerging
in which the test of what each country is called
upon to do is not its own ability to control the

116

Department of State Bulletin

outcome, but rather what is needed as a part of
the whole.

This new world order will not, we may be sure,
be patterned exactly on anythinj^ that has gone
before. Like all living, strong political organ-
isms, it must be fashioned according to the par-
ticular facts and needs with which it must deal.
It will be a complex of United Nations organs
and agencies, coal and steel and atomic energy au-
thorities, North Atlantic and inter- American, and
other regional oi-ganizations, all designed for the
job at hand.

Here again, it seems clear, events are in our
direction. These organizations are democratic in
their structure and operation. They are based
upon the principles of free discussion, free voting
by the membei-s, the prevailing of the will of the
majority with safeguards of the rights of the
minority. These are our kind of outfit. Col-
lectively, they can carry us far down the road to
a healthy world.

We cannot afford to be either optimists or pessi-
mists in this great struggle of our time. The out-
come is not predetermined. It is largely in our
hands, because the leadership of the free world
has fallen to us. What we say, what we do, what
we tear down, what we support, all bear on the
extent of each ebb and the strength of each flow
and will determine the final direction of the tide.

U.S. Replies to Rumanian Protest
Against Restrictive Travel Order

[Released to the press July 6]

The United States Oovernment has replied to the Ru-
manian Goi-erninent's protest of June 19, 1950, regard-
ing the institution of restrictions on travel by personnel
of the Rumanian Legation at Washington} The text of
the United States note, delivered to the Rumanian Le-
gation on July 3, 1960, follows.

The Secretary of State presents his compli-
ments to the Honorable the Minister of Rumania
and, with reference to his note No. 2421 of June
19, 1960, has the honor to respond to the Ku-
manian Government's protest against regulations
which the United States Government has insti-
tuted in respect of travel by personnel of the Ru-
manian Legation at Washington.

It is of interest to note the Rumanian Govern-
ment's explicit acknowledgment that the imposi-
tion of travel restrictions by a receiving govern-
ment upon the oflBcial pereonnel of a sending
government constitutes a limitation of the normal
activity of a diplomatic Mission. With this view,
the United States Govermnent readily agrees.

Restrictions of movement, like restrictions
upon the free flow of information and cultural
exchange as imposed by the Rumanian Govern-

" Bulletin of June 5, 1950, p. 921 ; July 3, 1950, p. 30.
July 17, 1950

ment, are basically distasteful to the American
people and its Government. Travel regulations
applicable to personnel of the Rumanian Lega-
tion at Washington have been instituted merely as
a reciprocal limitation of dipkunatic privilege in
view of the nature and effect of travel restrictions
as applied by Rumanian authorities to membei-s
of the American Legation at Bucharest.

On the one hand, the Rumanian Government
complains that restrictions on the travel of its Le-
gation jDersonnel tend to prevent its diplomatic
Mission from carrying on its normal activity.
On the other hand, the Govermnent of Rumania
alleges that its own travel restrictions are applied
without discrimination to all diplomatic Missions
in Rumania. The inescapable deduction from
this argument, if taken at face value, would be
that the Rumanian Government is applying
measures which tend to prevent the performance
of normal activities by all diplomatic Missions in
Rumania.

Without debating the artificial contention of
the Rumanian Government that its travel restric-
tions are nondiscriminatory, it may be said that
the United States Government rejects the thesis
that, no matter how obstructive and abnormal the
behavior of a particular state toward American
interests and official American representatives, the
conduct of United States relations with that state
must correspond uniformly with the conduct of
United States relations with other states.

At such time as the Rumanian Government may
be disposed to remove the restrictions which it
has placed upon the travel within Rumania of
American Legation personnel, especiallv in per-
formance of tTie normal functions of a diplomatic
Mission, the United States Government will be
prepared to alter accordingly the restrictions
which presently apply to travel by personnel of
the Rumanian Legation within the United States.
Meanwhile, as the Rumanian Government has
been informed, the travel procedure will be ad-
ministered with a view to the current treatment
in this regard by Rumanian authorities of the
United States representatives in Rumania.

U.S. Survey Mission To Study
Philippine Economic Situation

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press iy the White House June 29]

The United States Government, at the request
of President Elpidio Quirino, is sending an Amer-
ican Economic Survey Mission to Manila to study
and report on the jDresent pressing economic prob-
lems of the Philippines. When President Quirino
was in Washington last February he discussed

117

with me some of the difficulties which face his
country. The idea of this mission has developed
out of these discussions and subsequent ones in
Manila between President Quirino and Ambassa-
dor Cowen.

The purpose of this mission will be to survey the
entire Philippine economic situation, to make rec-
ommendations on measures of self-help which
might be undertaken by the Philippine Govern-
ment itself, and to make recommendations on ways
in which the United States might be helpful.
President Quirino has assured me that this mission
will receive the fullest cooperation of the
Philippine Government.

The Honorable Daniel W. Bell, President of the
American Security and Trust Company of Wash-
ington, and formerly Under Secretary of the
Treasury, has accepted the important position of
chief of the mission. He will be my personal rep-
resentative, with the personal rank of Ambassador,
and will report directly to me. The deputy chief
of the mission will be Maj. Gen. Kichard J. Mar-
shall, President of the Virginia Military Institute,
who has had many years' experience in the Philip-
pines. He will have the personal rank of Minister.
Work is now proceeding actively on the selection
of the other members of the mission, and I hope
it will be prepared to start its work early in July.

I consider this mission to be of the highest im-
portance, not only because of the results which I
expect it to produce but also because it is a symbol
of the half-century of intimate relationship be-
tween the Philippine and American peoples. It
is my hope that the mission will further solidify
this historic association.

SURVEY MISSION MEMBERSHIP

The Department of State announced on July 7
that the Economic Survey Mission to the Philip-
pines will arrive at Manila on July 10.

Members and advisers of the Mission follow :

Memiers

Daniel W. Bell (Chief of Mission), President, American
Security and Trust Company, Washington, D.C.

Richard J. Marshall (Deputy Chief of Mission), Major
General, U.S.A., Ret., Superintendent, Virginia Mili-
tai-y Institute, Lexington, Va.

Edward M. Bernstein (Chief Economist) (On leave of
absence from the International Monetary Fund),
Washington, D.C.

August L. Strand (Agricultural Survey), President, Ore-
gon State College, Corvallis, Oreg.

Francis McQuillin (Industry and Power), Assistant to the
President, West Penn Power Company, Pittsburgh,
Pa.

Advisers

Alvin H. Cross (Fiscal Management), Deputy Commis-
sionar, Accounts and Collection TJnit, Bureau of In-
ternal Revenue, Department of the Treasury

Michael J. Deutch (Industrial Engineering), 1737 H
Street, NW., Washington, D.C.

David I. Ferber (Political Adviser), Foreign Service OflS-
cer. Department of State

Lawrence Fleishman (Fiscal Management), Supervising
C\istoms Agent, Department of the Treasury, Seattle,
Wash.

Joseph B. Friedman (Legal Affairs), 1026 Woodward
Building, Washington, D.C.

Wilbur A. Gallahan (Fiscal Management), Tax Adviser
to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Depart-
ment of the Treasury

William T. Heffelfinger (Fiscal Management), Assistant
to the Fiscal Assistant Secretary of the Treasury,
Department of the Treasury

Richard A. jMiller (Distribution and Trade), 420 East 23d
Street, New Yorli

Austin Nisonger (Fiscal Management), Deputy Chief,
Accounting Division, Civil Aeronautics Administra-
tion, Department of Commerce

Jameson Parker (Public Relations), 2116 Bancroft Place,
NW., Washington, D.C.

Clarence M. Purves (Agriculture), Assistant Chief, Re-
gional Investigations Branch, Office of Foreign Agri-
cultural Relations, Department of Agriculture

Louis Shere (Taxation), Professor of Economics and Di-
rector of Tax Research, University of Indiana, Bloom-
ington, Ind.

William W. Tamplin (Mining), Bureau of Mines, Depart-
ment of the Interior

Donald Thompson (Banking), Vice President, Federal Re-
serve Bank of Cleveland, Cleveland. Ohio

Carlton L. Wood (Distribution and Trade), Office of In-
ternational Trade, Department of Comniei-co

German Export- Import Figures
for 1947-48 Released

The Department of State on June 22 released
the report of an international firm of auditors
on the audit of the Joint Export-Import Agency
accounts for the years 1947-48. JEIA was the
official military government agency which, during
the period covered by these accounts, was respon-
sible for the trade and commerce of the United
States-United Kingdom bizonal area of Germany.
The agency's responsibility was, subsequently, ex-
tended to the French zone as well.

With the formation of the German Government
late in 1949, JEIA's responsibilities were gradu-
ally assigned to German agencies, and the organi-
zation was terminated on December 19, 1949.
The organization is now in liquidation, and an
audit for tlie period from January to September
30, 1949, is now under way, with final audit at date
of complete liquidation.

Assets on December 31, 1948, consisted of bal-
ances in foreign banks of $296,328,274 and ac-
counts receivable at $182,312,474, for a total of
$478,640,748. The principal liabilities were ac-
counts payable at $82,174,711, and the capital of
the agency was $125,355,504, consisting of equal
United States-United Kingdom contributions in
the manner specified in the bizonal fusion agree-
ment of December 2, 1946.

118

Department of State Bulletin

The United States in tiie United Nations

[July 8-14]

Secretary-General's Communique on Korea

All United Nations members, with the excep-
tions of Yugoslavia and Egypt, had, by July 13,
replied to the circular telegram sent out by Secre-
tary-General Lie inquiring about the type of as-
sistance members might be prepared to offer in
implementation of the Security Council resolution
of June 27.^ Fifty-two replies from members, as
well as two from nonmembers — Italy and the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, acknowledge the
communication and indicate moral support and, in
some cases, offer direct military assistance or other
material aid. Byelorussia, the U.S.S.E., Czecho-
slovakia, Poland, and the Ukraine rejected the
Security Council action as "illegal, as did the
Chinese Communist regime and North Korea.

Economic and Social Council

During the second week of its eleventh session,
now in progress at Geneva, the Economic and
Social Council concluded general debate on meth-
ods for financing economic development of under-
developed countries, approved the report of the
Statistical Commission, including the resolutions
contained therein, and almost completed consider-
ation of the report of the Transport and Com-
munications Commission.

The question of methods for financing economic
development of underdeveloped countries was re-
ferred to the Council's Economic Committee for
more detailed study. In the course of the general
debate, Isidor Lubin of the United States com-
mented on the progress that had been made in
reaching a common understanding of the basic
elements of the problem of economic development.
Not only was there a full realization that internal
effort and organization on the part of the coun-
tries themselves is required, he said, but also that
capital from foreign sources, both private and pub-
lic, can play a vital part in the process. One of
the major tasks before the Council, Mr. Lubin con-
tinued, "is to try to analyze the conditions and
factors which may affect the pace and scope of
economic development in the near future."

The Council approved a number of proposals of
the Transpor-t and Communications Commission

" BuLLEi'iN of July 3, 1950, p. 7.

in connection with consideration of its report.
One of the approved resolutions recommends rati-
fication of the convention establishing the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organiza-
tion, and, in this connection, Mr. Lubin announced
that the United States Senate had ratified this
convention. Other resolutions involved proposals
to remove barriers to international transport of
goods, coordination of inland transport, maritime
shipping affecting Latin America, international
road transi^ort, the problem of pollution of sea
water, and implementation of the decisions of the
Atlantic City telecommunications conference in
1947.

A resolution authorizing the Secretary-General,
on the advice of the Interim Coordinating Com-
mittee for International Commodity Arrange-
ments, to convene a conference to consider inter-
national commodity problems was referred, after
India's opposition, to the Council's Economic
Committee for further study.

Interim Committee

On July 13, the Interim Committee opened dis-
cussion on disposition of the former Italian colony
of Eritrea, with presentation of the report of the
United Nations Commission for Eritrea by Kap-
porteur Ziaud Din of Pakistan. The report puts
forth three different proposals for the disposition
of Eritrea. The first, favored by the delegations
of Burma and the Union of South Africa, calls
for a federation of Eritrea, as a self-governing
unit, with Ethiopia, under the sovereignty of the
Ethiopian Crown. The second proposal, submit-
ted by the Norwegian delegation, suggested re-
union of Eritrea with Ethiopia, with provision
that the western province could provisionally and
for a limited period of time be left under the pres-
ent British administration. The third proposal,
submitted by Guatemala and Pakistan, would
place Eritrea under direct United Nations trus-
teeship for a maximum period of 10 years, at the
end of which it would become independent.

In the ensuing debate the Norwegian and South
African delegates supported, in general, the pro-
posals of their Commission representatives, while
the United Kingdom delegate spoke in favor of
a partition plan. The Burmese and Pakistani
representatives, lacking instructions, reserved
their right to speak when the debate resumes on
July 14.

July 17, 1950

119

General Policy p^^^

U.N. Places Unified Command of Military
Forces in Korea Under United States:
Text of Security Council Resolution ... 83

General MacArthur Designated as Com-
manding General. Statement by the
President 83

The United Nations and Korea. By Philip

C. Jessup 84

Charging South Korea as Aggressor Reminis-
cent of Nazi Tactics. Statement by
Secretary Acheson 87

U.S. Military Actions in Korea. Addresses
by John Foster Dulles:
New Phase of American Foreign Policy . . 88

The Interdependence of Independence . . 91

New Challenges to American Diplomacy. By

George C. McGhee 96

Where We Stand Today. By Francis H.

Russell 112

U.S. Replies to Rumanian Protest Against

Restrictive Travel Order 117

The United Nations and
Specialized Agencies

U.N. Places Unified Command of Military
Forces in Korea Under United States:
Text of Security Council Resolution ... 83

General MacArthur Designated as Com-
manding General. Statement by the

President 83

The United Nations and Korea. By Philip

C. Jessup 84

The United Nations and Page

Specialized Agencies — Continued

U.N. Commission Reestablishes Headquarters

in Korea 92

The United States in the United Nations . . 119

Economic Affairs

U.S. Survey Mission To Study Philippine
Economic Situation:

Statement by the President 117

Survey Mission Membership 118

International Information and
Cultural Affairs

Support for an Expanded Information and
Education Program. Statement by Sec-
retary Acheson 100

Forging a Free World With a Truth Cam-
paign. By Edward W. Barrett .... 103

Technical Assistance

Point Four: An Investment in Peace,
dress by the President

Ad-

The Department

Analysis of Senator McCarthy's Public State-

ments

106

Publications

Foreign Relations Volumes, 1933, Released . 95

German Export-Import Figures for 1947-48

Released 118

U. S, GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1980

^Ae/ z/)eh€f/)^tmeni/ 4)^ ^aie^

JUSTICE BASED ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A THREAT

TO TYRANNY • Address hy the President 123

THE WORLD COTTON SITUATION 145

FOURTH SESSION OF CONTRACTING PARTIES

TO GATT • By Melvin E. Sinn 150

ADMINISTERING THE DISPLACED PERSONS

ACT • By Herv4 J. L'Heureux 125

For complete contents see back cover

Vol. XXIII, No. 577
July 24, 1950

Qje/ia/y^me^ ^/ y^te J3llilGiin

Vol. XXIII, No. 577 . Pubucation 3919
July 24, 1950

For sale by the Superintendent of Documenti

U.S. Qovernment Printing Office

Washington 26, D.O.

Prick:

62 Issues, domestic $6, foreign $8.50

Single copy, 20 cents

The printing of this publication has
been approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (February 18, 1849).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation of the Department
oy State BtJU-Exra as the soiu-ce will be
appreciated.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication compiled and
edited in the Division of Publications,
Office of Public Affairs, provides the
public and interested agencies of
the Government with information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the De-
partment of State and the Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes
press releases on foreign policy issued
by the White House and the Depart-
ment, and statements and addresses
made by the President and by the
Secretary of State and other officers
of the Department, as well as speciai
articles on various phases of inter-
national affairs and the functions of
the Department. Information is in-
cluded concerning treaties and in-
ternational agreements to which the
United States is or may become a
party and treaties of general inter-
national interest.

Publications of the Department, as
well as legislative material in the field
of international relations, are listed
currently.

Justice Based on Human Rights: A Threat to Tyranny

Address by the President ^

To our forefathers, the courts were the distinc-
tive symbol of the kind of government — the kind
of society — which they were creating in the wilder-
ness of this continent. This new nation was to be
a democracy based on the concept of the rule of
law. It was to be a society in which every man
had rights — inalienable rights — rights which
were not based on creed, or rank, or economic
power but on equality. In such a society, the
courts had the function not only of dealing out
justice among citizens but of preserving justice
between the citizens and the state.

The founders of this country had a very clear
conception of the corruptibility of power — of the
innate danger in all human affaii-s of the selfish
or arbitrary exercise of authority. To guard
against this ever-present danger, they adopted the
principle that there is a fundamental law — ex-
pressed in the Constitution, and particularly in the
Bill of Rights — to which every exercise of power
has to conform. The purpose of this fundamental
law is to protect the rights of the individual. To
apply this underlying law became the special task
of the courts.

This concept of justice based on individual
rights is so familiar to us that we take it for
granted. Yet, in essence, it is a revolutionary con-
cept. It has always been a threat to absolutism
and tyranny. It was the great weapon in our
own Eevolution and the basis of our Republic.
Today, in a world where absolute power is again
on the march, this concept of justice has tremen-
dous strength. It is a challenge to the new forms
of tyranny as it was to the old.

Totalitarian Concept of Justice

In our lifetime, we have witnessed a world-
wide attack on this ideal of justice. Fascism,
nazism, Soviet communism, all have tried to con-

" Made at the laying of the cornerstone of the new
United States Courts Building in the District of Columbia
(111 June 27 and released to the press by the White House
on the same date.

vince people that our concern with individual
human rights is false and fraudulent.

In the areas under their control, these totali-
tarian movements have swept away all restraints
on their own power. They have subjected their
own people to all the evils of tyranny — to kid-
naping, torture, slavery, murder — without hope
of redress or remedy. They have made a mock-
ery of the forms of justice. Their judges are
prosecutors; their prosecutors are hangmen;
their defense attorneys are puppets. Their trials
are coldly calculated displays of propaganda,
based on torture and designed to spread
falsehood.

Wherever nations or peoples have been over-
come by totalitarianism, the practice of justice
has been snuffed out. But the ideal remains, deep
in the hearts of men. Men will always long for
protection against the midnight arrest, the slave
camp, the torture chamber. Men will never ac-
cept these things as right. Today, men feel more
deeply than ever that all human beings have
rights and that it is the duty of government to
protect them.

Today, we are participating in a great inter-
national movement for the better protection of
individual rights. New methods of protecting
and advancing human rights are being proposed
and discussed. Across the world, men of good
will are seeking new ways of making human
rights triumphant over tyranny.

steps for Triumph Over Tyranny

The first step was taken in the Charter of the
United Nations. Weary of the crimes of the Axis
tyrants, all the united nations pledged themselves,
in the Charter, to promote universal respect for
and observance of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. The San Francisco conference ended
with the promise that there would be, in time,
an international bill of rights, which would be
as much a part of international life as our own
Bill of Rights is part of our life under the
Constitution.

July 24, 1950

123

From this point, many steps have been taken
toward the creation of an international law and
morality which will protect human rights against
the misuse of arbitrary power.

By the judgment of the Niirnberg Tribunal,
October 1, 1946, it was established that the highest
officials of a government are answerable before
the bar of an international court for committing
war crimes, crimes against peace, and — in connec-
tion with either of these — crimes against hu-
manity. This great principle was further con-
firmed by a resolution of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly of December 11, 1946.

International action is also being taken against
the crime of genocide — the slaughter of entire hu-
man groups — whether committed in time of peace
or in time of war. One of the most shocking
examples of genocide was the Nazi attempt to
exterminate an entire religious group deliberately
and methodically. The General Assembly of the
United Nations has denounced this terrible prac-
tice and has affirmed that genocide is a crime
under international law.

To prevent and punish the crime of genocide
in the future, a multilateral convention on the sub-
ject was prepared and approved by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in December of
1948. The convention is now before the various
members of the United Nations, as well as some
nonmember nations, for ratification. Over half
the ratifications necessary to bring the convention
into force have already been deposited.

I have asked the Senate of the United States
to give its advice and consent to the ratification
of that convention. I am hopeful that the Sen-
ate will do so before this Congress adjourns. We
must do our part to outlaw forever the mass
murder of innocent peoples.

Covenant of Human Rights

Another step toward the international protec-
tion of human rights was taken by the General
Assembly of the United Nations in December
1948, when it proclaimed the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. Like our own Declara-
tion of Independence, this document asserts that
all membei's of the human family are endowed
with certain inalienable rights. It enumerates
and describes these fundamental rights and
freedoms.

But the Declaration of Human Rights is only
an appeal to the conscience of the world. It
offers no means of redress when rights are vio-
lated. To meet this need, a multilateral conven-
tion is now in preparation. This is designed to
make binding law out of a number of the guiding
principles of the Declaration. It will be known
as the Covenant on Human Rights.

The task of obtaining general agreement on such
a Covenant in the face of existing differences in
legal systems and of language barriers is, of

124

course, an arduous one. I have faith, however,
that the Covenant will ultimately be adopted and,
also, that it will be followed by other agreements
to give effect to the principles enunciated in the
Declaration of Human Rights.

Thus, bit by bit, new concepts of international
law and justice are taking form. Through an in-
ternational society of nations, the concept is de-
veloping that the barbarous treatment of individ-
uals by any nation is the concern of all nations.
This growth of international law is most im-
portant in building for peace.

It is a mistake to underestimate the significance
of these developments. In our divided world, it
is easy to point to the tremendous gulf between
the concept of individual human rights and the
attainment of conditions which will insure their
enjoyment. It is easy to be discouraged by the
difficulty of creating international safeguards
against the infringement of these rights.

Governments Created To Serve Human Rights

But we must remember that it is our belief that
governments are created to serve human rights.
We must understand clearly that our belief in
human rights is shared today by peoples all over
the world. We must have faith and vision
sufficient to realize that this belief is the rock on
which the peoples of the world can build a better
and a peaceful future.

In its beginnings, this world movement toward
the protection of human rights may not appear
particularly impressive. But the courts of the
District of Columbia were not very impressive,
either, when they were first set up, 150 years ago.
They were without buildings or physical equip-
ment and uncertain of their jurisdiction. These
courts have grown strong, because they are based
on a living truth. And so it will be with the quest
for the international protection of human rights.
It, too, will succeed, because it is based upon the
same great concept.

On us, as a nation, rests the responsibility of
taking a position of leadership in the struggle for
human rights. We cannot turn aside from the
task if we wish to remain true to the vision of
our forefathers and the ideals that have made our
history what it is.

Above the outward forms of our Government,
above our laws and the Constitution itself, there
is an eternal law of justice. This is the justice
of a God who created mankind to live together in
brotherly love. This is the justice by which all
the deeds of men are judged. The fundamental
purpose of our lives is to strive toward it, to the
best of human ability.

As a nation, we must devote ourselves to that
struggle. In the words of the ancient Hebrew
prophet, we should say, "Let judgment run down
as waters, and righteousness as a mighty stream."

In no other way can the nations of the earth
endure.

Department of State Bulletin

ADMINISTERING THE DISPLACED PERSONS ACT OF 1948, AS AMENDED

iy Herve J. VHeureux
Chiefs Visa Division

The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, as amended
by Public Law 555, gives the Department of State
and its consular officers major responsibility for
administering four new programs :

1. The immigration of up to 18,000 Polish vet-
erans in Great Britain, sometimes referred to as
Anders Army Poles ;

2. The immigration of up to 4,000 refugees from
China ;

3. The immigration of Greek refugees and of
certain nationals of Greece, entitled to preference
status under our regular quota laws;

4. The immigration of European refugees in
Europe outside Germany, Austria, and Italy, some-
times called "out-of-zone refugees."

Together with the Displaced Persons Commis-
sion and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, the Department of State and its consular
officers, as in the past, share responsibility for
;he immigration of all other persons who may be
ssued immigration visas under the act, with these
nodifications :

1. The program for the admission of persons
)f ethnic German origin, formerly exclusively in
-he hands of the consuls, and of the Immigration
,nd Naturalization Service has now been made the
)rimary responsibility of the Displaced Persons
I!ommission whose favorable findings are subject
Jo review by the consuls and by the immigration
tuthorities. Assurances of employment, housing,
nd against becoming a public charge are now re-
uired to be submitted, for this class of immigrants,
o the Displaced Persons Commission, as in the
ase of eligible persons and eligible displaced
rphans ;

uly 24, 1950

2. Although under the original act the Displaced
Persons Commission had exclusive authority to
determine the eligibility of displaced persons
under the act. Public Law 555 leaves the first de-
termination of such eligibility in the hands of the
Commission but gives the consular officer and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service the right
to review those cases approved by the Displaced
Persons Commission and to take adverse action
if they do not agree with the findings of the
Commission.

Briefly, the principal problems confronting the
Department and our consular officers in adminis-
tering those programs of the Displaced Persons
Act for which the Department of State carries
major responsibility, are these :

As soon as the President signed the amendnsents
to the Displaced Persons Act, the Department sent
instructions to its consular officers in Germany,
Austria, and Italy that informed them of the
major provisions of the new act and enabled them
to issue visas in most cases that originate with
the Displaced Persons Commission. Also, the
Visa Division commenced the preparation of a
first draft of regulations which are expected to
cover all phases of the consular responsibilities in
relation to the Displaced Persons Act.

The regulations, although desirable and help-
ful in implementing the act, are actually not re-
quired by the act except in relation to assurances
which may be submitted in lieu of affidavits or
other evidence of support for certain groups.
However, it is planned to cover by regulation the
full range of the program and to anticipate as
many questions as may arise under the act so that

125

in administering the act questions of interpreta-
tion and policy will cause a minimum of delay.

In reference to the procedure and problems in
relation to those parts of the displaced persons
program for which the Department carries the
major responsibility, certain general observations
apply to all four groups.

In lieu of affidavits of support or other evidence
of support, assurances of employment, housing,
and against becoming a public charge, may be
submitted by a citizen or citizens of the United
States for the Polish veterans in Great Britain,
refugees from Cliina, the Greek refugees and
Greek preferentials, and for the so-called Euro-
pean "out-of-zone" refugees.

Congress has made this provision in order that
American organizations interested in these groups
of refugees may assist in their resettlement. In
these cases, either form of evidence will be ac-
ceptable and either may be used for different indi-
viduals. Affidavits of support in these cases may
be submitted by aliens as well as by citizens ; only
assurances of employment, housing, and against
becoming a public charge must be submitted by a
citizen or citizens of the United States. If the
alien submits a satisfactory affidavit of support,
which may indicate available employment, he is
exempt from the contract labor provisions in sec-
tion 3, Act of February 5, 1917. He is likewise
exempt from those provisions of the Act of Feb-
ruary 5, 1917, which bar aliens whose passage is
paid for by corporations and others. In other
words, an applicant is entitled to the exemptions
specified whether he submits affidavits of support
or an assurance as authorized in the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, as amended.

Although the Department and its consular offi-
cers will do everything possible to assist in ad-
ministering the Displaced Persons Act, every
effort will be made to prevent the entry into the
United States of any alien who may be a source
of danger to our country. The question of se-
curity shall be paramount. Therefore, consular
officers are being instructed to exercise particular
care in screening applicants of the groups referred
to inasmuch as the thorough investigation and
written report required of eligible displaced per-
sons and persons of German ethnic origin is not
required for these groups.

All groups referred to must meet certain resi-
dence requirements in order to qualify under the

act. A Polish veteran, for example, must have
resided in the British Isles on June 16, the effec-
tive date of the amended act. The question has
been raised whether a person meeting this resi-
dence requirement who has since moved to other
countries, for example, to a country in the Western
Hemisphere, without being firmly resettled there,
could apply there for a visa. It is doubtful that
Congress intended that he should be permitted to
apply there for a visa. For the time being, at
least, the issuance of visas to Polish veterans will
be restricted to our consular offices in the British
Isles.

There are exceptions, of course. Eefugees from
China, if otherwise qualified, may apply for visas
anywhere in the world outside of the United
States as long as they are not firmly resettled.
The same rule applies in the case of Greek refu-
gees, some of whom have found temporary asylum
in neighboring countries.

In cases in which affidavits of support have
already been submitted for aliens in the four
groups described, new affidavits may not have to
be submitted, assuming the date of preparation of
such affidavits and corroboratory evidence is rea-
sonably current. No rule applies, except that of
reason, regarding the length of time such affidavits
may be regarded as having probative value. This
value depends to a great extent upon the relations
between the applicant and the sponsor, the surplus
margin of income shown, and the apparent per-
manency of the means of support of the sponsor
as indicated in the affidavit and accompanying
evidence. The consul, of course, has the final re-
sponsibility to determine whether the evidence
submitted is satisfactory. Wherever doubt exists
in the mind of the sponsor, he should possibly sub-
mit new evidence to the consul.

The Department of State is preparing assurance
forms for use by citizens and American organiza-
tions who wish to sponsor persons within the four
groups. The Department's regulations will set
forth, in considerable detail, the manner in which
these assurances are to be submitted.

As a rule a sponsor will have to submit assur-
ances directly to the consular office in which the
alien plans to apply for his immigration visa. It
is not planned to sot up a "validation procedure"
similar to that of the Displaced Persons Commis-
sion at Washington. However, the Department
will exercise a general supervision over the work
performed by consuls as it is presently doing with

126

Deparfmenf of State Bulletin

reference to all consular activities. It also plans
to require consuls to refer to the Department un-
named assurances ; that is, assurances which do not
identify an alien by name but only by skill, if the
consul within a reasonable period of time is un-
able to find an applicant meeting the requirement
of the assurance. The Department will then refer
these assurances to other consular offices where
Such applicants might be registered. The Depart-
ment will also request consuls to set up a vocational
index for all registrants so they can handle "un-
named assurances" as expeditiously as possible.

Polish Veterans in Great Britain

Eighteen thousand immigration visas may be
issued to Polish veterans in Great Britain. The
act requires that these persons, in order to qualify,
must have resided in the British Isles on June 16,
1950, and must have registered for immigration
visas with an American consul in Great Britain
before that date. The terms "Great Britain"
and "British Isles," as used in the act, are con-
sidered to be synonymous. The Department does
not know how many persons in Great Britain may
qualify under this provision. Requests for in-
formation regarding specific cases should be
addressed to the American consul with whom the
applicant is registered, otherwise to the consul gen-
eral at London who will, most likely, be desig-
nated as the coordinator for the Polish program.
Within a few weeks, consuls in England will begin
to process cases under this program, particularly
cases in which satisfactory affidavits of support
have been submitted. In determining whether an
applicant is firmly resettled in England, the con-
sul will be guided by the expressed Congressional
intent that registration for an immigration visa
with an American consular officer in Great Britain
before June 16 shall be considered indicative of the
failure of such registrant to become either firmly
settled or resettled, notwithstanding the provisions
of British legislation, except in the case in which
such person has applied for British citizenship.

To qualify as a "Polish veteran," a person does
not have to be a native of Poland. As a matter of
fact, many Polish veterans were born in other
central European countries, such as Czechoslo-
vakia.

Refugees From China

Four thousand immigration visas may be issued
to refugees from China. They must be "Iro ref u-

Jo/y 24, J 950

gees" who resided in China on July 1, 1948, or on
June 16, 1950, and who are either still in China
or have departed but have not been ijermanently
resettled. Most of the beneficiaries of this pro-
vision are the so-called Samar refugees, persons
who were received for temporary refuge by the
Goverimient of the Philippine Islands after the oc-
cupation of parts of China by Communist forces.
The files of these aliens are being assembled and
forwarded to Manila, pending the opening of an
office at Samar. Therefore, affidavits or assur-
ances, when the assurance forms become available,
may be sent directly to the American Legation at
Manila. Every effort is being made to hasten the
implementation of this program, but technical diffi-
culties must be overcome in setting up offices at
Samar and in providing staff and equipment. An-
other serious question will be presented in con-
nection with this group as far as the security check
is concerned since, in many instances, security files
established in various consular offices in China
have been destroyed.

The Department is making efforts to have the
United States Public Health Service examine all
applicants at Samar at the earliest possible date,
even before a consular office is actually opened,
thereby eliminating applicants mandatorily inad-
missible on medical grounds.

Greek Refugees and Greek Preferentiais

Seven thousand five hundred visas are author-
ized to be issued to Greek refugees and 2,500 to
Greek preferentiais. The Greek refugees are na-
tives of Greece, who are either victims of military
operations in Greece by the Nazi government or
by military operations in Greece by the Com-
munist guerrillas. The term "native" as used in
the Act will be interpreted to mean persons born
on Greek soil and other persons chargeable to the
Greek quota under the Immigration Act of 1924.

Greek preferentiais are persons who, prior to
June 30, 1950, were residents and nationals of
Greece and are eligible for admission into the
United States as first or second preference quota
immigrants; that is, as the wife or minor child
of an alien admitted for permanent residence, or
as parent, or husband by marriage subsequent to
January 1, 1948, if an American citizen; or as a
skilled agriculturist, as provided in the 1924 act.
The term "nationals of Greece" will be interpreted
as including any person who is a citizen of Greece
regardless of his place of birth or the quota to

127

which he is chargeable under the Immigration Act
of 1924,

Many more persons will undoubtedly qualify for
admission under these provisions than the number
of visas authorized for them. Greek refugees will
be issued visas in the order of their registration,
and they should be advised to register with the
American consular offices, in the district where
they reside, at the earliest possible date. Imme-
diate registration is also advised for alien wives
and minor children, of lawfully admitted perma-
nent residents of the United States, who intend to
apply for visas. The alien relatives in the United
States should file with the Immigration and Nat-
uralization Service Form 1-475 verifying their
lawful admission, which form will then be sent
to the appropriate American consular office.
American citizens who desire to bring in their
alien parents or their husbands by marriage since
January 1, 1948, should be advised to file with the
Immigi-ation and Naturalization Service Petition
Form 1-133.

European Refugees in Europe

This class consists of aliens who, between Sep-
tember 1, 1939, and January 1, 1949, entered an
area or country in Europe outside Italy or the
American, British, or French sectors or zones of
Germany or Austria. In order to qualify under
this class, the aliens must establish that they are
persons of European national origin displaced
from the country of their birth or nationality or
of their last residence, as a result of events subse-
quent to the outbreak of World War II ; and they
must be unable to return to any of such countries
because of persecution or fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, or political opinions.
Also, they must not have been firmly resettled in
any other country. Between July 1, 1950, and
June 30, 1954, 50 percent of the nonpreference por-
tion of the immigration quotas under the 1924
act will be made available to such aliens. Visas
issued to them are in addition to those 341,000
authorized under the Displaced Persons Act.

In determining what constitutes "last residence,"
the Department plans to define in its regulations
this term as meaning the country of the alien's
residence in which he had the right to reside per-
manently and the right to work.

The issuance of quota visas under the Displaced
Persons Act does not depend on the availability
of quotas since future quotas are charged where

the current quota is oversubscribed. Therefore,
the incentive to an alien to misrepresent his place
of birth in order to be chargeable to a more favor-
able quota does not exist in the case of eligible
displaced persons who may be issued visas under
the act. Consular officers will, therefore, be in-
structed not to insist upon presentation of birth
certificates if they are not reasonably procurable.
An exception applies only in cases where a consul
knows, or has reason to believe, that an applicant
for a visa was not born in the country he lists as
his country of birth. In such case, the consul will
require secondary evidence in the absence of a
birth certificate. Also, where police certificates
are not reasonably available, as a rule, the consul
will accept, instead, character references and other
evidence.

In addition to the major groups, there is another
gi-oup of persons benefiting under the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, as amended, for whose im-
migration the Department carries the primary and
major responsibility. This group includes alien
children, chargeable to the German or Austrian
quotas under the provisions of the Immigration
Act of 1924, for whom section 12 of the Displaced
Persons Act, as amended, contains special pro-
vision for the issuance of visas. In order to qual-
ify for visa issuance, these children must not have
passed their sixteenth birthday on June 25, 1948,
and before May 1, 1949, must have been legally
adopted, under the laws of the country in which
they resided, by American citizens residing abroad
temporarily. These children are accorded what
might be called a "super priority" in that they are
entitled to be issued quota visas ahead of any other
group specified in the Immigration Act of 1924
and in preference to any alien admissible as a
quota immigrant under the Displaced Persons Act.
This provision is intended to facilitate the admis-
sion of children adopted by members of the armed
forces and other American personnel temporarily
stationed during the war and postwar period in
Germany. In view of the rather stringent date-
line requirements, possibly few qualified appli-
cants will fall in this category.

Notwithstanding the top priority provided for
the issuance of visas to these children, they are
classifiable as nonpreference quota immigrants.
Tliese children are exempt from paying visa fees
and are also exempt from the provisions of the
contract labor law and from those excluding pro-
visions of the 1917 act barring the admission of

128

Department of State Bulletin

aliens whose passage has been paid for by cor-
liorations, individuals, or others.

In regard to the four groups discussed earlier,
that is, the refugees from China, Polish veterans
in Great Britain, Greek refugees and Greek
preferentials, and European refugees in Europe,
a few general observations should be made.

Spouses and unmarried dependent children
under 21 years of age, including adopted children
and stepchildren of pei-sons qualifying for visa
issuance as membere of any of the four groups
described, may be issued visas within the numeri-
cal limitation provided for each group if such
persons are otherwise admissible into the United
States.

The Department has been asked whether visas
authorized to be issued to these special groups are
exclusively reserved for them or, if not used by
these special groups, whether they can be used by
the general group of eligible displaced persons.
It was not the intent of Congress to reserve, ex-
clusively, for example, 18,000 visas for Polish
veterans in England if there should not be so many
qualified applicants. On the other hand, consular
officers should be given ample time to issue visas
to these special groups before they can reasonably
conclude that there are not any more qualified ap-
plicants and that, accordingly, unused numbers
earmarked for them can be made available to
eligible displaced persons. This whole question
will have to be reviewed after the programs have
been under way for some time.

The Department expects to publish its regula-
tions very shortly. However, in order to give full
implementation to the act, personnel changes must
be made; the opening of new offices will be re-
quired; additional supplies and equipment must
be obtained ; the proposed regulations must be ap-
proved by the Department's legal adviser and by
the Attorney General before they can be signed
by the Secretary of State ; and other phases of the
work must be coordinated with appropriate politi-
cal officers and by those officials of the Department
who are charged with the administration of the
Foreign Service.

The Visa Division is a technical unit which is
responsible for only one phase of consular adminis-
tration of the displaced persons program, namely,
supervision of the execution of the law and the
regulations. Administration and policy are
primarily the responsibility of other units of the
Department.

As in the past, the Visa Division welcomes any
suggestion from public or voluntary agencies, from
other citizen groups interested in the administra-
tion of the program, and from our consular per-
sonnel. Many valuable and helpful suggestions
have already been received. The Department of
State is making every effort to resolve procedural
and policy questions in a mutually satisfactory
way and in a way that it believes to be in compli-
ance with the intent of Congress.

Scope of Atomic Energy
Program Expanded

Statement hy the President

[Released to the press hy the White House July 7]

I have today transmitted to the Congress a sup-
plemental appropriation request for the Atomic
Energy Commission for fiscal year 1951, in the
amount of 260 million dollars, to enable the Com-
mission to build additional and more efficient
plants and related f acilties required in furtherance
of my directive of January 31, 1950. That direc-
tive called upon the Commission to continue its
work on all forms of atomic weapons, including the
hydrogen or fusion bomb. These additional plants,
like the existing facilities, will provide materials
which can be used either for weapons or for fuels
potentially useful for power purposes. The plants
will be of advanced design, and their operation
will provide new knowledge that will speed the
progress of the atomic energy program. In this
new undertaking, the Atomic Energy Commission
has my complete confidence, based upon the able
and vigorous leadership which it has given to the
atomic energy program in the past. We shall,
moreover, continue to depend heavily upon the in-
genuity and cooperation of American industry.

The expansion in the scope of our atomic energy
program gives added emphasis to the fact that
atomic energy has great potentialities both for de-
struction and for the benefit of mankind. From
the very outset, we have stood, and we continue to
stand, firm in our desire for effective international
control of atomic energy to insure its use for peace-
ful purposes only. This is a fundamental objec-
tive to which this Government and the vast
majority of the United Nations have committed
their best efforts. Agreement on this goal would
make the facilities of our atomic energy enterprise
fully available for peaceful purposes. Until this
objective is achieved, however, we must strengthen
our own defenses by providing the necessary
atomic energy production capacity.

July 24, 7950

129

Assistance Placed at Disposal
of Unified Command in Korea

Statement hy Secretary Acheson
[Released to the press July 12]

Fifty-six out of 59 members of the United Na-
tions have responded to the Security Council reso-
lution of June 27 ^ which recommended that the
members of the United Nations furnish such as-
sistance to the Republic of Korea as may be neces-
sary to repel the armed attack and to restore inter-
national peace and security in the area.

Three of these 56, the U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia,
and Poland, rejected the resolution.

Of the remaining 53 states which replied, with
possibly one exception, all have given at least
some moral support to the resolution.

Military assistance has been oifered by the
United Kingdom, New Zealand, Australia, Can-
ada, the Republic of China, and the Netherlands.
I understand that other states are considering
making offers. Other assistance, chiefly economic,
has already been offered by Thailand, Norway,
Denmark, Chile, the Philippines, and Nicaragua.

The Security Council resolution recommencling
a unified command under the United States was
passed on July 7.^ The machinery has not yet been
created to take full advantage of the vigorous sup-
port which has been given to the United Nations
resolutions. It is expected that this machinery
will be set up in the very near future. In the
meantime, however, naval and air contingents
from Australia, New Zealand, and the United
Kingdom are already operating under the unified
command, and contributions from Canada and the
Netherlands will be arriving shortly.

Many states have indicated a desire to assist but
do not know what types of assistance within their
capabilities would be useful. Advantage will be
taken of these offers as soon as channels are set up.

Your prompt and accurate reporting of the situ-
ation, the dispatch and efficiency with which you
carried out the evacuation of the many American
citizens for whom you were responsible, and the
confidence which you have inspired in the face of
the unpi'ovoked aggression against Korea are in
the finest tradition of the Foreign Service.

Korean Foreign Minister
Expresses Gratitude for U.S. Aid

[Released to the press July 15]

Secretary of State Acheson has received the following
message, dated July H, from the Foreign Minister of the
Reinihlic of Korea, Ben C. Limb.

In this hour of extreme trial for the Korean
nation, I want you to know how deeply grateful
we are for the magnificent fight America is waging
to save Korea as well as democracy, and for your
own great personnel service in it. Korea is very
proud to be the front-line ally of the United States
and the United Nations and most emphatically
pledges all in her power to win a lasting victory
for tlie cherished common cause.

The Government and people of Korea feel sure,
and I know you do, that now is the time and Korea
is the place to demonstrate to the world once and
for all that democracy is the only way of peaceful
life, and that despotic Communism must be de-
cisively defeated. The morale and stamina of our
forces are very high. The fighting ability and
the material power of the American and Allied
Forces are unsurpassed. I know that our over-all
victory is only a question of time. We are all very
confident here.

Korea will never forget what the government
and people of America are doing for her; it will
go down in Korean history for many centuries as
a great turning point in her national life. I shall
highly appreciate it if you will kindly convey this
sentiment to President Truman, the Armed
Forces, and the people of the United States.

Ambassador Muccio Commended
on Performance of Duty in Korea

[Released to the press July 13]

Secretary Acheson has sent the following message to
John J. Muccio, United States Ambassador to the Re-
public of Korea.

The President has asked me to extend to you and
to your staff his appreciation and commendation
for your courageous and effective performance of
duty since the onset of the present emergency in
Korea.

' Bulletin of July 3, 1950, p. 7.
' Bulletin of July 17, 1950, p. 83.

United States Policy
in the Korean Crisis

The Department of State released on July 20
United States in the Korean Crisis. The Depart-
ment in this publication presents the documents
bearing on United States policy toward the de-
velopments in Korea in order to place full and
accurate information on such critical events before
the people of the United States and the world so
that they may reach informed judgments concern-
ing the actions of this Government.

Included in this account is a narrative describ-
ing the events from June 25, 1950 (Korean time),

130

Department of Slate Bulletin

when the North Korean forces launched an all-out
offensive across the 38tli parallel against the Re-
public of Korea to July 8 when President Truman
complied with a Security Council resolution, re-
questing all nations supplying forces and other
assistance for the defense of the Republic of Korea
to put them under a unified command headed by
the United States, and designated General Mac-
Arthur as commanding general of the forces
operating in Korea.

More than a himdred accompanying dociunents
cover the period from June 25-July 11, 1950.

United States Policy hi the Korean Crisis (xi,
68 pp.). Department of State publication 3922,
may be purchased from the Superintendent of
Dociunents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington 25, D.C., for 25(4 a copy.

Soviet World-Peace Appeal
Called Propaganda Trick

Stateme7\t hy Secretary Acheson
[Released to the press July 12]

I am sure that the American people will not be
fooled by the so-called world-peace appeal or
"Stockholm Resolution" now being circulated in
this country for signatures. It should be recog-
nized for what it is — a propaganda trick in the
spurious "peace offensive of the Soviet Union.

The resolution was adopted last March at the
Stockholm session of the Partisans of Peace, an
international organization established by the
Communists, and the campaign for signatures in
the United States is being actively promoted by
the Communist Party.

An analysis of the petition shows that it tries to
do two things: (1) promote the unenforceable
Soviet proposals concerning atomic energy, ignor-
ing the effective control plan approved by the over-
whelming majority of the United Nations and
opposed only by the Soviet Union and four of its
satellites; and (2) center attention on the use of
atomic weapons by branding as a war criminal the
first nation to use atomic weapons, ignoring the
aggression in other forms presently being prac-
ticed by the Communists.

As for the second point, namely, that the first
nation to use atomic weapons will liave committed
a crime against humanity and should be branded as
a war criminal, it is obvious that this is an utterly
cynical begging of the question. The real crime
against humanity is aggression and, in particular,
the deliberate resort to armed aggression in defi-
ance of the United Nations. The war criminals
are the people who sanction such action. The
weapons used are quite incidental to the crime.
Thus, the Communists throughout the world have

given the lie to the Stockholm proposal in their
support of North Korean aggression.

Just before the North Korean armed forces
launched their unprovoked attack against the Re-
public of Korea, more than half the population of
North Korea was reported to have signed the peti-
tion. This illustrates better than anything else
the basic hypocrisy of the Communist "peace
appeal."

Soviet Tactics Again Stall
Negotiations on Austrian Treaty

Statement hy Secretary Acheson
[Released to the press July 12]

The deputies for the Austrian treaty negotia-
tions met in London on July 10 for their 256th
meeting. In obvious preparation for this meeting,
the Soviet Government on July 8 sent to the Amer-
ican Embassy in Moscow a second note regarding
the Allied position in Trieste. This second note
merely repeats the unfounded allegations in the
Soviet note of April 20.

This Government's I'eply of June 16 ^ adequately
answered those allegations. There is, of course,
no valid reason for linking the two questions, but,
true to the Soviet propaganda pattern, the Soviet
deputy for the Austrian treaty negotiations, at the
July 10 meeting, instead of discussing the remain-
ing unagreed articles of the Austrian treaty,
utilized the meeting to read a prepared statement
on Trieste.

This Soviet action once again emphasizes that
the Soviet Government does not wish to conclude
an Austrian treaty at this time despite the pledge
which it made in the Moscow Declaration in 1943
to reestablish Austria as a free and independent
nation.^ The efforts of the Western deputies to
negotiate and conclude the treaty were unsuccess-
ful and, in view of the impasse, the -deputies ad-
journed, with the Western deputies a^eeing to
meet again on September 7. The Soviet deputy
stated that it would be necessary for him to refer
to his Government for consideration the Western
proposal to meet again on September 7.

The British, French, and United States Foreign
Ministers agreed at their meeting in London last
May that their respective Governments are ready
at any time to settle without delay all outstanding
issues of the treaty provided that this will defi-
nitely bring about agreement on the treaty as a
whole. ^ The principles agreed upon by the three

'For text of the U.S. note, answering the Soviet note
of April 20, see Bulletin of June 26, 1950, p. 1054.
' Bulletin of Nov. 6, 1943, p. 311.
• Bulletin of June 26, 1950, p. 1054.

July 24, 1950

131

Foreign Ministers were communicated to the So-
viet Government on June 12 * in the hope that the
Soviet Government would agree to associate itself
with the program and that more definite progress
in the solution of the Austrian problem might thus
be achieved. No reply has been received from the
Soviet Government to this approach.

The only true basis on which Austria can exer-
cise full sovereignty is by four-power agreement
and the withdrawal from Austrian soil of all forces
of occupation. It is fundamental that the Gov-
ernment of the United States desires the achieve-
ment of this objective.

Soviet actions designed to prevent conclusion of
the Austrian treaty must necessarily result in a
delay in the fulfillment of Austria's desire, with
which this Government is in full sympathy, to
enjoy complete independence. Under these cir-
stances, the three Western Governments are en-

deavoring, within the framework of existing
four-power agreements, to carry out such measures
as may properly be taken to strengthen the au-
thority of the Austrian Government and to lighten
Austria's occupation burdens.

It should be borne in mind, in this connection,
that any steps heretofore taken or to be taken by
this Government to reduce Austria's occupation
burdens are not regarded as a substitute for the
treaty. Our actions, in this respect, are endeavors
on our part to take such constructive measures as
may properly be taken, pending conclusion of the
treaty, to fulfill our obligations under the Control
Agreement of 1946 ^ which provides that the
Allied Commission for Austria shall assist the
freely elected Government of Austria to recreate
a sound and democratic national life and to assume
as quickly as possible full control of its own affairs
of state.

Soviet Delay in Repatriating German War Prisoners

COMPLETE DISREGARD OF HUMAN RIGHTS

[Released to the press July 141

Following is the text of a note delivered today to the
Soviet Foreign Office by the American Embassy at Mos-
0010 on the subject of prisoners of war still in Soviet
custody.

The Ambassador of the United States of Amer-
ica presents his compliments to the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and on instructions for his Govern-
ment has the honor to refer to the Soviet press
announcement of May 5, 1950, stating that the
repatriation of German prisoners of war from the
Soviet Union to Germany has been completed with
the exception of 9,717 persons convicted of grave
war crimes, 3,815 persons whose alleged war crimes
are in the process of investigation, and 14 persons
detained owing to illness.

The Government of the United States shares the
shock and concern of the German people over this
public announcement, and is unable to give cre-
dence to the Soviet statement that there are only
13,546 German prisoners of war in its custody.
These figures are completely at variance with the
information in the possession of the Govenunent
of the United States, showing that large numbers
of German prisoners of war known to have been in

* Bulletin of July 10, 1950, p. 74.
' Bulletin of July 28, 1946, p. 175.

the Soviet custody have not yet been returned to
their homes.

The Soviet Government is again informed that,
in accordance with the agreement reached by the
Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in April
1947 for the repatriation before December 31,
1948, of all German prisoners of war in the custody
of the four occupying powers, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and France did in fact re-
patriate all German prisoners of war in their
custody prior to the agreed date. The United
States, on its part, actually completed its program
of repatriation of German prisoners of war as
early as June 30, 1947.

Tlie Government of the Soviet Union has repeat-
edly failed to respond to requests for pertinent
information of its actions under the agreement of
April 1947. On January 24, 1949, the Soviet Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, in acknowledging receipt
of one of these inquiries, admitted that an unspec-
ified number of German prisoners of war were still
held in Soviet custody, failing however to furnish
any information concerning them, but stating
unequivocally that the Soviet Government would
complete the repatriation of German prisoners of
war remaining in its custody during 1949. It is
clear from the announcement of May 5, 1950, that
the Soviet Government has failed to honor this

132

Department of State Bulletin

commitment just as it lias failed to honoi" its earlier
commitment of April 1947. In this connection,
the Government of the United States desires to
make it plain that the arbitrary reclassification
by the Soviet Government of prisoners of war as
civilians would not, of course, have the effect of
relieving- the Soviet Government of its obligation
to return these persons to their homes and families.
By its delay in repatriating these German pris-
oners of war, and by its repeated refusal to furnish
information concerning them, the Soviet Govern-
ment has caused suffering and anxiety for large
numbers of prisoners of war in the Soviet custody
and their relatives and friends, and has demon-
strated a complete disregard for the fundamental
human rights of the unfortunate persons con-
cerned. The Soviet Government alone has the
power to mitigate this suffering, and it could do so
by taking the following steps :

(1) Furnish full information on the identifica-
tion of the 9,7l7 persons alleged to have been con-
victed of grave war crimes, the 3,815 persons whose
alleged war crimes are in the process of investiga-
tion, and the 14 persons said to be under treatment
for illness, who are still retained by the Soviet
Union as stated in the Soviet announcement of
May 5. This information would include the
present location and treatment of these persons,
data on the sentences imposed on those said to have
been convicted of war crimes, and the status of the
investigations pending, as well as information
with respect to measures taken by the Soviet
Government to ensure the right of these prisoners
of war to correspond with their families in
Germany.

(2) In accordance with the Geneva Convention
of July 27, 1929, to which the Soviet Union is a
party, to provide information on the number,
identity, date of death and place of burial of pris-
oners of war and civilian internees who have died
in captivity in the Soviet Union or in transit.

(3) Permit investigation in the Soviet Union
by an impartial international body in order that
the actual fate of the prisoners of war known to
have been in Soviet custody may be ascertained.
For this purpose, the Government of the United
States suggests the appointment of an ad hoc com-
mission designated by the United Nations, or a
^roup composed of representatives of the four
powers now occupying Germany, or representa-
:ives of neutral powers, or any other group mutu-
illy acceptable. It is noted in this connection that
he United States, the United Kingdom, and
France, at the time when they still had German
prisoners of war in their custody, furnished full
nformation concerning them to the interested
)arties, and permitted full and impartial access to
he prisoners of war by international agencies.

In concerning itself at this time with the ques-
ion of German prisoners of war, a question on
vhich the Soviet Government has made and

broken specific commitments, the Government of
the United States does not overlook the equally
disturbing parallel situation concerning the So-
viet failure to repatriate, or to account for, the
numerous nationals of the German-occupied coun-
tries who were taken prisoners during the war, or
who were brought to the U.S.S.K. as civilian in-
ternees.

Information concerning the action which the
Soviet Government is prepared to take on this
matter would be welcomed by the Government of
the United States, which would be willing to coop-
erate in any appropriate way.
* * *

The British and French Embassies are also com-
municating with the Soviet Government on this
subject.

As is well-known, the continued detention of
German prisoners of war in the Soviet Union has
been a matter of concern to the United States
Government ^ and to the Governments of the
United Kingdom and France for a considerable
period. The Foreign Ministers of the United
States, the United Kingdom, and France issued a
statement at London on May 12 with respect to
this subject which stated that the Foreign Min-
isters had agreed to take all possible steps to ob-
tain information bearing on the fate of prisoners
of war and civilians not yet repatriated from the
Soviet Union and to bring about repatriation in
the largest possible number of cases.

Americans Visiting Abroad

Ernest Carroll Faust, head of the Division of
Parasitology, Tulane University School of Medi-
cine, New Orleans, Louisiana, will lecture at the
University of Chile for the summer term.

Clifford H. MacFadden, assistant professor of
geography, at the University of California, Los
Angeles, will teach geography at the University
of Ceylon, Colombo, Celyon, for 1 year.

Francis M. Rogers, associate professor of ro-
mance languages and literature and dean of the
graduate school of arts and sciences, Harvard
University, will lecture for C weeks in Brazil.

John M. Henderson, of the Division of Public
Health, Columbia University Medical School, will
serve as visiting consultant at various schools of
public health and confer with public health offi-
cials in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile for 3 months
this summer.

These visits have been made possible through
grants-in-aid awarded by the Department of State.

1 For texts of previous communications on the subject
of German prisoners of war in Soviet custody, see Bitl-
LETiN of Jan. 16, 1949, p. 77; Mar. 27, 1949, p. 389; June
26, 1949, p. 824.

o/y 24, 1950

133

Soviet "Beetle'' Charge Labeled Ridiculous Propaganda

COMMUNIST FABRICATIONS AIM TO
COVER PEST CONTROL FAILURE

[Released to the press July 6]

The Soviet Government, in a note dated June
30, 1950, has identified itself with ridiculous propa-
ganda statements emanating for several weeks past
from Eastern European Communist regimes alleg-
ing that the occurrence of potato bugs in certain
areas of Eastern Germany has been caused by the
"dropping" of these insects fi'om American air-
planes.

It is interesting to note that the Soviet propa-
gandists have borrowed this whole invention from
the Nazis who during the war used to level the
same fantastic charge against Allied airplanes.

The facts — of which the Soviet Government was
undoubtedly aware when making ita charges^are
that potato bugs, or Colorado beetles, have existed
in Germany since before the war; have been
spreading rapidly in wartime due to the absence
of effective countermeasures ; and were recognized
as a serious threat to the East zone economy by
the Eastern German puppet government several
months prior to the date of the alleged American
bug offensive. A decree by the so-called German
Democratic Republic, dated March 2, 1950, ordered
the initiation of a major antipotato beetle cam-
paign throughout the entire area of the Soviet
zone. Special measures were to be concentrated
in a belt following the Czechoslovak and Polish
borders, apparently in an attempt to protect east-
ern Europe and the U.S.S.R. from further beetle
invasions. This problem had been one of major
concern to the Polish authorities as early as May
1949 when a nation-wide conference was held in
Warsaw, devoted to the combating of plant pests,
especially the potato beetle. Furthermore, the
Soviet Government itself issued a pamphlet en-
titled. The Colorado Potato Beetle^ signed for
printing May 16 — 6 days before United States
planes are supposed to have "dropped" the beetles
over Eastern Germany — in which the population
of the Soviet Union was instruct-ed to take special
precautions against an invasion of potato bugs
from Germany.

Manifestly, the Eastern German authorities
have been unable to cope with the problem. On

134

May 17, the official paper of the Socialist Unity
(Communist) Party for Saxony-Anhalt published
an appeal to the population, betraying distinct
alarm at long last to institute search parties and
other countermeasures. The appeal contains this
sentence: "The annual increase of swarms can be
traced to the fact that searches and chemical coun-
termeasures have repeatedly and consistently been
instituted too late, in spite of all orders." Mean-
while, the potato bug has spread farther into East-
ern Europe; and Soviet-German authorities are
faced with one other problem : the threat of a seri-
ous potato shortage this year, caused by a number
of factors besides the bug, such as inadequate agri-
cultural methods and last year's poor crop in
Eastern Germany which compelled the peasants
to consume a substantial portion of seed potatoes
during the planting season.

U.S. REPLY TO SOVIET NOTE

[Released to the press July 7]

The followinff is the text of the United States reply to
the Soviet note of June 30 alleging American responsibility
for potato crop infestation in East Qermany. The United
States note was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry
hy the United States Embassy at Moscow today.

While reluctant to give weight and credence to
this communication (The Soviet Note of June 30)
as an official message of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
the Government of the United States nevertheless
now feels obliged, in view of the extraordinary al-
legations contained therein, to point out that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has neglected to ac-
quaint itself with the most elementary and gener-
ally known facts of the situation with which its
communication purports to deal.

It is apparent that the Ministry has not even
troubled to consult with competent Soviet and
Eastern European experts familiar with the his-
tory of potato crop infestation in Eastern Europe
and whose description of the progress of this
infestation over a period of years has appeared in
official Soviet and other Eastern European pub-
lications.

Department of State Bulletin

This Government prefers to consider that the
Ministry has neglected to consult even its own of-
ficial publications on this subject rather than to
believe that the Soviet authorities are trafficking
lightly for propaganda or other purposes in mat-
ters vital to the welfare of the people of Eastern
Europe.

What has happened in obvious enough : the Com-
munist authorities in Eastern Germany have failed
to bring the bug problem under control and pro-
tect the agriculture of other satellite countries and
of the Soviet Union. Moreover, they are in need
of an excuse for the anticipated shortage. Instead
of holding them responsible for the hardships their
failure will cause to the people of Eastern Ger-
many and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Government
has resorted to a well-known device and invented
a "saboteur" — this time in the guise of the United
States Air Force. Soviet and German Communist
authorities are undoubtedly aware of the fact that
American aircraft have strictly and consistently
observed the established corridor and have at no
time flown over the areas in which the beetles are
alleged to have been dropped.

In the present world situation, fraught with ex-
plosive tensions, the Soviet Government has chosen
to poison the atmosphere even further with one of
the most fantastic fabrications that has ever been
invented by one government against another. In
this whole absurd and ridiculous propaganda in-
vention, this is the one fact that deserves to be
noted.

U.S. ANSWERS CZECHOSLOVAK CHARGES

[Released to the press July 7]

The follotmng is the text of a note sent by the Amer-
ican Embassy at Praha to the Czechoslovak Foreign
Office on July 6 with reference to Cxechoslorak allega-
tions concerning the potato bug.

The American Embassy presents its compli-
ments to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and has the honor to make the following
observations with reference to the potato bug :

To the extent that the potato bug represents a
Czechoslovakian domestic problem, it is not a
matter of concern to the American Embassy,
which nevertheless expresses its sympathy over
the damage to Czechoslovak agricultural produc-
tion caused by the insect in question.

To the extent, however, that efforts have been
made in Czechoslovakia to connect the United
States with the presence of the potato bug in this
country, the matter is of legitimate interest to the
American Embassy, which declares that allega-
tions to the effect that the United States encour-
ages the depredations of the potato bug in Czecho-
slovakia, or that the United States has sought
clandestinely to introduce the potato bug into
Czechoslovakia, are false and preposterous.

The Embassy ventures to suggest the inherent

unsuitability of the potato bug (doryphora de-
comlineata) as an instrument of national policy.
The Embassy doubts whether the potato bug,
even in its most voracious phase, could nibble
effectively at the fabric of friendship uniting the
Czechoslovak and the American people.

The Embassy avails itself of this opportunity
to renew to the Ministry the assurance of its
highest consideration.

U.S.-Spain Amend Air Agreement

[Released to the press June 23]

Negotiations between delegations of the Gov-
ernments of the United States and Spain to amend
the air transport services agreement between the
two Governments signed on December 2, 1944,
were concluded today.

After a cordial interchange of the viewpoints
of both delegations, it has been agreed that the
agreement shall be amended in the following
respects :

Air carriers of Spain will be permitted to con-
duct services to the United States over the follow-
ing routes :

Route 1

A route from Spain to San Juan, Puerto Rico,
via Lisbon, the Azores and Bermuda, and Caracas ;
in both directions.

Route 2

A route from Spain via Lisbon, the Azores and
Bermuda to Miami, and beyond Miami (a) to
Mexico and (b) to Habana and points beyond in
the Caribbean area and the west coast of South
America ; in both directions.

Under the existing agreement, the United States
has two routes through Spain :

Route 1

A route from New York through Lisbon to
Barcelona, proceeding therefrom to Marseilles,
and possible points beyond, in both directions.

Route 2

A route from New York through Lisbon to
Madrid proceeding therefrom (a) to Rome and
points beyond and (b) to Algiers and points
beyond, in both directions.

The United States route to Spain via South
America and Africa contained in the original
agreement will be deleted, inasmuch as United
States civil air carriers now have no interest in
using this route.

Articles dealing with machinery for arbitration
and determination of rates were added to the
agreement.

iM\i 24, 1950

135

The Need for an International Trade Organization

Views of Maurice J. Tobin
Secretary of Labor

The following letter dated March 10, 1950, was sent
from the Secretary of Labor, Maurice J. Tobin, to the
Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
John Kee.

Dear Congressman Kee: On May 24, 1949, I
submitted to your Committee a statement of my
views on the question of United States approval of
the Charter for an International Trade Organiza-
tion. I would like to take this opportunity to
supplement my earlier statement with respect to
events which have occurred since the original state-
ment was made.

The problem of maintaining full employment
was the subject of intensive discussion at the 1949
meetings of the International Labor Conference
and the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations, and at the current (1950) meetings of the
Economic and Employment Commission of the
Economic and Social Council. The intensity of
this discussion was to some extent a reflection of
events in the United States and of concern as to
the course which these events would take. Despite
the basic health of our economy, the prospects of
its continued prosperity, and the clearly tempo-
rary character of the 1949 recession, fear was
widely expressed that any drying-up of American
purchasing power would curtail foreign sales in
our markets, with serious resulting effects upon
the other economies involved.

Under these circumstances, the renewing of our
pledge to maintain full employment at home, as
set forth in the Employment Chapter of the Ito
Charter, is clearly appropriate. The taking of
other steps to expand world trade, on a multilat-
eral basis, as envisaged in the Charter, is also es-
sential as an adjunct in the international field to
the measures which we take at home to maintain
full employment.

Specifically, the Employment Chapter of the
Charter obligates the United States to take meas-
ures with a view to achieving and maintaining full
employment through actions appropriate to our
own political, economic, and social institutions.

136

Such a commitment is fully in keeping with our
own domestic policy of maintaining a high and
productive level of employment as set forth in the
Employment Act of 1946. The furtherance of this
aim throughout the world should do much to aid in
the expansion of world trade and the general rais-
ing of living standards.

I want to repeat my earlier statement to the
Committee that the Employment chapter of the
Charter preserves our right to seek full employ-
ment with the minimum of Government interven-
tion that we ourselves determine to be wise. In
other words, in accepting the Charter we would
not be agreeing to any planning or control that
we ourselves do not find to be necessary. We
would not be agreeing to give the other nations
of the world any power to compel us to take steps
that we ourselves are unwilling to take. We
would remain free to devise our own policies and
progi'ams.

The employment pledge is very specific on this
point stating that:

"Each member shall take action designed to
achieve and marntain full and productive em-
ployment and large and steadily growing de-
mand within its own territory thru measures
ap-propriate to its political, economic and social
institutions. ^^ (Italics supplied.)

Our freedom of domestic action can be well
illustrated by reference to the specific proposals
for maintaining full employment which have been
referred to or discussed at international meetings
during the last year. At none of the sessions was
there any question that a country's choice of meth-
ods was its own, and that it would remain so
should the Charter for an International Trade
Organization come into effect. There is now be-
fore the Employment Commission of the Eco-
nomic and Social Council, for example, a report
by a group of experts appointed by the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations concerning
further steps which the nations of the world might

Department of State Bulletin

take to aid in tlie maintenance of full employment,
entitled "National and International Measures
for Full Employment." This report deserves a
great deal of study. Many of its details include
things that we now do under the Employment Act
of 194G; others would require further legislative
action. It is unmistakably clear, however, that
whatever our reaction to tlie report, we are not
committed to it or any part of it until and unless
we ourselves decide tliat it has merit. This is
the case now ; it would continue to be the case
after the Ito Charter comes into effect.

The months since the submission of my earlier
statement have also seen the development of the
Point IV Program as one of the most significant
parts of our foreign economic policy. This pro-
gram is a voluntary program on the part of the
United States which pursues further the same
broad objectives as the Economic Development
Chapter of the Charter. The role of the Inter-
national Trade Organization in the field of eco-
nomic development would buttress and facilitate
the sound realization of the program which we
are initiating. The Ito Charter as a whole
would ensure that the products of economic de-
velopment have a maximum opportunity to move
in the channel of world trade and to contribute
to a general raising of world living standards.

STATEMENT SUBMITTED ON MAY 24, 1949

I appreciate this opportunity to present my
views on the Charter for an International Trade
Organization to the members and have heard in
some detail of the basic problems which were
involved in its negotiation from members of the
Department of LaJbor staff who participated in the
drafting conferences which led to the document
presented to you for acceptance.

Interrelations of Labor and Trade

I regard the Charter as a great achievement in
an important field and a forward step in foreign
relations. Not only does it provide for an inter-
national forum in which trade matters can be
discussed and differences ironed out, but agree-
ment has been reached on many important points
of substance in a way which should strengthen
the economic base upon which healthy world trade
and prosperity are founded. These points of
agreement, affecting matters of basic employment
policy, the problems of economic development, the
multitude of commercial problems (such as those
involving the nondiscriminatory use of quotas and
internal taxation), the special problems of inter-
governmental commodity agreements, and inter-
national cartels, have in every case the merit of
minimizing restrictions and promoting freedom
of trade and enterprise. This achievement is the
more notable because it has occurred in a world
which for over two decades has been moving in

July 24, 1950

895251—50 3

the direction of more and more government inter-
vention in economic life. If we can achieve the
trade freedom for which the Charter provides and
maintain that degree of freedom, the accomplish-
ment will be substantial.

Maintaining the maximum of goods in world
trade with a minimum of restrictions has implica-
tions beyond the immediate effects on trade. Free
institutions in the world of trade have their influ-
ence upon the maintenance of freedom in other
situations. The effects of the Charter can be ex-
pected to contribute, for example, to the healthy
and improving economic environment which sup-
ports and strengthens the kind of free trade union
movement which we have found to be essential to
the survival of democratic institutions.

I do not need to dwell at length upon the obvious
importance of healthy and unfettered world trade
to the welfare of the wage and salary workers of
the United States. As our industrial system has
developed, it has brought with it increasing inter-
relationships between our production and distribu-
tion mechanisms and the trade channels of the
world. In 1947, for example (the latest year for
which such data are available), almost two and
one-half million jobs in American nonagricul-
tural establishments were dependent upon export
trade. This represented 5.6 percent of non-
agricultural employment at the time; in some
individual industry groups, the proportion was as
high as 15 percent. Many additional jobs in the
agricultural sector of our economy are also de-
pendent on export markets. The flow of raw ma-
terials into this country is an essential part of the
fabric of the production process ; imports of con-
sumers' goods into our markets help to raise our
own consumption level. Imports into this coun-
try contribute to the support and maintenance of
the export markets on which so many of our jobs
at home depend.

Restrictions on the regular flow of trade in es-
tablished channels can have serious repercussions
on our own employment. The impact of a single
restrictive action can be illustrated by the situa-
tion in the United States textile industry during
the spring and sunnner of 1948, when unreason-
able licensing requirements of one of our Carib-
bean neighbors resulted in a piling-up in ware-
houses of textile yardage equivalent in manhour
requirements to roughly a full month's production
of more than 40,000 textile wage earners. On a
broader scale, the continuation of unpredictable
interruptions to trade can seriously affect the
livelihood of important groups of workers in our
economy.

From the point of view of safeguarding the
welfare of workers in our domestic industry, we
must also be certain that our commitment does
not lightly remove justifiable protection or elimi-
nate the possibility of necessary withdrawals of
tariff or other concessions in the event that se-
rious injury threatens the weaker portions of our

137

economy. I do not feel that we have given up,
in tlie Charter, our basic ability to protect Ameri-
can jobs, where appropriate, through proper tar-
iff protection, or to withdraw concessions which
threaten employment. The Charter provides the
same mechanisms for doing this which is speci-
fied in the successfully-applied procedures of our
own Trade Agreements Act and for an appi'o-
priate degree of international consultation.

The welfare of the wage and salary worker is
related to world trade in more ways, however,
than through the impact of specific trade restric-
tions or protective devices. High levels of world
trade mean high consumption levels. The wel-
fare of our poj^ulation at home can best be sought
by achieving a level of world trade in which there
is a continually rising volume of goods to be ex-
changed, based upon continually rising produc-
tion and purchasing power to buy the goods that
are produced.

The goal of a higher consumption of goods
and services implies something more than the
process of removing barriers to trade. It also im-
plies taking steps to establish and insure the con-
tinued existence of a healthy economic base upon
which world trade can develop. Such positive
steps must be taken in conjunction with efforts to
minimize restrictions on existing trade channels.
The two approaches complement each other.

Provisions for Employment
and Economic Activity

Positive steps to expand world trade are pointed
to in the Charter's chapter on employment and
economic activity, and in the Chapter on Eco-
nomic Development. From a long-range point of
view, these chapters may well prove to be as im-
portant to the full development of world trade,
and to improved consumption levels that in-
ci'eased trade brings, as are many of the remain-
ing provisions of the Charter. I want to discuss
the broad purposes of the provisions of these
chapters.

The basic obligation assumed in the Employ-
ment Chapter is agreement to take steps to main-
tain full and productive domestic employment.
The basic obligation is similar to that provided in
articles 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter.
It is also similar to that provided by our own
Employment Act of 1946. It reserves to us the
choice of measures to achieve full and productive
domestic employment. As an obligation, it does
not go beyond the obligation we have already as-
sumed to the population of our own country.

Why, then, it might be asked, is it necessary to
repeat this obligation, already self-imposed, in
an international document? The answer is to be
found in the wides|)read concern of the nations
of the world over the possibility of large-scale
unemployment, over the possibility that they
might not be able to maintain the nondiscrimina-
tory principles of the Charter in the face of major

economic difficulties. Each has been concerned to
have a positive statement of the other nations'
intent, even though fully aware that a statement
of determined intention is something less than an
ironclad guaranty of successful performance.

It is especially important that the United
States join in expression of this determination.
Concern over the possible effects of serious unem-
ployment in any country on world trade and on
the economies of all countries is well-known. Al-
though our own external trade may sometimes
seem small to us in relation to our total volume
of production, it is a fairly large proportion of
world trade in terms of dollar volume. Most im-
portant, our market bulks very large in the total
market of some individual nations. Disappear-
ance of this market through a drying-up of United
States purchasing power might have serious effects
on their economies. Our production system is the
envy of the world, and we need lack no confidence
in our ability to maintain our economic system on
a prosperous basis. Nevertheless, it must be rec-
ognized that fear of serious unemployment in the
United States has been an important factor in
negotiations, in conference after conference to
which our delegates have gone during the postwar
period, including those which have been in prep-
aration for the International Trade Organization.

There were many representatives at the confer-
ences leading up to the formulation of the Havana
charter who wanted the United States to assume
greater obligations to control its economy in the
interest of providing a more certain guaranty of
full employment. This was not agreed to by our
delegates. There can be no question about our
continued right under the Charter's Employment
Chapter to seek full employment with the mini-
mum of government intervention that we ourselves
determine to be wise.

The obligation to take preventive action to main-
tain full and productive employment obviously
must have its counterpart in the event that we
cannot maintain full employment, despite our best
efforts. The Charter obligates us to consult with
other nations on action to be taken in the event that
another economic crisis does affect world trade.
It would be unrealistic not to make such provision.
If we should have economic problems ahead, we
will want to handle them in such a way as to pre-
serve the cooperative and reciprocal trade rela-
tionships that we ai'e building up during times of
prosperity. We want the machinery we are build-
ing to weather, and not to flounder, in time of
storm.

Provisions for consultation in time of crisis must
be drawn with extreme care. We cannot agi'ee to
advance commitment of our resources or arbitrary
abridgment of the rights we have acquired by
negotiation with individual nations on a great
many trade matters. I do not propose in this
statement to elaborate on these provisions. It is
my understanding that expert and detailed testi-
mony on this matter will be offered before the

138

Deparlment of State Bulletin

Committee. The basic point I want to make is re-
lated to the over-all principle of consultation. If
we get into economic difficulties, we must coop-
erate, in our own interest and in the interest of
world economic stability, to minimize the effects
of our own troubles on other nations. We cannot
escape the fact that our own economy is of great
importance in the world economy or, tlie fact that
our economic difficulties can have wide repercus-
sions. Moreover, I do not see how we can avoid
becoming the subject of official discussion in in-
ternational forums in the event that we do begin
to have serious unemployment. Nor do I see how
we can avoid participation in cooperative endeav-
ors to solve serious world-wide problems. What
specific results this consultation will lead to cannot
be foreseen, as we cannot foresee the precise kinds
of economic problems with which we shall be deal-
ing. All that we can provide for at this time is
a mechanism and certain essentially procedural
rules concerning consultation. We cannot agree,
and I do not believe that we would be agreeing in
the charter, to go bej'ond the stage of consultation
and of cooperation on a basis to which we agree
in dealing with the most difficult problems of se-
rious economic maladjustment.

The undertaking to maintain full and produc-
tive employment is supplemented in the Employ-
ment Chapter by a separate undertaking to main-
tain fair labor standards, particularly in produc-
tion for export. Since the problem of competition
from countries with lower labor standards than
our own has been a perennial problem in our tariff
history, that is a provision we should welcome. Its
effectiveness will be realized at an extremely slow
rate, of course, because of the tremendous difficul-
ties involved in raising labor standards in coun-
tries with very low productivity. The method
of implementing the fair labor standards obliga-
tion will remain a domestic matter. Close rela-
tionship will obviously have to be maintained with
the Intei'national Labor Organization, which has
primary responsibility among the specialized
agencies in the labor field. The charter provides
an avenue of appeal to the Ito itself if it can
be shown that a country's failure to maintain fair
labor standards has the effect of nullifying or im-
pairing another Member's benefits under the
Charter.

ITO and Economic Development

The Chapter on Employment and Economic Ac-
tivity emphasizes chiefly the attainment and main-
tenance of employment. The chapter on economic
development looks to another major source of
the future expansion of world trade, through the
raising of productivity levels and realizing the
potential capacity of relatively underdeveloped
areas. The contribution to be made to world trade
and living standards here is the kind which is en-
visaged in the principles of Point 4 of President
Truman's inaugural message.

July 24, 1950

The Economic Development Chapter envisages
no intervention in the development plans of any
member nation. The responsibility for develop-
ment is a domestic one in each country, and devel-,
opment will necessarily take different forms in
each. Development in some countries may con-
centrate on industrialization, in others on exploi-
tation of mineral resources or the development of
sizable projects in the field of transport or power,
and in others on the achievement of higher pro-
ductivity in agriculture. Although a domestic
responsibility, development will necessarily re-
quire assistance from the capital, technical, and
industrial resources of the capital-exporting coun-
tries. Their cooperation on a voluntary basis is
important and offers advantages to them as well
as to the developing countries. The role of the
Ito under the Charter is essentially a coordinat-
ing role. Members in need of technical advice or
financial assistance may come to the organization
for aid. The organization will help them find
such assistance, which may take the form of pri-
vate technical service from other nations, paid
for by the developing country, or reference to the
collaborative aid of another specialized intergov-
ernmental organization, such as the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

It is entirely likely that the actual role of the
International Trade Organization in the field of
positive economic development will be limited.
The primary sources for developmental aid will
continue to be private investment and govern-
mental aid. Among the intergovernmental agen-
cies, the role of the World Bank, the technical aid
supplied by such specialized agencies as the Inter-
national Labor Organization, and work done un-
der the auspices of the Economic and Social
Council should prove to be of equal or greater
importance.

The Ito has a necessary role in the development
field because of its special role in cases where
trade barriers are used to protect development.
In this connection, the Ito provides a mechanism
through which restrictions on trade during the
developmental process, especially when exercised
through quantitative restrictions rather than
tariff rates, can be held to a reasonable and super-
vised minimum. This necessary concern of Ito
members with problems of development may re-
quire attention to various phases of the problem
of development, including helping the nation in-
volved to find technical assistance or means to de-
velopment other than trade restrictions.

One of the most difficult problems faced in
drafting the Charter was the question of the use
of restrictions otherwise prohibited by the
charter for purposes of economic development.
At times during the negotiations, the provisions
relating to the use of trade restrictions for "devel-
opmental" purposes threatened to offer the widest
loopholes for escape from basic commercial policy
rules. The deliberations were characterized by

139

disputes between the industrialized countries and
the relatively undeveloped nations, with the lat-
ter contending that limitations on their right
to use restrictive trade practices were designed to
keep them from industrializing. This miscon-
ception was corrected ordy by agreement of the
larger industrial nations to an express endorse-
ment of the idea of development and by a com-
mitment on their part to cooperate in such devel-
opment by imposing no unreasonable barriers to
the international movement of capital and skills
for developmental purposes. The more difficult
problems of the use of trade barriers and re-
gional preferences for development purposes were
worked out through a series of elaborate and tech-
nical articles, which will be best reviewed by the
Committee during the course of the expert testi-
mony before it.

The Charter is the product of negotiations
among many people from many nations, each
bringing his own experience and the reflection of
his own political, economic, and social institu-
tions. This is an element of strength in the
charter. The basic provisions of the employment
chapter, for example, were embodied in the origi-
nal United States proposals which led to the Char-
ter. Both the employment and the economic de-
velopment provisions embody principles which are
an accepted part of our own national and foreign
economic policy. They embody the positive steps
which we must consider seriously in our own self
interest and as part of our participation in world
affairs.

I respectfully urge that your Committee rec-
ommend unqualified acceptance of the Charter for
an International Trade Organization.

Clarification Asitedon Senate Coffee Report

Statement by Edward G. Miller

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ''^

I greatly appreciate your courtesy in giving the
Department of State this hearing. I assure you
of the desire of the Department to work coopera-
tively with your Committee and with all of the
other committees of Congress that consider sub-
jects relating to United States foreign policy. I
hope that you individually and collectively will
take advantage of our desire to be of assistance
whenever you want our help.

Especially in view of the strong protests which
have been made to the Department by the coffee-
producing countries regarding your subcommit-
tee's report on coffee, I believe that it is important
from the standpoint of our foreign relations that
the Committee be informed of the attitude of these
countries toward the report and the interpreta-
tion which they are placing upon its recommenda-
tions. I know that this Committee and the mem-
bers of the subcommittee are as anxious as the
State Department to correct any misunderstand-
ings or misapprehension regarding the intent of
the report.

Officials of the Department have previously ap-
peared before the subcommittee which prepared
the report to answer questions and to provide data.
The Department has endeavored to give the sub-
committee all assistance possible in obtaining such
material as it required from Embassy sources.
The Department did not, however, see the report

' Made before the Senate Committee on Agriculture and
Forestry on June 20 and released to the press on the same
date.

itself before it was made public, and was, there-
fore, not able to comment in advance on those sec-
tions which it might have recognized as poten-
tially troublesome. I doubt that even we in the
Department could have foreseen the full measure
of resentment which the report has aroused. That
it is resented deeply, not only by the governments
of the countries which have lodged protests with
the Department but by their citizens, is becoming
increasingly apparent. Our Embassies in the
principal coffee-producing countries report that
even those newspapers which are customarily
friends of the United States have been sharply
critical of the United States on this issue and that
many of the attacks have been extremely bitter.

It is always to this Government's interest to
maintain relations with neighboring countries on
as friendly a basis as possible. The opening par-
agraphs of the subcommittee's report express what
I am sure is a sincere concern for the welfare of
the Latin American people. Recognizing, then,
the fund of good will which exists, I am hopeful
that the Committee will be able to develop its
final position on the coffee report in a form which
will both make possible the attainment of the de-
sirable objectives, upon which I am sure we can
all agree, and demonstrate a full understanding
of the position of the coffee-producing countries.
Our record for cooperation within the hemisphere
on matters relating to coffee is one of long stand-
ing. It has been of mutual benefit; and I hope
that it can be maintained.

140

Department of State Bulletin

The State Department is not here to plead a
case for high coffee prices. The Department takes
no position regarding the fairness or unfairness
of any given level of coffee prices. It assumes
that under a system of free private enterprise,
such as we encourage in the United States, prices
will adjust automatically to reflect a fair balance
between the conflicting interests of producer and
consumer, always assuming, of course, that the
market is broad enough to assure competition of
sellers and buyers. Coffee prices may seem ex-
tremely high to us at the present time. During
the period of the thirties, they seemed to the
coffee-producing countries to be unduly low, and
I am sure that this Committee will understand
me when I say that, I believe, the 1930's would not
be a fair base period to select for coffee.

I realize that the price of coffee is an important
consideration for the American consumer, and I
can appreciate his confusion at seeing the price
double within a few months. I fully understand
his desire to have this sudden price rise investi-
gated, and I believe that the subcommittee should
Be commended for its efforts to uncover any market
manipulation which contributed to the increase
in prices. The Department is not trying in any
way to shield any individual or group of in-
dividuals— in the United States or abroad — who
may have taken unfair advantage of the tight
situation which developed in the coffee market
last fall. Furthermore, it recognizes that with
the virtual disappearance of the Brazilian Gov-
ernment-owned stocks, which had served as a buf-
fer for so many years, the possibilities of manipu-
lation were appreciably increased.

Propriety of Statements Questioned

On the other hand, the Department believes
strongly that no accusations of manipulation of
markets, or collusion between producing interests,
should be made unless and until there is clear
evidence to substantiate such charges. With re-
spect to such matters, the Department must rely
largely on other agencies of the Government and
on the findings of Congressional committees of
investigation. Apparently, the subcommittee
itself has had some difficulty in developing infor-
mation of this character. I am informed that no-
where in the report or in the record of the hearings
is conclusive evidence presented to show that there
actually was collaboration on the part of the pro-
ducing countries to withhold coffee from this
market in order to bring about a rise in price.
Accordingly, I question the propriety of the state-
ment on page 16 of the report that "it is likely"
that the decision of the National Coffee Depart-
ment of Brazil to close out its coffee stocks in 1948
was "the prelude of a well-laid campaign by Bra-
zil and Colombia to raise coffee prices." The Na-
tional Coffee Department of Brazil has been en-
deavoring to liquidate its surplus coffee stocks

over a long period of years, and it was logical to
suppose that it would eventually succeed.

Another section of the report refers to the fact
that the National Federation of Coffee Growers
of Colombia is currently holding considerable
stocks of coffee and that both Colombia and Bra-
zil undertake, from time to time, to support coffee
prices either by maintaining a fixed buying price
or by assisting in the financmg of the crop. This,
surely, cannot be regarded as evidence of price
rigging. Maintenance of pi-ice supports for agri-
cultural commodities is an accepted practice of
many governments, including our own. As surely
as the withholding of stocks leads to a temporary
price increase, their future liquidation will lead to
a decrease in prices, and each goverimient must
make its own decision as to what rate of disposal
is in the best interests of its producers. Unless
there is collaboration among suppliers to misrep-
resent the facts, and thus to mislead consuming
interests, these price-support programs cannot
properly be regarded as market manipulation.

If, on the other hand, what the subcommittee
had in mind was manipulation by individual
speculators, and if there is evidence of such opera-
tions, certainly the situation should be investi-
gated by the Department of Justice, and any in-
fringement of our antitrust laws should be
IDunished. The State Department, of course, fully
subscribes to the thesis that the Attorney General
should be vigilant in protecting the consumer
against any infraction of our laws, whether by
foreign or by domestic speculators. Recommen-
dation 7 seems to me, however, in the circum-
stances, to prejudge the case. It requests the
Attorney General to bring civil suit under the
antitrust laws to compel disposition of the coffee
stocks which the National Federation of Coffee
Growers of Colombia holds in the United States.
On the basis of the evidence presented in the re-
port, I believe that it should have simply proposed
that the Attorney General make an investigation
to determine whether there might be basis for
charges under our antitrust laws.

The Department's principal interest in the re-
port, however, relates to some of the other recom-
mendations. Surprisingly, little or no informa-
tion is supplied in the report by way of background
on such recommendations. This, together with
the fact that they appear to the Governments and
the people of the Latin American countries to be
either a reflection upon the Governments or an
attack upon their economies, accounts very largely,
I believe, for the reaction which the report has
aroused. I shall take these recommendations in
order beginning at recommendation 9 and ask that
you examine them with me from the viewpoint of
our Latin American friends.

Recommendations Arousing Protests

Recommendation 9 is that at all future meetings
of the Special Commission on Coffee of the Inter-
American Economic and Social Council, a repre-

Ju/y 24, 1950

141

sentative of the Department of Justice, detailed
for that purpose by the Attorney General, be pres-
ent. Very little information is given in the body
of the report regarding the activities of the Coffee
Commission. There is one statement to the effect
that most of the representatives on the Coffee
Commission also represent their countries on the
Pan American Coffee Bureau, which is a sales pro-
motion organization, and which has been accused
of endeavoring to influence the trend of coffee
prices. The implication which is immediately
drawn from the subcommittee's recommendation
by the foreign representatives on the Commission
is: first, that they are suspected of being unable
to divorce their trade interests from their official
duties, and second, that surveillance is required to
prevent them from using the Commission as a
front for other activities, which might be detri-
mental to the United States consumer. This is a
case where misunderstanding can be harmful.

In order to save your time, I should like, at this
point, to incorporate by reference the testimony of
the Department's representative before the sub-
committee regarding the importance of coffee to
Latin America and the origin, purpose, and sig-
nificance to Latin American producers and to
United States consumers of the inter-American
coffee agreement. For the coffee producers, it
meant material assistance during one of their
darkest hours. For our consumers, it has meant
that supplies are now undoubtedly more adequate,
because it helped check a very substantial decline
in coffee production. The testimony in question
begins on page 818 of part 2 of the hearings. From
that testimony, it will be noted that this agreement
was a treaty which was approved by the Senate,
and the protocols extending it were presented to
the Senate for their advice and consent.

From that testimony, it will also be noted that
it was apparent by 1945 that conditions in the
world coffee industry had changed significantly.
Brazil's production, which had accounted for the
major part of the world's exports, had declined
greatly. Consumption in the United States had
increased substantially during the war years, and
European markets were again becoming accessible.

This change with respect to the world coffee sit-
uation was referred to in the report of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee submitted by Sen-
ator Lodge on February 19, 1947. The report
pointed out that because of the changed situation
the United States had suggested that the quota
provisions of the agreement be rendered inopera-
tive. The same report also indicated that the
United States view regarding the quotas had pre-
vailed notwithstanding some reluctance by other
signatory governments.

From the time the quota provisions were
dropped on October 1, 194.5, the Coffee Agreement
ceased to be a factor in the world coffee-price sit-
uation. The coffee-producing countries wished,
nevertheless, to see the agreement extended — not
because it could be of any further assistance to

them pricewise, but because of what it had meant,
and because it would be an indication of our con-
tinuing interest in their coffee problems.

It was later decided, again upon the initiative
of the United States, to allow the agreement to
terminate altogether. In the report of the For-
eign Relations Committee on April 20, 1948, rec-
ommending approval of the final protocol, which
extended the agreement until September 30, 1948,
the Committee pointed out that the protocol pro-
vided that the Coffee Board "should undertake
to make arrangements to transfer its functions,
assets, and records to an appropriate inter-Amer-
ican or other international organization" by Sep-
tember 30, 1948, and said "The Foreign Relations
Committee which has repeatedly urged the more
effective coordination of existing international or-
ganizations, believe that the program contem-
plated for tlae Coffee Board would be a step in the
right direction."

In pursuance of this provision of the protocol,
the United States join with the other members in
petitioning the Organization of American States
to assume responsibility for certain aspects of the
work carried out by the Coffee Board under the
agreement. The Inter-American Economic and
Social Council agreed that "in order to provide
facilities necessary for keeping the world coffee
situation under continuous review and for collect-
ing, analyzing and disseminating information
bearing on long-range coffee developments," it
would create a Special Commission on Coffee.

COFFEE COMMISSION

The Coffee Commission is merely a consultative
body. Any recommendations it makes must be
passed upon by the Economic and Social Council
of the Organization of American States. It has
no staft' and no separate budget. Its principal
activities are to improve coffee statistics and to
cooperate with the Institute of Agricultural Sci-
ences in Turrialba, Costa Rica, on projects for the
improvement of coffee production and handling.
It is, nevertheless, a symbol of cooperation be-
tween the governments of the American Republics.
The coffee-producing countries believe, very
strongly, that, during the period of the operation
of the agreement, coffee consumers in the United
States, especially because of the relatively low
prices during the period of price control, have been
the principal beneficiaries of this cooiDeration.

The Coffee Commission now meets about once
a month and prior to the coffee investigation, so
far as the Department is aware, no question had
even arisen regarding the desirability of holding
open meetings, because no one had evidenced any
interest in attending. Statistics on coffee have
appeal for a very small group, and the general
interest in technical assistance has been focused on
a whole program, rather than on the $27,000
project for the year ending June 30, 1950, that is
being carried out on coffee at Turrialba.

142

Departmenf of Stafe Bulletin

I hope that with tliis background you may be
able to appreciate why the recominendatioa that
a repi"esentative of the Depai'tnient of Justice at-
tend the meetings of tlie Coffee Commission has
been interpreted by the members of the Commis-
sion as an afl'ront both to themselves and to their
govermnents. The Commission believes, and
made evident at the special meeting which
it called last Friday afternoon to consider the
coffee report, that it has been placed in an un-
favorable light ; that the affront was not deserved ;
and that it has no adequate means of protecting
itself. However, among other actions taken at
the meeting of the Commission on Friday was a
decision, by unanimous vote, that the Commis-
sion's meetings would customarily be open to any-
one who might wish to attend. The Department
believes that this decision was a wise one in that
it should help protect the Commission against un-
warranted criticism in the future, and it may lead
to a somewhat better understanding of the Com-
mission's activities both on the part of the public
and the press. I must, therefore, in all respect,
say that in my opinion this recommendation was
unwise.

QUARTERLY REPORTS

With respect to recommendation 10, that the
Bureau of the Census undertake to make regular
quarterly reports of the stocks of green and roasted
coffee on hand, I should like to mention that the
Coffee Commission some months ago requested the
United States representative to take this matter
up with the Bureau of the Census and to see
whether data on stocks could not be collected reg-
ularly. It was disappointed to learn that this
was not possible at that time, largely because funds
for this purpose were not available. If, as a re-
sult of your interest in the matter, this difficulty
can be overcome, a real improvement in our own
statistics on coffee could be realized. This might
serve as a useful example to other countries in-
terested in international trade in coffee.

Recommendation 11 is one to which the other
American Republics have taken strong exception
and which the State Department would not be
able to support. It suggests "that the United
States, through diplomatic channels, offer to assist
the Brazilian and Colombian Governments in such
a way as may seem feasible to aid these countries
in acljusting their official exchange rates of the
cruzeiro and the peso to the certificate-of-exchange
or realistic value of these jnoneys." Brazil and
Colombia are both members of the International
Monetary Fund, as is also the United States. The
Fund is the international authority on questions
of exchange, and the subject is a highly technical
one. Any request for an adjustment of exchange
rates must, under the Fund's regulations, originate
with the country desiring the change and come
before the directors of the Fund for consideration.
The United States Director on the Fund has an

opportunity, at that time, to make known the
views of this Government, and any action by this
Government through channels other than the
Fund would be considered inappropriate.

Recommendation 12 of the report urges the cof-
fee-producing countries "to establish full reliable
statistical organizations within their governments
that will provide accurate statistics on stocks of
coffee both in warehouses and interior, proper crop
estimates, tree census, acreage, etc."

This is another instance where I believe that
the wording of the recommendation could be im-
proved. I believe that no one is more aware of
the need for improvement of coffee statistics than
the producing countries themselves. Through
their representatives on the Special Commission
on Coffee, they have recently devoted much time
and thought to the preparation of a questionnaire
which has now been sent to the government of
each coffee-producing country in an effort to ob-
tain data which will be accurate, comparable, and
up to date. The Commission has also worked
with the United Nations Food and Agriculture
Organization to try to insure that the 1950 census
of agriculture which is now being taken in many
of the countries of the hemisphere will increase
the statistical information on coffee. But you will
note that the subcommittee's recommendation re-
fers not to reliable statistics but to "reliable statis-
tical organizations." This has been interpreted
by the coffee-producing countries as a reflection
not on their statistics — which they will readily
admit are not as comprehensive as they would like
to have them — but on their public officials. I'm
sure that no such interpretation was intended and
that a slight revision of wording would have elim-
inated the misunderstanding.

ANOMALOUS RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations 13 and 14 can best be consid-
ered together. One recommends that the United
States offer technical assistance to friendly nations
other than those in the Western Hemisphere in
expanding their coffee production. The other ad-
vises careful scrutiny of any loans made by this
Government to the Central and South American
countries in view of the fact that their economies
are largely dependent on coffee and that any per-
manent decline in consumption comparable to that
which occurred in the first 4 months of this year
will, ultimately, result in "a crash in coffee prices."
These two recommendations, presented in conjunc-
tion seem to be an anomaly. If the price of coffee
should fall to a level which might endanger the
financial structure of the countries now producing
coffee, it would not appear to be a promising field
for development in other countries under the tech-
nical assistance program.

Actually, I doubt that the first 4 months of this
year afford a reliable guide to future consimiption
trends. That was the period immediately follow-
ing the rapid price increase, and the hoarding

July 24, 1950

143

which we know occurred during the last quarter
of 1949 probably finds its parallel in the dis-
hoarding which took place during the first quarter
of 1950. I understand that there is a wide differ-
ence of opinion among men who know the coffee
trade best as to what effect the price increase is
likely to have on consumption in the long run.
In view of this fact, it seems to me that the need
for recommending special precautions with re-
spect to loans made to coffee-producing countries
has not been established. All loans made by the
Government will continue to be carefully scruti-
nized as to their economic and financial sound-
ness, and a determination as to repayment ability,
based upon the long-term internal and external
financial outlook, is always a fundamental
consideration.

With reference to the recommendation that the
United States encourage the production of coffee in
countries outside the hemisphere, there would ap-
pear to be no reason for placing a geographical
restriction on whatever aid may be offered through
the technical assistance program. If the outlook
is for a continuance of short supplies, we would,
logically, welcome increased production in any
country, including those to the south, which have
customarily supplied more than 95 percent of our
coffee imports and cooperated fully both with this
Government and with the domestic coffee trade in
endeavoring to meet our requirements. If the as-
sumption on which the recommendation was based
was that no assistance would be required to en-
courage production in areas which are already ac-
quainted with coffee culture, I believe that the
assumption was in error. Actually, improved cul-
tural practices could be introduced, advanta-
geously, in many countries which are now large
producers, and support and encouragement of ex-
perimental work on coffee in institutions such as
the Inter-American Institute of Agriculture in
Turrialba is urgently needed.

Kecommendation 15 is that the Economic Co-
operation Administration refuse to authorize any
further allocation of dollars for the purchase of
coffee. The coffee-producing countries might well
ask why their principal procluct should be singled
out for special restrictions. Is it punishment for
allowing prices to rise or is it to be interpreted
merely as an effort on the part of the United States
to obtain the lion's share of a limited supply?
Whatever the explanation, it is fresh salt in an old
wound. As you probably know, the EGA pro-
gram is regarded by many of these countries as
an obstacle to their own industrial development.
They have pointed out that this program for Euro-
pean reconstruction operates to their disadvan-
tage in at least two ways. First, they fear that
through possible future development of colonial
possession, active competition for their products
may be built up. Second, because of the strain
which it placed, especially in the early years, on
our industrial plant, they claim that the Marshall
Plan delayed them in obtaining new equipment

and replacement parts which were needed to face
the new competition. They asked, at one time,
for a Marshall Plan for South America, pointing
out that they were relatively undeveloped and that
capital was urgently needed. They could point
to an excellent record of cooperation with this
Government throughout the war in supplying
products which we then urgently needed. Our
answer included the assurance that they would
benefit, at second hand, from the demand for their
products which would develop in Europe as a
result of the flow of EGA dollars to the European
countries.

Actually, they have benefited much less from
the program than might have been expected. The
surplus disposal provisions of the EGA Act
limited procurement of agricultural products to
the United States if surplus stocks were available,
even when prices here were substantially higher
than elsewhei'e. So far as competing commodities
were concerned, therefore, Latin American coun-
tries were out of the market. They still might
benefit, however, from the purchase of petroleum,
coffee, sugar, and other tropical products, but it
would be difficult to establish the fact that their
export of coffee to Europe is larger because of the
EGA program. A relatively small amount of
coffee has actually been financed by EGA, and most
of this has been of inferior grades that are not
used in appreciable quantities in the United States.
In view of all the circumstances, it is understand-
able, I think, that they should regard the recom-
mendation regarding EGA procurement of coffee
as added evidence that the subcommittee is not
sympathetic to their problems.

View on Proposed Legislation

I do not wish to comment in detail on the other
recommendations of the report because they are,
in general not so directly related to the foreign
policy of the United States as are those that I have
already discussed with you, and since the Com-
mittee will presumably receive comments from
the agencies of the Government which are most
closely concerned. However, since two of the
recommendations deal with the only legislative
action proposed in the report, I should like to
indicate the present thinking of the Department
with respect to them.

The Department would have no objection, in
principle, to the bill proposed in recommendation
4 which would place trading in coffee under the
Commodity Exchange Act. The Department is
at present aware of no reason why. from the for-
eign policy viewpoint, coffee should not be subject
to the same legislation in respect of trading on
the commodity exchanges that applies to a large
number of staple commodities that are primarily
of domestic origin. In fact, unless there are prac-
tical reasons why this should not be done, the re-
duction that has gradually occurred over a period
(Continned on page 157)

144

Department of State Bulletin

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

The World Cotton Situation

REPORT ON NINTH PLENARY MEETING

OF INTERNATIONAL COTTON ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The International Cotton Advisory Commit-
tee convened its ninth plenary meeting on May 22
at AVashington to strive for further progress
toward its three major, continuing objectives
which are :

1. To furnish information regarding the current
economic position of cotton in the world.

2. To serve as a forum for the exchange of views
and ideas designed to facilitate solution of prob-
lems affecting the world's cotton industry.

3. To formulate suggestions for international
economic study in dealing with world cotton
problems.

Summary of Action

The Committee took no action on negotiating
an international cotton agreement but recom-
mended that the Standing Committee continue to
keep the world cotton situation under continuous
review and "make such recommendations to mem-
ber governments as it deems appropriate and com-
patible with their international obligations."

The Committee, although recognizing that bal-
ance-of-payments difficulties constitute a world-
wide problem whose solution is outside its scope,
agreed that the world for years to come will be
highly dependent upon raw cotton exports from
the United States. It took note of the fact that
those exports, at present, are made possible largely
through exceptional financing methods. In this
connection, the Committee asked its Standing
Committee, with the assistance of the Secretariat,
to follow developments in the balance-of-pay-
ments situation as it affects cotton and to report
on the matter at the tenth plenary meeting.

With reference to increasing world cotton con-
sumption, the Committee invited all member gov-

ernments to help raise clothing standards in their
countries through a study of national clothing
habits and by assisting manufacturers in carrying
out necessary sales promotion programs and by
further research and development of cotton pro-
duction and processing methods.

The Committee, reaffirming a resolution at its
eighth plenary meeting, recommended again to
member governments that where satisfactory steps
have not already been taken for the purpose, they
establish a national coordinating agency or desig-
nate an existing office to supply the Secretariat
with needed statistical and other information.
It recommended, furthermore, that such coordi-
nating agency of office serve also to distribute to
all appropriate agencies and offices of the respec-
tive governments information and material re-
ceived from the Secretariat and generally keep in
close touch with the Secretariat.

The Committee commended the Secretariat for
its report and published periodicals. One of the
studies prepared by the Secretariat was the An-
nual Review of the World Cotton Situation. This
document contains an analysis and summary of
developments during the current season and pros-
pects for the future in the various sectors of the
world economy — production, consumption, stocks,
trade, and prices.

Representation

Representation at the ninth plenary meeting was
the largest since the organization of the Com-
mittee 11 years ago. Edwin D. White (United
States) was elected chairman of the Standing
Committee which meets regularly during the year
at the permanent Secretariat at Washington to
keep the world cotton situation continuously under
review and promote the flow of information be-
tween the Committee's member governments.

Jw/y 24, ?950

145

The Governments of the following States were
represented at the Meeting by delegates :

Argentina

Australia

Austria

Belgium

Brazil

Canada

China

Esypt

France

Greece

India

Italy

Mexico

Netherlands

Pakistan

Peru

Turkey

United Kingdom

United States

The Governments of the following States were
represented by observers :

Bolivia

Colombia

Ceylon

Cuba

Denmark

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

Finland

Germany,

Federal Republic of
Guatemala
Haiti
Israel
Korea

Klcaragua

Panama

Philippines

Poland

Portugal

Supreme Command

Allied Powers
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria

Union of South Africa
Venezuela
■Jugoslavia

The following International Organizations were
represented by observers:

Intergovernmental Organizations

Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations

Interim Coordinating Committee for International
Commodity Arrangements of the United
Nations

International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment

International Monetary Fund

Organization for European Economic Cooperation

Nongovernmental Organisations

International Federation of Master Cotton Spin-
ners' and Manufacturers' Association

Summary Review of World Cotton Situation

The 1949-50 season has been of special impor-
tance for cotton. It is the first in the prewar era
to see an increase in the world supply (carry-over
plus production) of cotton. World production
has expanded on a broad front. At about 31 mil-
lion bales, it is expected to exceed consumption by
some 2 million bales. This amount would result
in a world carry-over of about 17 million bales on
August 1, 1950, this carry-over being actually and
proportionately the greatest in the United States.
Keintroduction of acreage restrictions in the
United States and Egypt will affect production in
the 1950-51 season. Despite prospective expan-
sion in the Indian Union, Pakistan, and elsewhere,
the global production in 1950-51 will possibly be
moderately smaller than in the current season.

World consumption of cotton, estimated at ap-
proximately 29 million bales in 1949-50, has shown
relatively little change in the past 4 seasons and

is still slightly less than the prewar (1934-38)
average. Unsettled conditions in the Far East
and the rebuilding of textile inventories in other
areas are among the local and short-term factors
offsetting each other in the current season. In the
face of substantial increases over prewar levels in
general economic activity and in consumption of
other fibers, the failure of cotton consumption to
expand is a world problem of great importance.
The review concludes that it is difficult to envisage
any significant and sustained advance in global
cotton consumption in the near future, with cotton
and cotton textile prices at current levels, and in
the context of the continuing world dollar short-
age, unless special mitigating arrangements are
made.

International trade in cotton has made further
gains, and world exports in 1949-50 are expected
to total 11.5 million bales — half a million bales
more than in 1948-49. The increased movement,
chiefly in dollar cottons, has been given assist-
ance by United States foreign aid programs and
impetus by the prospect of a smaller crop in the
United States next season.

Prices for cotton in national currencies have fol-
lowed divergent courses in 1949-50, moving up-
ward sharply in countries where currencies were
devalued and receding slightly in others. At the
same time, the United States price supports were
again operative and continued to influence, to some
extent, world prices for medium staples. Since
the announcement of acreage restrictions for the
1950-51 crop in the United States, market prices
have been stronger.

The review draws attention to the intensified
competition from rayon, which had a price advan-
tage over cotton in all major consuming countries
in 1949-50. This advantage was greatly enhanced
in Europe as a result of the higher cost of cotton
following devaluation. The displacement of cot-
ton by rayon is to some extent affected by consum-
ers' preferences for cotton, on the one hand, and
by insufficient supply of rayon on the other. In
the latter connection, note is taken of the fact that
in countries where rayon production is not already
close to the limit of capacity it is expanding rap-
idly.

Resolutions Approved

RESOLUTION I

It is Resolved:

That Messrs. Price, Waterhouse and Company's "Re-
port and Summary of Cash Receipts and Disbursements
for the Fiscal Year ending June 30, 1949" contained in
their letter of August 22, 1949, be accepted along with
the Secretariat's statement of the financial position of the
Committee as of March 31, 1950.

RESOLUTION II

It is Resolved:

(1) That the Standing Committee be authorized to ap-
prove expenditures in the twelve months ending June
30, 1951, in the following amounts :

146

Department of State Bulletin

Salaries, including tax reimbursements $48, 000

Office expenses (supplies, printing, duplicating,

binding, etc.) 6,000

Communications (cable, telephone, telegraph,

messenger and jwstage) 2,000

Transportation 9, 500

OflSce equipment 2, (XK)

Miscellaneous exiHjnses 1, 000

Total 68, 500

(2) That the Standing Committee be authorized to in-
crease expenditures, if necessary to carry out the approved
program of work, bv an amount not exceeding 15 percent
of the total of $68,500.

(3) That the Standing Committee be further authorized
to make such shifts and adjustments of funds from one
item to another within the total as it shall find to be in
the best interest of the work.

resolution iii

Wheeeas:

A graduated scale for contributions by member govern-
ments was established by Resolution II of the Sixth
Plenary Meeting, based on Ave categories of contributions
according to the annual average of total cotton exports
and imports in the five years of 1934-35 through 1938-39,
and

"Whereas:

It is deemed that postwar trade in cotton is insuffi-
ciently stabilized to afford a basis for a revision of the
scale of contributions,

Jt is Resolved:

(1) That assessments of member governments be made
according to the formula adopted for 1947-48, based on
the annual average of total cotton exported and imported
in the five years, 1934-35/1938-39, insofar as practicable,
and

(2) That assessments in 1950-51 conform to the fol-
lowing schedule :

Group I Over 4.000,000 bales $12, 000

United States

Group II 2,000,000 to 4,000,000 bales 8, 000

United Kingdom

Group III 500,000 to 2,000,000 bales 4, 000

Brazil Indian Union

China Italj;

Egypt Pakistan

Prance

Group IV 100,000 to 500,000 bales 2,500

Anglo-Eiiyptian Canada

Sudan Czechoslovakia

Argentina Mexico

Austria Netherlands

Belgium

Group V Less than 100,000 bales 1, 000

Australia

Greece

Turkey

Total 71,000

(3) That the contribution of a government newly ac-
ceding to membership in the International Cotton Ad-
visory Committee at any time during a fiscal .vear shall be
the annual assessment as calculated in accordance with
Section (1) of this Resolution, multiplied by the number
of quarters of the year in which the government is a mem-
ber and divided by four.

(4) That on resignation of a member, no refund shall
be made of any part of that member's contribution for any
unexpired portion of a financial year remaining at the
time of the member's resignation.

July 24, 1950

895251—50 4

(5) That the Standing Committee be requested to sub-
mit to the 10th Plenary Meeting a revised schedule of
assessments of contributions for member governments
for the year 1951-52, and to consider ways and means of
increasing the revenues of the Committee such as making
a charge for copies of its publications distributed to other
than member governments.

resolution iv

Whereas :

A Reserve Fund has been set up in accordance with
Resolution II of the Sixth Plenary Meeting and Resolu-
tion VI of the Seventh Plenary Meeting, and

Whereas :

The Reserve Fund on July 1, 1948 was $50,000.00, and

Whereas:

A Working Fund is needed from which to defray the
operating expenses of the Committee,

It is Resolved:

(1) That the Plenary Committee declare that the
amount of Reserve Fund on July 1, 1949, was $50,000.00.

(2) That Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of Resolution VI,
Seventh Plenary Meeting continue to be applicable to
the Reserve Fund.

(3) That any funds of the Committee in excess of
$50,000.00 shall constitute the Working Fund.

RESOLUTION V

Whereas :

It was agreed in Resolution VII of the Eighth Plenary
Meeting that invitations to accede to the International
Cotton Advisory Committee be held open to all members
of the United Nations of the Food and Agriculture Organ-
ization of the United Nations, having a substantial inter-
est in cotton ; and that the Standing Committee be au-
thorized to consider and to act upon applications for
membership from any other government having a sub-
stantial interest in cotton.

It is Resolved:

(1) That the Standing Committee be requested to
send to all governments eligible under Resolution VII of
the Eighth Plenary Meeting formal invitations to accede
to the Committee,

(2) That the authority of the Standing Committee to
consider and act upon the applications of other govern-
ments to accede to the Committee be reaffirmed,

(3) That the Standing Committee be requested to es-
tablish forthwith procedures for acting upon any ac-
ceptance, application, or withdrawal by such govern-
ments.

RESOLUTION Vi

Whereas :

The action developing from Resolution VIII of the
Eighth Plenary Meeting has yielded very useful results
and promises further benefits,

It is Resolved:

(1) To reaffirm Resolution VIII of the Eighth Plenary
Meeting,

(2) To recommend again to member governments that
where satisfactory organizational measures have not al-
ready been taken for this purpose, they consider favorably
the establishment of a National Coordinating Agency or
the designation of an existing office to provide the Secre-
tariat with all the information referred to in Resolution
VIII of the Eighth Plenary Meeting as well as to distrib-

147

ute to appropriate agencies and officers of tlieir govern-
ments all the information and material received from
the Secretariat, and generally to keep in close contact
with it,

(3) To recommend again to member governments that
they ascertain that statistical and other information re-
quested by the Secretariat, as specified in Annex A of
Resolution VIII of the Eighth Plenary Meeting, be sup-
plied regularly and rapidly.

RESOLUTION VII

Whereas :

Adequate data on the prices of cotton are of special
importance, and

Whereas :

It is not now possible to compute prices of various
growths on a world-wide basis,

/* is Resolved:

That member governments examine their facilities for
assembling price statistics in their respective countries
and consider the desirability and possibility of further
practical measures for the improvement of their price
information.

resolution viii

Whereas :

The Committee appreciates the excellent reports on the
Developing World Cotton Situation prepared by the Stand-
ing Committee and Secretariat, and

Where^as :

The information and Statistics furnished in these re-
ports are very valuable and some of the suggestions made
by the Standing Committee on various items merit con-
tinued consideration, and

Whereas:

The Committee also appreciates the high quality of the
Monthly Review and Quarterly Statistical Bulletin pre-
pared by the Secretariat

It is Resolved:

(1) That this Plenary Committee place on record Its
indebtedness to the Chairman, members of the Standing
Committee, the Secretariat, and others who participated
in the preparation of these reports, and

(2) That Parts A and B of the "Report on the Develop-
ing World Cotton Situation," prepared by the Secretariat
and the Standing Committee as working documents for
the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the International Cotton
Advisory Committee, be printed and sold to the public,
including as an annex the relevant resolutions of this
meeting.

Note : Resolution VIII was adopted with the reservation that
no restricted material supplied by other international bodies
would be published.

RESOLUTION IX

It is Resolved:

To continue to publish

(a) The Monthly Review of the World Cotton Situation
in accordance with the following schedule:

Publication date

July 15, 1950
August 15, 1950
September 15, 1950
October 15, 1950
November 15, 1950

Containing information
received through
June 30, 19.50
Julv 31, 1950
August 31, 1950
September 30, 1950
October 31, 1950

December 15, 1950
January 15, 1951
February 15, 1951*
March 15, 1951
April 15, 1951
May 15, 1951
June 15, 1951

November 30, 1950
December 31, 1950
January 31, 1951
February 28, 1951
March 31, 1951
April 30, 1951
May 31, 1951

•To Include annual statement on the World Cotton Situation
prepared for the Tenth Meeting of the Plenary Committee, and

(b) The Quarterly Statistical Bulletin for cotton and
competing fibers in accordance with the following
schedule :

September 15, 1950
December 15, 1950

March 15, 1951
June 15, 1951

RESOLUTION X

information is lacking on the following

Whereas :

Adequate
subjects

It is Resolved:

That the Secretariat undertake the work specified
below :

(1) The publication of information and statistics as
they become available of

(a) The production of cotton in individual countries
by staple length and grade ;

(b) The United States C.C.C. stocks, by staple length
and grade ; and the price policy regarding same from time
to time ;

(2) An investigation into the availability of informa-
tion concerning the supply of textile machinery, report-
ing to the next (Tenth) Plenary Meeting and if possible
making an interim report before then ;

(3) The transmittal of such condensed and bibliograph-
ical Information as is published and can be obtained from
member governments on :

(a) Relative production costs and farm incomes
from cotton and food crops including methods of account-
ing and actual results of investigations undertaken;

(b) New discoveries in the field of pest controL

RESOLUTION XI

It is Resolved:

That the following draft Resolution submitted by the
Peruvian Delegate be referred to the Standing Committee
for consideration and for such action as It deems desir-
able, bearing in mind budgetary limitations.

"Wherbias :

Resolution (Document 26) of the Fifth Plenary Meet-
ing, May 1946, states in item 8 'That the official and work-
ing languages of the International Cotton Advisory Com-
mittee be the same as those adopted by the United Na-
tions,'

Whereias :

It Is convenient to the Spanish-speaking people for their
full understanding of the work of this Committee and its
reports

It is Resolved:

That all the proceedings and information now being
compiled by the International Cotton Advisory Committee
and all subsequent proceedings and data, be published in

Spanish."

resolution xii

Whereas :

(1) Governments are concerned to increase general
standards of living for their populations, the more so

148

Department of State Bulletin

after the disruption of national economies caused by the
war,

(2) Governments are concerned that farmers receive
remunerative prices for their output,

(o) If both these objectives are to be met, production
and price policies must be evolved which give due regard
to the interests of both producers and consumers,

(4) World cotton consumption has not increased since
1947 in proportion to the general recovery in economic
activity and the rise in population,

(5) Cotton production since the end of the war has
increased in the dollar area, but remains below prewar
levels in some other areas, due mainly to the need for
food crops,

(6) Cotton stoclis increased in 1949/50 for the first
time since the war, mostly in the United States, resulting
in the reintroduction of acreage controls in that country ;
while at the same time cotton stocks have decreased else-
where,

(7) Postwar international trade in cotton is still greatly
hampered by the world-wide dollar shortage,

(S) Very outstanding results have already been at-
tained in the field of genetics and methods of production,

(9) The relatively higher price of cotton may in itself
have an unfavorable influence on the consumption of
cotton, and may stimulate recurring surplus production,

(10) Most of the non-dollar cottons currently enjoy
over the doUar cottons relatively wider price differentials
than the normal price premiums and discounts accounted
for by the difference in quality and grade,

(11) Technological progress has considerably improved
the quality of synthetic fibers, at the same time reducing
costs materially, resulting in keener competition with
cotton, which has been intensified by the effect of de-
valuation in many countries,

It is Resolved:

That the Meeting express in terms of the following para-
graphs, A through F, its views, conclusions, and recom-
mendations with respect to measures that governments
might appropriately take to improve the conditions for
consumption of cotton.

A. Cotton Consumption

The Committee considers that for various reasons,
Including the low level of incomes in many countries and
the failure of cotton consumption to respond to rises in
the level of incomes in other countries, the present ag-
gregate level of world consumption of cotton is unsatis-
factory, particularly In view of the general objective of
member governments of promoting for their populations
minimum standards of clothing (along with food and
housing).

The population in the countries where the level of
income is low is generally very dense and under-clothed,
and even a small Increase in the per capita consumption
of cotton and cotton goods in these countries would bring
about a large over-all increase in world consumption of
cotton.

With a view to creating conditions favorable for the
expansion of cotton consumption but without requesting
any preferential treatment for cotton vis-S-vis other
fibers, the Committee invites all member governments
to examine the factors which appear to hamper such ex-
pansion and when appropriate to modify national policies
which may contribute to this result, having special regard
to the following fields :

1. The practicability of reducing or removing im-
pediments, whether fiscal, commercial, or by other regu-
lations, on the exports and imports of cotton and cotton
goods and on the flow of internal trade in cotton and
cotton goods ;

2. Promoting a study of national clothing habits
and assisting manufacturers to popularize suitable cloth-
ing items with necessary sales promotion ;

3. Encouraging technical assistance in the field
both of agricultural and industrial production;

July 24, 1950

4. Supplying of cotton textile machinery on an easy
and long-term commercial basis ; and

5. Promoting research and developing alternative
uses of cotton.

B. Cotton and the Balance of Payments

While recognizing that balance-of-payments difficul-
ties are a world-wide problem, the solution of which is
not within the scope of this Committee, it seems never-
theless appropriate to remind member governments that
the level of textile activity in the world is still, and will
be for years to come, highly dependent upon the main-
tenance of large exports of raw cotton from hard currency
countries, which are at present largely made possible by
exceptional methods of financing.

The Committee invites the Standing Committee to
follow developments in the balance-of-payments situation
as it affects cotton and to report on the matter at the
Tenth Plenary Meeting.

C. Prices

Recognizing fully the essential objective of protecting
both the level and the stability of cotton growers' income
and providing textiles for a living standard as high
as possible, and calling the member governments' atten-
tion to outstanding and progressive achievements in the
field of synthetic fibers, the Committee:

1. Invites the Governments of all producing coun-
tries to give serious consideration to such modification of
their respective national production and price policies as
may be required to enable the world's consumers of cot-
ton and cotton goods to receive the maximum benefit from
improvements in technology and efficiency, and thereby
to contribute to the maintenance of cotton's position as
the most widely used and popular textile fiber and to an
Improvement of cotton's competitive position;

2. Invites the Governments of all consuming coun-
tries to take all practicable measures to increase the effi-
ciency of production and distribution of cotton goods ;

3. Invites all member governments to make every
effort to keep the greatest possible quantity of cotton
flowing in international trade at fair and reasonable
prices.

D. Research

The Committee draws the attention of the member
governments to the fact that research efforts are more
than ever necessary. It is only insofar as such research
in cotton production, manufacturing and distribution
meets with increasing success that cotton will be able to
maintain its outstanding position in the textile world,
and that cotton farmers will be able to maintain a satis-
factory outlet for the production of their land. Member
governments are requested to send their published infor-
mation, which may be of special interest to other govern-
ments, to the Secretariat for distribution.

E. Concessional Price Arrangements

The Committee, fully aware that the aggregate con-
sumption of cotton depends on the quantity of cotton and
cotton goods which can effectively move into international
trade from producing to consuming countries and noting
the present dilBculties which impede such international
trade, feels that every effort should be undertaken to
increase it.

Very serious objections in principle have been raised
against exceptional devices as being incompatible with the
normal, free flow of trade.

The Committee has therefore not found any possibility
of elaborating an arrangement of this kind, which would
help to solve the ditficulties, but if member governments
develop specific proposals regarding concessional prices
for cotton and cotton goods, they may be presented to the
Standing Committee for study and report to the Tenth
Plenary Meeting. Any such proposal should relate to
trade over and above normal trade and contain adequate
safeguards for the protection of the interests of other
exporting and importing countries.

149

F. International Cotton Agreement

Having in mind the present tendency of world cotton
production to exceed effective demand and the unstable
factors in the world cotton trade situation, the Committee
anticipates that the Standing Committee, under its original
terms of reference, will keep the vporld cotton situation
under continuous review and will make such recommenda-
tions to member governments as it deems appropriate
and compatible with their international obligations.

The Committee notes the discussion of intergovern-
mental measures relating to commodity agreements pre-
pared by the Interim Coordinating Committee for Inter-
national Commodity Arrangements of the United Na-
tions, which appears in Section A of the Report on the
Developing World Cotton Situation, and invites the Stand-
Committee to consider these measures in relation to cot-
ton and to report to the Tenth Plenary Meeting.

RESOLUTION XIII

Whereas :

The Government of Pakistan through its delegation has
invited the Committee to hold its Tenth Plenary Meeting
in Pakistan in the second fortnight of February 1951, and

Wherel^s :

It has been determined that an opening date approxi-
mating February 20, 1951, will be convenient alike to the
Government of Pakistan and to the Committee,

It is Resolved:

(1) That the Committee accept the gracious invitation
of the Government of Pakistan, and

(2) That a letter be addressed to the Government of
Pakistan expressing the warm thanks and appreciation
of the Committee.

resolution xiv

Wheehias :

The Government of India through its delegation has
expressed a desire to extend a most cordial invitation to
the Committee to hold its Tenth Plenary Meeting in India
and has in conclusion expressed its desire to be host to
the Committee at some future date,

It is Resolved:

(1) That the Committee express to the Government of
India warm thanks and appreciation and

(2) That the Committee take note of the interest of
the Government of India for the future.

RESOLUTION XV

It is Resolved:

(1) That the Delegates to this Ninth Plenary Meeting
of the International Cotton Advisory Committee express
to the Government of the United States their appreciation
and thanks for the excellent arrangements made for this
Meeting and for the hospitality and courtesy with which
they have been received ;

(2) That they express thanks, particularly to the
Chairman of this Meeting, the Honorable Charles F. Bran-
nan ; the Vice Chairman, Mr. Edwin D. White ; the Secre-
tary General, Dr. Arthur W. Palmer, and to the other
members of the Secretariat and of the International Con-
ferences Division of the State Department for their per-
sonal contributions to the success of the present Meeting ;
and

(3) That they wish the Chairman to convey to the
Government of the United States and its officials this
expression of their appreciation.

Fourth Session of the Contracting Parties

to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

by Melvin E. Sinn

The Conference recently held at Geneva from
February 22 to April 3, 1950, was the latest in a
series convened in accordance with the provisions
of article XXV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, which provide that :

Representatives of the Contracting Parties ' shall meet
from time to time for the purpose of giving effect to those
provisions of tliis Agreement which involve joint action
and, generally, with a view to facilitating the operation
and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.

Three previous sessions of the Contracting
Parties have been held : the first at Habana in
1948, the second at Geneva from August-Septem-
ber 1948, and the third at Annecy, France, from

The words "Contracting Parties" are capitalized when
used in the collective sense of the contracting parties
acting jointly.

April-August 1949, where tariff negotiations were
held concurrently. The fact that more countries
were represented at the fourth session of the Con-
tracting Parties than at any previous session indi-
cates the importance which nations are attribut-
ing to cooperative action in the field of interna-
tional trade. The following countries were repre-
sented at the Conference as contracting parties :
Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada,
Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, France, India,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Pakistan, Southern Ehodesia, the Union of South
Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. During the course of the session, Greece
and Indonesia, who were also represented at the
Conference, became contracting parties. The
Netherlands sponsored Indonesia under the pro-
visions of Article XXVI of the Agreement.

150

Department of Slate Bulletin

Denmark, the Doiuiiiican Republic, Finland,
Italy, Sweden, and Ui'uguay, who participated in
the 1949 Annecy taritf negotiations, were repre-
sented, and all except Ui'iiguay have now acceded
to the Agreement. Austria, the German Federal
Republic, and Turkey were also represented and
expect to partici]iate in the next round of tariff
negotiations. Observers at the Conference in-
cluded representatives from the International
Monetary Fund, the Economic Commission for
Europe, the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation, and the Allied High Conmiission.
During the session, notice of withdrawal from the
Agreement was received from the Nationalist
Government of China.

The United States delegation to the Conference
was headed by Ambassador Henry F. Grady,
■with John W. Evans, chief of the Economic Re-
sources and Security Staff of the Department of
State, as vice chairman.

Work of the Conference

As in previous sessions, the Conference pro-
ceeded by first considering items in plenary ses-
sion and then referring those which required
further study to working groups. For purposes
of analysis, the business covered by the fourth
session can be roughly divided into three cate-
gories: (A) preparations for the next round of
tariff negotiations, (B) examination of trade
practices, and (C) other problems arising from
the operation of the Agreement.

Preparation for the Tariff Negotiations

One of the most important tasks of the Con-
ference was to make advance preparations for the
third round of tariff negotiations which had been
decided upon by the third session at Annecy. The
Contracting Parties accepted an invitation from
the United Kingdom to hold the negotiations,
•which will begin on September 28 of this year,
at Torquay, England. They also decided to holcl
their fifth session at the same place beginning on
November 2, the two conferences to run concur-
rently. The Torquay tariff negotiations will be on
a large scale, with approximately 40 countries par-
ticipating. About 400 separate bilateral negotia-
tions will take place, as compared with 123 com-
pleted at Geneva in 1947 and 147 at Annecy in
1949.

Revalidation of Geneva and Annecy Schedules

In preparing for the forthcoming tariff negotia-
tions, the Contracting Parties were anxious to in-
sure that the negotiations will not be made the oc-
casion for raising tariffs, even though the technical
right exists in article XXVIII to adjust individual
rates in the tariff schedules after January 1, 1951.
To achieve this purpose, the Contracting Parties
considered a proposal designed to extend the as-
sured life of the Geneva and Annecy schedules

July 24, 1950

for a further period beyond January 1, 1951. Al-
though the Contracting Parties decided not to take
any definitive action before the Torquay negotia-
tions, they did pass a resolution recommending
that such an extension be made and further that in-
dividual contracting parties take the steps neces-
sary to be in a position to extend until January
1, 1954, the assured life of the tariff schedules
when the Torquay negotiations are completed.

The Contracting Parties also reaffirmed the rule,
followed at previous negotiations, that the binding
of a low tariff rate should be considered equivalent
in principle to the substantial reduction of a high
rate.

Participation of Switzerland

In September 1949, Switzerland had been in-
vited to participate in the third round of tariff
negotiations and in her reply had indicated cer-
tain special difficulties which she anticipated would
result from acceptance of the obligations of the
Agreement. The Contracting Parties examined
several proposals by which they hoped to meet
these difficulties and enable Switzerland to par-
ticipate. After long and sympathetic considera-
tion, however, the Conti'acting Parties concluded
that none of the particular proposals advanced
could both meet the Swiss position and be regarded
as satisfactory to the Contracting Parties. The
Contracting Parties hoped that a way might still
be found within the letter and spirit of the Agree-
ment for Switzerland to participate.

Participation of Western Germany

A vote of 17-1 rejected a proposal by Czecho-
slovakia that Western Germany should be excluded
from the Torquay negotiations.

EXAMINATION OF TRADE PRACTICES

The Contracting Parties conducted an extensive
survey of the use of quantitative restrictions in
the light of the requirements of the Agreement and
approved two reports on the subject. The first
report consists of a close examination of the
various techniques used in the imposition of quan-
titative restrictions on imports and exports and
suggests specific measures to minimize their harm-
ful effects. The second report considers the dis-
criminatory application of import restrictions per-
mitted by the postwar transitional period arrange-
ments of the Agreement.

Review of Quantitative Restrictions on Imports
and Exports

The final report of the Contracting Parties re-
flected general agreement that, with certain minor
exceptions, the following types of export restric-
tions were inconsistent with the provisions of the
General Agreement :

(a) Those export restrictions used by one coun-

151

try for the purpose of obtaining the relaxation of
another country's import restrictions.

(b) Those export restrictions imposed by one
country to obtain a relaxation of another coun-
try's export restrictions on commodities in short
supply or to obtain an advantage in the procure-
ment from another country of such commodities.

(c) Restrictions imposed by a country on the
export of raw materials in order to protect a do-
mestic fabricating industry.

(d) Export restrictions used by a coimtry to
avoid price competition among its exporters.

On the import side, the Contracting Parties
agreed that every effort should be made to mini-
mize the incidental protective effect resulting from
the imposition of quantitative restrictions even
where those restrictions were imposed legitimately
for balance-of-payments reasons. The report sug-
gested several methods of accomplishing this ob-
j ecti ve. It urged members to avoid encouragement
of investment in enterprises which could not sur-
vive without protection when the balance-of-pay-
ments justification for such protection has disap-
peared. The report also urged the members to take
every opportunity to impress upon producers, re-
ceivmg incidental protection from balance-of-pay-
ments restrictions, the temporary nature of the
restrictions. It asked countries to administer such
restrictions as are necessary on a flexible basis and
to adjust them to changing circumstances. The
report agreed that where quotas are necessary,
they should preferably be unallocated and should
apply without discrimination to as many countries
as possible.

The report cited certain instances of the misuse
of import restrictions :

(a) Maintenance by a country of balance-of-
payments restrictions which give priority to im-
ports of particular products on the basis of the
competitiveness or noncompetitiveness of such im-
ports with a domestic industry.

(b) The imposition by a country of administra-
tive obstacles to the full utilization of import
quotas in order to afford protection to a domestic
industry.

(c) The use of import restrictions as a means of
retaliation against a country which has refused
to conclude a bilateral trade agreement with the
country concerned.

The report also recommended that each con-
tracting party review its system of import and
export restrictions in the light of the report and
that officials responsible for the administration of
quantitative restrictions and those engaged in
negotiating bilateral agreements be made familiar
with the conclusions reached.

Discriminatory Application of Import
Restrictions

The Contracting Parties examined the docu-
mentation submitted on the discriminatory appli-

cation of import restrictions under the transitional
arrangements of article XIV and annex J of the
Agreement and prepared the first in a series of
annual reports required by the provisions of para-
graph 1 (g) of article XIV. The report is based
on information received from 20 countries which
are applying import restrictions under these tran-
sitional arrangements. It indicates that although
many countries have made rapid strides in elim-
inating their balance-of-payments difficulties, they
have not yet been able to earn the amounts of hard
currencies which their importers would desire to
expend under a regime of nondiscriminatory im-
portation. They have, therefore, had to conserve
their hard-currency earnings for essential imports
while, at the same time, allowing their importers
a relatively greater degree of freedom with respect
to purchases in the soft-currency areas.

Because the Agreement contemplates that rela-
tive prices shall still be an important factor in
determining the source of imports, even in the case
of countries permitted to discriminate as between
hard- and soft-currency areas, close examination
was made of the administrative devices used to
implement this objective.

The Contracting Parties also considered the
effect of bilateral agreements on trade patterns.
They concluded that although devaluation and in-
creased production had done much to minimize the
effect of bilateral agreements, a danger existed that
such arrangements, together with the relatively
high prices prevailing in certain soft-currency
areas, might attract exports that would otherwise
have been sent to dollar markets and assisted in
easing balance-of-payments difficulties.

The Contracting Parties also utilized informa-
tion obtained during the examination of individual
countries' import restrictions to determine which
countries should be invited to consult at the next
session with respect to intensifications in their im-
poi"t programs. The most important members in
this category are the sterling area countries, which,
in July 1949, agreed to attempt to reduce their
dollar imports by 25 percent below the 1948 level.
Australia, Ceylon, Chile, India, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, and the United
Kingdom were invited to consult at the fifth
session.

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